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ABSTRACT 
The problem being researched in the current study is the audit reforms in Vietnam, in particular 
the Law on External Audit (2011). The current research attempts to identify the government’s 
motivations for the introduction of the Law on External Audit (2011) and how the audit reforms 
in the Law affect audit firms and auditors’ practice in a developing country, Vietnam.  
The Law replaced the previous auditing legal framework, introducing substantial reforms to 
regulations for external audit. Importantly, changes were made to the sanction provisions for 
violations, and the inspection regime changed from being self-regulated to government-
regulated. In addition, this Law introduced new requirements for the audit of the financial 
statements of public utility entities.  
The current thesis adopts a qualitative method. This thesis utilizes a triangulation method for 
data collection, which consists of interviews, archival records and secondary data. This study 
utilizes the thematic analysis approach for data analysis. 
The major findings of the research are as follows. First, the internal motivation for the 
introduction of the Law by the Vietnamese government was to serve the public interest. The 
government’s external motivation was a result of the coercive pressures imposed by international 
organizations such as the World Trade Organization and World Bank. Second, the findings 
indicate that a significant number of small and medium-size audit firms have negatively 
responded to the new requirements for the audit of financial statements of public utility entities. 
A large number of research participants believe that the new conditions for conducting audit of 
public interest entities have resulted in an increase in audit market concentration in the public 
market. 
In terms of the requirement for audit partner rotation, a number of audit firms regardless of size 
also oppose the requirement of audit partner rotation. Interestingly, most participants in the 
research concur that compliance with the audit partner rotation requirement in appearance is 
common in the Vietnamese context. The results indicate a severe compromise of audit 
independence in this country. 
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Audit firms, especially the non-Big Four firms, have made significant changes in response to the 
audit reforms. Small audit firms use mergers and increase their resources in response to the new 
regulations regarding the conditions for establishment of audit firms. Medium-sized audit firms 
also use consolidations as strategies in order to comply with the new conditions for conducting 
audits of public interest entities.  However, some of these firms change in appearance only in 
order to appear to satisfy these requirements. There are consolidations in appearance and renting 
audit certificates to meet the requirements of the reform.  
According to the participants, auditors’ practices have also been significantly influenced by the 
audit reforms. However, these audit reforms notably affected the practice of non-Big Four 
auditors rather than that of Big-Four auditors. There is a concurrence among non-Big Four 
auditors regarding the increased audit workload, the enhancement in audit documentation, and 
audit quality. In addition, non-Big Four auditors produce fewer qualified audit reports than prior 
to the audit reforms. These changes are attributed to the change in the sanction provisions, the 
change in inspection regime, the force of law auditing standards, and the change in audit opinion 
regulation. However, a notable number of non-Big Four auditors concur that their changes in 
audit practice are mainly with the audit of pubic clients. A significant number of these auditors 
confirm that the audit practice of non-public clients does not change in reality. 
This thesis makes a distinctive contribution to the auditing literature in developing countries 
through the use of a qualitative method, the application of Oliver (1991)’s framework to gain 
insights into the strategic behaviours adopted by various external audit firms in response to 
institutional pressures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       v   
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AASC  Accounting and Auditing Service Company  
ACCA  Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
AICPA  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASIC  Australian Securities and Investments Commission  
AUASB  Auditing and Assurance Standards Board  
CLERP 9  Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 2004 
CPAB  Canadian Public Accountability Board  
GAAS  Generally Accepted Auditing Standards  
GAAP  Generally Accepted Accounting Principles  
GAO  US General Accounting Office 
CPA  Certified Public Accountants 
EC  European Commission  
IAS  International Accounting Standards  
IFRS  International Financial Reporting Standards  
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
HHI  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
MOF  Ministry of Finance  
OFT  Office of Fair Trading 
PCAOB  Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
 
 
       vi   
SEC  US Securities and Exchange Commission 
SOX  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
SSC  State Securities Commission of Vietnam 
VACO  Vietnam Auditing Company 
VACPA  Vietnam Association of Certified Public Accountants  
WB  World Bank 
WTO  World Trade Organization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       vii   
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: The current auditing legal framework…………………………………………………..8 
Table 1: Types of triangulation…………………………………………………………………..89 
Table 2: Groups of respondents………………………………………………………………….96 
Table 3: Profiles of interview respondents………………………………………………………97 
Table 4: Interviewee’s background information………………………………………………..100 
Table 5: Profiles of seven respondents involved in both main and follow-up interviews……...103 
Table 6: A list of strategies used to enhance the validity of qualitative research………………110 
Table 7: Responses from main interviews (chapter 6)………………………………………….202 
Table 8: Responses from follow-up interviews (chapter 6)…………………………………….203 
Table 9: Responses from main interviews (chapter 7)…………………………………………249 
Table 10: Responses from follow-up interviews (chapter 7)…………………………………...250 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       viii   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION………………………………………………………………………………….i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT………………………………………………………………………...ii 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………...iii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………….v 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES…………………………………………………………….vii 
TABLES OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………………...viii 
LIST OF APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………..xiii 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….1 
1.1 Research Problem and Research Background………………………………………………...1 
1.2  Research Motivation……………………………………………………………………….....9 
1.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions ………………………………………………10 
1.4 Research Scope and Methodology…………………………………………………………...11 
1.5 Research contribution………………………………………………………………………..12 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis …………………………………………………………………..15 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………………..18 
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….18 
2.2 Definition of regulations …………………………………………………………………….18 
2.3 Audit reforms and the motivations for the introduction of the audit reforms ………………19 
2.4 Audit reforms and audit market concentration……………………………………………....27 
2.5 Audit reforms and consolidation of audit firms……………………………………………...34 
2.6 Audit firms’ changes in response to audit reforms…………………………………………..35 
  2.6.1 Audit firms’ reactions to audit partner rotation requirement……………………………..37 
  2.6.2 Audit firms’ reactions and changes towards the annual transparency report requirement 40 
2.7 The impacts of audit reforms on audit quality…………………………………………….....43 
  2.7.1 Definition of audit quality………………………………………………………………...43 
       ix   
  2.7.2 Impacts of audit reforms on audit quality………………………………………………...45 
  2.7.3 Inspection regime and audit quality………………………………………………………47 
2.8 The impacts of audit reforms on issuing audit opinions……………………………………..51 
2.9 The impacts of audit regulations on auditors’ performance…………………………………53 
2.10 Audit firm size and audit quality…………………………………………….......................56 
2.11 Vietnam in brief and prior studies on accounting and auditing ……………………………58 
2.12 Conclusion…………………………………………….........................................................63 
CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK………………………………………………65 
3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..65 
3.2 Public interest theory of regulation…………………………………………………………..65 
  3.2.1 Public Interest theory of regulation………………………………………………………65 
  3.2.2 The adoption of Public Interest theory of regulation in the accounting and auditing     
literature………………………………………………………………………………………….69 
  3.2.3 Using Public Interest theory of regulation as a framework of the current study…………73 
3.3 Institutional theory…………………………………………………………………………...74 
  3.3.1 Isomorphism……………………………………………………………………………...75 
  3.3.2 Decoupling………………………………………………………………………………..76 
  3.3.3 Oliver (1991)’s framework……………………………………………………………….77 
  3.3.4 The adoption of Institutional Theory in accounting research…………………………….78 
  3.3.5 Using Institutional Theory as a framework of the current study…………………………83 
3.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………...84 
CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS ……………………………………85 
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….85 
4.2 Theoretical Stance of Research………………………………………………………………85 
4.3 Research Methods. …………………………………………………………………………..88 
       x   
  4.3.1 Data collection……………………………………………………………………………88 
  4.3.2 Data analysis…………………………………………………………………………….106 
4.4 Reliability and validity checks……………………………………………………………...110 
4.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….113 
CHAPTER V: THE MOTIVATIONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE LAW……….115 
5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………115 
5.2 Audit regulations before the introduction of the Law on External Audit………………….116 
5.3 Recent Audit reforms in Vietnam…………………………………………………………..117 
5.4 The motivation of the introduction of the Law on External Audit……………………….. 118 
  5.4.1 To fix inefficiencies in the audit market………………………………………………...118 
  5.4.2 To fulfil Vietnam’s international commitments………………………………………...142 
5.5 The motivation for the introduction of major reforms in the Law…………………………147 
  5.5.1 The reform of the establishment of accounting firms…………………………………...147 
  5.5.2 The reform of the conditions for audit of public interest entities……………………….149 
  5.5.3 The new requirement of audit firm’s transparency……………………………………...151 
  5.5.4 The new requirement of audit partner rotation………………………………………….153 
  5.5.5 The sanctions provisions to deal with violations, the change in inspection regime…….154 
  5.5.6 The new requirement for the audit opinion……………………………………………..156 
5.6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….162 
CHAPTER VI: HOW HAVE ACCOUNTING FIRMS REACTED TO THE REFORMS? 
WHAT CHANGES HAVE THEY MADE IN RESPONSE TO THE AUDIT 
REFORMS?…………………………………………………………………………………….164 
6.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………164 
6.2 Small audit firms’ responses to the new condition for operating audit firms ……………...164 
  6.2.1 Mergers between small audit firms……………………………………………………...165 
  6.2.2 Increase in the resources of small audit firms…………………………………………..167 
  6.2.3 Changes in appearance of small audit firms…………………………………………….168 
       xi   
  6.2.4 Summary and discussion………………………………………………………………..171 
6.3 Small and medium audit firms’ responses to the Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC …………….172 
  6.3.1 Resistance to change by small and medium-sized audit firms………………………….172 
  6.3.2 Merger between audit firms……………………………………………………………..178 
  6.3.3 Audit market concentration……………………………………………………………..180 
  6.3.4 Summary and discussion………………………………………………………………..183 
6.4 Reluctance of audit firms to publish annual transparent report…………………………….188 
6.5 Audit firms’ responses to the audit partner rotation requirements…………………………192 
  6.5.1 Acceptance of the current requirement of audit partner rotation………………………..192 
  6.5.2 Opposition to the current requirement of audit partner rotation………………………...194 
  6.5.3 Compliance with the requirement of audit partner rotation in appearance……………...198 
  6.5.4 Summary and discussion………………………………………………………………..200 
6.6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….204 
CHAPTER VII: THE IMPACTS OF THE LAW ON AUDIT PRACTICE…………………206 
7. 1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….206 
7.2 The changes in auditors’ practice in response to the change in the sanction provision and the 
new inspection regime………………………………………………………………………….206 
  7.2.1 Audit effort………………………………………………………………………...........207 
  7.2.2 Audit documentation……………………………………………………………………221 
  7.2.3 Audit quality…………………………………………………………………………….225 
  7.2.4 Summary and discussion……………………………………………………………….227 
7.3 The new audit opinion requirement and audit practice…………………………………….235 
  7.3.1 The reduction in the number of qualified audit reports…………………………………235 
  7.3.2 More audit procedures………………………………………………………………….238 
  7.3.3 Audit quality…………………………………………………………………………….243 
       xii   
  7.3.4 Summary and discussion………………………………………………………………..246 
7.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….251 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………253 
8.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………253 
8.2 Key findings………………………………………………………………………………...253 
8.3 Contributions……………………………………………………………………………….256 
8.4 Limitations………………………………………………………………………………….258 
8.5 Future research recommendations………………………………………………………….258 
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………………260 
APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………………….282 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       xiii   
LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interview questions for pilot interviews 
Appendix 2: Interview questions of main interviews 
Appendix 3: Interview Protocol 
Appendix 4: Interview questions (follow-up interviews) 
Appendix 5: The list of codes 
Appendix 6: List of themes and subthemes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       1   
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Problem and Research Background 
Assurance service is defined as “an engagement in which an assurance practitioner expresses a 
conclusion designed to enhance the degree of confidence of the intended users other than the 
responsible party about the outcome of the evaluation or measurement of a subject matter against 
criteria”. One of the most common types of assurance services is external audit of financial 
statements. The purpose of external audit of financial statements is to express an opinion about 
whether the financial reports are prepared in all material aspects in accordance with a financial 
reporting framework (Moroney, Campbell and Hamilton, 2014). 
External audit plays a crucial role in a market economy. The external audit of an enterprise’s 
financial statements is an essential service to investors, creditors, and other participants in the 
market economy. External audit permits creditors, bankers, shareholders and others to utilize 
financial statements with confidence, since auditors present a true and fair view of a company’s 
financial statements in compliance with accounting and auditing standards (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia, 2008, Khlif and Samaha, 2014). Kimmance (1981) states that the 
authorities request external audit not only to examine the fiscal regularity of accounting, but also 
to determine the possibilities of loss as a consequence of waste, fiscal management inefficiency, 
errors or other factors. The current audit environment emphasizes the external auditors’ 
responsibilities to detect and deter fraud (Patterson & Smith, 2007).  Furthermore, in light of the 
recent global financial crisis, regulators have come to see audit as an effective tool to help 
prevent or provide warning of financial institutions’ collapse in the future (BPP Learning Media, 
2012). High quality audit is crucial for well-functioning capital markets. Without high-quality 
audits, managers may incur higher agency cost (Smith, 2012).  
At the elementary level, audit regulation is needed to ensure continuing trust in auditors and the 
way they exercise professional auditing judgment. This reliance on regulation is due to its 
offering an independent examination of auditing performance (Humphrey, Kausar, Loft, & 
Woods, 2011). Laws and regulations also promulgate the role and position of auditors, and 
influence the functioning of audit markets. The legal environment of audit is pivotal since it can 
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provide both incentives and disincentives to auditors to execute meaningful audit (Favere-
Marchesi, 2000). Hence, the interest in the audit regulatory reforms has been ongoing for many 
years (Beattie, Fearnley, & Hines, 2013). 
Everything in the auditing profession appeared to be going well until the significant fall in the 
stock markets in 2002. In 2005, the auditing profession looked quite bleak.
1
 The collapse of 
companies such as Enron, WorldCom in the US, HIH Insurance and Onetel in Australia, and 
Parmalat in Italy resulted in a loss of investor confidence in the system of financial reporting. 
The unprecedented dissolution of Arthur Andersen caused the public loss of trust in the 
accounting profession. Corporate collapses around the world have attracted much media 
attention, placing in doubt the adequacy of regulations to improve audit quality (Hossain, 2013). 
Hence, there have been significant audit reforms in both developed countries such as in the US, 
the UK and Australia and developing countries, such as in China and South Africa after the 
corporate collapses. The corporate collapses and audit failures resulted in the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on 30 July 2002 in the US and the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program 9 (CLERP 9) on 25 June 2004 in Australia (Hossain, 2013). Policy makers 
around the world set out to tighten audit regulations (Eberlea & Lauter, 2011). 
Since the introduction of audit reforms were introduced, there have been ongoing debates 
regarding their impact on the auditing profession around the world. A number of research studies 
show that the audit reforms have had a positive influence on the auditing profession (McGowan, 
2014, Hossain, 2013, DeFond and Lennox, 2011, Hermanson and Houston, 2009, Carcello, 
Hollingsworth, and Mastrolia, 2011). The SOX of 2002 has changed the structure of the audit 
market and affected audit quality for the better. There has been a decrease in the number of small 
audit firms, and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections have 
improved audit quality by easing lower quality auditors out of the audit market (DeFond & 
Lennox, 2011). Similarly, PCAOB has been credited with replacing what was merely the self-
regulation of audit firms, and audit quality has also improved (Mont, 2012). SOX  legislation has 
increased auditors’ liability, which leads to a decrease in audit failure (Deng, Melumad, & 
Shibano, 2012). 
                                                          
1 Dan A. Simunic, “Discussion of Twenty‐Five Years of Audit Deregulation and Re‐Regulation: What Does it Mean for 2005 and Beyond?,” 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 24, no. s-1 (2005): 112. 
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However, there are other points of view about the impacts of the audit reforms on the auditing 
profession. Simunic (2005) states that some sections of SOX seem to cause trouble, including the 
concentration of auditing standard established by a few PCAOB staff members and the benefits 
versus the costs of public reporting on companies’ internal controls. Similarly, Willekens, 
Turley, and Quick (2008) conducted a study of the audit regulations in Europe and conclude that 
audit regulations may have unintended consequences, encouraging game-playing by those being 
regulated, rather than stimulating innovation in audit. The profession and academics have called 
for future research to identify the impacts of SOX and PCAOB on the market participants in the 
US (Daugherty & Tervo, 2010). Defond and Francis (2005), Nelson (2006), and DeFond (2010) 
have called for research to determine whether the reforms of institutional environments 
responsible for supervising audit firms have provided benefits. Hence, more studies are needed to 
investigate the impacts of the audit regulatory reforms on the auditing profession. 
 The problem being researched in the current study is the audit reforms in Vietnam, in particular 
the Law on External Audit (2011) (It is also termed as the Law on Independent Audit (2011)). 
The current research attempts to identify the government’s motivations for the introduction of 
the Law on External Audit (2011) and how the Law affects audit firms and auditors’ practice in a 
developing country, Vietnam. 
Vietnam is a medium-sized nation in the South East region of Asia (Dang, Marriott, & Marriott, 
2006). Politically, Vietnam is a one-party socialist state where the Communist Party is a 
dominant force (Bui, 2011b). Although Vietnam has adopted various economic liberalizations in 
recent years, it is one of the few countries where the Communist Party has continued to maintain 
political control (Doan & Nguyen, 2013).  
Vietnam is a developing country that adopted a centrally-planned economic system prior to 
economic reforms. Recently, successful economic reforms have been made to the market 
economy (Dang, Marriott, & Marriott, 2006). The economic reforms, namely “Doi Moi”, in 
1986 led to the decentralization of the state-owned enterprises and an increase in foreign 
investment (Dang et al., 2006, Doan and Nguyen, 2013). The Vietnamese economy has achieved 
considerable improvements during the past two decades or so. The Gross Domestic Product 
growth was 7.2 per cent in the first decade of the 21st century (Phan, 2014). Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has played a crucial role in the economic development of Vietnam. Vietnam 
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ranks in the top 15 most attractive economies for FDI around the world (Bui, 2011b). FDI 
inflows were around US$11.5 billion and $10 billion in 2008 and 2009, respectively (Doan & 
Nguyen, 2013). 
Since the transition of the Vietnamese economy to a market-oriented economy and the 
government promulgated policies to attract foreign investment, the demand for external audit 
services has increased rapidly (Ha, 2009). The establishment of the external auditing profession 
was a response to the economic needs of the country and was also intended for tax collection 
purposes. The Vietnamese external audit commenced in 1991 when the two audit companies, 
Vietnam Auditing Company (VACO) and Accounting and Auditing Service Company (AASC) 
were first established on 13 May 1991.
2
 Since then, this profession has developed significantly 
(Pham, Amaria, Bui, & Tran, 2014). Following the establishment of the Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi 
Stock Exchanges in the early 2000s, the auditing profession has grown exponentially to meet the 
demand for external audit of public interest entities. The revenue across the profession has 
increased at an annual rate of 20 percent over the past ten years (The World Bank, 2013). As of 
31 December 2012, there were over 1,200 Vietnamese CPA holders with registered practices. 
The Vietnam Association of Certified Public Accountants (VACPA), a professional auditing 
body, was set up in 2005. Moreover, there is also the presence of international professional 
bodies - the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) from 1996 and the 
Certified Public Accountants (CPA) Australia from 2006 (Phan, 2014). External audit in 
Vietnam plays a pivotal role in creating and maintaining an attractive, transparent investment 
environment which attracts investment, especially foreign investment. As the stock exchange 
market is growing in Vietnam, the importance of external audit is emphasized (Dang, 2010).  
Vietnam is a communist, civil law country, promulgating civil codes based on East German 
models and a European-continental criminal process (Costa & Zolo, 2007). The regulation 
reforms, particularly audit regulatory reforms, have played a pivotal role in boosting the 
economic development in Vietnam recently (IMF, 2007). Vietnam has been a member of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1995 and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) since 2007. It has also participated in a number of bilateral trade and investment 
agreements, notably the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement which has been in operation 
                                                          
2 These audit firms were established as state enterprises in 1991. However, they were privatized in 2007. 
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since 2001 (Doan & Nguyen, 2013). The recent laws adopted to unify the regulatory framework 
for domestic and foreign enterprises and to harmonize rules on trading rights, together with the 
prospect of accession, have already bolstered the investment climate in Vietnam (IMF, 2007). 
Vietnam has been undertaking its legal reforms so as to attract foreign investment and satisfy the 
lending requirements of international financial institutions (Chu, 2004). Vietnam’s first stock 
exchange, the Ho Chi Minh City Securities Trading Center, was built in 2000. From 2006, 
capital markets have grown rapidly, with over 600 companies listed on the country’s two stock 
exchanges. The rapid development of the stock market has been supported by equally rapid 
reforms of the legal and regulatory frameworks (The World Bank, 2013). 
In spite of the importance of external audit in Vietnam, the external audit market was considered 
to have a range of shortcomings in this country. In the past, the audit environment in Vietnam 
was characterized by low audit quality, and poor compliance with rules and auditing standards, 
especially by local audit firms (Pham, Amaria, Bui, & Tran, 2014). Auditors’ technical 
efficiency in Vietnam did not meet the requirements of international economic integration (Phan, 
2014). More importantly, there was a lack of a system to monitor and oversee audit activities. 
Moreover, audit quality depended too much on accounting firms. The competitive methods, 
namely cutting down fees, or paying auditors according to revenues, and so on, had 
compromised public confidence in the audit results. The size of the audit market in Vietnam was 
still small partly due to businesses’ voluntary demands for audit being minimal. Furthermore, 
public knowledge of external audit is still limited. Users of financial statements do not routinely 
use audit services. A number of businesses just need audit reports to meet compulsory 
requirements with little concern for the value and quality of the audit (Pham, Amaria, Bui, & 
Tran, 2014). In addition, audit independence in Vietnam was often compromised. In Vietnam, 
the Board of Directors appointed auditors and no approval of the appointment is requested. The 
liability of statutory audit was not big enough and sanction provisions were non-punitive 
(Favere-Marchesi, 2000). The major reasons for these flaws in the Vietnamese audit market were 
due to the lack of a comprehensive auditing legal framework, including both inadequate 
monitoring of compliance and shortcomings of the Decrees. 
Despite the crucial role that audit regulations play in the Vietnamese economy, the auditing legal 
framework before the Law on External Audit (2011) was considered to be weak.  The legal and 
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regulatory framework in Vietnam, as in other transitional countries, is considered to be limited in 
scope, to lack stringency, and have general terms (Dang, Marriott, & Marriott, 2006). Previous 
studies show that developed markets often protect investors better than developing ones due to a 
stronger auditing legal framework and auditors’ greater concerns about litigation and regulation 
risks (Shimin, Sun, & Donghui, 2010). The lack of professional sanctions could lead to 
violations of professional standards and regulations, thereby creating audit markets of uneven 
quality.
3
 Auditors in Vietnam did not face both regulation sanctions and litigation risks which 
would prompt them to improve audit quality. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) conducted 
inspections of accounting firms in Vietnam from 1999 to 2005. However, from 2006 to 2010, the 
MOF transferred their inspection work to the VACPA. These VACPA’s inspections of 
accounting firms still had deficiencies; they could not monitor audit firms and auditors 
rigorously, and this affected audit quality (MOF, 2010). The VACPA faced difficulties in 
fulfilling its obligations due to insufficient resources, and a lack of independence. The VACPA 
inspected the work of their-own members. The inspections by the VACPA were considered as 
non-punitive, and therefore did not deter audit firms and auditors from violating auditing 
standards and rules (MOF, 2010). Pham et al. (2014) also show that the lack of controls and 
oversight by state authorities and professional organizations also have influenced the audit 
quality in the country.  
Before the Law on External Audit (2011) was enacted, the auditing profession in Vietnam was 
regulated by several Decrees, including the Decree 105/2004/ND-CP date 30
th
, March, 2004 and 
the Decree 133/2005/ND-CP date 31
st
, October, 2005. These Decrees were considered to have a 
range of deficiencies as stated above. The most recent change in regulation on external audit is 
the Law on External Audit (2011). The enactment of the Law on External Audit (2011) in 
Vietnam is a significant audit reform. The passage of the Law is an important milestone in the 
auditing profession. Hence, it is important to investigate the influence of the Law, a significant 
audit reform, on the auditing profession in Vietnam. 
In the context of Vietnam, there are significant differences between the Law and the Decrees. 
The Law was established by the National Assembly. The National Assembly is the highest body 
                                                          
3
 Michael Favere-Marchesi, “Audit Quality in ASEAN,” International Journal of Accounting 35, no. 1 (2000): 148. 
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of state power of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the sole body with constitutional and 
legislative rights. The Law was adopted with a supreme legal force in the external auditing field.  
 The Decree 105/2004/ND-CP date 30
th
, March, 2004 and the Decree 133/2005/ND-CP date 31
st
, 
October, 2005 were produced by the Prime Minister of the government. The Government is the 
executive organ of the National Assembly, and the supreme state administrative agency of the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The Government is accountable to the National Assembly. 
These Decrees identified important issues in the external auditing field which were not mature 
enough to be developed into Law. In the context of Vietnam, when a profession is new, the 
Government often issues a Decree as a temporary legal document to regulate this profession. 
When the profession develops and expands quickly and has a range of issues that need to be 
regulated strictly, the National Assembly will establish a Law, which has greater legal force, to 
displace the Decree.  
After the Law on External Audit was enacted, the Decree 105/2004/ND-CP date 30
th
, March, 
2004 and the Decree 133/2005/ND-CP date 31
st
, October, 2005 were displaced. The current 
framework of regulations governing the external audit activities is illustrated in Figure 1. At the 
highest level, the Law on External Audit was passed by the National Assembly on 29
th
, March, 
2011. The second level in the audit regulations are the Decrees issued by the Prime Minister of 
the government. These Decrees provide detailed guidelines on the implementation of the Law on 
External Audit (2011). These Decrees consist of the Decree 105/2013/ND-CP date 16
th
, 
September, 2013; the Decree 17/2012/ND-CP, date 13th, March, 2012. At the third level is a set of 
auditing standards enacted at the ministerial decision level. The MOF is responsible for issuing 
the auditing standards. Finally, the MOF frequently produces circulars, which have a lower level 
in the regulatory hierarchy than do ministerial decisions, to offer additional guidance or further 
clarification related to provisions in legal documents issued at the above three levels (Doan & 
Nguyen, 2013). 
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Figure 1: The current auditing legal framework (Adapted from (Doan & Nguyen, 2013)) 
The Law is adopted with the supreme legal force of the legal system in the auditing field of 
Vietnam. This Law refers to both the private sector and the general public. The Law applies to 
the auditors, auditing firms, branches of foreign audit firms in Vietnam, the audit clients, 
auditing professional organizations and other organizations, individuals related to the activities 
of external audit. There have been profound reforms of regulations on external audit since the 
Law was promulgated, including: (a) new requirements for establishment of an audit firm 
including the requirement to have at least five practising auditors and to meet the condition of 
legal capital (in the context of Vietnam, “legal capital” (vốn pháp định) is defined as the 
minimum amount of capital required by laws for the establishment of an enterprise engaging in 
certain conditional business); (b) new requirements for audit of financial statements of public 
utility entities; (c) the new requirement of audit partner rotation; (d) the requirement for audit 
firms to publish annual transparent reports; (e) the change in the sanction provisions for 
violation; (f) the transformation of the inspection regime from the VACPA to the MOF and SSC; 
and (g) new requirements for audit opinion. The Law came into effect on 1
st
, January, 2012. 
It is important to identify the Vietnamese government’s motivations for the introduction of the 
Law and the impacts of the Law on audit firms and auditors’ practice. This thesis takes into 
consideration the views of four different accounting stakeholder groups in Vietnam (the 
The Law on External Audit 
Issued by the National Assembly 
The Prime Ministerial Decrees 
The auditing standards 
issued by the MOF 
The Circulars issued by 
the MOF 
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regulators of the auditing profession, representatives from the professional body, auditors from 
Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms, and audit clients) on these issues.   
1.2 Research Motivation 
The current study is motivated by several factors.  Firstly, Vietnam presents an interesting case 
study in terms of its economy and political system. Vietnam is emerging as a crucial market and 
geopolitical player in the Southeast Asia region. Vietnam had lost several decades of 
development and lagged behind its neighbours due to the Vietnam War (1945-1975) (Phan, 
Mascitelli, & Barut, 2013). However, this country has a rapidly growing economy, recently 
expanding its international trades and investments. It is a developing economy, which is well on 
its way transitioning from a central planned economy to a market-oriented economy. Hence, its 
experiences in regulatory frameworks may be relevant to other developing and/or transitional 
economies in their attempts to obtain faster and smoother economic development. In addition, 
Vietnam is one of the few countries where the Communist Party has continued to maintain 
political control (Doan & Nguyen, 2013). 
Secondly, the study is motivated by the pivotal role that external audit and audit regulatory 
reforms currently play in the Vietnamese economy. The regulation reforms, particularly audit 
regulatory reforms, have played a pivotal role in boosting the economic development in Vietnam 
by creating more favourable and more transparent investment environment (IMF, 2007). Hence, 
the problem being researched is the audit reform, a significant issue in the context of Vietnam. 
Thirdly, the study is also motivated by the unique characteristics of the audit environment in 
Vietnam before the adoption of the Law as presented above. The audit quality was poor and the 
unfair competitive edge gained by reducing audit fees was common in the audit market.  The 
flaws in the audit market were attributed to an inadequate auditing legal framework. Hence, it is 
crucial to investigate what motivated the Vietnamese government to introduce the Law and 
whether or not the Law, which is a reform of the auditing legal framework, can rectify these 
flaws in the audit market. Unfortunately, little is known about these issues.   
Fourthly, this study is also motivated by the lack of research on audit reforms and their impacts 
on the auditing profession in developing countries. Studies on audit reforms are usually 
conducted in developed countries rather than developing countries. In particular, in Vietnam 
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there have been few studies on auditing and to date there has been no study focusing on audit 
regulatory reforms and their impacts on the auditing profession in Vietnam. In addition, most 
studies have been conducted by using quantitative methods rather than qualitative methods (see 
Chapter 2).  
1.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
As previously emphasized, the enactment of the Law is an important milestone for the auditing 
profession in Vietnam and therefore it is important to acquire a comprehensive understanding of 
the motivations and the impacts of the audit reforms in the Law. The audit reforms (a-d, page 8) 
that are expected to influence the auditing at the firm level comprise: the new requirement that 
the establishment of an audit firm requires at least five practising auditors and must meet the 
condition of the legal capital; the new requirements for audit of financial statements of public 
utility entities; the new requirement of audit partner rotation; and the requirement for audit firms 
to publish transparency reports. In addition, the audit reforms (e-g, page 8) that potentially 
influence individual auditors’ practice level comprise: changes in the sanction provisions of 
violation; the transformation of the inspection regime from the VACPA to the MOF and State 
Securities Commission (SSC); and the new requirements for audit opinion. The details of these 
audit reforms are presented in Section 5.5, chapter 5. 
This research aims to report on the perceptions of regulatory bodies, professional bodies, audit 
firms and audit clients in relation to the audit reforms in the Law on External audit after more 
than four years of adoption in Vietnam. Specifically, its objectives are: 
1. To explore the major reasons why the Vietnamese government promulgated the Law on 
External Audit. 
2. To identify the audit firms’ reactions and changes in response to the audit reforms (a-d) in the 
Law, at the audit firm level. 
3. To investigate the impacts of the audit reforms (e-g) on the audit practice, at the individual 
auditor level. 
The researcher develops arguments based on a theoretical framework derived from public 
interest theory and institutional theory. Public interest theory will be used to identify the internal 
motivations that led the Vietnamese government to introduce the Law. The concept of coercive 
pressure in the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) will be utilized to find the 
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factors outside the Vietnamese jurisdiction shape change in the audit regulations in Vietnam. The 
following research question is posed: 
RQ1: What has motivated the Vietnamese government to introduce the Law on External Audit?  
 In addition, the researcher also adopts an institutional framework, particularly the aspects of 
isomorphism, decoupling (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and strategic 
behaviors that organizations can adopt to react to institutional rules in order to analyze the 
reactions of accounting firms and individual auditors to the institutional pressures and their 
changes to respond to these pressures (Oliver, 1991). The following research questions are 
posed: 
RQ2: How do accounting firms react to the audit reforms? What changes have accounting firms 
made in response to the audit reforms? 
RQ3: How do the audit reforms impact on auditors’ practice? 
1.4 Research Scope and Methodology 
The country investigated in this thesis is Vietnam. The thesis focuses on the audit reforms in 
Vietnam and their impacts on the auditing profession in this country. Research participants 
include government officers from the MOF and SSC; representatives from the VACPA; partners, 
managers and senior auditors of audit firms; and chief accountants of audit clients. The 
interviews with these participants were conducted twice. The first round of interviews was 
conducted from July to October 2014. The second round of interviews was conducted from 
December 2015 to January 2016. 
Experienced representatives from MOF, SSC and the VACPA have offered meaningful insights 
into the government’s motivations for the introduction of the Law as well as its impacts on the 
auditing profession. Partners, managers have knowledge of their audit firms’ reactions and 
changes following the reforms in the Law. Experienced partners, managers and senior auditors 
have been involved in the entire audit process and therefore can provide insights into the ways in 
which the audit reforms in the Law impact on audit practice. Partners, managers, senior auditors 
represent four kinds of audit firms. 
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Following Lee (2010), the supplier in the audit market in Taiwan is divided into four parts: Big 
Four firms, large audit firms, medium audit firms and small audit firms. The audit firms in this 
current study are also divided into four parts: Big Four firms, other large audit firms, medium 
audit firms and small audit firms. The Big Four firms are clearly defined as Deloitte, Ernst 
&Young, KPMG and Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Other large audit firms are those without Big 
Four firms which have more than one hundred employees with more than twenty practicing 
auditors, such as AASC, A &C, AAC, DTL, BDO, Grant Thornton, and UHY ACA. Medium 
audit firms often have from fifty to fewer than one hundred employees with from ten to fewer 
than twenty practicing auditors, such as AVA, CPA Hanoi, and AS.  All other audit firms are 
classified as small audit firms (VACPA, 2012). 
The current thesis adopts a qualitative method. This thesis utilizes a triangulation method for 
data collection, which consists of interviews, archival records and secondary data. Participants in 
the current study were selected using the purposive sampling method. Seventy semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews were conducted in two stages. The first stage was from July to October, 
2014 and the second stage was from December, 2015 to January, 2016. The major archival 
records coming from the MOF and VACPA are minute of meetings, reports, and audit 
regulations. The secondary sources of information used for this study consist of published 
articles and information on websites. This study utilizes the thematic analysis approach 
(Boyatzis, 1998, Braun & Clarke, 2006, Marks & Yardley, 2003, Harper & Thompson, 2012) to 
code development in data analysis. 
1.5 Research Contributions 
This thesis makes distinctive contributions to the accounting literature. Firstly, a range of studies 
on audit reforms has been conducted in developed countries and China rather than in other 
developing countries (Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie, 2009, Houghton, Kend, and Jubb, 2013, 
Engebretson, 2006, Brooks, Chalmers, Oliver, and Veljanovski, 2011, Kend, 2004, Zhu and Sun, 
2012, DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999). This thesis offers useful information about the current audit 
reforms in Vietnam that have not been published in the international accounting literature.  
Secondly, the audit market in Vietnam is still new, with a history of around twenty-five years. 
Hence, this thesis contributes to the literature on audit regulations and would be a helpful 
reference for future auditing research in Vietnam (Pham et al., 2014). 
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Thirdly, most audit regulation studies have been conducted by using quantitative methods rather 
than qualitative methods (Benjamin and Ulrike, 2012, DeFond and Lennox, 2011, Zhu and Sun, 
2012, DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999, Hossain, 2013, Wong, 2006). Previous studies, such as 
Engebretson (2006), Brooks, Chalmers, Oliver, and Veljanovski (2011), and Wong (2006) use a 
survey method but do not provide an in-depth understanding about the subject matter. Studies 
using a qualitative method, interview, for example Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009) and 
Houghton, Kend, and Jubb (2013) have smaller numbers of participants. This thesis uses purely 
qualitative methods, including interviews, archival records and secondary data to investigate the 
audit reforms in Vietnam. Seventy semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted. 
Fourthly, this thesis adopts the Oliver (1991)’s framework to identify the reactions and changes 
in response to the audit reforms in the external audit firms context in Vietnam. Previous studies 
such as Albu, Albu, and Alexander (2014) use the Oliver (1991)’s framework in the accounting 
context to illustrate how practices vary with regard to the adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Shapiro and Matson (2008) adopt the institutional concept of 
power, resistance to study the internal control regulation. Auditing studies such as that of Lander, 
Koene, and Linssen (2013) examine how audit firms address changes in their institutional 
environment, but focus only on mid-tier audit firms. Dirsmith, Heian, and Covaleski (1997)’s 
study focuses on Big 6 firms. By using the Oliver (1991)’s framework, this thesis has gained 
insights into the strategic behaviours adopted by various external audit firms in Vietnam in 
response to pressures to comply with changes in the institutional environment, that is, the audit 
regulatory reforms. 
The major findings of the research are as follows. First, the findings show that the public interest 
is the internal motivation of the Vietnamese government for the introduction of the Law. The 
external motivation for this government action comes from the coercive pressures imposed by 
international organizations such as World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Bank (WB). 
Second, the study contributes to the literature on the reactions of audit firms to audit reforms. 
Interviews with partners, managers, and senior auditors of audit firms indicate that a significant 
number of small and medium-size audit firms negatively respond to the new requirements for the 
audit of financial statements of public utility entities. In addition, some audit firms regardless of 
size also oppose the requirement of audit partner rotation. The results show that a notable 
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number of auditors and audit firms merely comply with the requirement of audit partner rotation 
in appearance, indicating a compromise of audit independence is common in the context of 
Vietnam. 
Third, audit firms, especially the local ones, have made significant changes in response to the 
audit reforms. Small audit firms use mergers, raising resources to respond to the new 
requirement to establish audit firms. Medium audit firms also use consolidations as strategies to 
meet the conditions for conducting audits of public interest entities. However, some of these 
firms just merge in appearance in order to meet these requirements. Almost all research 
participants believe that the new conditions for conducting audit of public interest entities have 
resulted in an increase in audit market concentration in the public market. These conditions make 
it difficult for small and medium-size audit firms to enter the public audit market. Large audit 
firms have advantages and gain more market shares than do medium-size and small audit firms 
in the public audit market. In addition, regarding the reform of the annual transparency report, 
interviewees believe that apart from large audit firms, a significant number of audit firms are 
reluctant to publish this kind of report. Therefore, a number of audit firms have tended to publish 
poor quality annual transparency reports in order to meet the minimum requirements.  
Fourth, according to the participants, auditors’ practice of public clients is also notably 
influenced by the audit reforms in terms of audit effort, audit reporting behaviour, audit 
documentation and audit quality. However, these audit reforms significantly affect the practice of 
non-Big Four auditors rather than that of Big-Four auditors. The main reason is that elite 
organizations like Big-Four accounting firms become immune to coercive pressure of the 
Vietnamese audit regulations since their market activities extend beyond the jurisdiction of field-
level regulations in Vietnam. Big Four firms in Vietnam seem to have had greater brand name 
quality prior to the audit reform. Global and regional managers also come to inspect Big Four 
firms in Vietnam annually. In addition, these Big Four firms also have to follow their global firm 
policies and international standards. 
These findings have practical implications for the Vietnamese regulators in the auditing field. 
The findings regarding Research Question 2 (How do accounting firms react to the audit 
reforms?) also offer feedback on the reforms. Interviews with partners, managers, and senior 
auditors of audit firms illustrate that small and medium-size audit firms negatively respond to the 
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new requirements for the audit of financial statements of public utility entities. In addition, a 
notable number of audit firms regardless of size also oppose to the requirement of audit partner 
rotation. The findings may help the Vietnamese regulators to assess the adequacy of the present 
auditing legal framework and may provide guidelines for auditing policy makers when 
developing an audit regulatory framework and improving the auditing profession in the future.  
The results also have implications for audit firms in terms of their future strategies. It is 
suggested that non-Big Four firms, rather than Big Four firms, are significantly affected by the 
audit reforms. According to participants, large audit firms have better advantages and acquire a 
larger share of the market than do medium and small audit firms in the public audit market. In 
addition, since the introduction of the audit reforms, public audit clients have been inclined to 
appoint auditors from large audit firms. The results also show that there is a common trend of 
mergers between audit firms after the enactment of audit reforms. However, the interviewees 
assert that there are difficulties facing audit firms as they consolidate. The results of the current 
study are interest of audit firms which consider consolidations in the future. 
The results show that a significant number of audit firms and auditors merely comply with the 
audit reforms in appearance. The results have implication for the professional body, the VACPA 
in supporting their audit firm members to comply with the audit reforms 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
This chapter introduces the background and the problem of the research, the research objectives, 
the research questions, the research design, and the research contribution. 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on audit regulations, the motivations for the 
introduction of audit regulatory reforms, the impacts of audit reforms at the firm level and at the 
individual auditor practice level. There has been a wide range of prior studies on this subject in 
developed countries since audit reforms, such as the SOX in the US and CLERP 9 in Australia, 
were enacted. These empirical studies were mainly conducted in the US, Australia, UK, and 
other European countries. A much smaller number of studies on this matter have been conducted 
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in developing countries, mainly in China. Chapter 2 discusses the findings of these studies and 
the gaps in the literature are identified. 
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework of the research. It reviews key theories, and the 
main aspects of Public Interest theory of regulation, and the Neo Institutional theory. Chapter 3 
also reviews previous studies on auditing and accounting that adopt these theories as theoretical 
framework. Finally, this chapter explains why these theories should be used to explain the 
findings of the current study. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodological framework of the study. Chapter 4 begins with the 
rationale for choosing the qualitative approach. The next section of this chapter presents the 
methods used for data collection and data analysis. A triangulation method was applied for data 
collection, including interviews, archival records and secondary data. This study employs 
thematic analysis for data analysis. The final section of Chapter 4 describes the techniques used 
to check the reliability and credibility of the results. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings related to the audit reforms in Vietnam and the Vietnamese 
government’s motivations for introducing the audit reforms. Chapter 5 presents the internal 
motivation for the introduction of the Law. The flaws of the audit market in Vietnam were 
attributed to the deficiencies of the previous auditing regulations. Hence, the Law was enacted to 
address the weaknesses of the previous auditing regulations in order to improve a hitherto 
inefficient audit market. The Public Interest theory of regulation was used to explain this finding. 
Chapter 5 also shows that the external motivation for the enactment of the Law came from the 
coercive pressure on the Vietnamese government exerted by international institutions such as 
WTO and ASEAN and foreign investors and lenders such as the WB and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). The coercive isomorphism of Neo Institutional theory was utilized to explain this 
finding.  
Chapter 6 presents the findings associated with the audit firms’ reactions and changes in 
response to the major audit reforms. Chapter 6 presents the audit firms’ reactions and changes to 
respond to major audit reforms separately, containing the new requirement for establishment of 
audit firm; the new requirements for audit of financial statements of public utility entities; the 
new requirement of audit partner rotation; and the requirement for audit firms to publish annual 
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transparent reports. In this chapter, the researcher applies the Oliver (1991) framework to explain 
the findings. 
Chapter 7 presents the findings related to the impacts of the major audit reforms auditors’ 
practice. Chapter 7 commences with the impacts of the greater legal force of the Law, the new 
sanction provisions and the changes in the regime of inspection on the auditors’ practice. This 
chapter also examines the impact of the new requirement regarding audit opinion on the auditors’ 
practice. Two aspects of Institutional theory, isomorphism and decoupling, were employed to 
explain the findings of Chapter 7.  
Chapter 8 provides the summary of findings and conclusions of this research. Chapter 8 also 
discusses the research implications, the limitations of the research, and recommendations for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the literature, including empirical studies related to the 
topic of the current study in order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the study’s 
issues and findings. The review of the literature on audit regulations is conducted to enhance the 
researcher’s understanding of the research gap related to audit regulations in Vietnam and 
theoretical framework, as well as methodologies that have been utilized in previous studies. 
There are several major streams of literature associated with the current study. The first focuses 
on audit regulatory reforms and the motivations for the introduction of such reforms in various 
countries. The second stream of literature focuses on the influence of audit reforms on audit 
firms and the audit market. The third line of literature considers the impacts of audit reforms on 
audit practice. Finally, the researcher summarises the Vietnamese research in brief and identifies 
the research gap. 
2.2 Definition of regulations  
Academics disagree on the meaning of the term ‘regulation’, presenting various divergent views 
regarding its definition.  Baldwin  and  Cave  (1999)  consider  regulation  as  a  discrete  mode  
of government action. The authors define regulation as a particular set of commands like a 
binding set of rules.  However,  Mitnick  (1982)  defines  regulation  as  an  ‘intentional  
restriction  of  a subject’s  choice  of  activity  by  an  entity  not  directly  or  partly  involved  in  
that  activity’.  The author  posits  that  regulation  is  a  procedure  involving  both  public  and  
private  entities:  a  co-regulation procedure. In Puxty, Willmott, Cooper, and Lowe (1987), 
regulation is defined as a combination of market, state and community.  From the perspective of 
the social perceptions of regulation,  regulation  is  a  political  process  with  the  success  of  the  
process  reliant  on  public confidence.  This perception reflects concerns about the environment, 
occupation and safety and so on, advocating a positive view of regulation (Gerboth, 1973). 
The  Oxford  Dictionary  defines  the  term  as  a  ‘prescribed  rule’  or  ‘authoritative  direction’.  
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Similarly,  the  Macquarie  Dictionary  defines  regulation  as  ‘a  rule  of  order,  as  for  conduct, 
prescribed  by  authority;  a  governing  direction  or  law’.  Based  on  the  two  definitions,  
Deegan (2009)  states  that  regulation  is  produced  to  control  or  to  govern  conduct.  
Therefore, when discussing regulation related to accounting, this author refers to rules produced 
by authoritative bodies, comprising the actions of the authoritative bodies. Regulation also 
implies that it is a basis for supervising and enforcing compliance with regulation requirements. 
In this study, the logical role of regulation is to fix the market failures.  Market failure is a 
pivotal catalyst for regulatory intervention (O’Regan, 2010). Regulation is needed when the 
market fails to provide results or behaviour that is in the public interest (Dewing & Russell, 
2004). The state seeks to direct or encourage behaviour which would not occur without such 
intervention with the purpose of rectifying the deficiencies. Where such intervention appears, 
regulation has a directive duty, whether conducted by self-regulatory agencies or public bodies in 
the public interest (Neu and Graham (2005) in O’Regan (2010)). 
2.3 Audit regulatory reforms and the motivations for the introduction of the audit reforms. 
Regulators often intervene in audit markets after high profile audit failures have occurred, as 
market-based incentives and competences are considered to have failed.
4
 (DeFond & Zhang, 
2014). After the corporate collapses and audit failures around the world in recent decades, 
authorities in a large number of countries have revised their accounting and auditing regulations. 
Both developed and developing countries (including Vietnam) follow the global trend of audit 
reforms after the corporate collapses. There have been similar audit reforms between Vietnam 
and other developed and developing countries. 
Amongst developed countries, there has been a range of audit regulatory reforms in the US, the 
UK and Australia. Numerous studies have been conducted to examine these audit reforms and 
the motivations for the reforms in these countries. The researcher mentions the audit reforms, 
SOX in the US and CLERP 9 in Australia since the audit reforms in Vietnam are similar and 
relevant to those in these two countries (the reforms related to inspection regime, audit partner 
rotation, and transparency reports). 
                                                          
4 Mark DeFond and Jieying Zhang, “A review of archival auditing research,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 58, no. 2-3 (2014): 304. 
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The SOX (2002) was implemented by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the 
US for the purpose of improving public confidence in the markets after the audit failures in the 
early 2000 (Houghton et al., 2013). The Act contains several reforms related to external audit. 
Firstly, corporations are forced to ensure that audit committee are undertaken by external 
directors and have at least one member who is a financial expert. Furthermore, the Act also 
established the PCAOB which is responsible for establishing auditing standards and ethics rules, 
registering the accounting firms and determining their eligibility to audit SEC members, and 
supervising accounting firms. The SOX (2002) requires that all audit firms which conduct audits 
of public companies have to register with PCAOB. PCAOB conducts annual inspections of audit 
firms with 100 or more public clients and triennial inspections of audit firms with fewer than 100 
public clients. Other provisions that impact directly on auditors are the new requirement for audit 
rotation and the Act’s ban of non-audit service supply. The provision of audit rotation requires 
both the lead audit partner and the review partner to rotate after every five years (the former 
requirement in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)  required only 
the engagement partner to rotate every seven years) (Willekens et al., 2008) and (Moore, 
Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006). Additionally, Section 103 requires audit firms to: retain 
audit work papers for at least seven years; provide a second partner review of the audit report; 
and describe the extent of testing of the internal control structure of companies. Sections 202 and 
204 demand audit committee approvals for services supplied by external auditors, and extend the 
number of communications required between auditors and the audit committee (Ghosh & 
Pawlewicz, 2009). 
Other changes include disclosure of and certification by company management regarding 
internal control systems (Section 302) and auditors’ attestation of management’s reports on 
internal control (Section 404). Before the enactment of SOX, the auditor’s testing of internal 
controls was optional. However, under SOX section 404, a fundamental level of internal control 
testing is required for the auditor to separately report on them (Ebrahim, 2010).  
Standards for conducting audit of internal control over fiscal reports in conjunction with 
financial statement audits were stipulated in Auditing Standard No 2, which took effect in 
November 2004 for accelerated filers. However, after the adoption of these standards, there were 
strong criticisms related to the costs associated with Auditing Standard No 2 compliance. In 
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response, the PCAOB issued a new auditing standard, Auditing Standard No 5 to supersede the 
Auditing Standard No 2 (Krishan, Krishnan, & Song, 2011).  
Hill, McEnroe, and Stevens (2005) surveyed 1,200 CPAs including seniors, managers, 
partnerships from audit firms to determine those conditions of the SOX with which they agreed 
or disagreed. The result shows that almost respondents approved of the PCAOB’s role as an 
independent inspector and they agreed that PCAOB should establish quality control, ethics, and 
independent standards but not auditing and accounting standards. In terms of document keeping 
and internal-control disclosures, almost all participants agreed that better recordkeeping is 
important, but only half of them agreed that internal control testing and findings must be 
revealed. Regarding the prohibition of non-audit services, most of participants agreed that four 
services, including broker-dealer, investment advisor, investment banking services and 
bookkeeping should not be permitted. This study does not focus on the motivations for the 
introduction of the SOX.  
The purposes of the enactment of the SOX in the US have attracted the attention of both media 
and academics. Almost all previous studies and press have concurred that the introduction of the 
SOX is for the public interest. According to Bather and Burnaby (2006), the establishment of the 
SOX regulatory framework is designed with the public’s perception in mind. As a result of 
pressure from the public which sought changes to prevent future, large-scale losses, the Act was 
introduced. The aim of the Act was to protect investors by ensuring accurate and reliable fiscal 
statement disclosure after a number of corporate collapses and audit failures had occurred. In 
addition, Cooper and Jobson (2006) and Blankley, Hong, Kerr, and Wiggins (2014) assert that 
regulation is enacted to restore public confidence in the accounting profession. Engebretson 
(2006) surveyed accountants, bankers, financial analysts, internal auditors and educators to 
obtain their perspectives on the purpose of the SOX, the effectiveness of SOX in achieving its 
aims, and the effectiveness of this Act in enhancing quality of audit, fiscal data, and corporate 
governance. That study concluded that the main three aims of the Act were to enhance the 
reliability of corporate reports, rebuild investor confidence in the fiscal market, and prevent fraud 
in the future.  
Ball (2009) contributed to the debate on whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s historical increase of 
regulation was a good idea. Based on the perspective that the political process has an incentive to 
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avoid perceived responsibility for investor losses, and that legislative action is a political attempt 
to escape blame, the author states: “Spurred on by the White House and the press, by declining 
U.S. prestige, by a declining dollar, by declining share prices, by the events of September 11, and 
by an economic downturn, Congress rushed to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Ball (2009) refers 
to the capture theory of regulation when stating that SOX potentially has not promoted social 
welfare. Moore et al. (2006) raise concerns that lobbying by interest groups could occur in terms 
of the reforms introduced in the SOX. While the SOX introduces some notable reforms, these are 
still inadequate, ignoring the conflict of interests inherent in the system.  
At the same time that accounting scandals occurred in the US, Australia also experienced large 
corporate collapses, such as HIH Insurance, Telco, One.Tel and fraudulent financial reporting by 
Harris Scarfe. The Australian authorities reacted to these scandals by promulgating the Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program Act 2004 (CLERP 9), effective from 1 July 2004. The 
regulators felt it necessary to increase public confidence through auditing regulations in a 
manner similar to the US. The CLERP 9 major audit reforms include: the overall requirement for 
auditors to be independent under the Corporations Act; restrictions on the employment of 
auditors by clients and financial relationships between audit firms and audit clients to assure 
independence; reinforcing disclosure requirements in relation to auditor supplied non-audit 
services; banning audit firm partners who were directly involved in an audit from being directors 
of audited clients within two years of the auditor resigning from the audit firm; establishing 
regulatory auditor independent inspection process; making the Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (AUASB) a mandatory board and distancing it from profession co-regulation; 
and crucially, giving legal backing to auditing standards (Houghton et al., 2013).  
The CLERP 9 was adopted from 2004, and IFRS were promulgated from January 2005. In 
addition, the clarity of Auditing Standards which are based on the International Standards 
became effective from 1 January 2010. In March 2010, the chairman of the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) issued the Treasury’s consultation paper, namely Audit Quality in Australia: A 
Strategic Review.  The Treasury examined the impact of an uncertain economic environment on 
audit quality in Australia, including the test on the strength of the audit regulation framework and 
the performance of the audit profession. The Treasury also assessed whether or not the 
Australian audit regulation framework was in line with the best international standards and 
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consistent with the global trends at that time in terms of auditor inspection. A qualitative 
approach was adopted to analyse 18 written submissions from stakeholders, which commented 
on the Treasury’s paper. The key finding was that the Australian regulations were in line with 
international practice and no fundamental changes were needed. However, the Treasury 
mentioned particular issues that could warrant future regulation reforms, including audit rotation, 
FRC auditor independence function, audit deficiency reports and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) communication with audit committees as well as annual, 
transparent audit firm reports (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). 
Few studies have been conducted to determine the motivation for the introduction of audit 
reform in Australia. For example, Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009) investigated the 
motivations of the Australian government in making the auditing standards legally enforceable 
and the impacts of the force of law on the auditing profession. It is suggested that the 
government’s motivation was mainly driven by corporate collapses and a desire to increase 
public confidence in financial data. The government responded to the collapses by ensuring 
higher audit quality and increasing public confidence in financial information. In general, the 
study participants indicated that the Public Interest theory is a reasonable explanation for the 
force of law auditing standards in Australia.  
In Europe, the EU’s 8th Company Law Directive regulated the auditing area. This Directive also 
forced the adoption of International Standards on Auditing for compulsory audit conducted in 
EU countries (Öhman & Wallerstedt, 2012). However, during the reforms of EU audit 
regulations, the profession and the state members successfully opposed the far-reaching 
convergence of European regulations with the US model of public oversight. The professions are 
still permitted to play a pivotal role in the oversight regime and inspections of audit firms. 
Through its lobbying actions, the European auditing profession and its Member States has played 
a pivotal role in preventing transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Although recognising the need 
for changes, the profession still argued for continuing the mandatory company law-based model 
of regulation with profession involvement. Thus, private interests resisted a convergence with the 
US model (Eberlea & Lauter, 2011). 
In the UK, the changes in audit regulation were also a reaction to the events related to accounting 
scandals in 2001-2003. The regulation of the fiscal market in the UK has been light in 
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comparison with that in the US. To date, there have been several reforms in auditing regulations 
in the UK. In terms of the framework for auditor regulation and standard setting, in 2002 the new 
Accountancy Foundation was established together with a number of boards with responsibility 
for different aspects of oversight and regulation. In 2004, the Accountancy Foundation was 
terminated and its responsibilities were transferred to the FRC which is a new body serving as 
the independent regulator for accounting and auditing. FRC gives the Auditing Practices Board 
(APB) responsibility for establishing the ethical standards, which is the major change in 
regulatory responsibilities. The APB has adopted International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) for 
application in the UK and Ireland by issuing a complete new set of practice standards – 
International Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland). With regard to ethic reforms, APB 
promulgated a series of new Ethical Standards, including a range of reforms of the ethics partner, 
management threat, economic independence, auditor tenure and rotation (a five year maximum 
for the audit engagement partner and seven years for other key audit partners) and the ban on 
some non-audit services. Thirdly, there have been some reforms related to auditor liability 
consisting of: the creation of limited liability partnerships and the promulgation of proportional 
liability. Fourthly, some reforms related to independent directors, responsibilities for audit 
committee, corporate governance disclosures and the engagement of shareholder with audit 
process (in the Companies Act 2006)  have been adopted in the UK (Willekens et al., 2008). 
Fifthly, the change in independent inspections of audit firms, new FRC operating body, the 
Public Oversight Board (POB), were established to be responsible for inspection of public 
interest audit and the publication of the inspection results (Beattie et al., 2013).   
Developing countries are similar to developed countries as they have introduced reforms to the 
financial market in response to the accounting scandals. In China, the dissolution of the 
Yinguangxia Company and other listed firms, the withdrawing of licenses from the largest audit 
firms in China resulted in changes to the financial regulatory framework to restore public 
confidence in financial data (Bandyopadhyay, Chen, & Yu, 2014).  In 2003, the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission and China Ministry of Finance jointly produced the audit 
partner rotation requirement which stipulates that all audit partners in Chinese-listed firms have 
to rotate after five consecutive fiscal years (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014).  
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In Russia, for the purpose of enhancing trust, the government revised their auditing legal 
framework. The framework comprises a three-level system of audit quality control, including the 
federal level – control exercised by government institutions (i.e. the Finance Ministry, the 
Central Bank, and others); the level of professional auditing organizations – control carried out 
by professional auditing organizations; and the firm level – quality control procedures introduced 
within an audit firm. In addition, there were reforms related to certification criteria. The reforms 
require auditors to have no less than 40 hours of professional training per year, and a university 
degree became an obligatory requirement. Furthermore, the system of audit firm licensing was 
tightened in 2003, as the government issued the Decree “On Audit Licensing”. The Law on 
Auditing required that the audit firm must have a minimum of five certified auditors. Finally, the 
new auditing standard No. 7 (Internal Quality Control for the Audit) was produced so as to 
address internal quality control issues in audit firms (Willekens et al., 2008). 
The SOX has affected regulatory regimes in many countries including Mexico. National Banking 
and Securities Commission in Mexico introduced rules that mimic some provisions of SOX. 
However, the rules do not request internal control certification and setting up a public oversight 
board as in the US. The auditor independence rules are the same as those in SOX. The rules took 
effect from 2005 (Garcia Mata, 2004).  
In alignment with other countries in the world, the authorities in South Africa made changes to 
the auditing legal framework so as to restore public confidence in the auditing profession. This 
country introduced audit reform by passing the Auditing Profession Act, 2005. This Act 
established the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors to replace the Public Accountants’ 
and Auditors’ Board which subsequently set up the Standards Committee for Auditor Ethics. 
Furthermore, a new Disciplinary Committee was set up by the Independent Regulatory Board for 
Auditors and new Disciplinary Provisions were adopted in 2007. The Ministry of Finance takes 
responsibility for supervision of the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (Odendaal & 
Jager, 2008). Odendaal and Jager (2008) evaluated the regulation of the auditing profession in 
South Africa against the factors that are of importance for an effective and creditable regulatory 
system with reference to the regulation of the profession in some other English-speaking 
countries with which South Africa has historical and professional ties. Documents related to the 
regulation of the auditing profession in these countries are analysed. It is found that those factors 
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that are important to a regulatory system are, to a large degree, addressed by the regulation of the 
auditing profession in South Africa. 
In Egypt, the authorities have implemented regulatory reforms related to audit. The new 
corporate governance code was passed in 2005 for firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange. 
The Egyptian Standards on Auditing was introduced in 2009, which is aligned with the 
International Standards on Auditing issued in 2007 (Khlif & Samaha, 2014). 
In summary, after the corporate collapse and audit failures around the world, governments in a 
range of countries, both developed countries and developing countries, have revised their 
accounting and auditing regulatory frameworks. A larger number of previous studies have been 
conducted in developed countries in comparison with developing countries. A number of 
countries around the world mimic the SOX model in the US to revise their auditing legal 
framework. The main audit reforms are associated with the oversight board regime, audit 
independence, attestation of clients’ internal control system, the adoption of current international 
auditing standards, the changes in legal liability.  
In developed countries, academics and press made statements of the motivations for introducing 
audit reforms. There are mixed views on the government’s motivations for audit reforms. Audit 
reforms were introduced with public interest in mind (Bather and Burnaby, 2006, Cooper and 
Jobson, 2006 and Blankley et al., 2014). Ball (2009) stand on the view of capture theory of 
regulation to state that SOX potentially has not promoted social welfare. Moore et al. (2006) 
raise concerns that lobbying by interest groups could occur in terms of the reforms introduced in 
the SOX. However, few empirical studies investigate the underlying motivations for the 
introduction of audit reforms in these countries. Engebretson (2006) surveyed accountants, 
bankers, financial analysts, internal auditors and educators to get their perspectives on the 
purpose of the SOX. This research adopts a quantitative method and it does not mainly focus on 
the motivations for the introduction of the audit reforms. Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie 
(2009) investigated the motivations of the Australian government in making the auditing 
standards legally enforceable by using qualitative, semi-structured interviews. It is indicated that 
the Public Interest theory is a reasonable explanation for the force of law auditing standards in 
Australia. The number of interviewees of this study is small. Hence, it is questionable that the 
results of this study can be generalized. 
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Academics and the press have stated that developing countries are similar to developed countries 
in that they have introduced reforms to the financial market in response to the accounting 
scandals. There are a number of studies focusing on the audit reforms in developing countries, 
for example Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) in China, Garcia Mata (2004) in Mexico, Odendaal 
and Jager (2008) in South Africa among others. However, to date, no study has been conducted 
in developing countries to identify the underlying motivations for the introduction of audit 
reforms in these countries. Thus, the current study investigates the Vietnamese government’s 
motivations for the introduction of the Law on External Audit (2011). Currently, this Law is the 
most significant change in the auditing framework in Vietnam. This study adopts a qualitative 
method, semi-structured interviews, archival records and secondary data. Number of 
interviewees of the current study is much larger than those of other previous studies. 
2.4 Audit reforms and audit market concentration 
Sherer (1980) defined market concentration as the percentage of revenues generated by a few 
dominant players. According to Minyard and Tabor (1991), concentration ratio is the percentage 
of audit fees produced by a small number of dominant audit firms.  
According to Shepherd (1997), there are six categories of markets. Three market kinds are 
characterised by high market power, including monopoly (one company consists of 100 per 
cent); dominant firm (one company consists from 40 to 99 per cent); and tight oligopoly (four 
firms consist of over 60 per cent). The other three market types offering effective competition 
are: loose oligopoly (four companies consist of less than 40 per cent); monopolistic completion 
(many competitors with a small degree of market power); and pure competition (many 
competitors, who do not have market power). There are several ways to measure the level of 
concentration in the audit market, such as concentration ratio (CR), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). However, the most common one is the concentration ratios, which present the share of the 
largest suppliers (Beattie, Goodacre, & Fearnley, 2003). 
The first direction of literature examines the extent of audit market concentration. Increased audit 
market concentration in the developed countries has attracted academic research as well as the 
concerns of authorities in these countries. The supply of audit services is concentrated in the 
hands of few dominant accounting firms in most developed countries. This has increased the 
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attention of authorities in the US and Europe in terms of removing barriers to entry for small 
auditors (Evans Jr & Schwartz, 2014). The European Commission (EC) raised concerns over the 
audit market concentration as Big Four audit firms accounted for more than 90% of the listed 
audit market in a vast majority of EU state members. The EC also suggested measures to remedy 
this situation, such as including joint audits, and mandatory audit firm rotation (European 
Commission, 2010). The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) referred the market for the provision of 
mandatory audit services to large firms in the UK to the Competition Commission for further 
investigation. OFT has raised concerns over the high concentration in the audit market with 
substantial barriers to entry (OFT, 2011). Entry into the top tier of the audit market has proven 
very demanding for mid-tier audit firms (European Commission, 2010). 
The US Government Accountability Office (2003b) studied the consolidation and competition in 
the public accounting market. This study shows the worry about the concentration in the audit 
market of large US clients and this matter raises possible selection, price, quality and 
concentration risk concerns. It showed that Big Four firms audited more than 78% of all public 
firms in the US and 99% of all public company sales. The US Government Accountability Office 
(2008) pointed out that Big Four accounting firms continued to dominate in the audit market of 
clients. Big Four firms collected 94% of all audit fees of public companies in 2006. Audit firms 
with 2006 audit revenues of more than $500 million are highly concentrated base on HHI. Firms 
with revenues from $100 million to $500 million are moderately concentrated, whereas firms 
having less than $100 million in revenues are not concentrated. The results indicate that in 2006, 
Big Four accounting firms continued to dominate in the audit market of clients which have more 
than $500 million of sales per year, whereas non-Big Four firms obtained more market share of 
audit clients which have $500 million of sales or less. The market concentration in the UK is as 
severe as in the US. Big Four firms gained 90% market share in 2002, increasing to 96% after 
the demise of Andersen (Beattie et al., 2003). Bigus and Zimmermann (2008) found that the 
German audit market is highly concentrated. The Big Four accounted for 87% of the total audit 
fees and 90% of the total fees in 2005. The level of concentration has steadily increased since the 
beginning of the 1990s. The level of concentration in this country is higher than in Switzerland, 
but is lower than in the US and UK. 
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However, several studies on audit market concentration show that it has been calm during some 
periods in developed countries. For example, in Germany, the concentration level had decreased 
in terms of the mandatory audit of the 200 largest German listed companies between 1991 to 
1994 (Quick & Wolz, 1999).  
Audit market concentration has also occurred in developing countries. However, the level of 
concentration in these countries is lower than that in developed countries. Ishak, Mansor, and 
Maruhun (2013) found that Big Four firms accounted for around 72% of the market share in 
Malaysia in 2003. In China, the market share of the big 4 firms was 36.98% in 2002, increased to 
54.72% in 2007 and decreased to 44.3% in 2009 in the audit market (Zhu & Sun, 2012).  
The second direction of literature focuses on the reasons for changing the level of audit market 
concentration. Beattie et al. (2003) point out three main reasons for changes in the audit market 
concentration, including voluntary realignment, changes in the set of audit clients, and changes 
in the set of suppliers. The six most common reasons why UK listed audit clients change auditors 
are: high audit fees, dissatisfaction with audit quality, changes in firms’ top management, need 
for group auditor rationalisation, need for big N audit firms and merger or acquisition by another 
firm. When there is a preference for leading audit firms, concentration will increase. New 
listings, insolvencies and mergers impact on the set of audit clients. Major increases in audit 
market concentration appear as leading suppliers disappear from the audit market, either through 
merger or demise. Beattie and Fearnley (1994) investigated the audit market concentration of the 
listed audit market in the UK during the period from 1987 to 1991. It is concluded that the 
general increase in the audit market concentration is attributed to both the voluntary realignments 
and audit firm mergers. Pong (1999) investigated the audit market concentration in the UK 
during the period from 1991 to 1995. The author concluded that the change in the concentration 
during this period is due to the switch from small audit firms to the Big Six and newly-listed 
firms selecting a Big Six auditor.  
A number of previous studies point out that the mergers between large audit firms have led to an 
increased concentration of the audit market (Wootton, Tonge, and Wolk, 1994, Quick and Wolz, 
1999, Wolk, Michael, and Wootton, 2001, Lee, 2010). However, Duxbury, Moizer, and Wan-
Mohamed (2007) show the merger of PWC in the UK seems to decrease the level of 
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concentration as the model predicts a slight increase in long-term market share of the non-Big 
Five after the merge.  
Richardson (2001) showed that the increase in concentration in the Canadian audit market was 
due to improved transportation and communications technologies, and economies of scale in 
production. 
Several studies have been conducted to determine the effects of audit reforms on audit market 
concentration.  These studies include Houghton et al. (2013), Read, Rama, and Raghunandan 
(2004), Zhu and Sun (2012) and Bleibtreu and Stefani (2011) among others. Studies on the 
influence of audit reforms on audit market concentration show mixed results. 
Almost all studies on the impact of audit reforms on the audit market structure point out that the 
reforms result in an increase in the audit market concentration in developed countries. Beckstead 
(2006) conveys the impact of SOX on smaller audit firms. The study concluded that the 
PCAOB’s rules covering auditing standards for all auditors of public companies really raise 
barriers to entry into the public accounting market for small audit firms. These standards and 
rules are inappropriate for smaller public companies and smaller auditors. Due to SOX, the Big 
Four firms now audit 80% of all public companies in the US (Beckstead, 2006). Houghton et al. 
(2013) used a qualitative method to investigate the impact of the CLERP 9 on public confidence 
in fiscal data, audit cost and competition in the audit market. They concluded that the increased 
audit costs have resulted in increasing barriers to entry into the audit market. Questionnaires 
were utilized in Kend’s study to determine participants’ opinions about the costs and benefits of 
mandatory audit partner rotation. The author found that mandatory audit partner rotation will 
cause a decrease in the number of small audit firms, leading to less competition. Benjamin and 
Ulrike (2012) investigated whether a country’s audit regulation results in a concentration in the 
audit market. The final sample includes 141,190 firm-year observations of listed companies with 
a total of 2,439 audit firms in 29 countries. The results show that the presence of proportionate 
liability system and the ban of joint provision of audit and non-audit services considerably 
decrease audit market concentration. In contrast, the joint audits and the compulsory audit firm 
rotation considerably increase audit market concentration. This study shows the need to examine 
clients and firms’ strategies in response to new regulations.  
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Other studies conclude that the audit reforms resulted in a change to the structure of the public 
audit market. Read et al. (2004) examined the small audit firms’ changes in the SEC audit market 
after the SOX. A mixed method was utilized. Data was extracted from AuditorTrac and 
interviews were conducted with audit partners from 29 audit firms that stopped performing SEC 
audits and 15 audit firms that did not have any SEC audit clients, but were registered with the 
PCAOB. It was found that 47 small audit firms ceased SEC audit engagements from 2002 to 
2003, compared to 8 audit firms that decided to stop SEC audit from 2000 to 2001. The 
interview results show the main reasons for stopping SEC audit engagements are: (1) the more 
strict oversight regime under PCAOB and the additional costs associated to coping with PCAOB 
rules and PCAOB inspections; (2) an increase in professional liability insurance costs related to 
SEC audits; and (3) stringent scrutiny of SEC registrants post-SOX. In addition, the reasons why 
audit firms with no SEC clients register with PCAOB are: (1) desire to enter the SEC audit 
market; and (2) a signal of their audit quality to non-SEC registrants and their stakeholders. 
DeFond and Lennox (2011) evaluated the impact of SOX on small auditors in the US. The result 
indicated that the SOX notably affects the structure of the public audit market for small audit 
firms by decreasing the number of audit firms and considerably increasing audit firm size and 
client concentration. 
However, prior studies also found that audit reforms have not affected audit market 
concentration. Zhu and Sun (2012) utilised a quantitative method to investigate the impact of 
changes to accounting standards on the concentration in the audit market in China.  These 
authors used the ratio of revenue of the four (ten) largest audit firms and the total number of 
listed firms audited by the Big Four (ten) largest audit firms as measures of audit market 
concentration. It is suggested that the change in accounting standards did not increase the audit 
market concentration significantly as larger audit firms did not further increase their market 
share. 
In addition, a few studies concluded that the audit reforms result in a decrease in audit market 
concentration. DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999) examined the effect of adopting the new auditing 
standard related to enhanced auditor independence on audit market concentration in China. Audit 
market share of the top ten auditors was compared before and after the adoption of the new 
auditing standards. A quantitative approach was adopted to test hypothesis. It was found that the 
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frequency of modified reports increased nine-fold due to the change, which led to a decrease in 
the audit market share among large auditors. The results suggest that the market share of larger 
auditors declined due to the implementation of the new auditing standards. The overall result 
shows a decrease in audit market concentration due to the reforms. Bleibtreu and Stefani (2011) 
investigated the impact of prohibition of non-audit services on audit market concentration by 
utilizing models in the tradition of Salop (1979). The findings indicated that the prohibiting of 
non-audit services to audit clients had secondary impacts on the structure of audit market. 
However, the prohibiting of non-audit services raises or reduces market concentration depending 
on the cost structures of small and large audit firms as well as the extent of the competition for 
small audit clients.  
 There have been more major changes in the Taiwan audit market since 1988, including the 
relaxation of CPA examinations in 1988, the consolidation between KPMG and Cooper Lybrand 
in 1999, between T. N. Song and Deloitte &"Touche Taiwan in 2003, and the decrease in CPA 
examination pass rate in 2001. Lee (2010) investigated the impact of these changes on the audit 
market concentration. A quantitative method was adopted. It was concluded that big N audit 
firms dominate the large part of audit market. The big N market concentration during 1992-1997 
was lower than that for other periods after relaxing the CPA examinations in 1988. Since 
tightening up CPA examination in 2001, the big N market concentration increased.  
 In conclusion, the first line of literature studying the extent of audit market concentration shows 
that authorities around the world have been concerned about the high concentration in the audit 
market and have suggested the ways to deal with this situation. The level of audit market 
concentration in developed countries is found to be higher than in developing countries (US 
Government Accountability Office, 2008, Beattie et al.,2003, Bigus and Zimmermann, 2008, 
Ishak et al., 2013, Zhu & Sun, 2012). 
The second line of literature investigates the reasons for the change in the level of audit market 
concentration. These studies mainly focus on the impacts of consolidations between audit firms 
and audit market concentration. A large number of previous studies conclude that the mergers 
between audit firms have changed the level of audit market concentration (Quick and Wolz, 
1999, Lee 2010, Wootton, Tonge, and Wolk, 1994, Wolk, Michael, and Wootton, 2001). 
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Studies on the impacts of audit reforms on audit market concentration show mixed results. Most 
studies on the impact of audit reforms on the audit market structure point out that the reforms 
result in an increase in the audit market concentration in developed countries. For instance, 
Beckstead (2006) concluded that the PCAOB’s rules covering auditing standards for all auditors 
of public companies really raise barrier to entry the public accounting market for small audit 
firms. The audit market concentration increases in the US due to the implementation of the SOX. 
Houghton et al. (2013) found that the legal backing auditing standards and ASIC inspections 
increased audit costs, leading to increasing barriers to entry the audit market. Benjamin and 
Ulrike (2012) concluded that the joint audits and the compulsory audit firm rotation considerably 
increase audit market concentration.  
However, Zhu and Sun (2012) found that the reform of accounting standards have not impacted 
audit market concentration in China. Conversely, some of previous studies found that the audit 
reforms decrease the level of audit market concentration. For example, DeFond, Wong and Li 
(1999) showed a decrease in audit market concentration due to the implementation of new 
auditing standards in China.  
In developed countries, there have been empirical studies on the impacts of changed conditions 
for the audit of public companies on the audit market concentration. In the US, some studies on 
the impact of SOX and PCAOB on audit market structure and concentration were conducted, 
including those of  Beckstead (2006), Read et al. (2004) and DeFond and Lennox (2011). In 
Australia, Houghton et al. (2013) investigated the impact of legal backing auditing standards and 
ASIC on competition in the Australian audit market.  
There have been some studies on the association between the audit reforms and audit market 
concentration in developing countries. These studies were mainly conducted in China. Zhu and 
Sun (2012) focus on the impact of changes to accounting standards, whereas DeFond, Wong, and 
Li (1999) examine the effect of adopting the new auditing standard related to enhanced auditor 
independence on audit market concentration. Lee (2010) investigated the impact of the relaxation 
of CPA examinations on the audit market concentration. Among these studies, merely study of 
DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999) focuses on the influence of the audit reforms of public clients on 
audit market concentration. However, this study applies a quantitative method to test hypothesis. 
Thus, the current study investigates the influences of audit reforms associated with the conditions 
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for conducting audit of public interst entities on the audit market structure in Vietnam, 
particularly the extent of audit market concentration. The current study adopts a qualitative 
method rather than a quantitative method as adopoted in the study of DeFond, Wong, and Li 
(1999).  
2.5 Audit reforms and consolidation of audit firms 
The previous literature pays attention to the extent of consolidation of audit firms and the major 
motivations for the mergers of audit firms.  
Beattie and Fearnley (1994) states that both economies of scale and competition for market share 
in an inelastic market have resulted in a series of audit firm mergers. Other reasons for the 
mergers are: the need for more capital to compete, for the big computer systems to work in 
consulting, increased specialization, bigger industry capacities and internationalization of 
accounting firms. Macro factors may generate challenges for small audit firms. Motivations of 
acquiring companies may provide solutions to these challenges (Pickering, 2012). In the US, 
there were significant changes in the business environment for audit firms in the 1990s 
comprising litigation crisis, aggressive competition between audit firms and improvement in 
computer and information technologies. To react to these environmental changes, accounting 
firms use strategies like downsizing, mergers and affiliations as well as specialized services 
according to industry groups. These accounting firms use mergers and  affiliation as a strategy to 
intensify their practice in some parts of the market (Ruhl & Tang, 1996). The consolidation of 
accounting firms was a dominant trend in the US between 1998 and 1999. Around the US, 
symposia and conferences on consolidation drew thousands of accountants trying to stay on the 
top of their world. Accounting firms were convinced to merge so as to compete (Krotman & 
Sinkin, 2000). The US Government Accountability Office (2003b) studied the consolidation and 
competition in the US audit market. Their investigation showed that the mergers of the biggest 
accounting firms were intended to (a) keep pace with the increasing size and international reach 
of public companies to which the firms offer their audit services; (b) achieve a bigger economic 
scale as a result of modernized operations and other technology, and (c) enhance industry-
specific and technical expertise.  
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In Germany, there was also a trend of consolidation among audit firms during the 1990s. Clients’ 
internationalisation and their extended services requested a diversification that could be best 
served by large and international audit firms. This request led to consolidation of national as well 
as international audit firms in the German audit market (Quick & Wolz, 1999).  
In Russia, the Law on Auditing 2011 required that the personnel of an audit firm should include 
a minimum of five certified auditors. This reform in Russia also led to mergers between small 
companies and the larger ones (Willekens et al., 2008). 
 
In conclusion, a few studies have investigated the motivations for the mergers between audit 
firms. These studies found that major motivations for mergers are economies of scale, 
competition, the advancement of computer and information technologies and enhancement of 
industry-specific and technical expertise. To this researcher’s knowledge, few studies have 
focused on the impact of audit regulatory reforms on the consolidation of audit firms. There has 
only been a passing comment of Willekens et al. (2008) that the Law on Auditing 2011 in Russia 
resulted in mergers between audit firms. The study of Willekens et al. (2008) explored the 
auditing regulation and trust in Russia in general, but did not focus particularly on the 
consolidation of audit firms. Using a qualitative approach, in this current study the researcher 
investigates the impacts of audit reforms related to conditions for establishing audit firms and 
conducting audits of public interest entities on the consolidations between audit firms by using a 
qualitative method.  
2.6 Audit firms’ changes in response to audit reforms 
Previous studies show that audit firms have changed their strategies, activities, structure, 
procedures and productivity due to the audit reforms. Baker (1993) used a qualitative method -
participant observation- to investigate the strategies and responses of large, international public 
accounting firms to the changing environment and in defence against the threats to the self-
regulation of accounting profession. The US government had accepted that the public accounting 
sector should be self-regulated. However, there had been strong efforts on the part of members of 
Congress to increase the level of public regulation in the public accounting profession. In 
addition, there were changes to the laws regarding the auditors’ duties to third parties. Three 
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strategies were investigated: maintaining client relationships, maintaining relationships with 
others, and projecting a company image.  
Shaub (2005) asserted that the SOX will notably affect audit firms’ structure and procedures for 
years. There are four major sections of SOX that impact on accounting firms. Section 101 sets up 
the PCAOB, section 201 bans auditors from supplying consulting services to their audit clients, 
section 203 addresses compulsory audit partner rotation and section 404 requires auditors to 
attest managements’ assessment of internal control. Chang, Choy, Cooper, Parker, and Ruefli 
(2009) investigated how such the reforms impact on accounting firms’ productivity. The authors 
used the quantitative method and the study sample consisted of 56 largest accounting firms in the 
US for the periods 1996-1999 (pre-SOX) and 2003-2006 (post-SOX). They concluded that 
accounting firms had undergone a productivity growth of around 17% from the pre- to post- 
SOX. This productivity achievement is due to technical progress rather than a change in relative 
efficiency. Furthermore, non-Big Four firms outweigh the Big Four firms in terms of both 
productivity growth and technical progress. McHugh III and Polinski (2012) investigated the 
effects of SOX and related provisions on the audit market in the US. These provisions include 
bans of certain non-audit services to audit clients, audit partner rotation requirement, PCAOB 
registration and inspections, and sanctions provisions, attesting of internal control report. It was 
shown that SOX influenced audit contracting and engagement continuity. After SOX, the largest 
audit firms strengthened and stabilised the relationships with their audit clients. The largest audit 
firms retained their less risky clients and decided not to renew audit contracts with the most risky 
ones. The latter were transferred to audit firms with less frequent inspections. For triennial firms, 
the level of market activity remained generally unchanged from its level pre-SOX. Eldaly (2012) 
studied the impacts of recent audit regulations on the audit companies’ strategies by utilizing 
semi- structured interviews with the top managers of regulatory bodies and Big Four firms’ 
partners in the UK and Egypt. The study offers better insight into the satisfaction of the Big Four 
audit firms with the new independent oversight regime and shows how these audit companies 
reacted to the new requirements of the independent inspection body.   
Brooks et al. (2011) conducted a survey to obtain audit committee members’ views on the 
CLERP 9 and other stakeholders’ recommendations for the improvement of auditor 
independence. Audit committee members have agreed with a number of the audit reforms, such 
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as broadening the role of the FRC related to inspection, supervision and advising related to 
auditor independence concerns; professional liability reform; legal backing for auditing 
standards; a confirmation of independence by audit companies; statutory audit partner rotation 
and the reveal of non-audit service fees. This study concentrates on the audit committee 
members’ views on the audit reforms, rather than auditors and audit firms’ reactions to the audit 
reforms. Hughes (2008) presented the disadvantages that the CLERP 9 can generate in Australia. 
According to the author, the reforms to the quality control standards forced audit firms to revise 
their audit methodologies, and upgrade audit manuals and training programs. 
In conclusion, previous studies on audit firms’ changes as responses to audit reforms have been 
conducted in developed countries. These studies show that audit firms have significantly 
changed their strategies, policies to react to the audit reforms. Eldaly’s study was conducted in a 
developing country. However, this study merely focuses on Big Four audit firms rather than all 
types of audit firms. The current research investigates the different groups of audit firms’ 
changes as responses to audit reforms in a developing country, Vietnam. 
2.6.1 Audit firms’ reactions to audit partner rotation requirement 
Auditor independence has been regulated by regulators and professional bodies all over the 
world. Auditors’ independence is one of the most important characteristics that auditors must 
ensure since it contributes to the reliability of fiscal data. In order to safeguard auditor 
independence, a range of countries in the world have stipulated mandatory audit partner rotation. 
In US, the SOX requires that lead and review audit partners have to rotate after five consecutive 
financial years. The European Union requires that audit partners of Public Interest Entities have 
to rotate after seven years. In Australia, the CLERP 9 requires audit partners of listed company 
or listed registered scheme to change after five years, which is in line with the US and the UK. 
However, Australia requires a two year time-out period, whereas the US and the UK adopted a 
time-out period of five years. Canada also requires a five-year rotation period with a five-year 
time-out period. New Zealand has also implemented a seven-year rotation period and two-year 
time-out model (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). Other countries including China, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Japan, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany, require mandatory audit partner 
rotation. In China, audit partners of listed firms have to rotate after five consecutive years; these 
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are both lead audit partner and a reviewing partner who must be at least a deputy executive of the 
audit firm (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). 
Advocates of audit partner rotation believe that a long relationship with an audit client can affect 
the auditor’s judgement and results in an impairment of audit independence. Studies show that 
the engagement time increases, which causes a decrease in audit independence (Geiger and 
Raghunandan, 2002, Carey and Simnett, 2006). Audit quality and audit independence are 
enhanced after the rotation of audit partners. A new auditor is expected to have fresh eyes in 
order to focus on different aspects of the engagement and enhance audit quality (Bandyopadhyay 
et al., 2014). Doval (2008) reported the statutory change of audit partner rotation and the 
regulators expected this change to limit the close relationship between individual partners of 
audit companies and their appointed clients that has resulted in major corporate frauds.  
In contrast, opponents of audit partner rotation consider that mandatory audit partner rotation can 
result in a loss of client knowledge as the auditor must rotate off after a period of time. This 
knowledge is not available to the new auditor. Chi, Huang, Liao, and Xie (2009) found that there 
is no evidence suggesting an enhancement of actual independence and audit quality after a 
rotation of audit partner. 
The first stream of previous literature examines the influence of audit partner rotation on audit 
practice. Extant literature focuses on the impact of mandatory audit partner rotation and audit 
quality. Notable academic research has investigated the impact of this independence requirement 
on audit quality. Studies show audit partner rotation enhances auditor  conservatism (Hamilton, 
Ruddock, Stokes, & Taylor, 2005). Audit partner rotation improves audit quality (Carey and 
Simnett, 2006, Bandyopadhyay, Chen and Yu, 2014, Lennox, Xi, and Tianyu, 2014). For 
example, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) examined the audit quality consequences of China’s 
mandatory audit partner rotation (MPR) regulation. It was found audit quality improved in the 
three years immediately following a client firm’s MPR during the 2004-2011period. Specifically, 
the improvement was most pronounced in those provinces with both low levels of audit market 
concentration and low levels of legal development. Lennox, Xi, and Tianyu (2014) tested the 
impact of mandatory partner rotation in China. It was found that mandatory audit partner rotation 
led to better audit quality in the years immediately after rotation.  
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However, other studies show a negative impact of mandatory audit partner rotation on audit 
quality, including Chen, Lin, and Lin (2008), Chi, Huang, Liao, and Xie (2009) and Daugherty, 
Dickins, Hatfield, and Higgs (2012) among others. For example, Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield, 
and Higgs (2012)’s results suggested an indirect, negative impact and unintended consequence of 
accelerated rotation on audit quality. Auditors believe that audit quality suffers as partners 
attempt to acquire new industry experience so as to avoid relocation.  
The second spectrum of prior studies focuses on stakeholders’ perception of the current 
mandatory audit partner rotation requirement and the adoption of mandatory audit partner 
rotation of audit firms in practice. 
Ryken, Radich, and Fargher (2007) examined the rotation practices before and after the adoption 
of mandatory audit partner rotation policies in Australia. They concluded that the mandatory 
requirement of audit partner rotation reduced the extent of long partner tenure. In addition, 
auditors located outside Brisbane, Melbourne, Sydney  are likely to have a longer audit tenure 
than those who are in the three major cities; there is evidence of the different impacts of the 
mandatory requirement on small audit firms. It is suggested that future research should 
investigate the need for plausible exemptions to mandatory audit partner rotation given the 
higher costs of partner rotations to small audit firms and audit firms located in remote areas. 
Chapple and Hossain (2011) investigated the Australian practice post- CLERP 9 with mandatory 
audit partner rotation. The findings show that the average audit partner tenure was from two to 
three years over the research period. For around 85% of the market, audit partner rotation was 
from one to five years. There is also a bigger observed impact of mandatory audit partner on 
audit engagement related to non-Big Four audit firms. Houghton, Jubb, Kend, and Ng (2010) 
conducted a survey to investigate the perceptions of users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters 
and regulators’ regarding mandatory partner rotation. They concluded that a five-year audit 
partner rotation is considered to cause problems for large, complex and highly regulated audit 
clients in Australia. It is suggested that the government should consider a different application of 
audit partner rotation requirement instead of only one approach. Similarly, Commonwealth of 
Australia (2010) showed that the particular issues that may warrant future regulation reforms 
consisting of audit partner rotation. The CLERP 9 requires lead and review audit partner to rotate 
off after five consecutive years. However, stakeholders that responded to the Treasury’s paper 
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generally agreed that a seven-year period was appropriate for the rotation of an audit partner. A 
range of stakeholders stated that for large, complex or highly regulated firms, the audit of, it 
could take from two to three years for auditors to obtain optimal effectiveness. Hence, rotating 
off after five years causes a notable loss of expertise and knowledge (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2010). To be similar to Australia,  Masters (2009) reported the results of the survey 
conducted to explore audit committee chairman’s attitudes to audit rotation and concluded that 
most audit committee chairman of large firms hope that their lead audit partners can stay on for 
seven years rather than five years in the UK. Kend (2004) employed questionnaires to obtain 
these participants’ perspectives on the costs and benefits of mandatory audit partner rotation. 
This study’s respondents from the Big Four confirm that the reform requiring a five-year partner 
rotation would be undesirable. These audit firms incur more costs due to the five-year partner 
rotation requirement. 
To summarise, the first line of literature investigates the impacts of audit partner rotation on 
audit practice. A large number of previous studies were conducted to identify the influence of 
audit partner rotation on auditors’ conservatism and audit quality. The results are mixed. The 
second line of literature focuses on stakeholders’ perception of the current mandatory audit 
partner rotation requirement and the adoption of mandatory audit partner rotation of audit firms 
in practice. These studies were all conducted in developed countries, such as Australia, the UK 
and US. For instance, the studies of Ryken et al. (2007), Chapple and Hossain (2011), (Houghton 
et al., 2010), and Kend (2004) were conducted in Australia. There has been no study on the 
stakeholders’ perception of the current mandatory audit partner rotation requirement and the 
adoption of mandatory audit partner rotation of audit firms in practice in developing nations. In 
this study, the researcher will investigate the stakeholders’ perception of these issues in Vietnam. 
2.6.2 Audit firms’ reactions and changes towards the annual transparency report 
requirement 
Authorities in several countries in the world such as the EU, Australia and Vietnam have 
required audit firms to publish transparency reports consisting of information on audit firm 
governance. An audit firm’s transparent report must consist of a description of the firm’ legal 
structure, ownership, and governance structure; a statement by the firm on the effectiveness of 
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the internal control system; and information about the basis for remuneration of the firm’s 
partners. 
In Article 40, namely “Transparency Reports” of EU’s Eight Directive, the European Union 
requires audit firms of Public Interest Entities to disclose information associated with governance 
structure, internal quality control system, quality assurance review, education and independent 
practice and partner payment (Deumes, Schelleman, Bauwhede, & Vanstraelen, 2012). In the 
US, a Treasury Committee report in 2008 suggested that the PCAOB require large audit firms to 
issue transparency reports. In 2009, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(2009) investigated the possible effects of the improved transparency of audit firms, particularly 
whether it will enhance audit quality and the availability and delivery of audit services. The 
report concluded that transparency would enhance audit quality; however, transparency of audit 
firms alone may not exclusively enhance audit quality. More disclosures may offer notable 
benefits and more objective information for investors, audit committees, regulators and other 
stakeholders as assessing the audit quality of audit firms. Transparency could improve the 
availability and delivery of audit services. However, additional transparency may confirm that 
large audit firms are the most suitable to conduct audits of large public companies. However, to 
date, the US has not adopted the requirement of annual transparency report. 
In Australia, the Treasury held discussions with stakeholders to determine whether they saw 
value in requiring audit firms that conduct audits for the purposes of the Corporations Act, to 
issue their annual transparency reports. The Treasury made a recommendation that the 
requirement of the EU’s Article 40 should be utilized as the platform for developing an annual 
transparency report for Australian audit firms (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). In 2012, the 
Australian government issued a reform that stipulated the form and content of the annual 
transparency reports for audit firms. Annual transparency reports in Australia are required of 
firms which audit 10 or more significant entities such as listed companies, listed registered 
schemes, authorised deposit-taking institutions, and insurance companies (Chartered 
Accountants, 2015). 
The government of the UK advocates the transparency report requirement, suggesting that the 
report is a suitable agreement between all of the stakeholders’ interests. The advantages of 
greater transparency outweigh the cost implications. However, the German Chamber of Public 
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Accountants disagreed with the extent of the detailed requirement and criticised the fact that the 
report merely dealt with audit firms and not individual auditors. They also debated that the date 
which shows when the last quality assurance review took place is not pivotal, and suggested that 
it is more crucial to understand that the quality assurance review was successful (Pott, Mock, & 
Watrin, 2008). The costs related to transparency report publication are expected to be higher for 
smaller audit firms. With regard to the benefits, improvement in audit firms’ transparency can 
enhance investor confidence in the financial reports. However, the reliability of information in 
the transparency reports in EU countries has not recently been monitored, leading to misleading 
or inaccurate revelations (Deumes et al., 2012). Pott et al. (2008) identified how practitioners in 
the US evaluate some aspects of a transparency report according to auditor independence 
disclosed by audit firms. The findings showed no considerable difference between voluntary and 
mandatory transparency reports, or whether or not the report is audited. There is no difference 
between practising auditors and accountants in terms of the evaluation of the transparency 
report’s effectiveness. In addition, audit firms are opposed to the idea of the mandatory 
requirement to publish a transparency report. Despite the fact that transparency reports could 
supply valuable information for investors and audit clients, the auditing profession is pessimistic 
regarding the beneficial impact of more transparent information. 
There have been few empirical studies to assess the implementation of the compulsory 
requirement of annual transparency reports in practice. The Financial Reporting Council in  UK 
(2015) reviewed the contents of transparency reports of public interest entities in the UK. It 
concluded that the quality of the transparency reports in 2013/2014 was considerably higher than 
those examined in 2010. However, there were still issues that needed to be addressed in the 
annual transparency report such as the revelations of international networks, financial 
information, independent procedures and list of public interest entities. Deumes et al. (2012) 
examined the transparency reports in several EU countries including Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK. Deumes et al. (2012) found that there is a difference in the 
transparency report disclosure scores among audit firms. In addition, the initial transparency 
reports of these audit firms have a considerable lower transparency disclosure score, indicating 
that disclosure score increases over time.  
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In conclusion, several countries in the world have required audit firms to publish annual 
transparency reports. To date, there have been few studies on the mandatory requirement for 
issuance of such reports and the implementation of such requirement in practice. Pott et al. 
(2008) identified how practitioners in the US evaluate some aspects of a transparency report on 
auditor independence disclosed by audit firms. The Financial Reporting Council in  UK (2015) 
reviewed the contents of transparency reports of public interest entities in the UK. Deumes et al. 
(2012) examined the transparency reports in several EU countries. The current study investigates 
the implementation of the compulsory requirement of publishing such reports in developing 
countries by utilizing a qualitative method. 
2.7 The impacts of audit reforms on audit quality 
2.7.1 Definition of audit quality 
The most commonly utilized definition of audit quality was developed by DeAngelo (1981).  
This author defines audit quality as a combination of technical expertise of the auditor and the 
auditor’s independence. In particular, audit quality is defined as the possibility that an auditor 
both discovers a breach in the client's accounting system, and reports the breach (DeAngelo, 
1981). Citron and Taffler (1992) consider the value of the audit report is taken to be a function of 
both auditor competence and auditor independence. There is little consensus about how to 
define, let alone measure, audit quality. The perception of audit quality is based very much on 
who looks through it. Users, auditors, regulators and society, and all stakeholders in the financial 
reporting process would have diverse perspectives on what constitutes audit quality, which will 
determine the type of indicators they might use to assess audit quality (Knechel, Krishnan, 
Pevzner, Shefchik, & Velury, 2013). No-one has concurred on a definition of audit quality but it 
is associated with a number of factors such as the auditing legal framework, ethical standards, 
technical expertise and skills of auditors and their staff, the audit regulators and other bodies 
involved in the audit review process. There are other drivers of audit quality associated with the 
practices and processes implemented in audit firms (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). The US 
Government Accountability Office (2003a) referred to audit quality as auditors conducting an 
audit “in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) to provide reasonable 
assurance that the audited financial statements and related disclosures are (1) presented in 
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and (2) are not materially 
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misstated whether due to errors or fraud.” In the UK, Beattie and Fearnley (1995) showed the 
firm-level factors of audit quality including integrity, technical competence and reputation. In 
addition, partner-level factors of audit quality consist of technical competence and working 
relations.  
Yanyan, Lisheng, and Yuping (2015) investigated whether audit partner quality influenced the 
audit engagement quality and whether many levels of quality control constrict the impacts in 
China. Audit partner quality is measured by audit failure rate, and engagement quality is 
measured by restatements. Low litigation risk in China reduces audit firms’ incentives to adopt 
appropriate quality control, resulting in more pronounced impacts of individual partner on audit 
quality. This study found that despite different levels of quality control, audit-partner quality 
considerably influences audit engagement quality and these impacts are intensified by the audit 
partners’ own financial incentives. 
Knechel et al. (2013) and  Francis (2011) presented similar indicators for audit quality. They 
divided audit quality indicators into four categories: inputs, process, outcomes and context. 
Firstly, the inputs to an audit are a reflection of the individual characteristics of the audit team, 
like professional scepticism, knowledge and expertise. Secondly, audit quality is affected by the 
characteristics inherent to the audit process, such as risk assessment, analytical procedures, and 
work paper review. Thirdly, the relevant outcomes would be reflected in diverse observable 
characteristics such as restatements, financial reporting quality, accuracy of audit reports, and 
results of regulatory reviews. Finally, indicators related to the context of the audit, consisting of 
the presence of abnormal audit fees, audit tenure, audit partner compensation, and audit fee 
premiums, would affect auditor incentives. The indicators comprised both financial (e.g., 
restatements) and non-financial measures (e.g., auditor expertise).  
Previous studies investigated the determinants that drive auditors to supply audit quality and 
clients demand for audit quality. The supply of audit quality is a function of auditors’ incentives 
related to both independence and competence. Auditor independence incentives consist of 
reputation risk, litigation risk and regulation risk. Regulation risk involves the auditors’ sanctions 
consisting of fines and criminal penalties. Auditor competence refers to the auditors’ ability to 
supply high audit quality, depending on factors such as inputs to the audit process. Regulatory 
intervention often impacts on both auditors’ incentives and competence in providing high audit 
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quality.  Factors that drive clients to demand audit quality comprise client incentives to demand 
high audit quality and client competence to fulfil their audit quality demands (DeFond & Zhang, 
2014). Similarly, Nelson (2009) also states factors that incentivise auditors to provide higher 
audit quality, including concerns over regulatory enforcement, potential litigation cost and 
reputation losses. 
2.7.2 Impacts of audit reforms on audit quality 
Studies that investigate the impact of audit reforms on audit quality have been conducted mainly 
in developed countries such as the US, UK and Australia. These studies show mixed results.  
A number of studies show that the adoption of SOX, CLERP 9 enhances audit quality. 
McGowan (2014) investigated the impact of SOX on audit quality in non-profit hospitals subject 
to single audit act in the US. A quantitative approach was adopted. The result shows an 
enhancement of audit quality from the prior to the after SOX adoption. Non-Big Four firms 
underwent a notable enhancement in audit quality as discretionary accruals are utilized as a 
proxy for audit quality. In contrast, Big Four audit firms had a considerable enhancement in audit 
quality as internal control deficiencies are proxies for audit quality. The Centre for Audit Quality 
(2008) noted an improvement in audit quality since the passage of SOX. According to their 
survey, 82% of participants asserted that overall quality had enhanced considerably over the 
studied period. Wong (2006) reported the CPA Australian survey with business professionals to 
obtain their viewpoints regarding the effect of the new auditing standards and other key audit-
related CLERP 9 changes on audit quality and public confidence. It was anticipated that the new 
standards would improve confidence in auditors, and the business professionals recognized that 
the reforms could improve public confidence in audited fiscal reports. Hossain (2013) 
investigated the impact of CLERP 9 on auditor independence and audit quality by utilizing data 
from the pre- and post-CLERP 9 periods to run models. The author used the performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals and the auditor’s propensity to issue a going-concern opinion for 
a fiscally distressed firm as proxies for audit quality. The study provided evidence of enhanced 
auditor independence and audit quality after the regulatory reforms were adopted.   
There are fewer studies on the influence of audit reforms on audit quality in developing countries 
than in developed countries. A number of previous studies on the impacts of audit reforms on 
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audit quality were conducted in China. In 2004, China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) promulgated two new regulations 
pertaining to the state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government (CSOEs). These 
rules restrict management impacts on auditors by mandating that SASAC appoint auditors for 
CSOEs and imposing management to keep auditors for at least two years and at most five years. 
Chi, Lisic , Long, and Wang (2013) used abnormal accruals as proxy for audit quality to identify 
the impacts of the two changes on the audit quality and find that the audit quality of CSOEs is 
enhanced due to the adoption of reforms. Shimin et al. (2010) investigated the impact of legal 
and regulatory changes in China on audit quality. The results showed that auditors in China are 
more likely to compromise audit quality for financially important clients as the institutions for 
investor protection are weak. The institutional change in China has prevented the compromise 
since auditors have to be concerned about litigation risk and regulatory sanctions.  
In contrast, other previous studies on the impacts of audit reforms on audit practice concluded 
that the audit reforms have not enhanced audit quality. With regard to the impact of the force of 
law of auditing standards on the auditing profession, there have been several studies on this 
topic, such as those of Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009) and Houghton et al. (2013). 
These studies used a qualitative method- interview and produced generally similar results. These 
two studies concluded that the legal backing does not improve audit quality and enhance public 
confidence. There had been an increase in the monitoring costs with no directly derived benefits. 
In particular, documentations and other requirements had distracted the auditor from focusing on 
the key task, which led to a reduction in audit quality. Smith (2012) examined the effects of audit 
reforms on investors’ perceptions of audit quality in the US. The first reform was the 
replacement of Auditing standard 2 with Auditing standard 5. The second one was the litigation 
reform aiming at reducing auditors’ liability exposure followed by an alleged audit failure. 
Perceived audit quality in this study was measured as (a) a material weakness that could go 
undetected by the auditor, (b) an intentional material misstatement that would be revealed in 
future financial statements and (c) an unintentional material misstatement that would be revealed 
in future financial statements. Smith concluded that investors perceived a decrease in audit 
quality after the introduction of these two regulatory changes. Chatterjee and Mir (2006) 
investigated whether statutory cost audits impacted the users’ trust in the reported financial 
statements and whether mandatory cost audits bring with it benefits by conducting open-end 
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interviews with cost auditors, accountants, fiscal executives of audit clients and investors in 
India. The result showed that mandatory cost audits had not improved the degree of trust of 
investors and did not produce the benefits that regulators anticipated. 
In sum, a large number of previous studies investigate the impacts of audit reforms on audit 
quality in developed countries, mainly in the US, UK and Australia. Few studies were conducted 
in developing countries such as in India and China. These previous studies in both developed and 
developing countries show mixed results. For example,  Centre for Audit Quality (2008) noted 
an improvement in audit quality since the passage of SOX. Chatterjee and Mir (2006) showed 
that mandatory cost audits in India have not improved the degree of trust of investors and they 
have not offered benefits as the regulators expected. Most of these studies utilize a quantitative 
method, except Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009) and Houghton et al. (2013) in Australia. 
These quantitative studies utilized different indicators for audit quality. In addition, there has 
been no study that focuses on the impacts of audit reform associated with audit opinion on the 
audit quality. This current study is the first study to examine the influence of audit reform related 
to audit opinion on audit quality in a developing context by using a qualitative approach. 
2.7.3 Inspection regime and audit quality 
The most fundamental change in the SOX is the displacement of self-regulation by the 
government regulation with the establishment of the PCAOB. After the establishment of PCAOB 
in the US, other countries in the world mimicked the US and set up public oversight boards by 
either introducing or expanding their use of inspection programs (DeFond, 2010). Most public 
oversight board research has been conducted in the US since the PCAOB publicly discloses the 
inspection results in this country. Research on the transformation from the peer review regime to 
the public oversight board system is interesting since it presents a trade-off of experience for 
independence. However, PCAOB inspections have been criticized since the inspectors are 
considered to lack of auditing expertise (DeFond, 2010).  
 The first line of extant literature investigates whether PCAOB inspection results signal audit 
quality of audit firms. Gunny and Zhang (2013) investigated whether PCAOB’s inspection can 
enhance actual audit quality during the periods inspected. The findings indicated that without the 
going concern as proxy for actual quality, the PCAOB reports for triennially inspected auditors 
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differentiate audit quality. For annually inspected auditors, the findings are contradictory and 
imply that the inspection reports do not differentiate audit quality during the inspected period. 
Lennox and Pittman (2010) used a quantitative method to analyse audit firm monitoring after the 
PCAOB started its inspections. The study showed that audit clients do not believe that the 
PCAOB’s inspection reports are valuable for signalling audit quality. In addition, the information 
content of peer review reports decreases after they are narrowed down in scope due to the 
inspection of PCAOB. Thirdly, the authors noted that the signalling role of peer review reports 
almost comes from information that PCAOB’s inspections do not publicly reveal. Collectively, 
little is known about audit quality under the new regulation regime. DeFond (2010) situated 
Lennox and Pittman (2010)’s examinations in a broader auditing and regulatory literature so as 
to criticize what we should learn and should not learn from their findings. It was concluded that 
Lennox and Pittman (2010)’s examinations of the transition from the peer review regime to 
PCAOB inspection and the comparison of valuable information between two regimes, offer 
worthwhile  insights regarding factors that notify market participants of audit quality. However, 
the author points out that future research should investigate the impact of PCAOB inspection on 
auditors’ behaviour. In addition, the PCAOB inspection may lead to mergers between audit 
firms. The future research should investigate the impact of this consolidation on audit quality. 
Offermanns and Peek (2011) examined whether PCAOB inspection reports signal audit quality 
by analysing inspection reports from January 2005 and March 2010. Their findings indicated that 
inspection reports have information content in terms of signalling audit quality. 
The second spectrum of literature investigates the impact of PCAOB inspection on audit quality 
and shows mixed results. 
Previous studies found evidence suggesting that the PCAOB inspection improves audit quality 
for small auditors. DeFond and Lennox (2011) evaluated the impact of SOX on small auditor in 
the US. The results indicated that PCAOB’s inspections raise the audit quality by encouraging 
the low quality auditor to exit the audit market. The PCAOB enforcement imposes costs on small 
auditors and encourages them to escape from the public audit market. The authors used the audit 
firm’ avoidance of AICPA peer review, or failure to register with the PCAOB, receiving  
weaknesses as they are reviewed or inspected as proxy for low quality audit. In addition, they 
also presumed that low quality auditors are more likely to yield to client pressure by producing 
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less going-concern opinions. Hermanson and Houston (2009) used a quantitative method to 
investigate the second-time inspection results of 116 smaller audit firms (those audit fewer than 
100 issuers annually) in the US. It was found that in their first inspections, 60% of these firms 
had audit deficiencies, while only four audit firms (3%) of these firms had audit deficiencies in 
the second inspections. The results of the analyses suggested an improvement in audit quality 
and quality control among those smaller audit firms that had been inspected twice. Blankley, 
Kerr, and Wiggins (2012) examined the letters produced by triennial audit firms to the PCAOB 
as reactions to their inspections. Data comprised 654 publicly available responses from these 
audit firms. A document analysis approach was adopted. The results indicated that a majority of 
audit firms confirm that they support the PCAOB’s objective of improving audit quality and 
believe that the inspection process results in better audit quality.  
Some studies have focused only on the impact of PCAOB inspection on audit quality of larger 
accounting firms. Carcello, Hollingsworth, and Mastrolia (2011) explore whether the PCAOB 
supervision process leads to an improvement in audit quality in Big Four audit firms.  These 
authors used the change in auditee abnormal accruals as proxy for audit quality. It was concluded 
that the PCAOB oversight procedure had resulted in enhanced audit quality, at least as evaluated 
by the reduction in auditee earning management. Church and Shefchik (2012) examined the 
PCAOB’s inspection reports of large, annually inspected audit firms. The inspection reports 
analyse audit deficiencies which imply audit quality. It was found that there was a notable 
downward linear trend in the number of deficiencies during the studied period. In addition, the 
findings are generally similar as the authors compare Big Four and second-tier audit firms.  
There are a few studies focusing on public oversight board in other countries. For example, 
Carson, Simnett, and Vanstraelen (2013) examined the efficiency of the varying forms of public 
monitored regimes in different countries all over the world by using the quantitative method to 
analyse data. The authors use abnormal accruals as proxy for audit quality.  It is suggested that 
audit quality is better in countries that have a national public inspection body which is a member 
of IFIAR (International Forum of Independent Audit Regulator). Audit quality is better in all 
audit firms for the period when public oversight regimes are promulgated than for the pre-
inspection period. However, the presence of public supervision impacts on audit quality, not on 
the characteristics of a supervision regime. 
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However, a number of prior studies indicate that there is still doubt that audit quality is enhanced 
by an independent inspection system. It is clear that significant questions arise with the creation 
of a regulatory framework designed with public perception in mind (Bather & Burnaby, 2006). 
Boone, Khurana, and Raman (2015) used a quantitative method to investigate the December 
2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte impacted on this audit firm’s switching risk, 
audit fees and audit quality relative to other Big Four firms over the three-year period after the 
censure. The authors utilized absolute abnormal accruals and the likelihood of financial 
misstatements as revealed by subsequent restatements as proxies for audit quality. The finding 
indicated that there is no evidence to suggest that the accounting firm’ audit quality was different 
from that of other big 4 firms during the studied period. Beattie et al. (2013) surveyed chief fiscal 
officers, audit committee chairs and audit partners to obtain their views about the effect of 36 
economic and regulatory factors on audit quality in the UK post- SOX. The results showed that 
all groups consider that different interactions between audit committee members and auditors 
among the above factors are the most influential in improving audit quality. In contrast, 
International Standards on Auditing and the audit oversight system are seen as less effective 
since participants maintain that the changed regime producs high costs with limited benefits. 
Although the PCAOB rules require the publicly registered audit firms to be monitored by the 
PCAOB, almost all audit firms still perform under the peer review system. Using a quantitative 
model approach, Casterella, Jensen, and Knechel (2009) and Hilary and Lennox (2005) 
examined the effectiveness of the peer review system operating under the AICPA’s self-
regulation system. Both sets of researchers drew a nearly similar conclusion: that AICPA gives 
an effective indication of audit quality. However, current actions by authorities indicate that self-
regulation peer review system has not been effective. The change in regulations in the US was a 
reaction to the observation that most audit failures are associated with audit firms with clean 
inspection reports under the peer review system. Turner (2006) criticized the peer review regime 
as a weak self-regulatory system for auditors which led to one firm reviewing another, with a 
code of ‘Don’t tell on me, and I won’t tell on you’. Peer review is considered to be ineffective 
since the peer review is not independent (Fogarty, 1996, DeFond, 2010, Anantharaman, 2012) 
and peer review is not punitive (Fogarty, 1996, DeFond, 2010). Bather and Burnaby (2006) 
pointed out that self-regulation of the auditing profession by audit practitioners means that one 
day they decide on the accuracy and fairness of financial statements, and the next day make a 
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recommendation on the audit processes of those statements. There is a perceived conflict of 
interests in these engagements.  
In sum, almost previous research on the inspection regime has been conducted in the US where 
the PCAOB and AICPA publicly disclose the inspection results. The first stream of literature 
investigates whether the PCAOB signal audit quality. The results are mixed. For instance, 
Lennox and Pittman (2010) showed that audit clients do not consider that the PCAOB’s 
inspection reports are valuable for signalling audit quality. In contrast, Offermanns and Peek 
(2011)’s finding indicates that inspection reports have information content in terms of signalling 
audit quality. The second stream of literature examines the impacts of PCAOB inspection on 
audit quality and produce different results. Several studies including those of DeFond and 
Lennox (2011), Hermanson and Houston (2009), Blankley et al. (2012), Carcello et al. (2011), 
Church and Shefchik (2012) and Carson et al. (2013) found evidence suggesting that the PCAOB 
inspection improve audit quality. However, other studies including Boone et al. (2015) and  
Beattie et al. (2013) concluded that PCAOB inspection does not result in an enhancement of 
audit quality. While the PCAOB rules require the publicly registered audit firms to be monitored 
by the PCAOB, almost all audit firms still perform under the peer review system. Previous 
studies show that AICPA inspections signal audit quality. However, the peer review system is 
often criticized for not being independent and being non-punitive. Most previous studies on the 
influences of PCAOB inspections on audit quality utilize a quantitative method with diverse 
measures as proxies for audit quality, except Blankley et al. (2012). Using document analysis, 
Blankley et al. (2012) examined the letters produced by triennial audit firms to the PCAOB as 
reactions to their inspections. The limitation of this study is that the data was merely documents 
from audit firms. The current study adopts a triangulation method for data collection, including 
semi-structured interviews, secondary data and archival records. The current study uses a 
qualitative approach to investigate the perceived impacts of the independent inspection regime 
together with the punishments for non-compliance, on audit quality in a developing country, 
Vietnam. 
2.8 The impacts of audit reforms on issuing audit opinions 
Empirical research has concentrated on the stream of literature that focuses on the impact of 
audit reforms on going concern behaviours. Previous studies show that audit reforms have 
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impacted going concern reporting behaviour of auditors. For example, Gramling, Krishnan, and 
Yinqi (2011) evaluated whether PCAOB’s recognized audit shortcomings are related to the 
triennially inspected audit firms’ change in issuing going concern opinion for their financially 
distressed audit clients. The results of the document analysis showed that firms with audit 
deficiencies in PCAOB reports were more likely to distribute the going concern opinion for  their 
financially distressed clients after their first inspection than prior to their inspection. With audit 
firms showing no deficiencies in their inspection report, the findings offer less evidence of the 
possibility of publishing going concern opinion. The change in going concern decisions with 
PCAOB audit deficiencies is due to either (1) an increased willingness to stand up to clients 
and/or (2) the increased level of competence in reporting decision. Geiger, Raghunandan, and 
Rama (2005) found evidence that auditors were more likely to produce going-concern modified 
audit opinion after the corporate collapses (such as Enron, WorldCom) and the introduction of 
SOX. Myers, Schmidt, and Wilkins (2014) also conducted models to examine whether SOX 
resulted in a change in auditor behaviour related to going concern opinions. The findings show 
that non-Big N auditors had become significantly more conservative in their going concern 
reporting behavior, whereas the going concern reporting behavior of Big N audit firms had 
generally improved. Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama (2006) investigated the impact of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on going concern reporting behaviors of 
auditors. The finding indicated that auditors were less likely to produce going concern opinions 
for financially distressed audit clients after the adoption of the Act. The major reason for this 
change is a decrease in litigation risk.  
Corporate collapses between 2000 and 2002 led to an increase in litigation against auditors, 
increase in media scrutiny, and improved regulations for the auditing profession. Fargher and 
Liwei (2008) used a quantitative approach to compare the auditors’ tendency to produce going-
concern opinion for publicly listed companies before and after 2000-2002 in Australia. This 
study focused on auditor reporting behaviors after the scandals but prior to the effective date of 
CLERP9. It was found that auditors were more likely to produce going-concern opinions for 
distressed clients immediately after the crisis period. 
Another stream of the literature focuses on impacts of audit reforms on modified audit opinions. 
Zhu and Sun (2012) utilised a quantitative method to investigate the impact of changes in 
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accounting standards on the structure of audit opinions. The result showed that the possibility of 
issuing modified audit opinions did not change considerably due to the reform. However, 
DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999) examined the effect of adopting the new auditing standard related 
to enhanced auditor independence in China. They found that the frequency of modified report 
increased nine-fold due to the change. Blay (2005) investigated the impact of independence 
threats and litigation risk on auditors’ evaluation of information and reporting choices. They 
concluded that auditors who face high litigation risk were more likely to suggest a modified audit 
report. 
To sum up, while some studies provide evidence that audit reforms impact on going-concern 
reporting behaviour of auditors, another stream of literature focuses on the effects of audit 
reforms on modified audit opinion behaviour of auditors. For example, DeFond et al. (1999) 
found that the frequency of modified report increased nine-fold due to the adoption of the new 
auditing standard in China. However, there has been no study specifically focuses on the audit 
reforms related to audit opinions. In this present study, the researcher uses a qualitative method 
to investigate the impacts of audit reform associated with audit opinion on auditors’ reporting 
behaviour. 
2.9 The impacts of audit regulations on auditors’ performance 
There has been an increase in the literature that investigates the impact of audit reforms on 
auditors’ performance all over the world. The results of these studies are mixed. 
A number of studies conclude that the adoption of audit reforms influences auditor performance. 
Öhman and Wallerstedt (2012) investigated the association between audit regulation and the 
development of the auditing profession in Sweden from the end of the nineteenth century to the 
end of the twentieth century. A qualitative method was adopted to analyse the data from 
documents, archives and interviews. These authors conclude that accepted practice has preceded 
audit regulation and that the laws and additional rules codified audit practice in this country.  
The impacts of SOX on auditors’ performance in the US have recently attracted more attention 
from academics. Hoitash, Hoitash, and Bedard (2008) evaluated the audit risk adjustment during 
the first period of SOX adoption. While audit fees increased during the 404 period, the results 
indicate less audit risk adjustment under section 404 than section 302 in the previous year. 
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Nelson (2006) analysed the influence of recent audit reforms in the U.S on auditors and audit 
clients. All academic research related to this topic was gathered. The purpose of the study was to 
analyse Moore et al. (2006) and other publications related to the impacts of the audit reforms. 
The researcher argued that Moore et al. (2006) did not adequately determine how the reforms 
diminish the possibilities of audit flaws by influencing the motivations and actions of auditors 
and audit clients. Shaub (2005) analysed the impact of SOX on five threats to auditor 
independence. Sections of SOX were analysed by employing the model of Shaub (2004). It was 
found that only self-review threats have been substantially dealt with and even in those cases, 
self-review exposures remain. Khlif and Samaha (2014) investigated the effect of the Egyptian 
Standards on Auditing on the relationship between internal quality control and external audit 
delays. They found that the adoption of the Egyptian Standards on Auditing seemed to notably 
improve audit practice by reducing external audit delays. Suil and Seung-Weon (2001) presented 
a model in which a firm’s owner, an auditor, and outside investors strategically interact. The 
study investigated how a change in the auditors’ legal liability to outside investors influenced the 
firm owner’s choice of an internal control system and the auditor’s effort choice. It was 
concluded that, if the auditor’s legal liability to investors is large; there is a loss of efficiency 
since the owner underinvests in the internal control system and the auditor overinvests in audit 
effort. In contrast, if the liability is small, then efficiency is decreased due to the owner’s 
overinvestment and the auditor’s underinvestment.  
Conversely, other studies have concluded that audit reforms do not affect auditor performance. 
Ryu, Uliss, and Roh (2007) evaluated the effects of SOX on auditors’ audit performance. Even 
though it was anticipated that auditors would use a more rigorous audit process in deciding 
whether to issue a going concern or other type of qualified opinion with financially distressed 
clients, results indicated that there was no difference between the post-SOX period and the prior-
SOX period. However, the sample size of the study is small – merely 18 bankrupt firms. 
Patterson and Smith (2007) investigated the influence of SOX on auditing intensity and internal 
control strength by running models. The authors documented that although SOX has induced a 
stronger internal control and less fraud, it has not necessarily resulted in a higher level of control 
testing. Carey, Monroe, and Shailer (2014) reviewed the Australian academic studies 
investigating auditor independence. The purpose of the study was to assess what academics had 
learned about the impact of CLERP 9 on auditor independence. This review provides the little 
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evidence of the impact of the regulatory reforms on auditor behaviour (independence in fact) and 
perceptions (independence in appearance). 
In terms of the influence of inspections regime on auditors’ performance, previous literature 
shows that the reforms associated to inspection regime influence audit practice. The 2007 
PCAOB report showed that, according to their PCAOB inspection results, triennial firms had 
changed their audit processes (PCAOB, 2007). Nelson (2006) pointed out that PCAOB’s 
capability to execute more thorough quality control assessment and impose significant 
punishments on audit firms should encourage auditors to conduct more effective audit since 
auditors stand to be less willing to accept client pressure. Daugherty and Tervo (2010)  
investigated perceptions of the PCAOB’s inspection processes from the leadership of triennial 
audit firms, obtaining their initial oversights. A survey was conducted to get audit firms’ 
perceptions in relation to PCAOB’s inspection processes. Overall, small audit firms documented 
that the PCAOB inspection process led to various negative audit practices, whereas medium and 
large ones stated that their outcomes were more favourable. Similarly, Blankley et al. (2014) 
investigated the impact of PCAOB inspection on triennial audit firms’ audit quality. A 
quantitative was adopted to conduct empirical tests. The results indicate that audit firms respond 
to the deficiencies identified in their inspection reports by improving their audit efforts after the 
inspections.  
In conclusion, studies on the impacts of the audit reforms on auditor performance show different 
results. For instance, Hoitash et al. (2008) evaluated the audit risk adjustment during the first 
period of SOX adoption and the results indicated less audit risk adjustment under section 404 
than section 302 in the prior year. Carey et al. (2014) reviewed the Australian academic studies 
investigating auditor independence. This review displays the little evidence of the impact of the 
regulatory reforms on auditor behaviour (independence in fact) and perceptions (independence in 
appearance). 
In terms of the inspection regime, previous literature concludes the impacts of reforms related to 
inspection regime on auditors’ practice. For instance, Daugherty and Tervo (2010)  concluded 
that  small audit firms documented that PCAOB inspection process led to various negative 
aspects of their audit practice, whereas medium and large ones informed about the more 
favourable outcomes.  
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There have been few studies related to the influence of inspection regime reforms on audit 
practice, including those of Daugherty and Tervo (2010) and Blankley et al. (2014). These 
studies focus on the PCAOB inspection in the US and utilize a quantitative method. In this 
present study, the researcher investigates the impact of audit reforms related to an independent 
inspection regime on auditors’ practice in a developing country, by utilizing a qualitative 
method. 
2.10 Audit firm size and audit quality 
Studies on the difference in audit quality between big N firms and non-big N firms are often 
predicated on two major reasons. Firstly, Big N firms may differentiate their audit services by 
superior technical expertise, which makes their audit quality better than others. Secondly, Big N 
firms differentiate their audit quality by their investment in reputed capital (Cullinan, Du, & 
Zheng, 2012). DeAngelo (1981) made a connection between audit firm size and audit quality and 
stated that Big N audit firms have more incentives to provide higher audit quality.  Big N 
auditors offer better audit quality in the US so as to protect their firms’ reputation and avoid 
litigation cost. Similarly, DeFond and Zhang (2014) stated that “big N auditors are posited to 
provide higher audit quality because they are expected to be more independent. This is because 
their larger client base subjects them to greater reputation risk and less pressure to succumb to 
individual clients and because their “deep pockets” subject them to higher litigation risk”.  
However, some studies found direct evidence that reputation incentives affect Big Four audit 
quality in countries with low litigation risk.  Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) offered evidence on 
the importance of auditors’ reputation for audit quality in Japan where litigation plays no role. In 
this country, the prospect of litigation has no influence on auditors delivering audit quality. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang (2008).  Weber et al. 
(2008) found evidence supporting the reputation rationale for deliver audit quality in Germany 
where litigation risks are relatively small. 
In contrast, other studies found that litigation risk rather than reputation risk affects audit quality 
of Big N audit firms. Lennox (1999) found the lack of evidence for reputation effects and it 
seems to be the threat of litigation rather than the loss of client-specific rents that drives the 
higher audit quality of larger auditors. Khurana and Raman (2004) investigated whether the 
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perceived better audit quality of Big Four audit is related to auditor litigation exposure or to 
reputation concerns in US, Australia, Canada and the UK. The results also indicated that 
litigation exposure rather than reputation protection drives perceived audit quality. 
Previous studies use different indicators as proxies for audit quality. A range of previous studies 
use abnormal accruals as proxy for audit quality. Other measures of audit quality consist of 
litigation rates, number of inspection deficiencies, incidence of restatement, the tendency to issue 
going concern opinion for financially distressed clients and so on. Adopting these measures of 
audit quality, these quantitative studies found that Big N firms provide higher audit quality than 
non-big N firms (Palmrose (1986); Bishop, Hermanson, and Houston (2013); Roybark (2012); 
Hermanson, Houston, and Rice (2007); Hermanson and Houston (2008)). For example, Palmrose 
(1986) demonstrates that the top auditors are punished less by the SEC. Bishop et al. (2013) 
studied the PCAOB’s first time and second time inspections of international audit firms. It is 
concluded that audit firms with deficiencies are smaller, but have more issuer clients than non-
deficiency firms. In addition, Big Four firms are less likely to have shortcomings than others. 
Similarly, Roybark (2012) concludes that audit firms with public quality control criticisms are 
smaller, have fewer office branches and notably fewer audit partners and staff than others. Larger 
audit firms tend to be better equipped to address quality control criticisms discovered by the 
PCAOB prior to the public disclosure.  
In addition, previous literature also indicates that small audit firms face challenges in coping 
with changing and increasingly complex legislation and regulation in comparison with large 
audit firms (Pickering, 2010).  
However, there have been arguments as to why big N and non-big N firms should offer similar 
audit quality. Firstly, Big N and non-Big N firms are subject to the same regulatory and 
professional standards. Hence, both types of audit firms must have a plausible level of audit 
quality. Secondly, “non-Big N auditors have superior knowledge of local markets and better 
relations with their clients”; this makes them better able to detect mistakes and frauds. Thirdly, 
the inability of non-Big N audit firms to afford insurance coverage may increase audit effort in 
non-Big N firms. Finally, auditors often switch between Big N firms and non-Big N firms and 
knowledge transfers could reduce the quality difference between these two types of audit firms 
(Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, & Zhang, 2011). Lawrence et al. (2011) investigated the quality 
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difference between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. The authors use three indicators as proxies 
for audit quality, including discretionary accruals, the ex ante cost-of-equity capital, and analyst 
forecast accuracy. This study found that the treatment effects of Big 4 auditors are insignificantly 
different from those of non-Big 4 auditors in terms of all the three audit quality indicators. 
Boone, Khurana, and Raman (2010) found limited evidence to suggest that Big N firms could be 
more likely to adequately produce going concern opinions than non-Big N firms. Petroni and 
Beasley (1996) found no difference in claim loss reserve accuracy between audit clients of big N 
and non-big N auditors. 
In conclusion, a number of previous studies conclude that Big N auditors have more incentives to 
provide higher audit quality due to reputation risk as well as litigation risk (Cullinan et al., 2012, 
DeAngelo, 1981, DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Studies such as those of Skinner and Srinivasan 
(2012) and Weber et al. (2008) found direct evidence that reputation incentives affect Big Four 
audit quality in countries with low litigation risk. However, other studies including Lennox 
(1999) and Khurana and Raman (2004) found that litigation risk rather than reputation risk 
affects the audit quality of Big N audit firms. 
Most of the previous studies used different indicators as proxies for audit quality and found that 
Big N firms provide higher audit quality than non-big N firms; these studies included Palmrose 
(1986), Roybark (2012), Bishop et al. (2013) among others. In addition, previous literature also 
considers that small audit firms face challenges to cope with changing and increasingly complex 
legislation and regulation in comparison with large audit firms (Pickering, 2010). However, there 
have been arguments as to why Big N and non-Big N firms should offer similar audit quality. 
For instance, Lawrence et al. (2011) found that the treatment effects of Big 4 auditors are 
insignificantly different from those of non-Big 4 auditors in terms of all three audit quality 
indicators. Boone et al. (2010) found limited evidence to suggest that big N firms would be more 
likely to adequately produce going concern opinions than non-big N firms. 
2.11 Vietnam in brief and prior studies on accounting and auditing. 
Since 1986, Vietnam has been reforming its economic system which moves from a centrally 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy to connect with other countries in the world. 
       59   
The Vietnamese accounting system was modified in 1995 (Jacques & Nguyen, 2011). However, 
the first audit firm was established in 1991 (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2008).  
There has been a range of studies related to accounting reforms during the period of economic 
transition in this country. Nguyen and Eddie (1994) studied the reform of the accounting system 
in Vietnam. Their conclusion was that the Vietnamese accounting system needed further 
reformed in order to be aligned with the country’s political, social, legal, cultural and economic 
characteristics as well as the needs for internationalisation of its economy. Nguyen and Pham 
(1997) conducted a study on important changes in Vietnamese accounting practices and 
profession as the country was in transition from the central planning system to a more market-
oriented system, with particular focus on the new accounting system issued by the MOF in 1995. 
They concluded that the newly introduced accounting system represents an important step 
towards conformity with international accounting standards and harmonisation with ASEAN’s. 
Narayan and Godden (2000) focused on financial management and governance issues in 
Vietnam. Their study provided an overview of accounting and auditing in Vietnam, the 
professional infrastructure, accounting and auditing standards, training, government budgeting 
and accounting, donor assistance and outlined issues and recommendations on how the financial 
management and governance issues in Vietnam could be improved in the late 1990s. Yang and 
Nguyen (2003) studied the enterprise accounting system of Vietnam and the United States’ 
generally accepted accounting principles. Major similarities and differences between the US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and the Vietnamese accounting system promulgated 
in 1995 were highlighted. Adams and Do (2005) examined the Convergence of Vietnamese 
accounting and auditing principles to international accounting and auditing principles. They 
provided an overview of accounting and auditing practices in Vietnam and compared them with 
international conventions and practices, including international standards on accounting and 
auditing until April 2005.  
Pomberg, Pourjalali, Daniel, and Kimbro (2012) and Le (2011) focused on management 
accounting information system in Vietnam. In her thesis, Bui (2011b) sought to understand the 
factors underpinning the development of the accounting profession including external factors, 
such as pressure from France, the US, China and the Soviet Union, and internal factors such as 
political and economic policies. Despite French rule for more than 80 years, the development of 
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the accounting profession in Vietnam was not initiated or influenced by the French. The 
accounting and auditing legal frameworks have improved by providing a transparent system to 
meet the requirements of the socialist-oriented market economy. In addition, it is argued that the 
Vietnamese state has played a dominant role in the development of accounting in the post-
colonial periods, by regulating accounting practice. Bui (2011b) suggested that other research is 
needed to study the development of the auditing profession, the development of the taxation 
system, and in-depth study on the development of the Vietnamese accounting and auditing 
standards. In addition, the accounting and auditing legal framework in Vietnam continued to 
improve as the country integrates with the world economy. This resulted in the issuance of the 
Law on External audit on 29/03/2011. Bui (2011b) suggests the future research should examine 
the implications of this regulation for the accounting and auditing profession in Vietnam. 
Hooper, Nguyen, and Sinclair (2011) focused mainly on the French legacy of accounting 
development in Vietnam. Nguyen, Hooper, and Sinclair (2012) explored the probability of 
substantive change in the Vietnamese accounting field, given that as approached from 
Bourdieu’s perspective of the “habitus”, most participants are likely, but not necessarily, to react 
conservatively to change. Interviews with bookkeepers, professional accountants, managers and 
academics were conducted. It was found that of the 44 interviews, the bookkeepers were 
generally opposed to change. They preferred a compliance mode of accounting that relied on 
government instructions. Conversely, the representatives from other groups were more open to 
change and saw merit in following accounting principles rather than government rules. Other 
Vietnamese studies focused on accounting reforms in the economic transition in this country, 
including Chu (2004), Jacques and Nguyen (2011), K. Tran and Nguyen (2012), Doan and 
Nguyen (2013) and Dang, Marriott, and Marriott (2006).  Chu (2004) investigated accounting 
change during the period when the economy was being transformed from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy in Vietnam. It was found that Vietnamese accounting has 
distinctive characteristics in comparison with those of other countries. The most notable 
phenomena of the development of accounting in this country are: the importation of accounting 
from developed countries and the influence of Vietnamese culture and socialist ideology on its 
development. Jacques and Nguyen (2011) analysed economic transition and accounting system 
reform in Vietnam. It was concluded that, unlike many accounting reforms in former socialist 
countries, Vietnamese accounting reforms result from both external pressures and internal needs. 
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The Vietnamese accounting system is moving towards a private capitalist accounting system 
while still preserving elements of the old system. This movement faces difficulties due to 
adapting a private capitalist accounting system to work in a state-dominated market economy. 
Doan and Nguyen (2013) offered a comprehensive and concise review of changes in accounting 
regulations and practice in Vietnam from the mid-1980s and analysed the future development. 
The Vietnamese accounting system consists of elements taken from Western accounting and 
factors inherited from the old (Soviet- style and French- influenced) system. The future 
convergence toward international practice seems to be slow, especially with small and medium 
enterprise and large enterprises that do not attract capital from foreign investment.  
Xiaoping (2008) compared Vietnamese accounting system reforms and Chinese reforms. The 
two countries’ accounting system reforms should be identical and these two countries should 
actively converge toward international accounting standards as well as fully consider their 
domestic situation. 
Nguyen and Nguyen (2012) examined current Vietnamese accounting regulations introduced to 
enhance international harmonization and showed how Vietnam developed an accounting system 
that harmonises with international standards while preserving macroeconomic control. The 
recent Vietnamese accounting system had been introduced to implement Vietnam’s commitment 
to harmonise its accounting system with world practices. This process faces difficulties due to 
the country’s accounting tradition and Vietnam’s economic system. It was shown that 
Vietnamese regulations have been carefully adapted and combined so that Vietnamese 
accounting standards can co-exist with the uniform accounting system. This makes the Vietnam 
system different from the Anglo-Saxon world, but is comparable to China. 
Nguyen and Gong (2014) also evaluated the formal convergence between Vietnamese 
accounting standards and International Accounting Standards (IAS)/IFRS from the perspectives 
of a single standard, clusters of standards and the whole standards. Twenty-four Vietnamese 
accounting standards were selected as the sample. The method of matching and fuzzy clustering 
analysis developed by Qu and Zhang (2010) was employed. They indicated that the level of 
convergence between the two sets of standards is mid-level convergence. 
       62   
However, few studies have been conducted on auditing, and no study has been conducted on 
auditing regulations, in the country. Vo, Mai, Nguyen, and Pham (2013) evaluated the benefits of 
state audit for state economic groups and conglomerates, whereas Vu  and Nassery (2010) 
identified the differences in ethical awareness and ethical judgement of auditors in three 
countries namely Sweden, India and Vietnam. Vo et al. (2013) concluded that state audits have 
served its main functions and offered benefits in testing information distributed by the state 
economic groups. Vu  and Nassery (2010) stated that auditors’ awareness and ethical judgement 
are influenced mainly by their national cultures, age and experiences. However, education and 
gender failed to be regarded as important, influential factors. The level of ethical sensitivity is 
homogeneous in all audit firms regardless of their size. Favere-Marchesi (2000) studies audit 
quality, audit independence and liability of mandatory audit in ASEAN. This research utilizes 
questionnaires to seek the perceptions of participants from Big Five audit firms, representatives 
from regulatory bodies and professional bodies. This research concludes the difference between 
competence requirement of auditors, the requirement of mandatory audit, and the reporting 
responsibility. In addition, audit quality in these countries is compromised since there is the lack 
of rules regarding to audit independence. The liability regimes in these countries are considered 
not to provide incentives for auditors to supply high audit quality. Do and Ngo (2015) and Phan 
(2016) pay attention to factors influencing the quality of financial statements audit in Vietnam. A 
survey was conducted with auditors in different kind of audit firms in the former study. It is 
suggested in the former study that occupational qualification is an important factor affecting 
audit quality of enterprise financial statements in Vietnam. The latter study utilizes a mixed 
method and concludes that the elements of the cost and staff capacity, ownership of enterprises 
audit, quality control work inside, quality control work outside are significant factors that impact 
audit quality in Vietnam. Pham et al. (2014) investigates auditors’ perspectives of audit quality 
and factors affecting audit quality in Vietnam. It is concluded that there are positive association 
between (1) audit firm size and audit quality, (2) industry expertise auditor and audit quality. The 
study also suggested that employee turnover and past employment with audit client have 
negative effects on audit quality in Vietnam.  
Nguyen (2015) investigates how knowledge is managed in an auditing firm in Vietnam. Findings 
offer useful insights to build a theoretical model of knowledge management process in auditing. 
The auditing process classifies into three main stages: collecting, analysing, and synthesizing.  
       63   
In sum, there have been a large number of previous studies on accounting in Vietnam, especially 
accounting reforms. The overall results of these studies show that Vietnam has adopted 
significant accounting reforms in their transitional process of the economy. The accounting legal 
framework in Vietnam is harmonizing with the international one. However, studies on external 
audit in Vietnam are quite rare. For example, Vo et al. (2013) evaluated the benefits of state audit 
for state economic groups and conglomerates, whereas Vu  and Nassery (2010) identified the 
differences in ethical awareness and ethical judgement of auditors in three countries namely 
Sweden, India and Vietnam. Study of Favere-Marchesi (2000) merely focuses on audit quality 
and participants of audit firms come only from Big Five audit firms. Do and Ngo (2015) and 
Phan (2016) and Pham et al. (2014) concentrate on factors affecting audit quality in Vietnam. 
Nguyen (2015) concentrates on knowledge management in auditing firms in Vietnam. These 
studies fail to recognize the impact of the current audit reforms in Vietnam. 
To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, no study on audit regulations in Vietnam has been 
published. This current study aims to report on key stakeholders’ views on the reasons for the 
establishment of the Law on External Audit and the impacts of its audit reforms on the audit 
profession in Vietnam. 
2.12 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the key literature on the audit reforms and the impacts of 
audit reforms on audit firms, audit market and auditors, which are major themes of this study. 
After the corporate collapse occur around the world, a number of countries have revised their 
accounting and auditing legal frameworks. Several studies conclude that the audit reforms were 
introduced in the public interest, whereas others stand on the view of capture theory of regulation 
or Economic Interest theory of regulation state that audit reforms potentially has not promoted 
social welfare.  
The studies on the impacts of audit reforms on audit firms and audit markets convey mixed 
results. Most studies on the impact of audit reforms on the audit market structure point out that 
the reforms result in an increase in the audit market concentration in developed countries. For 
instance, Beckstead (2006) concluded that the PCAOB’s rules covering auditing standards for all 
auditors of public companies really raise barrier to entry the public accounting market for small 
audit firms. Very few studies on this issue have been conducted in developing countries, except 
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China. Zhu and Sun (2012) found that the reform of accounting standards have not impacted 
audit market concentration in China. Other previous studies found that the audit reforms 
decreased the level of audit market concentration. For example, DeFond, Wong and Li (1999) 
show a decrease in audit market concentration due to the implementation of new auditing 
standards in China.  
The literature also shows that few studies have focused on the impact of audit regulatory reforms 
on consolidation among audit firms. For instance, there has been merely statement of Willekens 
et al. (2008) that the Law on Auditing in Russia resulted in mergers between audit firms. 
 Studies focusing on audit firms’ views of the current mandatory audit partner rotation 
requirement and the adoption of mandatory audit partner rotation of audit firms in practice were 
all conducted in developed countries such as in Australia, UK and US. For instance, Ryken et al. 
(2007), Chapple and Hossain (2011), Houghton et al. (2010) and Kend (2004) were conducted in 
Australia.  
Previous literature indicates that few countries in the world have required audit firms to publish 
annual transparency reports. To date, there have been few studies on the mandatory requirement 
for issuance of such reports and the implementation of this requirement in practice. 
The literature also suggests different results in terms of the influence of audit reforms on audit 
practice, particularly audit quality, auditors’ behaviour when issuing audit opinions and auditors’ 
performance. For instance, Daugherty and Tervo (2010)  concluded that  small audit firms 
reported that the PCAOB inspection process had a negative influence on their audit practice, 
whereas Blankley et al. (2014)’s results indicated that audit firms respond to the deficiencies 
identified in their inspection reports by improving their audit efforts after the inspections.  
There have been a large number of previous studies on accounting in Vietnam, especially 
accounting reforms. However, no study on audit regulations in Vietnam has been published. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter offers an overview of the key literature on the audit regulatory reforms 
around the world. This chapter builds the theoretical framework for the current thesis. Public 
Interest theory of regulation and Neo Institutional theory will be utilized in the theoretical 
framework of this study. This chapter will review key theorists and the main aspects of their 
theories. In addition, this chapter also reviews the previous studies in accounting and auditing 
areas utilizing these theories as frameworks. Finally, the researcher presents plausible 
justification as to why these theories are used to explain the findings of the thesis. 
3.2 Public interest theory of regulation 
3.2.1 Public Interest theory of regulation 
The regulation theories provide the framework for identifying the relationship between 
regulation and the different groups to which it applies, and how these groups are affected by 
regulatory reforms (Hecimovic, 2007). The Public Interest theory, the Capture theory and the 
Economic Interest group theory of regulation are the major regulation theories. The Public 
Interest theory of regulation suggests that regulatory changes are made in the interest of the 
public. In contrast, researchers who embrace Capture theory argue that in the introduction of 
regulation, the organizations that are subject to the regulations will come to control the regulator. 
The regulated organizations will ultimately gain control of the regulatory body since they know 
that the decisions made by the regulator influence significantly their organizations. The regulated 
parties will capture the regulators with the intention that the regulations made by the regulators 
will bring advantages to their parties. The Economic Interest group theory of regulation makes 
an assumption that groups will establish to protect particular interests. Different groups are seen 
as being in conflicts with each other and they will lobby government or regulators to introduce 
regulations that benefit them. There are divergent ways of looking at the same phenomenon: 
some academics believe that the regulatory reform was brought about for the public interest, 
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while others may see that the reform serves the private interests of those who controlled the 
introduction of the reform (Deegan, 2009).  
Public Interest theory is an economic theory first developed by Pigou (1938). Pigou (1938) stated 
that governments need to intervene in the free play of the market to save resources and to protect 
the public “In any industry, where there is reason to believe that the free play of self-interest will 
cause an amount of resources to be invested different from the amount that is required in the best 
interest of the national dividend, there is a prima facie case for public intervention”. According 
to public theorists, regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the 
correction of inefficient or inequitable market practices. That is, regulation is first put in place to 
benefit the whole society rather than a particular social group. The regulators are seen as neutral 
arbiters that represent the interests of the society. The promulgation of legislation is considered 
as a balancing act between the social benefits and the social costs of the regulation. Applying this 
argument to financial accounting, and assuming the existence of a capital economy, society 
needs confidence that capital markets efficiently direct resources to productive assets. Regulation 
is seen as an instrument that creates such confidence (Deegan, 2009). Governments intervene in 
the market for the purpose of protecting the public interest, and maximizing the social welfare on 
behalf of society (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). The regulation is produced in response to the demand 
of the public for corrections of markets (Gaffikin, 2005). According to this theory, the central 
authority is the regulator who is supposed to have the best interests of society at heart and the 
regulator tries to maximize social welfare. Therefore, regulation is considered as a trade-off 
between the cost of regulation and its social benefits in the form of improved operation of 
markets (Scott, 2009). This theory was the dominant perspective of regulation until the 1960s 
and still has a large number of supporters. However, it is often criticized that the public interest 
theory underestimates the impacts of economic and political power that affect regulation 
(Gaffikin, 2005).  
The original Public Interest theory was based on two assumptions. One is that economic markets 
are extremely fragile and likely to operate very inefficiently if left alone. Another is that the 
government regulation is virtually costless. With these assumptions, it could be argued that the 
principal government interventions in the economy were responses of government to public 
demands for the rectification of palpable inefficiencies and inequities in the operation of the free 
       67   
market. The reformulation of the Public Interest theory holds that regulatory agencies are 
established for public purposes; however, they are then mismanaged. As a result, those purposes 
are not always achieved (Posner, 1974). 
Proponents of this theory see that its aim is to achieve certain publicly desired results which, if 
left to the market, would not be produced (Bator, 1958). Shubik (1970) concluded that 
government regulation is the way to overcome the drawbacks of imperfect competition. 
Perspectives that emphasize the public interest center on the view that those charged with 
regulation do so in accordance with public interest objectives rather than group or individual 
self-interest (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, Cochran, 1974).  
However, it is difficult to determine the public interest. The meaning of the term ‘public interest” 
is subject to notable debate (Sikka, Willmott, & Lowe, 1989). The public interest is well 
understood at the policy level, whereas at the operating level, the expression is vague and has 
various interpretations (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008). 
Cochran (1974) differentiated theories of public interest into four categories. The first is the 
normative theory of the public interest. The public interest becomes an ethical standard for 
assessing particular public policies and targets that the political order could follow. The 
normative view of public interest is fundamentally concerned with the good of the community as 
a whole. Hence, a policy or action is considered to be in the public interest when it enhances the 
collective welfare of the public. The second category is the abolitionist theory, whose proponents 
refuse to believe that the concept of the public interest has meaning or validity. There are no 
interests pertaining to the public as a whole; there are merely different groups with their own 
specific set of interests. The third category is the process theory whose advocates consider the 
concept of the public interest by referring to the political processes through which policy is 
generated. According to these theorists, there is no ‘public’ with a single interest, merely groups 
having different interests. The fourth one is the consensualist theory according to which the 
public interest is a vague, but valuable, term that refers policy debate to a public value 
consensus. Concensualist theorists “emphasize interests broader than those of special interests 
groups” (Cochran, 1974). This perspective is nearer to the normative view of public interest than 
those of the abolitionist or process theorists since consensual theorists view ethical standards as 
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well as peoples’ interests in a context that is broader than immediate self-interest (Dellaportas & 
Davenport, 2008).  
Dellaportas and Davenport (2008) summarized more clearly the four categories of Cochran 
(1974). Normative theories have an ethical standard that is intended to maximize the interests of 
all or most of the population. Consensualist theories view morals in policy debate and consist of 
a considerable proportion of the population, but not the entire population. Process theories 
propose that the public is comprised of competing groups with different interests. Finally, 
abolitionist theorist refute the notion of the public or an ethical standard and refer merely to 
immediate self-interest (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008). 
 Generally, when the term ‘public interest’ is used in accounting, it is taken to refer to the 
collective well-being of the community. The public interest is defined in the codes of ethics 
(APES 110) promulgated by the Australian professional accounting bodies as “the collective 
well-being of the community of people and institutions that the members serve”. The duties to 
serve the public interest are not confined to any specific group, but to all stakeholders. The 
definition of public interest in accounting is in line with Cochran’s (1974) normative 
classification of public interest theories. The perspective is that the accounting profession should 
exist to serve the interests of the wider community, consisting of non-users, seems to be 
impossible. The consensualist notion of the public interest constrains the scope of public to 
primary users of accounting information (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008). The primary users of 
financial reports normally consist of investors and members of the financial community 
(Davenport & Dellaportas, 2009).  
Parker (1994) defined public interest is the actions to “protect the economic interest of 
professional members’ clients and of third parties who place reliance on the pronouncements and 
advice delivered by both the professional body and its members”. According to Colson (2004), 
the accounting profession’s public comprises clients, credit grantors, governments, employers, 
investors, the business and financial community, and others who rely on the objectivity and 
integrity of certified public accountants to maintain the function of commerce. SEC 
commissioners and chief accountants have considered that auditors should be the guardians of 
the investing public’s interest, which implies that auditors should align their interests with those 
of the users of their reports. 
       69   
3.2.2 The adoption of Public Interest theory of regulation in the accounting and auditing 
literature 
Recent research often concludes that the accounting profession frequently professes to serve the 
public interest, whereas in actuality it serves its own private interest. For instance, in seeking a 
supplemental Royal Charter (issued in 1948), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales appealed to its guardianship of the public interest by confirming that “:…the 
furtherance of the aforesaid objectives would be facilitated and the public interest served…” 
(Sikka et al., 1989). Sikka et al. (1989) referred to the inability of the professional associations to 
serve the public interest. The profession is accused of pursuing economic self-interest in the 
name of public interest (Lee (1995)  in Canning and O'Dwyer (2001); Canning and O’Dwyer 
(2003); Parker (1987); Parker (1994)). It seems that the self-regulation of the accounting 
profession is concerned with protecting the profession’s reputation rather than protecting the 
public interest (Bédard, 2001). The public interest is included in the code of ethics merely to 
avoid criticism and retain the privilege of self-regulation (Collins and Schultz, 1995, Canning 
and O'Dwyer, 2001). There is a risk that the profession will be unwilling to enforce its own code 
of ethics and, therefore, self-regulation is not appropriate (Henderson & Henderson, 2001). 
Baker (2005) evaluated the rhetorical claims made by AICPA, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and PWC which claim to act in public interest. The results indicate that there 
are economic interests involved and these economic interests generate a public accounting 
ideology, one that conflates the values and actions of the public accounting profession by 
appearing to serve the public interest. Davenport and Dellaportas (2009) investigated accounting 
profession members’ interpretation of the public interest ideal and to obtain their opinions about 
the issues in the literature which indicate that the profession serves self-interest rather than public 
interest. The findings suggested that members emphasize the formal definition of the public 
interest, but their application of the public interest in actuality is inconsistent with this definition. 
In contrast, the results of Fisher, Gunz, and McCutcheon (2001) show that the disciplinary 
process of ACCA in the UK operates both in the public interest and in the association’s private 
interest. 
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Recent corporate collapses have caused the public to question the independence of the auditing 
profession. Questions are raised in terms of the need for greater government involvement in 
regulations of accounting and auditing practices around the world. The self-regulation to protect 
the public interest has been increasingly challenged (Willmott, Puxty, and Cooper, 1993, Sikka 
et al., 1989). Thus, the increase in state involvement in the auditing profession has been seen 
crucial to safeguard the public interest (O’Regan, 2010). In the context of auditing profession, an 
audit firm must have capacity to assure that its audit clients comply with financial reporting 
frameworks and its ability to ensure that the firm discharges its responsibilities to the company’s 
shareholders and creditors. These capacities depend on two factors. The first associates with the 
auditor’s independence from the audit client, while the second one relates to its capacity to 
unearth questionable accounting methods. Audit failures occur in the context of auditing as 
auditors’ independence and their ability to unearth questionable accounting methods are 
undermined. An example is the bankruptcy of Enron in 2001. From 1997, Enron has fraudulently 
managed its financial reports to mislead its shareholders and creditors. However, Enron also put 
pressure on Arthur Andersen (Enron's auditor) to ignore these issues. Arthur Andersen was 
found guilty of illegally destroying documents associated to the SEC investigation which stopped 
its license to audit public companies, effectively closing the business (Fooks, 2003). The 
involvement of government in setting accounting standards is a result of audit failure. Market 
forces alone do not create the quality and quantity of information needed to benefit society 
(Brown & Tarca, 2001).  
The states play a crucial role since a regulative bargain must be struck so as to obtain and 
maintain jurisdictional protection. Governments in Europe have required, in exchange for 
jurisdictional protection, much greater power over the professions (Macdonald (1995) in Bédard 
(2001)). In the US and Australia, the public interest as a rationale for regulation has received 
academic acceptance (Hantke-Domas, 2003, Hecimovic & Martinov-Bennie, 2009). Typical 
examples of the greater involvement of governments in the regulations of auditing and 
accounting are the SOX in the US and the CLERP9 in Australia. In response to pressure from the 
public, these reforms were enacted so as to protect the investment community and other 
stakeholders (Brown & Tarca, 2001). 
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There have been several studies utilizing the Public Interest theory as a framework in relation to 
accounting and auditing regulation. Several studies affirm that public interest is a reasonable 
motivation for increased government interventions in the accounting and auditing field. Brown 
and Tarca (2001) study the future of Australian accounting standard setting and use the 
perspective of Public Interest to state that government intervention in accounting and auditing 
regulation is a low cost solution to improve capital market confidence. According to Godfrey 
(2006), the Public Interest theory provides an explanation for the decision by the Australian 
government to intervene by regulating the standard setting process. The purpose of the 
intervention was to serve the general public interest, which is evidenced by the enhanced 
investor confidence in the capital markets. Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009) used public 
interest theory of regulation to explain the Australian government intervention in the audit 
market by making the auditing standards the force of law. Riotto (2008) examined and explained 
the impacts of 11 titles of the SOX and conclude that this act set up new substantive and 
procedural requirements for public interest entities for the purpose of enhance the quality of 
financial reporting, disclosure and auditing. According to the author, in the short run the public 
interest is taken into attention. Canada, Kuhn, and Sutton (2008) investigate the foundations 
underlying the SOX and the results show a clear picture of why the public interest research 
should be rallied behind SOX. The SOX is considered as one of the most significant acts with 
regard to the protection of the public interest in the area of corporate financial interest. 
Engebretson (2006) surveyed accountants, bankers, financial analysts, internal auditors and 
educators to get their perspectives on the purpose of the SOX, the effectiveness of SOX in 
achieving that aims, as well as the effectiveness of this Act in enhancing quality of audit, fiscal 
data, and corporate governance. It was concluded that the top three aims of the Act were to 
enhance the reliability of corporate reports, rebuild investor confidence in the fiscal market and 
prevent fraud in the future. Stiglitz (2002) in Harold Mulherin (2007) considered the SEC to be 
in the public interest and implied support for the SEC policies, for instance Regulation Fair 
Disclosure. 
However, other studies found that government regulations serve both public interest and its own 
private interest. O’Regan (2010) used Public Interest theory as framework to investigate the 
reform in the auditing profession in Ireland, the introduction of an independent authority, the 
Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority to regulate the profession. The authors 
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found that both the government and the profession presented arguments based on the public 
interest to support their respective strategies. The profession’s view of public interest failed to 
resonate with the government, the media or the public. In opposing the profession’s claims, the 
government stated its priority of defining and protecting the public interest in the face of private 
interest. Bédard (2001) evaluated the role of disciplinary activities of the accounting profession 
in protecting the public interest in the Canadian province of Quebec. In this domain, despite the 
fact that the profession is self-regulated, some rules are enforced by the government, consisting 
of compulsory public participation and oversight conducted by a regulatory agency. The results 
showed that the predominance of the public interest over the private interest relies on the degree 
of regulation and public participation. Lesage, Sabine, and Kettunen (2012) examined the 
“public interest protection” asserted by both proponents and opponents of the joint audit system. 
European Commission released a Green Paper “Audit policy: Lessons from the Crisis” in 2010. 
The debate raised by the EC paper in terms of joint audit as a system to constraint audit market 
concentration, led the authors to examine the costs and benefits of this system. The results do not 
provide evidence that higher costs and better audit quality are related to joint audit. It was 
concluded that both groups were more concerned with defending their self-interest rather than 
protecting the public interest. 
Previous studies utilizing the Public Interest theory of regulation as frameworks were conducted 
in developed countries, such as the US, Australia rather than in developing countries. Hence, 
there is a lack of research using this theory in developing country. In addition, these previous 
studies in developed countries show mixed results regarding to governments’ motivations for 
accounting and auditing reforms. Studies conducted by Brown and Tarca (2001), Godfrey 
(2006), Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009), Riotto (2008), Kuhn, and Sutton (2008), and 
Engebretson (2006) confirm that public interest is the main motivation of governments’ 
accounting and auditing reforms. In contrast, other studies indicate that governments’ regulations 
in accounting and auditing fields serve both public interest and their own private interests (For 
example, O’Regan (2010), (Bédard, 2001) and Lesage et al. (2012)). The current research aims 
to base on Public Interest theory as a framework to investigate the motivations for audit reforms 
in a developing country, Vietnam. 
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3.2.3 Using Public Interest theory of regulation as a framework of the current study 
There are major reasons why the Public Interest theory is appropriate to explain the introduction 
of the Law on External Audit (2011) in Vietnam.  
Firstly, this Law was promulgated for the correction of inefficient market practices. There have 
been a range of shortcomings in the Vietnamese audit market. The scale of audit market has been 
still limited and the number of practising auditors has been small. In addition, audit quality has 
been poor; audit training has been not professional; and auditors have violated the ethical 
principles when auditing. Audit quality control in Vietnam has been incompetent and there have 
been circumstances where some auditors have lent their audit certificates to others to establish 
audit firms. One of the major reasons that led to these shortcomings was the lack of competent 
audit regulation since the highest level of audit regulation was only a Decree while in other areas 
such as banking, security the highest level of regulation is a Law (VIB, 2011). Since the highest 
level of audit regulation was only the Decree (the Decree No 105/2004/ND-CP on External 
Audit), there were a range of problems. The Degree did not clearly show the rights, duties and 
the prohibited activities of audit firms, auditors, and audit clients. Consequently, it was difficult 
to determine the responsibilities of audit firms and auditors and to deal with violations. 
Furthermore, the Decree did not have detailed sections associated sanctions of violations 
(Quochoi, 2011). Hence, there were shortcomings in the Vietnamese audit market needed to be 
fixed. 
Secondly, the auditing profession in Vietnam does not have enough power to capture the 
regulation since the accounting profession in Vietnam is a state-controlled profession (Bui, 
2011b). Heavy government involvement in economic activities is a common phenomenon in 
developing countries. There is evidence to suggest that in many developing countries the 
profession is not in a position to effectively regulate accounting, even in some countries without 
any recognized professional organizations. Therefore, regulation of accounting in the public 
interest by a government body, with the establishment of accounting principles and the 
supervision of their application throughout the economy as its major tasks, deserves serious 
consideration in developing countries (Perera, 1989). The relationship between the state and the 
accounting profession in many developing countries, such as Thailand, China, Cambodia, 
Ethiopia, Iran is state-controlled profession, which is described by Siegrist (1900) as one 
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demonstrating a top-to-bottom development led by the state and is subject to state ordinances ( 
for example, Pholkeo and Yapa (2012), Zhen (1999), Terdpaopong and Mihret (2013) and Saeed 
(2006)). Therefore, the current study does not use Capture theory of regulation as its theoretical 
framework. 
According to Pigou (1938), governments need to intervene in the free play of the market to save 
resources and to protect the public “In any industry, where there is reason to believe that the free 
play of self-interest will cause an amount of resources to be invested different from the amount 
that is required in the best interest of the national dividend, there is a prima facie case for public 
intervention”. The Vietnamese economy has been a market-oriented economy since the 
implementation of the Doi Moi policy in 1986. This economy is in the transition to a free market. 
All state-owned auditing companies were privatized. The adoption of international accounting 
and auditing standards, framework helps the Vietnamese audit market in the process of 
transforming to a free market.  Hence, the adoption of this theory to the Vietnamese market is 
applicable. 
Public interest theory will be used to explain the internal motivations that led the Vietnamese 
government to introduce the Law. This thesis relies on the definition of the public interest 
according to the concept proposed by Parker (1994). The author defined public interest actions as 
those intended to “protect the economic interest of professional members’ clients and of third 
parties who place reliance on the pronouncements and advice delivered by both the professional 
body and its members”. The third party comprises lenders, regulators, social interest groups, 
government, and corporate shareholders.  
This section reviews the regulation theories and justifies the adoption of Public Interest theory of 
regulation in the theoretical framework of the current study. The following section will discuss 
about Institutional theory and the justification for the adoption of this theory in the theoretical 
framework. 
3.3 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory offers an explanation of how organizations seek to align perceptions of their 
practices and characteristics with social and cultural values which are institutionalized in 
organizations (Deegan, 2009). Institutional theorists suggest that organizations react to the 
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pressures from their institutionalized environments by developing or altering their practices 
which enhance their organizations’ legitimacy in their environment (Zucker, 1987). Neo-
institutional theory was originally developed in the sociology field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
`DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contended that bureaucratization and other forms of 
organizational change appear as a result of processes that cause organizations to become more 
similar. This process is largely influenced by the state and the professions. Highly structured 
organizational fields offer a circumstance in which individual efforts to address uncertainty and 
constraint usually lead to homogeneity in structure, culture and output. Fligstein (1990) in 
Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) studied institutional theory in public sectors and stated that 
there are two parts to the institutional theory of change: (1) organizations subject to 
governmental pressure and embrace institutional myths; and (2) strategies and structures are 
disseminated and organizations in the field become homogenized. 
There are two major dimensions of institutional theory. The first one is isomorphism and the 
second one is decoupling. The following sections will discuss these aspects of institutional 
theory. 
3.3.1 Isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces one unit 
in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions”. At 
the population level, this approach indicates that organizational characteristics are modified by 
increasing their compatibility with environmental characteristics. Institutional theory interprets 
how organizational structures and practices are shaped through changes generated by 
institutional isomorphism. An organization is considered as a member of an organizational field 
that consists of some organizations or industries which are subject to a similar institutional 
environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) classified three types of institutional isomorphism: 
coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism.  
Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations 
by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society 
within which organizations operate. These pressures are: force, persuasion or invitations. In 
some cases, organizational change is a response to a governmental mandate (DiMaggio & 
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Powell, 1983). The presence of a common legal environment impacts on many aspects of an 
organization’s behavior and structure. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that states and other 
large rational organizations extend their dominance over areas of social life. Thus, organizational 
structures increasingly come to reflect rules and regulations legitimized by the state. According 
to Touron (2005), there are two main stakeholders that exert coercive pressure. Firstly, the state 
enacts rules and regulations exerting institutional pressures on organizations. Secondly, the 
capital suppliers have financial resources that organizations need (Touron, 2005). 
A mimetic process occurs in the presence of uncertainty. Uncertainty is a powerful force that 
encourages imitation. As organizational technologies are poorly understood or targets are 
ambiguous, or the environment symbolic is uncertainty, organizations may mimic other 
organizations. Organizations have tendencies to mimic other similar organizations in their area 
which they consider to be more legitimate or successful. Modeling is a response to uncertainty. 
Models could be diffused through employee transfer or by consulting firms or industry trade 
associations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Normative pressures stem primarily from professionalization. Professionalization is the 
collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their 
work, to control “the production of procedures”. Two factors of professionalization are crucial 
sources of isomorphism. One is the formal education and legitimizing of a cognitive base 
produced by university specialists and the second one is the elaboration of professional networks 
that span organizations and across which new models diffuse rapidly. Professional and trade 
associations provide a vehicle for the definition and promulgation of normative rules about 
organizational and professional behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Scott (2008) defined institutions as “comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to 
social life”. Three pillars of institutions, regulative, normative ad cultural-cognitive pillar 
correspond to three kinds of institutional isomorphism namely the coercive, normative and 
mimetic isomorphism respectively. 
3.3.2 Decoupling 
Decoupling is “the situation in which the formal organizational structure or practice is separate 
and distinct from actual organizational practice. In other words, the practice is not integrated into 
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the organization’s managerial and operational processes. Formal structure has much more to do 
with the representation of an organizational-self than with the actual operations of the 
organization” (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004). 
 Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested that decoupling is a circumstance where actual 
organizational practice is different from the external appearance of organizations. This permits 
organizations to apparently comply with social expectations, for the purpose of maintaining   
legitimacy. 
Orton and Weick (1990) in Mark  Dirsmith, Fogarty, and Gupta (2000) differentiate decoupling 
and loose coupling. They considered decoupling is a circumstance where both the symbolic 
properties of the formal organizations and instrumental work processes are different and 
uncoupled from one other, with each keeping its own identification. In contrast, loose-coupling is 
defined as a circumstance where symbolic displays and work processes still keep their own 
identification, and yet are also influenced by each other. Individual organizations are active 
participants, which can adopt partial autonomy to react to isomorphism pressures (Barley and 
Tolbert (1997) in Mihret, Mula, and James (2012)). For example, organizations can support, 
oppose or intend to impact on institutional norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Although 
institutional theory has usually been utilized to understand organizational similarity, it is also 
pivotal to know organizational change in response to a change in institutional pressures (Zhang, 
Boyce, & Ahmed, 2014).  
3.3.3 Oliver (1991)’s framework 
Oliver (1991) presents the strategic behaviors that organizations can adopt to react to pressures 
toward conformity with the institutional environment. The author points out five kinds of 
strategic responses: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. 
Acquiescence may take the forms of habit, imitation and compliance. Habit is defined as an 
unconscious adherence to taken-for-granted rules or values. Imitation is similar to the concept of 
mimetic isomorphism, is considered as conscious or unconscious mimicry of institutional 
models. Compliance is defined as “ conscious adherence to or incorporation of values, norms or 
institutional requirements” Compliance is seen as more active than habit or imitation, which 
means that an organization consciously and strategically opts to conform with institutional 
pressures for the purpose of self-serving benefits ranging from social support to resources or 
predictability. An organization may conform to external pressures since the embracing of 
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external constituents or society enhances its legitimacy, and protects it from public criticism and 
sanctions of non-compliance. Organizations often comply with conflicting institutional demands 
or inconsistencies between institutional expectations and internal objectives.  
Compromise can take the forms of balancing, pacifying or bargaining with external constituents. 
Balancing is considered as the accommodation of multiple constituent demands in response to 
institutional pressures. Pacifying is partial compliance with the expectations of one or more 
constituents. An organization that applies the pacifying method typically mounts a minor level of 
resistance to institutional pressures.  Bargaining is associated with the effort of the organization 
to demand some concessions from an external constituent. For instance, an organization may 
negotiate with a government agency to reduce the scope of its conformity with a newly-instituted 
government rule. 
Avoidance is considered as organizations’ attempt to preclude the necessity of compliance by 
concealing their non-conformity, buffering themselves from institutional pressures or escaping 
from institutional rules. Concealing is defined as “disguising nonconformity behind a façade of 
acquiescence”. Organizations can employ ritualism - ceremonial displays or symbolic 
compliance of institutional rules. Concealing is different from the acquiescent tactic of 
compliance in the degree to which conformity is apparent or actual.  
Defiance is a kind of resistance to institutional pressures. Three forms of defiance include 
dismissal, challenge and attack. Dismissing or ignoring institutional rules is a strategic selection 
that organizations are more likely to adopt while the external enforcement of institutional rule is 
considered to be low or when internal targets conflict significantly with institutional 
requirements. 
The tactics of acquiescence, compromise, avoidance and defiance show increasingly active 
amount of resistance to institutional pressures. Manipulation is the most active reaction to the 
pressures since it is aimed to actively influence or control institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). 
3.3.4 The adoption of Institutional Theory in accounting research 
Different aspects of new institutional theory have offered a theoretical framework for research in 
accounting and auditing. Institutional theory can be used at three levels of analysis. The highest 
level is global institutions, which shape the structures and actions of the lower levels. The second 
level comprises the governance structures consisting of the organizational field and the 
       79   
organizations themselves. Lastly, there is the individual or group level of institutions (Scott, 
2001). Nations, like organizations, are exposed to coercive institutions outside of the economy. 
As the economy is small and poor, it is more dependent on international norms than when the 
economy is large and wealthy (Judge, Li, & Pinsker, 2010). 
The institutional theoretical framework has currently received significant attention from 
researchers in the accounting and auditing field. Institutional theory is increasingly being applied 
to accounting research (Baker & Rennie, 2006).  Institutional theory is widely adopted as a 
framework to research accounting in governmental agencies (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2003, 
Fogarty, Zucca, Meonske, and Kirch, 1997) and the public sector (for example, Modell (2003), 
Lapsley and Pallot (2000), Bealing, Dirsmith, and Forgaty (1996), Arnaboldi and Lapsley 
(2003), Bealing (1994), Bealing et al. (1996), Farquharson (2013), Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 
(2004), Modell (2001), Brignall and Modell (2000), Farquharson (2013) and Jarvis (2014)). 
However, this theory is also utilized as a framework for accounting and auditing research in 
private sectors. Fogarty (1992a) concluded that the Financial Accounting Standard Board is a 
private-sector organization, which bridges the public-sector areas that have been well researched 
by institutional theory and its clear frontier within the private sector. Siegel, Agrawal, and 
Rigsby (1997) adopted institutional theory to offer a general way of understanding organizational 
socialization both in accounting firms and the accounting profession. Carpenter and Dirsmith 
(1993) applied this theory to investigate sampling and the abstraction of knowledge in the 
auditing profession. Touron (2005) explained, through the lens of institutional theory, why the 
US GAAP was adopted by French firms. 
A number of studies utilize this theory as frameworks to research accounting and auditing in 
developed countries. Several studies confirm the coercive, normative and mimetic aspect of 
institutional theory.  For instance, Baker, Bédard, and Hauret (2014) conclude that the similarity 
is a result of external pressures from global capital markets for standardized regulatory practices 
in three countries: the US, France and Canada. In the case of the US, due to corporate and audit 
failures and a significant change in political and economic environment in the post September 
11, 2001, the SOX were enacted. In terms of new institutional theory, SOX can be considered as 
an instance of coercive isomorphism. The change in the auditor regulation in the US was 
imposed by forces which were outside the auditing profession. Since the SOX had extraterritorial 
influence, the French government used the US as a model. This government was also forced by 
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international pressures to change their auditor regulations. Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge 
(2007) conclude that central government in the UK imposed some coercive, normative and 
mimetic pressures to all the organizational attributes of local government equal to those at the 
national level. Other studies confirm the isomorphism aspect of institutional theory in term of 
activity-based costing, accrual accounting, IFRS adoption, management accounting, internal 
audit (for example, Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2003), Lapsley and Pallot (2000), Pilcher (2011), 
Baker and Rennie (2006), Arena, Arnaboldi, and Azzone (2006), Al-Twaijry, Brierley, and 
Gwilliam (2003), Mihret et al. (2012)). Hassan (2005) drew on DiMaggio and Powell (1983)’s 
perceptions of coercive, mimic and normative isomorphism to connect a changing hospital to the 
changes in the wider institutional context.  
However, other studies in developed countries did not confirm the isomorphism aspect of 
institutional theory. For example, Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous (2015) utilized institutional 
theory to examine whether the PCAOB, by utilizing of coercive and mimetic isomorphism, 
imposes pressures for change in audit practice associated estimates. The authors concluded that 
the institutional change needed to enhance the audit of complex estimates will not happen unless 
there is compelling evidence to support a new method. This method is encouraged by standards 
setters. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) used institutional theory to examine the introduction of 
a new organizational form, the multidisciplinary practice in the professional business service 
field.  The results of this study suggested that elite organizations like the Big Five accounting 
firms become immune to coercive and normative pressure since their market activities extend 
beyond the jurisdiction of field-level regulations. 
In developing countries, previous studies have shown that international organizations can exert 
coercive pressures to influence accounting and auditing practice in these countries (for example, 
Ashraf and Ghani (2005), Irvine (2008), Hassan (2008), Mir and Rahaman (2005), Al-Omari 
(2010), Judge et al. (2010), Albu, Albu, Bunea, Calu, and Girbina (2011)). Al-Omari (2010) 
depicted the relationship between the WB, other lending or donor organizations and developing 
countries, and concluded that the former is able to affect the policy-making decisions of the latter 
due to its control of the need for economic capital. Ashraf and Ghani (2005) showed how Asia 
Development Bank and International Monetary Fund played a crucial role in shaping accounting 
practice in Pakistan. Irvine (2008) referred to the WB and IMF as two organizations that 
constitute a main global institutional force through their loans and assistance of economic 
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development. Hassan (2008)’s findings explained how the interaction between the domestic 
institutions and international funding institutions such as the WB and the IMF generated 
internationally institutional pressures so as to build financial regulations that are similar to the 
International Accounting Standards. Phan (2014) investigated the key factors of IFRS adoption 
in Vietnam through the lens of institutional theory. The result showed that international 
organizations such as the WB, the WTO, ADB, and the IMF play pivotal coercive roles in the 
widespread implementation of IFRS in Vietnam. 
According to Deegan (2009), the World Bank is a funding body which usually lends funds for 
projects in developing countries. Hence, the World Bank often exerts coercive pressure on 
borrowers to implement accounting and reporting rules that comply with its requirements. As a 
result, entities that receive funding from the World Bank tend to implement similar accounting 
and reporting practices. In addition, the World Trade Organization plays a crucial role in shaping 
the global accountancy profession and setting up a global market for auditing services (Arnold, 
2005). 
A limited number of studies on accounting and auditing utilize the decoupling aspect of 
Institutional theory as a conceptual framework. These studies were all conducted in developed 
countries. For instance, Basu, Dirsmith, and Gupta (1999) examined the relationship between the 
actual work performed by an organization and the image it presents to external parties in the 
context of the US General Accounting Office’s (GAO) audit reporting process. Beasley, 
Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal (2009) used loose coupling aspect of institutional theory to 
examine the audit committee oversight practice. Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2002) 
used this theory to investigate the impacts of corporate governance on the audit process. 
Pettersen (1995) showed the decoupling between budgets as plans and accounting information as 
outcomes of actual action in Norwegian hospitals.  
Several studies utilizing the Oliver (1991)’s framework in the accounting field were conducted in 
developed countries. These studies reaffirm the organizational strategies that organizations adopt 
to respond to institutional pressures. For instance, Carpenter and Feroz (2001) utilized 
institutional theory to investigate how institutional pressures exerted on state governments in the 
US influenced the decision of these governments to either implement or resist the use of GAAP. 
The findings suggested that key accounting bureaucrats in New York and Michigan adopted a 
compromise approach as their initially organizational strategies in response to institutional 
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pressures to adopt GAP; whereas Ohio’s accounting bureaucrats took a ‘defy’ approach despite 
the fact that the political leaders endorsed an ‘acquiesce’ strategy. Delaware initially applied a 
‘manipulate’ approach but did not implement GAAP until a political entrepreneur for GAAP 
appeared in the early 1990s. Bealing et al. (1996) investigated the SEC’s effort to develop a 
dramaturgy of exchange relations with its external constituents with regard to its compliance 
with sanctioned language forms and its use of both acquiescence and compromise tactics to deal 
with external constituents and to balance needs for appearance of regulation with de facto 
inaction in regulating the audit profession. Other studies apply Oliver (1991)’s framework to 
study how practices vary with regard to the adoption of IFRS and internal control regulation ( for 
example, Albu, Albu, and Alexander (2014), Shapiro and Matson (2008)).  
Few studies utilize Oliver (1991)’s framework in the auditing field. These studies were all 
conducted in developed countries. However, these studies focus on a particular kind of audit 
firms, for example mid-tier audit firms or Big N audit firms. Lander et al. (2013) examined how 
mid-tier accounting firms address changes in their institutional environment which led to a shift 
in emphasis from the trustee logic to the commercial logic in the Netherlands. The findings 
suggested that these firms faced major strategic issues associated with the changing role of the 
accountant and changes in organizational structure and practices. When these issues challenge 
the characteristics of their personal identity, there is internal resistance to this transformation. 
Accountants who are not partners generally challenge new duties that upset their usual work 
routine, while partners oppose changes that affect their autonomy. These kinds of opposition 
affect accounting firms’ strategic organizational responses to institutional pressures. The 
institutional pressure comes from the change in government legislation, development in 
technology, the globalization of clients, and requirement of clients for more specialized 
consulting services. Dirsmith, Heian, and Covaleski (1997) adopted institutional theory to 
analyze the exercise, resistance and transformation of control in Big 6 firms. The findings 
showed that the structural and social processes of management by objectives and mentoring, 
when serving fundamentally the administrative and practitioner components of the firms have 
interpenetrated or been mutually constitutive in actual practice. In addition, management by 
objectives and mentoring are infused with power which serve as examples of the constraints, 
media and outcomes of structural and social change in the Big 6 accounting firms. 
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The Oliver (1991)’s framework remains fresh and insightful, in the auditing field, even though 
this theory was introduced few decades ago. This is a coherent framework that is currently 
adopted in the auditing literature (for example Lander et al. (2013) ). 
3.3.5 Using Institutional Theory as a framework of the current study 
The institutional theory was utilized as the theoretical framework for the current study for several 
reasons. Firstly, the new institutional theory was utilized to understand the forces of 
globalization (for example, Baker, Bédard, and Hauret (2014), Ashraf and Ghani (2005), Irvine 
(2008), Hassan (2008), Mir and Rahaman (2005), Al-Omari (2010), Judge et al. (2010), Albu, 
Albu, Bunea, Calu, and Girbina (2011)). Secondly, Power (2003) emphasized that imagination is 
crucial in the field of financial auditing and the role of auditing in producing legitimacy. Thirdly, 
the adoption of institutional theory to accounting firms is appropriate (Fogarty, 1992). 
Institutional theory is widely utilized in accounting studies and is a favored framework for 
studying change in accounting (Albu, Albu, & Alexander, 2014). Fogarty, Helan, and Knutson 
(1991) also stated that public accounting exists in an institutionalized environment to the extent 
of its mandate to provide the market with information about the realities of financial reports. 
Fourthly, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) acknowledged that in the accounting field, there are 
very clear mechanisms of institutionalization and hence normative, coercive and mimetic 
pressures for compliance are high. 
Previous studies adopting isomorphism aspects of institutional theory found mixed results in 
different accounting and auditing research. Some studies confirm the isomorphism aspect of 
institutional theory, such as studies of  Baker et al. (2014) and Mihret et al. (2012); whereas 
studies of Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) and  Griffith et al. (2015) do not confirm. 
The number of previous studies applying the decoupling aspect of institutional theory is small 
and conducted in developed countries rather than developing countries. Previous studies affirm 
the Oliver (1991)’s framework of organizational strategies in response to the institutional 
pressure. However, there is a lack of research that adopts this framework in the auditing field and 
across different types of audit firms. 
The current study utilized the institutional theory’s concept of coercive pressure to explain how 
international pressures, such as those from WTO, ASEAN or WB brought about change in the 
audit regulations in Vietnam by motivating the Vietnamese government to introduce the Law. In 
addition, the researcher also adopted an institutional framework, particularly the aspects of 
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isomorphism, decoupling and strategic behaviors that organizations can adopt to react to 
institutional rules to analyze the reactions  of accounting firms and individual auditors to the 
institutional pressures and their changes in response to these pressures. The institutional 
pressures come from the enforcement of the Law by state agencies in the field of audit in 
Vietnam. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The current research identifies two major factors within and outside the Vietnamese jurisdiction 
which motivated the government in this country to introduce the Law on External Audit. 
In the current research, the researcher develops arguments based on a theoretical framework 
derived from two theories including public interest theory and institutional theory. Isomorphism, 
decoupling, and Oliver (1991)’s framework are aspects of institutional theory. Public interest 
theory and institutional theory were adopted in different parts of the findings as following. 
 Public interest theory will be used to explain the internal motivations that led the Vietnamese 
government to introduce the Law. The concept of coercive isomorphism (belongs to 
isomorphism aspect of institutional theory) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) will be utilized to 
explain how the factors outside the Vietnamese jurisdiction, international pressures, such as from 
WTO, ASEAN or WB shape change in the audit regulations in Vietnam by motivating the 
Vietnamese government to introduce the Law (related to RQ1: What has motivated the 
Vietnamese government to introduce the Law on External Audit?).  
 In addition, the researcher also adopts an institutional framework, particularly the aspects of 
isomorphism, decoupling (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and strategic 
behaviors that organizations can adopt to react to institutional rules in order to analyze the 
reactions of accounting firms and individual auditors to the institutional pressures and their 
changes to respond to these pressures (Oliver, 1991). The institutional pressures come from the 
enforcement of the Law by state agencies in the field of audit in Vietnam (related to RQ2: How 
do accounting firms react to the audit reforms? What changes have accounting firms made in 
response to the audit reforms? And RQ3: How do the audit reforms impact on auditors’ 
practice?). 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS  
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter three, the theoretical framework for this study was developed. In chapter four, the 
researcher rationalises the methodology and methods employed in this study. 
Yin (2003) stated that methodology can appropriately refer to the theoretical analysis of the 
methods suitable to a field of study or to the body of methods and principles particular to branch 
of knowledge. Therefore, the well-designed methodology ensures the validity and reliability of 
data. This research study utilises a qualitative approach to identify the motivations for the 
introduction of the Law and its impacts on the auditing profession in Vietnam. The “what” and 
“how” questions are designed to achieve the research objectives. The methodology shows the 
readers how the study was conducted. The first section of this chapter illustrates the theoretical 
stance of the research. The next section explains the data collection process and data analysis 
approach to the research. The final section outlines the techniques and methods that the 
researcher adopted to ensure the reliability and credibility of the results. 
4.2 Theoretical Stance of Research  
The research philosophy that a researcher applies comprises of crucial assumptions about the 
way that the researcher looks at the world. The assumptions will decide the research strategies 
and methods that the researcher selects. There are three main ways of thinking about the research 
philosophy, consisting of epistemology, ontology and axiology.  
Epistemology considers what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field. There are three distinct 
views of what researchers consider important in the study, including the positivist, realist and the 
intepretivist perspective. When your research philosophy reflects the principles of positivism, 
you will probably apply the philosophical stance of the natural scientist. Positivist researchers are 
in favour of working with an observable social reality and the final result of such research could 
be law-like generalisations. These researchers are likely to adopt a highly structured 
methodology, so as to facilitate replication. 
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Realism is another epistemological view. The most important feature of realism is that what the 
senses show us as reality is the truth. There are two main types of realism. Direct realism 
considers that what you experience through your senses describes the world accurately. Critical 
realism states that what you experience are sensations, the illustration of things in the world, not 
the things directly. Critical realists show how often our senses deceive us. 
Interpretivism is an epistemology that emphasizes the difference between conducting research 
among people rather than objects such as trucks and computers. These theorists interpret the 
social roles of others in accordance with their own set of meaning. There are two strands of 
interpretivism, including phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. Phenomenology 
mentions to the way in which we as humans make sense of the world around us. The symbolic 
interactionism means that we explain the actions of others with whom we interact and this 
interpretation results in adjustment of our own meaning and actions. Interpretivists have to enter 
the social world of our research subjects and understand their world from their point of view 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007). 
The current study stands on the interpretivism perspective. The researcher entered the auditing 
field and understanding this field in relation to the Law on External Audit (2011) from the 
perspectives of the professional body, the MOF, and audit firms (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2007).  
Ontology is concerned with nature of reality. It frames questions of the assumptions that 
researchers have about the way the world operates and the commitment held to specific views. 
There are two aspects of ontology, namely objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism illustrates 
the position that social entities stay in reality external to social actors concerned with their 
existence. In contrast, subjectivism holds that social phenomena are generated from the 
perceptions and consequent actions of those social actors involving their existence. According to 
subjectivists, reality is considered to be socially constructed. The ontology aspect of the current 
study is subjectivism. The motivations for the introduction of the Law and its impacts on audit 
firms and auditors are human constructed. These aspects of the current study are created from 
and dependent upon the perspectives of different groups of participants involving with the Law. 
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The research strategies include experiment, survey, case study, action research, grounded theory, 
ethnography and archival research. These strategies should not be considered as being mutually 
exclusive (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007). 
Yin  (2003)  emphasizes  that  case  study  is  a necessary  research  strategy  for  social science. 
Case study is appropriate to explain broadly research topic, to include complex multi-variables 
and to consist of multiple sources of evidence. Robson (2002) in Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill 
(2007) gives the definition of case study as a strategy to do research which associates an 
empirical investigation of a specific contemporary phenomenon within its context by utilizing 
multiple sources of evidence. If a researcher utilizes a case study strategy, he or she is likely to 
triangulate multiple sources of data. Case study strategies comprise single case versus multiple 
cases. A single case is utilized where it represents an important case or, a unique case. The 
current study adopted a single case study strategy. The auditing profession in Vietnam consists 
of unique characteristics. Using the Vietnamese auditing profession is a single case, within 
which the professional body, the regulatory body and audit firm groups are sub-units in the case. 
Blaikie (2010) introduces five kinds of objectives of research, including exploration, description, 
explanation, understanding, and prediction. To explore is an attempt to build an initial, rough 
description, an understanding of the phenomenon. To describe is to offer a specific account and 
reporting characteristics of the phenomenon. To explain is to build the elements, factors that 
produce the state of the phenomenon. To understand is to establish the reasons for specific social 
action. To predict is to utilize some understanding and explanation of a phenomenon to forecast 
the outcomes under specific circumstances. The nature of the current research is explanatory and 
descriptive. The current study targeted to explain the Vietnamese government’s reasons for the 
introduction of the Law and describe the influences of the Law on both audit firm and auditor 
level. 
Qualitative research is basically interpretive. Researchers of this approach make an interpretation 
of the data. These researchers have to analyse data for themes and make an interpretation about 
its meaning theoretically. This approach involves in the filtering the data through the researcher’s 
lens that is situated in a specific socio-political and historical moment (Creswell, 2003). 
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Strauss and Corbin (1990) indicate that qualitative research refers to people’ lives, stories, 
behavior, and organizational functioning. In addition, qualitative research provides information 
about the “human” side of an issue - that is, the often contradictory behaviors, beliefs, opinions 
of individuals (Dunn, 1983).  
A qualitative methodology is adopted in the current study due to several reasons. The nature of 
the research questions dictates the methodology used to conduct the research (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Qualitative studies are most useful for answering 'why?' and 'how?' questions (Marshall, 
1996). The purpose of the current study is to determine what it was that motivated the 
Vietnamese government to introduce the Law and how the reforms in the Law impact on the 
audit firms and auditors. Interviews permit the researcher to gain rich information to explain and 
describe these issues.  
The qualitative methodology is useful for obtaining personal points of view, such as those of 
professionals and clients (Patton & Cochran, 2002). Gibbs and Flick (2007) suggest that 
qualitative research is purposed to understand, describe and sometimes explain a phenomena 
from the inside in different ways. One of these ways is to analyze experiences, perspectives of 
individuals or groups. Qualitative research is used to gain insight into people’s attitudes, 
behaviors, concerns, motivations, aspirations, culture or lifestyles (Joubish, Khurram, Ahmed, 
Fatima, & Haider, 2011). The purpose of the research is to gain insight into the key stakeholders’ 
perceptions and behavior toward the audit reforms in Vietnam.  
Another reason for the selection of the qualitative method is the unreliability of economic data 
and the problems in administering surveys in transitional economies, which made quantitative 
methods difficult to be conducted (Dang, Marriott, & Marriott, 2006). 
4.3 Research Methods.  
 4.3.1 Data collection 
There are several methods for the collection data in qualitative research, including interview, 
observation, the analysis of artifacts, documents, and cultural records, and the use of visual 
materials or personal experience (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Evidence can be collected from 
multiple sources. Triangulation has been generally considered a process of using multiple 
perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation 
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(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Triangulation uses evidence from different sources to corroborate the 
same fact or finding (Rowley, 2002). 
Types of triangulation defined by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (1991) are as follows:  
Table 1: Types of triangulation 
Types of triangulation Brief description 
Data triangulation Data is collected at different times or from 
different sources in the study of a 
phenomenon and both micro-level and 
macro-level perspectives are covered 
Investigator triangulation Data on the same phenomenon is collected 
independently by different researchers and 
results are compared to get round the 
potential bias that comes from the reliance on 
a single researcher. 
Methodological triangulation Both quantitative and qualitative methods of 
data collection are used. 
Theoretical triangulation A theory is taken from one discipline and 
used to explain a phenomenon in another 
discipline 
Multiple triangulation The simultaneous combination of multiple 
researchers, multiple studies, multiple 
sources of data and multiple theoretical views 
 
Wahyuni (2012) asserts that case study data is collected in the form of primary and secondary 
data. The primary data is usually collected using semi-structured interviews with the experts in 
the observed topic from the case. The secondary data consists of internal publications provided 
by participants to the researchers, and publicly available data which are relevant to the topic 
being studied. Data triangulation assists the researcher not only to collect more comprehensive 
relevant information, but also to cross-check their consistency in order to enhance the robustness 
of findings. 
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The data triangulation approach is utilized for the current study because of the support of parties 
involving in external audit activities in Vietnam, the access to internal documents from the 
government, the MOF and the VACPA, and the publication of a variety of articles from 
Vietnamese journals. The data for the current study consists of the semi-structure interviews with 
key stakeholders, the documents from the MOF and VACPA and the secondary data from 
quality academic Vietnamese journals.  
4.3.1.1 Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
The purpose of a qualitative interview is to know the world from the subjects’ points of view 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Interviews permit the subjects to convey to others their situation 
from their own perspective and in their own words (Kvale, 1996). 
In the current study, the semi-structured, in-depth interview is employed to collect data for three 
major reasons. Firstly, the researcher can follow a series of questions that have been prepared. 
Hence, purposeful data will be gathered. Secondly, the researcher can handle the conversation 
effectively due to its semi-structured format, which creates more flexibility. The sequences of 
questions are varied, based on the situation, and taking into account the variety of participants 
who are representatives of regulatory bodies, professional bodies, auditors, and chief 
accountants. Thirdly, the semi-structured, in-depth interview encourages participants to share as 
much information as possible in an unconstrained environment, where the interviewer utilizes a 
minimum of prompts and guiding questions (Hecimovic & Martinov-Bennie 2009) and thus, it is 
suitable for describing outcomes from the perspective of the stakeholders. Interviews can offer 
insights into the effects of the Law that audit firms and auditors have experienced. The 
researcher will ask for examples or elaboration of answers in order to gain a deep understanding 
of the issues (Wahyuni, 2012). An in-depth interview seeks detailed information and greater 
understanding, as these allow us to explain the different perceptions and meanings of some 
activities, events, or places (Holstein & Gubrium, 2002).  
In the current study, semi-structured face-to-face interviews with the key stakeholders were 
conducted to obtain their perceptions of the impacts of the audit reforms. This method has been 
used to obtain participants’ perspectives or experiences in various studies on accounting and 
auditing, including Houghton et al. (2013), Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009), Cohen et al. 
(2010), Beasley et al. (2009), and Dang et al. (2006) among others. 
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4.3.1.1.1 Main interviews 
Designing interview questions and interview guide 
Interviews comprise main questions, follow-up questions and further probing. The main 
questions ensure that the research problem will be thoroughly examined and that each part of a 
broad topic will be investigated (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The main interview questions in the 
current research were formulated based on sources including: auditing literature around the 
world, Vietnamese journals, legal documents of audit in Vietnam, information on the website of 
the MOF and the VACPA related to the audit reforms in the Law, discussions with the senior 
supervisor, and two academics in Vietnam.  
A good interview question should contribute thematically to knowledge production and 
dynamically to encouraging a good interview interaction (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In the 
current research, the research problem was divided into three parts. Main interview questions 
were designed for each research question (see the initial interview questions in Appendix 1). 
The researcher conducted pilot interviews with five participants for the purpose of revising the 
initial interview questions (see the revised interview questions in Appendix 2). 
To obtain a richer and deeper understanding, the researcher used follow-up questions (see the 
interview protocol in Appendix 3) to encourage the interviewees to extend on comments that the 
researcher considered important to the research. The researcher not only asked about what she 
heard, but also asked about any gaps and omissions (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). 
An interview guide indicates the research topics and their sequence in the interview (Kvale, 
1996). Interview protocol is the most formal of the conversational guides, which is a written 
form of the main questions. In the current research, the researcher designed the interview 
protocol after the pilot interviews were conducted. The interview protocol in the current study 
was updated with changes to the main questions and the follow-up questions of each main 
question. Questions are often changed when new, important matters emerge that should be 
broached with other interviewees (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). After reviewing previous interviews, 
the researcher prepared and updated the interview protocol for each subsequent interview (see 
the interview protocol in Appendix 3). 
Pilot interviews 
Interviews require skills that take training and practice to acquire (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Before the main interviews, five pilot interviews were conducted. The interviewees consisted of 
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two managers of other large audit firms, one partner of a middle audit firm, one senior auditor 
from middle audit firm and one academic in Vietnam. These audit firms and auditors were 
selected in the pilot interviews since they are experienced and they simulate the real 
interviewees. These interviewees each had more than ten years of experience in the auditing 
field. Each pilot interview lasted from around 90 minutes to 120 minutes and was audio-
recorded. The researcher listened carefully and transcribed the pilot interviews to analyze and 
find the weakness of the interviews herself that needed to be addressed. Initially, the researcher 
did not have the interview question related to the condition for conducting audit of public clients. 
Participants of the pilot interviews considered the condition for conducting audit of public 
interest entities is the most significant change that directly affects small and medium audit firms. 
After the pilot interviews, the researcher modified the interview questions by adding the 
interview question: “How does the change in the condition for conducting audit of public interest 
entities affect audit firms?” The researcher also learned the skills to follow-up the themes that 
she thought would be crucial in the main interviews. These interviewees also commented on the 
interview questions and suggested some changes. After the pilot interviews, several interview 
questions were changed. For example, before the pilot study the researcher intended to ask 
“What are the main impacts of the Law on audit practice?” The interviewees of the pilot study 
commented that this question was too broad. The interviewees suggested that the researcher 
should focus on some major reforms that are likely to impact significantly on audit practice. 
After the pilot interviews, this question is changed as “How do the higher legal force of the Law 
and the sanction provisions in the Decree 105/2013/ND-CP impact audit practice?”; “How does 
the change in the inspection regime impact on audit practice?”; “How do the changes in the 
requirement for audit opinion (points 2 and 3, section 48 in the Law) impact on audit practice?”. 
Selecting participants for the interviews 
Higginbottom (2004) stated that qualitative research typically – although not exclusively – 
applies non-probability sampling techniques. This means that it is not usually intended that the 
findings of a particular study will be generalizable, but will apply only to the specific population 
under the investigation. Similarly, Marshall (1996) asserted that random sampling is 
inappropriate for qualitative studies. The study of a random sample provides the best opportunity 
to generalize the results to the population but is not the most effective way of developing an 
understanding of complex issues related to human behaviour. Oliver (2006) defined purposive 
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sampling as a form of non-probability sampling in which decisions concerning the individuals to 
be included in the sample are taken by the researcher, based upon a variety of criteria which may 
include specialist knowledge of the research issue, or capacity and willingness to participate in 
the research. The advantage of purposive sampling is that the researcher can identify participants 
who are likely to provide data that are detailed and relevant to the research question. However, in 
disseminating the findings, the researcher should make fully transparent the criteria upon which 
the sample process was based. Robinson (2014) stated that purposive sampling strategies are 
non-random ways of ensuring that particular categories of cases within a sampling universe are 
represented in the final sample of a project.  
The researcher of the current study used the purposive sampling technique to choose participants. 
The researcher has been involved in the auditing area for more than ten years. The researcher 
actively selected the most productive sample based on the researcher’s practical knowledge of 
the research area (Marshall, 1996). The rationale for employing a purposive strategy is that the 
researcher assumes, based on their a-priori theoretical understanding of the topic being studied, 
that certain categories of individuals may have a unique, different or important perspective on 
the phenomenon in question (Robinson, 2014). The researcher categorized groups of participants 
in the same way as the studies done by Hecimovic (2007) and Houghton et al. (2013). The first 
group of participants comprised representatives from MOF, SSC. MOF and SSC are state 
agencies which directly monitor the external audit activities. The second group of participants 
includes representatives from VACPA, which is the professional body of external audit in 
Vietnam. The third group consists of the partners, managers and senior auditors of both Big Four 
and non-Big Four audit firms. The fourth group includes chief accountants of audit clients. The 
researcher wanted to select participants from different groups since their views and perspectives 
on the introduction of the Law and its impacts may vary. The research questions in the current 
study concern the auditing profession, so it was anticipated that these participants could provide 
detailed and rich data relevant to the research question. Samples should be chosen purposively to 
reinforce how potential group differences and similarities can be highlighted (Harper & 
Thompson, 2012). 
Purposive sampling is a method whereby participants are intentionally chosen to present some 
predefined conditions (Luborsky & Rubinstein, 1995). Hence, the researcher established certain 
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criteria for the selection of participants for the current study: participants had to be at least 30 
years of age and working in Vietnam; participants must hold at least a bachelor degree and been 
involved in the auditing profession for at least five years. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), Creswell 
and Plano Clark (2011), Minichiello, Aroni, and Hays (2008) and Rubin and Rubin (2005) 
suggest that interviewees should be experienced and knowledgeable. Moreover, these authors 
also recommend that the credibility of findings is enhanced if the researcher can ensure that the 
individuals being interviewed reflect a variety of views on the research topic.  
The interviews for the current study were conducted with individuals who have specific 
knowledge and expertise in the auditing area. The researcher sought highly experienced 
participants for the interviews since they were more likely to offer useful insights into the 
Vietnamese government’s motivations for the introduction of the Law and the influences of the 
Law on the auditing profession. Experienced partners and managers have knowledge of their 
audit firms’ policies and changes resulting from the reforms in the Law. Moreover, experienced 
partners, managers and senior auditors are involved in the entire process of audit. Hence, they 
can provide insights into how the audit reforms in the Law impact on audit practice. Experienced 
representatives from MOF, SSC and the VACPA have offered meaningful insights about the 
government’s motivations for the introduction of the Law as well as its impacts on the auditing 
profession. 
The MOF is the regulatory body of the external audit in Vietnam. The SSC is responsible for 
supervising the external audit of listed firm and has the authority to approve accounting firms 
and CPAs which are permitted to conduct audits of listed firms. Before applying for ethics 
approval, the researcher obtained a letter from the Deputy Head of the Department of 
Accounting and Auditing Regulation in the MOF and one letter from Deputy Head of SSC. The 
Deputy Heads gave permission for the researcher to interview staff in these departments. The 
Deputy Head of the Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation in the MOF was 
contacted by phone as a means of obtaining MOF interviewees. Three senior staff from this 
Department involved in the project of building the Law on External Audit agreed to be 
interviewed. 
Deputy Head of SSC was contacted and this authority introduced the researcher to two 
authorities who are responsible for supervising the audit of listed firm. These two authorities 
agreed to be interviewed at their office. Regarding participants from the VACPA, the Deputy 
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Head of the Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation in the MOF introduced the 
researcher to a Deputy Head of the VACPA. The researcher contacted the Deputy Head of the 
VACPA to get access to interviewees. Finally, three senior staff from this professional body 
agreed to be interviewed.  
With regards to participants from audit firms, there is a list of practising auditors on the website 
of the VACPA. The details of auditors are grouped according to their audit firms (Please see the 
link http://www.vacpa.org.vn/Page/Detail.aspx?newid=4879). The list contains information 
about auditors including names, dates of birth, and positions in their audit firms. The researcher 
intended to approach potential participants who had both knowledge and experience. Hence, the 
partners and managers of audit firms were approached and invited to participate in the current 
study. Seventy phone calls were made to invite these auditors to participate in the research. The 
researcher invited only partners and managers who have had at least ten years of experience in 
auditing to participate in the project. Eventually, thirty two partners and managers of audit firms 
in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh agreed to participate in the search project. Two managers, one from a 
small audit firm and one from non-international large audit firms after the interviews introduced 
the interviewer to two senior auditors. These senior auditors agreed to participate in the research. 
According to these two managers, the senior auditors had experience and knowledge regarding 
the research topic. The final sample from audit firms consists of thirty-four participants, resulting 
in the response rate is 49%. 
Regarding audit client participants, there is a list of listed firms on the website of Hanoi Stock 
Exchange (Please see the link http://hnx.vn/web/guest/dang-niem-yet). The chief accountants of 
these firms were contacted by telephone and three of them agreed to participate in the research.  
The names of 45 participants, the dates of interviews and backgrounds of participants were 
collected and recorded precisely. Table 2 shows the professional status of the groups of 
participants who involved in the main interviews and follow-up interviews.  
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Table 2: Groups of respondents 
No. Organizations Status Number of 
interviews 
Per cent 
Main interviews 
1 Department of Accounting and 
Auditing Regulation in the MOF 
Deputy Head and senior 
staff 
3 7 
2 SSC Senior staff 2 4 
3 VACPA Deputy Head and senior 
staff 
3 7 
4 Big 4 firms Managers 8 18 
5 Non-Big 4 firms Partners, managers, and 
senior auditors 
26 57 
6 Audit clients Chief accountants 3 7 
 Total  45  
Follow-up  interviews 
 Big 4 firms Managers 2 8 
 Non-Big 4 firms Partners, managers, and 
senior auditors 
23 92 
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The profiles (organisations, location, and experience) and backgrounds of interviewees (gender, 
and age) are illustrated in Table 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3: Profiles of interview respondents 
No. Organizations Location Code used Years of 
experience 
Main interviews 
1 MOF Hanoi Representative 1 32 
2 MOF Hanoi Representative 2 12 
3 MOF Hanoi Representative 3 10 
4 SSC Hanoi Representative 1 33 
5 SSC Hanoi Representative 2 32 
6 VACPA Hanoi Representative 1 40 
7 VACPA Hanoi Representative 2 7 
8 VACPA Hanoi Representative 3 8 
9 Big Four firm A Hanoi Manager 1 13 
10 Big Four firm A Hanoi Manager 2 10 
11 Big Four firm A Hanoi Manager 3 10 
12 Big Four firm I Hanoi Manager 1 13 
13 Big Four firm I Ho Chi Minh Manager 2 11 
14 Big Four firm L Hanoi Manager 1 10 
15 Big Four firm L Hanoi Manager 2 10 
16 Big Four firm L Hanoi Manager 3 12 
17 Other large audit firm B Hanoi Manager 1 10 
18 Other large audit firm B Hanoi Manager 2 12 
19 Other large audit firm B Hanoi Senior auditor 8 
20 Other large audit firm E Ho Chi Minh Manager 13 
21 Other large audit firm J Hanoi Manager 1 13 
22 Other large audit firm J Hanoi Manager 2 28 
       98   
23 Other large audit firm J Hanoi Manager 3 14 
24 Other large audit firm J Hanoi Manager 4 12 
25 Other large audit firm J Hanoi Partner 22 
26 Other large audit firm S Hanoi Manager 18 
27 Other large audit firm U Hanoi Manager 10 
28 Medium audit firm D Ho Chi Minh Manager 10 
29 Medium audit firm F Ho Chi Minh Manager 10 
30 Medium audit firm H Ho Chi Minh Manager 14 
31 Medium audit firm K Hanoi Partner 22 
32 Medium audit firm K Hanoi Manager 12 
33 Medium audit firm M Hanoi Partner 18 
34 Medium audit firm P Hanoi Partner 13 
35 Medium audit firm Q Hanoi Manager 10 
36 Small audit firm C Hanoi Partner 22 
37 Small audit firm C Hanoi Manager 12 
38 Small audit firm G Ho Chi Minh Manager 11 
39 Small audit firm G Ho Chi Minh Senior auditor 7 
40 Small audit firm N Hanoi Partner 10 
41 Small audit firm O Ho Chi Minh Manager 11 
42 Small audit firm T Hanoi Manager 10 
43 Audit client 1 Hanoi Chief 
accountant 
10 
44 Audit client 2 Hanoi Chief 
accountant 
11 
45 Audit client 3 Hanoi Chief 
accountant 
16 
Follow-up interviews 
1 Big Four firm A Hanoi Manager 4 10 
2 Big Four firm A Hanoi Manager 5 10 
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3 Other large audit firm Y Hanoi Manager 1 11 
4 Other large audit firm Y Hanoi Manager 2 10 
5 Other large audit firm Y Hanoi Manager 3 15 
6 Other large audit firm Y Hanoi Manager 4 14 
7 Other large audit firm Y Hanoi Senior auditor 7 
8 Other large audit firm Y Hanoi Senior auditor 8 
9 Other large audit firm ZC Hanoi Manager 1 11 
10 Other large audit firm ZC Hanoi Senior auditor 10 
11 Medium audit firm K Hanoi Partner 17 
12 Medium audit firm V Hanoi Manager 1 11 
13 Medium audit firm V Hanoi Manager 2 13 
14 Medium audit firm V Hanoi Manager 3 11 
15 Medium audit firm W Hanoi Manager 1 10 
16 Medium audit firm W Hanoi Manager 2 14 
17 
 
Medium audit firm W Hanoi Manager 3 12 
18 Medium audit firm ZB Hanoi Partner  14 
19 Medium audit firm ZB Hanoi Manager 1 10 
20 Medium audit firm ZB Hanoi Manager 2 13 
21 Small audit firm X Hanoi Partner 14 
22 Small audit firm ZA Hanoi Partner 10 
23 Small audit firm ZA Hanoi Manager 1 11 
24 Small audit firm ZA Hanoi Manager 2 10 
25 Small audit firm ZA Hanoi Manager 3 13 
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Table 4: Interviewee’s background information  
Gender No. Percent 
Main interviews   
Male 29 64 
Female 16 36 
Follow-up interviews   
Male 14 56 
Female 11 44 
 
Means: Mean Minimum Maximum 
Age    
Main interviews 37 30 62 
Follow-up interviews 34 30 39 
Years of experience Mean Minimum Maximum 
Main interviews 
Representatives of MOF 18 10 32 
Representatives of SSC 32.5 32 33 
Representatives of VACPA 18 7 40 
Partners of audit firms 18 10 22 
Managers of audit firms 12 10 28 
Senior auditors of audit firms 7.5 7 8 
Chief accountants of audit clients 12 10 16 
Follow-up interviews 
Partners of audit firms 14 10 17 
Managers of audit firms 12 10 15 
Senior auditors of audit firms 8 7 10 
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Interview process 
When participants agreed to be interviewed by phone call, interview appointments were made 
immediately. Subsequently, three to five days before the interviews, participants were sent 
formal invitation letters, interview questions and consent forms through email. The objective was 
to leave the interviewee time to think about the research topic.  
Prior to commencing each interview, the researcher introduced herself, explained the nature and 
purpose of the research, and explained the contents in the invitation letter and consent form for 
the interviewees. The researcher asked the interviewee to sign the consent form. The researcher 
asked the interviewee about his or her background, including name, age, education background, 
working experience, position of interviewee, and any professional memberships. The researcher 
filled in the background form for each interviewee. The researcher asked the participant for 
permission to audio record the interview. 
When conducting the interview, the researcher followed interview guidelines and the interview 
questions which included main questions, follow-up questions and probes (please see 
Appendices 2 and 3). Interviews began with the researcher introducing the research topic; the 
main interview questions were asked directly after this introduction. The researcher elicits depth 
and detail about the research topic by following up on answers given by the interviewees during 
the interviews. The researcher probed further to encourage the interviewee to expand on what he 
or she has said that the researcher considers is crucial. Qualitative interviewers listen for what 
has been said and has not been said in order to ask follow-up questions (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). 
During the interviews, the researcher concentrated on what the interviewee said, decided to 
probe further, asked for clarification, and addressed gaps and omissions.  
After each interview, the researcher gave the interviewee a souvenir from Australia, thanked the 
interviewee. Internal documents that accompany an interview were given to the interviewer by 
some of the interviewees. These documents include minutes of meetings, reports, and other 
internal documents. After each interview and prior to conducting the next one, the researcher 
transcribed the interview.  
The first-time interviews were conducted from July 2014 to October 2014. All interviewees are 
Vietnamese; therefore, interviews were conducted in the Vietnamese language. The duration of 
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each interview ranged from 45 to 90 minutes. All interviewees agreed to be recorded. The 
researcher also took notes during and after these interviews. The information in the notes places 
the interview within its larger context and offers more information on the informant (Minichiello 
et al., 2008).  For instance, the researcher made the following note after the interview with a 
partner in a medium audit firm:  
“She is the partner who has worked in the auditing field since 1991. She is the most experienced 
auditor that I have met. Her answer to the interview question “Do the higher legal force of the 
Law, the sanction provisions in the Decree 105/2013/ND-CP and the changes in the inspection 
regime enhance audit quality?” is totally different from other previous interviewees. She said that 
these changes just make the audit documentation better, but do not improve audit quality. She 
explained that we did all the audit work before these reforms adopted. Now, we just pay more 
attention to document the working papers well. I think what she said is true. Her facial and 
physical expressions during the interview reflect that she said the true. Her answers are 
consistent and the explanation of every answer seems reasonable…So, in the next interviews, I 
have to ask interviewees to confirm this theme”.  
Most interviewees agreed to be interviewed in their offices. However, some interviewees were 
reluctant to do so, and therefore the interviewer had to arrange another venue such as a coffee 
shop, for example.  
4.3.1.1.2 Follow-up interviews  
The purpose of the second round of interviews was to test the concepts, themes discovered in the 
main interviews, and establish links between concepts. Qualitative researchers reach a level of 
their analysis where propositions are tested in the field (Minichiello et al., 2008).  
The researcher conducted the follow-up interviews from December, 2015 to January, 2016 for 
the purpose of checking the validity and credibility of the themes that emerged in the first-time 
interviews. Participants of the follow-up interviews include seven interviewees from the main 
interviews and twenty-five interviewees who did not participate in the main interviews. 
Interview questions for follow-up interviews are presented in Appendix 4. All follow-up 
interviewees were asked the same questions as in Appendix 4. Themes emerged from the follow-
up interviews are presented in Table 8 and 10. 
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According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), one way to check the emerging themes is to present them 
directly to the interviewees and ask them to respond. It is best to obtain feedback about these 
themes from the informants. The researcher of the current study presented the results of the main 
interviews to seven of the participants involved in the main interviews and obtained their 
feedback. These interviewees included one representative from the MOF, one representative 
from VACPA, one manager of Big Four firm, two managers of other larger audit firms, one 
partner of middle audit firm and one manager of small audit firm. Most of the participants agreed 
with the themes emerging from the main interview analysis. The backgrounds of these 
participants are presented in the Table 5. 
Table 5: Profiles of seven respondents involved in both main and follow-up interviews 
No. Organizations Location Code used Years of 
experience 
1 MOF Hanoi Representative 1 32 
2 VACPA Hanoi Representative 3 8 
3 Non-international large audit firm S Hanoi Manager 18 
4 Non-international large audit firm B Hanoi Manager 2 12 
5 Non-international large audit firm J Hanoi Manager 1 13 
6 Medium audit firm K Hanoi Partner 22 
7 Medium audit firm U Hanoi Manager 10 
 
The researcher also conducted twenty-five interviews with new participants who are partners and 
managers of audit firms, coming from four audit firm types in Vietnam. The purpose of the main 
interviews is exploratory; whereas, the purpose of the follow-up interviews is to test the 
propositions of the main interviews. A study was repeated for confirmation using a different 
population (Tongco, 2007). The backgrounds of these interviewees are illustrated in Tables 1, 2, 
and 3. 
4.3.1.1.3 Ethical issues of the interviews 
The current study has been approved by the Chair of Business College Human Ethics Advisory 
Network, RMIT. The approval No 18590 has been granted for the period from 12 June 2014 to 
04 March, 2017. To assist the researcher in dealing with ministries, institutions and professional 
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bodies, an invitation letter from RMIT University which states the aims and benefits of the 
research program and meets the ethical requirements for research of RMIT university, was 
printed in both English and Vietnamese. The researcher strictly followed the ethical 
requirements. The interview’s ethical dimension is first addressed with regard to the ethical 
guidelines of informed consent, confidentiality and consequences (Kvale, 1996). Informed 
consent involves informing the participants about the overall target of the research, and the 
possible risks and benefits from participating in the research (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The 
researcher contacted the participants by phone to gain interview consent. Prior to the agreed 
interviews, invitation letters and formal consent procedures were formally emailed to all 
participants. Before each interview, the researcher explained all the content in the invitation 
letter and in the consent form which covers the ethical issues. The researcher also informed the 
participants that their participation was voluntary and they had the right to withdraw from the 
research at any time.  Consent forms were signed by the participants before the interviews. 
Confidentiality implies that private data which identifies the participants will not be disclosed 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In the current study, the identity of the interviewees has been kept 
confidential. The researcher coded the position and the workplace of interviewees; for example, 
manager 1, Big Four audit firm I.  
4.3.1.2 Archival records 
Yin (2003) gives examples of archival records including: service records, organizational records, 
personal records. These archival records can be utilised in conjunction with other sources of 
information. When the archival evidence has been deemed relevant, an investigator must be 
careful to ascertain the conditions under which it was produced, and its accuracy. The archival 
records used in this research came from the MOF and the VACPA. The MOF is the regulatory 
body of the external audit in Vietnam. The MOF is a government agency which has the function 
of implementing the State management in finance, including external audit. Pursuant to the 
Decree No 118/2008/NĐ-CP issued by the Government, the main tasks and duties of the 
Ministry of Finance related to accounting and auditing is implement the state management in 
accounting and auditing (Ministry of Finance, 2006). According to the Law on External audit 
(2011), the Ministry of Finance takes responsibility for the implementation of state 
administration on external audit activities, with the major duties and powers as follows: a) 
Making and submitting suggestions to the Government for deciding the strategy and policy of 
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developing activities of external audit; b) Stipulating the criteria for undertaking the 
examination, and the organization of the examination for granting auditor certificates; granting, 
revoking, and managing certificates of auditors; c) Stipulating the standard form of the certificate 
of sufficient conditions for trading audit service, granting, modifying and revoking the 
certificates of sufficient conditions for trading audit service; d) Suspending the trading activities 
of an audit service; d) Inspecting, examining and settling complaints and denunciations and 
handling violations of legislation on external audit; g) Inspecting, examining activities in the 
field of external audit of the professional organizations on audit; h) Providing for registration and 
management of audit practice; publicizing the list of auditing firms, branches of foreign auditing 
firms in Vietnam and practicing auditors; i) Monitoring the quality of audit services. 
Under the MOF, the Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation and the General 
Department of Taxation are the two departments related to the management of accounting and 
auditing service. The Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation presently plays the 
most important role (Phan, 2014). 
Under the Law on External Audit (2011), the VACPA is the professional auditor organization 
that provides information to auditors and performs a number of tasks related to external audit 
activity prescribed by the Government. The major archival records from the MOF and VACPA 
are minutes of meetings, reports, other internal documents. In addition, the researcher also 
collected all legal documents issued by the government and the MOF.  
4.3.1.3 Secondary sources 
A secondary source is useful and has been utilised in various stages of the current study as a 
significant tool to gain an idea of the research topic, literature review, and validation of data 
collected from primary sources. The secondary sources of information used for the current study 
consist of published articles and websites. The researcher collected the published articles from 
the Accounting Journal (Vietnam), the Auditing Science Journal (Vietnam), the Auditing Journal 
(Vietnam), the Accounting and Finance Science Journal (Vietnam), and the Vietnamese Stock 
Journal (Vietnam). 
Websites are useful resources for the researcher to obtain a range of articles, reports and other 
information related to the Law on External Audit (2011). The websites accessed by the 
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researcher were http://www.mof.gov.vn, http://www.ssc.gov.vn, http://www.vacpa.org.vn, 
http://www.en.neu.edu.vn/, and http://vneconomy.vn. 
4.3.2 Data analysis 
4.3.2.1 Transcribing and translating the interviews 
According to Silver (2005) in Strauss and Corbin (1990), reliability can be obtained by ensuring 
that when interviews are transcribed, all aspects of data are transcribed, even the most minute.  
Most audio or video data is transformed into text to be analysed. The reason is that text is an easy 
form of recording that the data analysis techniques can be used to analyse (Gibbs & Flick, 2007). 
Thus, all the interviews in the current study were transcribed. The interviews were conducted in 
the Vietnamese language which is the first language of the interviewees, and all were audio-
recorded. Transcriptions were conducted in Vietnamese to avoid missing specific meanings and 
expressions when analysing the data. After finishing transcribing data from verbal form to the 
written form, the researcher listened to the recordings once more to ensure that the data had been 
precisely transcribed.  
The interview transcripts were sent to interviewers to reconfirm the interview information. Some 
misunderstandings were found and fixed. Then, the validated interview transcripts were 
translated from Vietnamese into English by the researcher. Each interview took about 20 hours 
to translate into English.  The translation was checked again by a professional translator. 
4.3.2.2 The processes of analyzing the data 
There are several studies giving overview of the different methods of qualitative analysis 
including thematic analysis, content analysis, constant comparative analysis, narrative analysis, 
discourse analysis, conversation analysis and so on (Kvale, 1996). Thematic analysis is a process 
of encoding qualitative data. A theme is a pattern identified in the data that at minimum 
describes and organizes the observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the problem 
(Boyatzis, 1998).  
Thematic analysis and content analysis are the most common forms of analysis in qualitative 
research (Marks & Yardley, 2003). In terms of content analysis, the results of the content 
analysis have been judged as trite since they rely only on frequency outcomes. The researchers 
who conduct content analysis are sometimes criticized for removing meaning from its context. 
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However, thematic analysis permits researchers to combine analysis of the frequency of codes 
with analysis of their meaning in context, thus adding the advantages of the subtlety of a truly 
qualitative analysis (Marks & Yardley, 2003). Thematic analysis is a method used to identify and 
analyze patterns of meaning in the data set. The end result of a thematic analysis should highlight 
the most important constellations of meanings present in the data set (Harper & Thompson, 
2012). The focus of thematic analysis is to find the themes emerged from the transcripts of 
interviews with participants (Minichiello et al., 2008). Interview data or textual newspaper data 
are likely to be at the root of thematic analysis (Harper & Thompson, 2012).  
The current study utilized the thematic analysis approach ((Boyatzis, 1998, Braun & Clarke, 
2006, Marks & Yardley, 2003, Harper & Thompson, 2012) to code development in data analysis. 
The researcher in the current study combined the individual experiences of the respondents and 
the meanings they attach to them. This study used the same method for data analysis as that of 
Houghton et al. (2013) in their study of participants’ perceptions of the impact of the CLERP 9 
audit reforms in Australia. The research topic of Houghton et al. (2013) is similar to that of the 
current study, but in a developed country. 
A theme is derived from theoretical idea (deductive) that the researcher takes to the research or 
from the raw data (inductive). A dual deductive and inductive set of themes are utilized together 
in high-quality qualitative research (Harper & Thompson, 2012). In the current search, the 
researcher approached the data with preconceived categories from public interest theory of 
regulation and institutional theory, but was still open to any other concepts and categories that 
emerged. 
Undertaking thematic analysis involves six main steps: familiarizing one’s self with the data, 
generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes 
and producing the report (Braun & Clarke, 2006). These authors also provide a 15-point 
checklist of criteria for good thematic analysis with regard to transcription, coding, analysis, and 
written report.  
Using the NVivo version 10 and 11 qualitative data analysis software program, the researcher 
identifies textual patterns from the various interview transcriptions, thereby permitting 
conclusions to be drawn from the trends and themes in the data (Houghton et al., 2013). NVIVO 
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is an example of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software specifically designed for 
thematic analysis (Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2009). This study utilized NVIVO software version 
10 and 11 for the data analysis procedure. This software helps the researcher to address many 
more interviews than analyzing manually coding. The software helps the researcher to organize 
codes, cluster codes and categorize them into themes. In the current research, six phases were 
adopted as suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006) in order to execute the thematic analysis. 
These phases are as follows. 
Stage 1: Acquiring familiarity with the data 
The researcher collected and transcribed data by herself. Hence, the researcher began the 
analysis with prior knowledge of the data, including initial thoughts and ideas written down after  
the collection and transcription of each interview (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Qualitative data 
analysis involves deliberate listening, reading, re-reading and theme recognition (Tuckett, 2005). 
Hence, the researcher read through the interview transcripts three times in order to become 
familiar with the data before the analysis. During this period, the researcher also wrote down 
some critical points and ideas that the interviewees referred to since this is important for the 
initial analysis. In the current research, each transcript of interview was then put into Nvivo 
software for the purpose of analysis. According to Harper and Thompson (2012), software 
packages such as Nvivo enable the researcher to systematically examine the data for co-
occurring themes, the sequence of themes, and complex relationships between themes. 
Stage 2: Producing codes 
To facilitate coding, researchers need to select a subsample from each sample group. The data 
from the subsamples is the basis for developing the code (Boyatzis, 1998). The researcher 
created a coding book to guide the data analysis. The coding book consisted of the full set of 
codes that she employs in the data. The list of codes was derived from both the content of the 
data and the conceptual framework of the study. The researcher established a list of nodes in the 
Nvivo software that is comparable with the coding book. After applying the list of nodes to 
around 20% of the data, the list of nodes was revised. After this stage, the whole data set was 
coded at three different times. The first time and second time were in March, 2015 and July, 
2015 respectively. The third time was in January, 2016. Materials from data can be coded into no 
node, or one node or more than one node. The analysis was conducted across interview questions 
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rather than for each interview question individually. The final list of nodes is illustrated in 
Appendix 5. 
Stage 3: Searching for themes 
This stage involves grouping the different codes into themes and assembling coded data extracts 
in the themes. Researchers analyze codes and examine how different codes can be brought 
together to create an important theme. Researchers have to consider the relationship between 
codes, between themes and different levels of themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In addition, the 
nuance of high frequency themes are identified and are grouped based on their differences and 
similarities (Harper & Thompson, 2012). The researcher of the current study grouped the free 
nodes into tree nodes in the Nvivo. 
Stage 4: Reviewing themes  
This stage involves establishing a set of candidate themes and refining the themes. There are two 
levels to the cleansing of themes. Level one addresses refinement at the level of the coded data 
extracts for a theme and examines whether they create a coherent pattern. The researcher read all 
the data extracts from each theme to determine the coherence. If it is not coherent, the researcher 
decided whether or not the theme was problematic. When a theme was assessed to be 
problematic, it was discarded. 
Level two relates to examining the validity of each theme in relation to the whole data set and 
considering whether the thematic map precisely demonstrates the meaning evident in the whole 
data set. At this stage, the researcher also read through the data twice in order to decide whether 
the themes make sense in the data. The researcher also coded the data one more time in January, 
2016. The purpose was to code additional data in themes that were missed during the last coding 
stage and to code the data of the second-time interviews within themes. 
Stage 5: Defining themes 
The researcher revisits the data extracted in each theme to review its coherence and consistency. 
The researcher not only paraphrases the content of the data, but also illustrates what is interesting 
about them and why. Each theme is also re-examined and the relationship between themes is also 
considered. If the theme is large and complex, the researcher considers whether the theme 
consists of sub-themes. The final process in this stage is to give a theme a precise and concise 
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name. The result of the stages 3, 4 and 5 is the list of themes, issues and subthemes described in 
the Appendix 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10.  
Stage 6: writing the report 
The purpose of this phase is to tell a complex story of the data in a way that convinces the 
readers of the reliability of the analysis. The analysis needs to go further - from the description of 
the data to an interpretation of aspects of the research topic, and the development of arguments 
associated with the research questions. The unit of analysis is the entity that the interpretation of 
the study focuses on (Boyatzis, 1998). Chapter 5 of the current study identifies the Vietnamese 
government’s motivations for the introduction of the Law; the unit of analysis is the government. 
Chapter 6 investigates how audit firms have reacted to the major audit reforms and the changes 
they have made in response to the audit reforms; the unit of analysis is an audit firm. Chapter 7 
explores how the audit reforms have impacted on auditors’ practices; the unit of analysis is the 
auditor. 
 In this step, the researcher links the analysis narrative to the theoretical framework and prior 
literature. This stage of theoretical interpretation also helps the researcher to revise the themes if 
necessary. In addition, these themes were externally validated by internal documents from the 
MOF, VACPA and academic literature. 
4.4 Reliability and validity checks 
Reliability and validity are conceptualized as trustworthiness, rigor and quality in qualitative 
paradigm. McMillan and Schumacher (2006) suggest ten strategies to ensure the reliability and 
validity of qualitative findings. These strategies are illustrated in the Table 6. 
Table 6: A list of strategies used to enhance the validity of qualitative research 
No Strategy Description 
1 Prolonged and persistent 
field work 
Allows interim data analysis and corroboration to ensure 
match between findings and participants reality 
2 Multi-method strategies Allows triangulation in data collection and data analysis 
3 Participant language 
verbatim accounts 
Obtain literal statements of participants and quotations from 
documents 
4 Low-inference 
descriptions 
Record precise, almost literal, and detailed descriptions of 
people and situations 
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5 Multiple researchers Agreement on the descriptive data collected by the research 
team 
6 Mechanically record data Use of tape recorders, photographs, and videotapes 
7 Participant research Use of participants recorded perceptions in diaries or 
anecdotal records for corroboration 
8 Member checking Check informally with participants for accuracy during data 
collection; frequently done in participant observation 
studies 
9 Participant review Ask participants to review researcher’s synthesis of 
interviews with person for accuracy of representation; 
frequently done in interview studies. 
10 Negative or discrepant 
data 
Actively search for records, analyze, and report negative or 
discrepant data that are an exception to patterns or that 
modify patterns found in data. 
 
In addition, Brink (1993) also recapitulated the major critical strategies, recommended by 
leading qualitative researchers to enhance the validity and reliability of qualitative research. 
These strategies are triangulation, multiple, expert consensual validation from others, member 
checks, searching for disconfirming evidence, checking for representativeness, and thick 
description. ‘Triangulation’ refers to the use of two or more data sources, methods, investigators, 
theoretical perspectives and approaches to analysis in the study of the phenomenon and then 
validating the congruence among them. ‘Multiple’ refers to the repetitions of measurement over 
or long period of time, at different points of time, in different situations or setting and by 
different people. Expert consensual validation from others entails independent analysis of the 
data by others like research colleagues, a judge panel or participant informants. ‘Member check’ 
refers to recycling of analysis back to informants. Conclusions are sent back to the informants 
and feedback is required regarding the accuracy of the content. This ensures that the researcher 
and the informant are viewing the data consistently. Searching for disconfirming evidence 
requires an active search for disconfirmation of what is believed to be true. Checking for 
representativeness includes checking for the representativeness of the data as a whole, of the 
coding categories and of the examples used to analyze and present data. Thick description means 
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that the criteria and procedures are made explicit in the studies. Hence, validity and reliability 
can be judged only if a very detailed account of the context or setting within which the study 
took place and a thorough description of the procedures from the beginning to the end are given. 
According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), tactics to ensure the validity include checking for 
representativeness, triangulation, assessing evidence, following up on surprises, replicating a 
finding and getting feedback from informants. Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest that another 
strategy for enhancing the validity of the findings is to use quantitative figures when these make 
sense. Following these strategies recommended by McMillan and Schumacher (2006), Brink 
(1993), Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), and Strauss and Corbin (1990), the researcher adopted the 
following strategies to ensure the validity and reliability of the research.  
Firstly, the triangulation technique was applied by collecting multiple data resources including 
interviews, archival records from the government, the MOF and the VACPA, and secondary data 
from Vietnamese journals and reliable websites. Data triangulation assists the researcher not only 
to collect more comprehensive relevant information, but also to cross-check their consistency in 
order to enhance the robustness of findings. According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), 
objectivity of qualitative research is considered to be free of bias, meaning that the results have 
been cross-checked and verified. In Chapter 5 of this thesis, the results of analyzing the archival 
records collected from the MOF and VACPA are validated by the interview and secondary data. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, the results of analyzing interview data are cross-checked with the archival 
records and the secondary data. 
Secondly, the researcher used an audio recorder to record all the interviews. During the 
interviews, the researcher assesses the consistency of the interviewees’ answers and asked 
follow-up questions if there was inconsistency.  If inconsistency in the answers is not explained, 
the researcher did not use the answers as data for the analysis. 
Thirdly, each interview was transcribed twice to ensure the reliability of the transcription. 
According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), to be sure you are right, the interviewer should write a 
summary and ask the interviewees if it is what they meant. Hence, each interview in the current 
study was followed up by email and conversations with the interviewees to confirm the main 
themes of the interviews.  
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Fourthly, the consistency and trustworthiness of research findings are considered in relation to 
the issue of whether the finding is reproducible at other times (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
Reliability is concerned with the consistency, stability and repeatability of the informant’s 
accounts as well as the investigator’s ability to collect and record information accurately (Seltiz, 
Wrightman, & Cook, 1976). It indicates the ability of a research method to yield consistently the 
same results over repeated testing periods. Therefore, the interviews for the current research 
were conducted two times. The main interviews were conducted from July to October 2014. The 
the follow-up interviews were conducted from December 2015 to January 2016. Participants in 
the follow-up interviews consist of seven participants involved in the main interviews and an 
additional twenty-five participants. The purpose of the follow-up interviews was to confirm the 
themes that emerged from the analysis of the first interviews “Am I right?” (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005). The researcher presented the results of the main interviews to seven participants involved 
in these interviews to obtain feedback from them. 
Fifthly, the main interviews were coded and analyzed three times by the researcher. The first 
time was implemented to code the data of the main interviews. The second time was conducted 
after the first time few months to check the consistency of the first-time analysis results. The 
third time coded the data of the follow-up interviews. The number of interviewees involving in 
the research was seventy. The findings of the analysis were complemented by quantitative 
figures (see Table 7 page 203, Table 8 page 204, Table 9 page 249, and Table 10 page 250). 
Finally, the research design was done with the consultancy of the researcher’s supervisors and 
two academics in Vietnam. A pilot interview was conducted so as to revise the interview 
questions. After the pilot study and obtaining advice from the supervisors and the academics, the 
researcher designed appropriate interview questions and established an interview protocol for the 
real interviews.   
4.5 Conclusion 
This study employed a qualitative approach to acquire an in-depth understanding of the 
Vietnamese government’ motivations for introducing the  Law and the main impacts of the audit 
reforms in the Law on audit firms and auditors’ practice. The researcher deployed a qualitative 
methodology for several main reasons. Most importantly, the researcher selected a qualitative 
study due to the nature of the research questions. Qualitative studies are most useful for 
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answering 'why?' and 'how?' questions (Marshall, 1996). The purpose of the study is to determine 
why the Vietnamese government introduced the Law and how the reforms in the Law impact on 
the audit firms and auditors. A qualitative method was considered appropriate for the purpose of 
the current study. 
The researcher adopted a data triangulation method for data collection, including semi-structured 
in-depth interviews, archival records and secondary data. The interviews were conducted twice. 
The main interviews were conducted from July to October 2014. The follow-up interviews were 
conducted from December 2015 to January 2016. The major archival records from the MOF and 
VACPA are minutes of meetings, reports, and other internal documents. In addition, the 
researcher also collected all legal documents issued by the government and the MOF. The 
secondary sources of information used for this study consist of published articles and websites. 
This study utilizes the thematic analysis approach to code development in data analysis. The 
NVIVO software package versions 10 and 11 were also used to assist the data analysis 
procedure. NVIVO is an example of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
specifically designed for thematic analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MOTIVATIONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE LAW 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the Vietnamese government’s major motivations for the 
introduction of the Law on External Audit. In other words, the results and discussions pertaining 
to Research Question 1 are presented in this chapter. These main themes, issues are also 
presented in Appendix 6. A brief overview of the audit regulations and the current audit reforms 
in Vietnam will also be described so as to help readers understand well the topic of this study in 
the context of Vietnam. The factors that have motivated the Vietnamese government to enact the 
Law are classified according to internal factors and external factors outside the Vietnamese 
jurisdiction. In addition, this chapter also summarises the main audit reforms in the Law and the 
Vietnamese government’s motivations for the introduction of these reforms. The description of 
these main audit reforms will enable the readers to better understand the contents of Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7, and the impacts of these audit reforms on the audit firms as well as on individual 
auditors’ practice. 
According to the VACPA, audit firms in Vietnam are divided into three groups: large audit 
firms, medium audit firms and small audit firms. Large audit firms often have more than one 
hundred employees with more than twenty practicing auditors. Large audit firms include Big 
Four firms and other large audit firms. The Big Four firms are Deloitte, Ernst &Young, KPMG 
and Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Other large audit firms are those apart from the Big Four which 
have more than one hundred employees with more than twenty practicing auditors. Medium 
audit firms often have from fifty to fewer than one hundred employees with between ten and 
twenty practicing auditors.  All other audit firms are classified as small audit firms (VACPA, 
2012). In this study, audit firms are grouped according to the above VACPA definition. 
Following Lee (2010), the suppliers in the audit market in Taiwan is divided into four categories: 
Big Four firms, large audit firms, medium audit firms and small audit firms. The audit suppliers 
in this current study are also divided into four: Big Four firms, other large audit firms, medium 
audit firms and small firms.  
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5.2 Audit regulations before the introduction of the Law on External Audit 
Due to the importance of external audit activities, the Vietnamese government has paid attention 
to developing the external audit in Vietnam. Before the Law on External Audit was promulgated, 
the government had issued four Decrees to regulate external audit activities. The MOF had 
issued sixteen Decisions, Circulars to prescribe conditions to establish and operate an accounting 
firm, the conditions for registering to become practicing auditors, management of practicing 
auditors. Audit quality control was conducted by the MOF and VACPA. The MOF issued forty-
one auditing standards related to external audit. The auditing profession in Vietnam before the 
Law went through two phases as follows. 
The first phase was from 1991 to 1997.  External audit was first established in 1991. From the 
time when the Vietnamese economy transitioned to a market-oriented economy and the 
government promulgated policies to attract foreign investment, the demand for external audit 
services increased quickly (Ha, 2009). Two Vietnamese accounting firms, namely VACO and 
AASC, were established in May, 1991 and the government permitted five international 
accounting firms including DTTI, P.W, A.A, KPMG and E. &Y. to set up their branches in 
Vietnam at that time. The government introduced Decree No. 07/1994/ND-CP on 29/01/1994. 
This was the first audit regulation imposing conditions under which accounting firms could be 
established and operate, and the rights and responsibilities of auditors. The Decree provided 
basic regulations for auditors, audit firms and the state management regarding audit operation 
(Phan, 2011).  
The second phase was from 1998 until 2011. Foreign investment had increased rapidly and the 
government had prescribed mandatory audit clients. Therefore, the demand for external audit had 
increased significantly. For the purpose of developing the audit market and enhancing audit 
quality in Vietnam, the government issued three Decrees to regulate external audit activities. 
Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP was introduced on 30/3/2004. Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP had 
several reforms in comparison with Decree No. 07/1994/ND-CP: (a) it introduced the 
requirement that practising auditors be independent, especially audit partner rotation of three 
consecutive financial years; (b) it made a distinction between an auditor and a practicing auditor; 
(c) more types of companies and organizations were compulsorily audited clients; (d) it 
established requirements for practising auditors; (e) it introduced a main requirement whereby an 
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audit firm could be established if it had at least three practising auditors; (f) it set out the 
responsibilities and rights of audit firms and the requirement for independence at audit firm 
level; and (g) The requirement for audit reports. 
Decree No. 133/2005/ND-CP, dated 31/10/2005 and Decree No. 30/2009/ND-CP, dated 
30/3/2009 were also issued to adjust several articles of Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP. These 
audit regulations in Vietnam were necessary for the development of the audit market and 
achieved the government’s goal of enhancing financial transparency. Hence, the number of 
accounting firms increased significantly and audit quality control improved. By 2009, there were 
165 accounting firms and around 1,500 CPAs in Vietnam (Ha, 2009). 
5.3 Recent Audit reforms in Vietnam 
Over the past 20 years, external auditing activities in Vietnam have markedly improved. An 
important milestone was the first Law on External Audit which was passed by the National 
Assembly of Vietnam on 29
th
 March 2011. It is the supreme legal document on independent 
auditing to be issued in Vietnam, which enhances the status of independent auditing profession, 
and creates a stable and sustainable legal foundation for the development of this profession (The 
VACPA, 2014a). 
The Law on External Audit 2011 (Vietnam) displaced Decree No. 105/2004 ND-CP, Decree No. 
133/2005/ND-CP and Decree No. 30/2009/ND-CP. The Law was adopted with the supreme legal 
force of the legal system in Vietnam. The Law has much more legal force than the three Decrees.  
There have been significant reforms on external audit since the Law was promulgated: (a) giving 
legal backing to auditing standards; (b) new requirements for audit opinion; (c) new 
requirements for auditors to be independent; (d) new requirements for the establishment of audit 
firms that include having at least five practising auditors and meeting the condition of the legal 
capital; (e) more types of companies and organizations are statutorily audited clients; (f) new 
requirement for audit firms to publish annual transparency reports; (g) new requirements for 
audit of financial statements of public utility entities; (h) a change in the inspection regime; and 
(i) a change in sanction provisions. 
In addition, under the Law, the MOF reissued new auditing standards to displace the previous 
ones. There are considerable reforms in the new auditing standards in comparison with the 
previous ones. The most significant change in the new standards is the change in the audit 
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methodology. The approach in the new standards is up-to-date. These new standards adopt the 
risk assessment method, whereas the old ones applied the sampling method (The MOF, 2013). 
5.4 The motivation for the introduction of the Law on External Audit 
5.4.1 To fix inefficiencies in the audit market 
5.4.1.1 The deficiencies of previous audit regulations  
Low legal level 
The motivations for the introduction of the Law were highlighted in the proposals of the Law. 
The MOF is the state agency, mainly responsible for the creation of the Law. The researcher 
collected all the internal documents of MOF and the government related to the Law creation 
project. These internal documents include proposals of the Law, reports, submissions to the 
parliament, minutes of meetings, and discussions associated with this issue. The results of 
analysing these internal documents and interviews with representatives from the MOF, the SSC 
and the VACPA illustrate that one of the major reasons for the enactment of the Law was the 
deficiencies of previous audit regulations. More importantly, the highest level of previous audit 
regulations was the Decrees, whereas the highest level of legal document in other fields is Laws. 
Hence, the previous audit regulations had low legal force and were not comparable with legal 
documents in other fields.  
The MOF asserts that the highest audit legal documents were Decree 105/2004/ND-CP and 
Decree 133/2005/ND-CP issued by the government, being on a lower level than ordinances and 
laws. To adapt to the development of diverse economic activities in the market economy and 
strengthen the management of the state, most of the areas have been legalized, for instance, Law 
on Enterprises 2005, Investment Law, and Commercial Law. Meanwhile, the external audit field 
was merely regulated with the Decrees. These did not fully guarantee the legal conditions for 
implementing external audits and were not in sync with the current legal systems in other fields 
(Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation, 2007). 
“Because of living and working styles in accordance with rules and regulations, the state 
orientation is that all occupations must be regulated by laws. That is the fundamental basis” 
(Representative 1, VACPA) 
Another reason is that the low level of previous audit regulations did not correspond with crucial 
roles that auditing profession plays in the Vietnamese economy. Hence, previous audit 
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regulations needed to be upgraded to become the Law to emphasize the importance of external 
audit in the economy. External audit is a special service, certifying financial information in 
society. External audit expresses an opinion about whether the financial report is prepared in all 
material aspects in accordance with a financial reporting framework. External audit plays a 
crucial role in the market economy, and helps to prevent and detect misuses and waste 
(Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation, 2007). In the context of Vietnam, external 
audit also plays a pivotal role in creating and maintaining an attractive, transparent investment 
environment which attracts investment, especially foreign investment (Dang, 2010).  
The Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation (2007) declares that: “The external 
audit field just had the Decree to regulate, which is not commensurate with the importance and 
scale of development of the auditing profession”. A representative from MOF also confirmed 
that it was necessary to let the public understand more about audit by introducing the Law. 
“The enactment of the Law is to let the general public know more about external audit. Firms 
will access audit services more. The auditing profession in Vietnam is still quiet new, with a 
short history” 
Representative 2, MOF 
A representative of VACPA considers that the external audit is a special service. This service has 
a more legal nature and a large proportion of the general public relies on the results of this 
service. Therefore, the low level of previous audit regulations did not correspond with the 
importance of the auditing profession. 
“The auditing profession has more legal nature, which is called the service but it has legal 
features…If the auditor wrongly concludes, it affects so many people. For the reasons above, the 
auditing profession must be regulated by a law, which stipulates responsibilities of auditors, 
conditions to become a practicing auditor and so on”.  
(Representative 1, VACPA) 
Another manager of a mid-tier firm illustrated the importance of this profession by describing 
auditing results as firms’ health certificates. He believed that the auditing profession needed to 
be regulated by a higher legal document instead of Decrees. 
“The auditing profession is significant, like a doctor to provide the health certificates for patients. 
An audit result is a health certificate of a company and an economy. It is an important profession 
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and the general public wants to trust audit results. Therefore, the Decree 105/2004 was upgraded 
to become the Law”.  
(Manager 1, firm K). 
The weak legal force of previous audit regulations led to a weak legal framework for external 
audit and non-compliance. According to Luong (2011), independent audits were regulated by the 
government Decrees, but did not provide a strong enforcement of legal framework for the 
development of auditing firms and dealing with risks in auditing activities. Doan (2009) also 
asserted that a range of issues related to external audit needed to be legalized by a higher level of 
legal document than the Decrees. These issues comprise conditions, rights, responsibilities of 
practicing auditors; the conditions for establishing and operating audit firms; rights and duties of 
audit firms; state management of the audit profession; and punishments for violations. These 
issues should be stipulated in a law of the parliament rather than a decree of the government.  
A representative of the MOF also mentioned the deficiencies of the previous audit regulations: 
“There were deficiencies of the Decree 105/2004. At the Decree level, we cannot address these 
issues, so we have to upgrade the Decree to the Law”.  
(Representative 2, MOF) 
A manager of a big firm attributed the flaws of practical problems in auditing to the low level of 
the previous audit regulations: 
“The first reason is the Decree 105/2004 did not have highly legal force, so practicing auditors 
still had problems in the implementation process”.  
(Manager 1, other large audit firm J) 
Incomplete contents, general audit regulations 
The Decree did not fully define the content needed to enhance the audit quality and meet the 
requirements of the integration process. The Decree did not prescribe minimum capital 
requirements for limited liability audit firms. This deficiency caused problems in the 
compensation for damages of audit clients. The previous audit regulations did not prescribe the 
criteria for inspections of audit firms. In addition, the Decree regime did not have contents 
related to audit documentation and audit reports (Department of Accounting and Auditing 
Regulation, 2007). 
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The Decree also did not stipulate the audit of public interest entities. The economic groups were 
insolvent, whereas auditors certified the true and fair level of their financial statements. This was 
a pressing issue and required a number of countries to strengthen further the additional 
provisions relating to statutory audit of public interest entities. In Vietnam, Decree 
105/2004/ND-CP did not regulate the audit of public interest entities (Ha, 2010b). Hence, the 
regulations failed to create incentives for auditing firms to provide high quality audit services for 
their audit clients. A partner in a mid-tier firm also presented this view: 
“In fact the Decree 105 was so simple and not sufficient. It is not applicable at the moment... 
Therefore, The Law was passed”. 
 (Partner, medium audit firm P) 
A manager of a Big Four firm concurs that the Decree lacked many of the features necessary to 
regulate the auditing profession. Hence, it was crucial to introduce a more comprehensive 
auditing legal framework that could govern many aspects of audit activities. 
“We had a Decree from 2004; the scope of it was small.  It is a significant profession so both the 
society and economy needs the Law. The Decree was so simple, did not govern many aspects of 
the auditing profession”.  
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm A) 
The Decree stipulated no clear regulations regarding the prohibitions, rights and obligations of 
audit firms, auditors and audit clients. Hence, it was difficult to deal with violations committed 
by auditors and audit firms. 
A manager of a medium audit firm claimed that the general sections and loose audit regulations 
resulted in a range of violations by auditors and audit firms in the past. 
“The Decree 105 did not specify the sections related to auditors and accounting firms. For 
example, it did not prescribe strictly the responsibilities of auditors and accounting firms. Almost 
sections were not specified in the Decree 105. A practicing auditor could register his or her audit 
job in several accounting firms. The provisions of Decree 105 were very loose”. 
(Manager, medium audit firm K). 
“The Decree 105/2004/ND-CP is so general. It did not prescribe clearly the rights and duties of 
auditors and audit firms”. 
Representative 3, VACPA 
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The Decree contained only general and ambiguous stipulations for the compensation by audit 
firms of audit clients and users of audit reports: “To be held responsible for clients and users of 
audit results and provided services; to pay compensations for damage caused by their auditors, 
who are at fault, to clients when providing auditing services and other relevant services”. The 
ambiguous regulation regarding the audit firms’ responsibilities towards their clients and users of 
audit reports reduced the duties and efforts required of auditors and audit firms. According to 
Doan (2009), the audit regulations in the past were ambiguous and not stringent, which affected 
audit quality and the operations of audit firms. 
Non-punitive regulations 
The Decree did not prescribe in detail the contents related to inspections of audit firms, and 
sanctions for violations (Ha, 2010b). In the Decree, there was a general article about the 
sanctions of auditors and audit firms: “To be held responsible according to legal systems; 
organizations and individuals that commit acts of violating the provisions of this Decree shall, 
depending on the nature and seriousness of their violations, be disciplined, administrative 
sanctioned or examined for criminal liability”. These flaws of previous audit regulations did not 
prevent irresponsible practices by auditors and audit firms. Hence, audit quality suffered as a 
result (VACPA, 2011). A MOF representative asserted that, unlike the accounting field, the 
auditing field did not have details of sanctions to address violations. 
“We did not have a legal document promulgating the sanctions in the auditing field. In the field 
of accounting, we have, but not in the auditing field”. 
Representative 1, MOF 
“The sanction provisions were not detailed in a legal document. The Decree 105/2004/ND-CP is 
so general, which did not create a frame for audit firms and auditors to be in”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
Another MOF representative also emphasized that they faced difficulties in dealing with 
violations. There were no criteria regarding punishments. Hence, the previous audit regulations 
were non-punitive, which affected audit quality. 
“The Decree 105/2004/ND-CP was so generic, so we finished inspections of audit firms but 
there were no grounds for sanctioning. Every time we inspected audit firms, the processing time 
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to deal with punishment was very long since the Decree 105/2004 was very general, not specific. 
So, we had to consult with many departments to conclude the sanctions” 
Representative 3, MOF 
According to the data from archival records of the MOF, the supervision of the auditing 
profession conducted by the VACPA under the Decree was not effective. Before the Law was 
introduced, the auditing profession in Vietnam was self-regulated. The VACPA was established 
in 2005. From 2005 to 2011, the MOF delegated to the VACPA the rights and duties of 
supervising audit firms and auditors. Under Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP, the MOF issued the 
Decision 47/2005/QD-BTC, dated 17/07/2005 to transfer the MOF’s rights and obligations of 
supervising audit firms and auditors to the VACPA. Accordingly, VACPA was mainly 
responsible for: annual training of practising auditors; management of the list of practicing 
auditors and audit firms; considering the conditions and publicizing the list of auditors and 
auditing firms eligible to conduct audit; consulting audit firms, inspections of audit firms, 
participating in building audit regulations. In particular, in terms of inspection of audit firms, the 
MOF conducted inspections of audit firms in Vietnam from 1999 to 2005. However, from 2006 
to 2011, the MOF transferred their inspection work to the VACPA. The inspections that VACPA 
conducted in audit firms still had deficiencies, since they could not monitor audit firms and 
auditors rigorously, which affected audit quality (MOF 2010). The VACPA faced difficulties in 
meeting its obligations due to insufficient resources, and failure to act professionally and 
independently. The inspections by VACPA were considered as non-punitive, and hence did not 
deter audit firms and auditors from violating auditing standards and regulations. Therefore, the 
MOF could not transfer to the VACPA any additional rights and duties associated with 
regulating external audit (MOF 2010).  
 “The VACPA has to protect its members. Hence, the inspection of VACPA is loose and non-
punitive”  
Representative 2, MOF 
Conflict of previous audit regulations with other laws, an obsolete auditing legal framework 
There was a conflict between previous audit regulations and other laws in terms of the conditions 
for establishing audit firms. The Circular 60/2006/TT-BTC dated 28/06/2006 under Decree 
105/2004/ND-CP prescribed the conditions for establishing and operating audit firms. This 
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Circular was issued by the MOF. However, the Law on Enterprises 2005 promulgates: 
“Ministries, ministerial equivalent bodies shall not be permitted to stipulate conditional lines of 
business and business conditions”. In addition, Decree No. 139/2007/ND-CP dated 05/09/2007 
that details the Law on Enterprises also stipulates that: “All provisions regarding the types of 
lines of business subject to conditions and such business conditions in other legal documents 
other than laws, ordinances like decrees or relevant decisions of the Prime Minister of the 
Government shall no longer be effective as from 1 September 2008”. Hence, the audit 
regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance promulgating the conditions to establish audit 
firms became ineffective from 01/09/2008. 
The Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation (2007) asserted that the promulgation of 
the Law on Enterprises 2005 has made obsolete several provisions in Decree No. 105/2004/ND-
CP and in Circulars’ guiding standards and conditions for the establishment and operation of 
audit firms. This situation led to difficulties in state management of audit and increased the risks 
associated with audit activities. The Law on Enterprises 2005 stipulates the criteria for 
establishing and operating the conditional businesses: “Directors must hold professional 
certificates”. However, the previous audit regulations prescribed:  
“Directors of audit firms must hold audit certificates and have at least three-year experience after 
being awarded the certificates”. Hence, there were conflicts between the Law on Enterprises 
2005 and the previous audit regulations.  
A manager of a mid-tier firm also noted the conflict between Decree No. 105/2004 and the Law 
Enterprises 2005:  
“The Decree 105/2004 conflicted with the Law Enterprises 2005 which was issued in 2005. 
When the Decree 105 was upgraded to become the Law, the Law regulated directly the auditing 
profession and the conflict was addressed”.  
(Manager, medium audit firm K). 
A manager of a Big Four firm described the Decree 105/2004 as an out-dated regulation:  
“In terms of the government, the Decree 105/2004 was born a long time ago and it was no longer 
updated again. Hence, it is required a new regulation to support the government in the 
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governance of this audit market. I think mainly due to the Decree 105/2004 which it is too out-
dated and should be changed”. 
 (Manager 1, Big Four firm L) 
5.4.1.2 The shortcomings of the audit market in Vietnam 
All the participants in the study concurred that there were a range of deficiencies in the audit 
market. Hence, the regulators needed to address these issues. According to MOF (2010), the 
major reason for the deficiencies in the audit market was the uncomprehensive auditing legal 
framework as presented in section 5.4.1.1. The highest legal document of audit was Decree No. 
105/2004/ND-CP, whereas the highest legal documents of other professions are the laws. The 
previous audit regulations were out-of-date and had a range of deficiencies, which did not 
provide incentives for auditors and audit firms to improve audit quality. 
Small audit market  
The mandatory audit clients were foreign companies, state-owned companies, banks, financial 
institutions, listed firms, public interest entities and insurance companies. Audit clients were 
mainly mandatory auditees. Even though some companies were mandatory auditees, they did not 
appoint auditors to conduct audits of their fiscal statements. A range of financial statements of 
state-owned enterprises in the municipalities were not audited although these enterprises were 
compulsory auditees. In addition, some foreign companies which were mandatory auditees also 
did not hire external auditors to conduct audit of their financial statements (Ha, 2008). The 
number of audit clients was not large and unstable. The Vietnamese economy is transforming 
from the planned economy to the market-oriented economy. The audit service was incomplete. 
There was still reluctance to use audit services (The Government, 2010). The reason for these 
shortcomings was the weak and non-stringent auditing legal framework in Vietnam. The auditing 
legal framework lacked details regarding sanction provisions and therefore did not prevent 
violations. 
Low audit quality 
Apart from the auditors of big accounting firms, other auditors were not professionally trained. 
The number of people holding international accounting and auditing certificates was around 480. 
Auditors in Vietnam did not have a lot of experience in the international audit environment. 
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Some auditors did not recognize the importance of following the ethical standards and audit 
regulations (MOF, 2010). Practising auditors did not comply fully with professional ethics and 
disciplines. Sanctions for violations were loose and negligible, which did not prevent violations, 
thereby affecting the audit quality. New accounting firms were small, and did not have high audit 
quality. These new accounting firms did not have an audit quality control department, and the 
number of auditors was three, just enough to meet the requirement of audit regulations. Hence, 
the audit quality in these firms was still low. It was mainly due to the weak auditing legal 
framework before the introduction of the Law (MOF, 2010). 
A manager of a Big Four firm presented her view about audit quality:  
“At the time that the stock market developed quickly and the general public needed and trusted 
external audit results, there was scepticism about the audit quality and the true and fair of 
financial statements”.  
(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm L) 
A manager of a mid-tier firm indicated that the low audit quality was due to slack supervision:  
“The government did not manage the audit market strictly. There was an increase in the number 
of accounting firms, but the audit quality in these firms was still low”.  
(Manager, other large audit firm E) 
Similarly, a senior auditor of a small accounting firm reported on the different audit quality 
among audit firms: 
 “Last time, the number of accounting firms increased quickly, however, the audit quality was 
not high. Although we had auditing standards and the inspection of the VACPA, audit quality 
was different among accounting firms. Audit fee and human resource among accounting firms 
were different”. 
(Senior auditor, small audit firm G) 
Thinh (2008) compared the audit quality between local audit firms and international audit firms 
and concluded that the audit quality and reputation of small local audit firms were lower than 
those of international audit firms. Some local audit firms cooperating with international audit 
firms had better audit quality than other local audit firms, but did not have as good audit quality 
as audit firms in other countries. Auditors and audit firms faced low regulation risk and litigation 
risk under the regime of the Decree. However, international audit firms face higher reputation 
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risk to incentivize them to provide higher audit quality than local audit firms. In addition, 
auditors of international audit firms are considered to be more competent than those of local ones 
(DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
Since the audit quality was poor and there were audit failures in the stock market, public 
confidence in audits was undermined. Scandals occurred in the Bach Tuyet Cotton Joint Stock 
Company, Vien Dong Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company, and the Vinashin Industry Group. 
All of the scandals were related to the auditors’ issuance of inaccurate audit opinions. Hence, 
investors were impacted by these bankruptcies and questioned the audit quality. 
“Through inspections, we know that audit quality of small audit firm was still low”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
 “Generally, small audit firms worked inefficiently. They accepted small audit contract, only 10 
million. They signed and sold their signatures, so the auditors’ responsibilities reduced. Hence, 
public trust in auditors is little. Confidence in the audit falls after the audit failure related to 
collapses of listed firms on the stock market”. 
 
(Manager, other large audit firm E) 
 
“Previously the auditing profession operated under the Decree 105, the number of small audit 
firms was a lot. Small audit firms often lacked of practicing auditors. These small audit firms 
rented audit certificates to operate. The audit quality was not high”. 
(Partner, medium audit firm P) 
The unfair competition in the audit market 
In the last few years, audit firms spoiled audit clients. They were ready to satisfy all the demands 
of their clients, even misrepresenting audit clients’ financial data to obtain audit fees. Hence, the 
true and fair circumstance of financial statements were not certified (Parliament, 2011b). Audit 
firms competed by reducing audit fees rather than by increasing audit quality. Hence, the audit 
quality was low (VACPA, 2011). 
Audit firms did not cooperate well and even competed unfairly. Some audit firms cut audit 
procedures and quality control work so as to reduce costs in order to compete and pursue profits 
(Thinh, 2008).  Most small and medium audit firms did not have the audit fee frame, so they 
could increase or decrease audit fees as they pleased. Audit fees charged by these firms were 
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different and low (VACPA, 2012). Ms Ha Thi Ngoc Ha, Deputy Director of the Accounting and 
Auditing Regulation Department of the MOF acknowledged the unfair competition among 
members of the auditing profession. Ms Ha stipulated that audit firms have to fully charge audit 
clients and be able to perform all audit processes and procedures. Many statutory audit clients 
did not properly perceive the role and value of external audit. Thus, these auditees tended to 
appoint audit firms offering low audit fees. This circumstance resulted in a reduction in audit 
fees among audit firms to attract audit clients (Bui, 2011a). Some audit firms even halved their 
audit fees just to attract clients. Thus, the audit quality was low (Doan, 2010). Prior literature 
suggests that if the audit market is actually characterized by increasing competition, audit fees 
would be pushed down (Menon & Williams, 2001). In addition, below-normal audit fees could 
relate to lower audit quality (Asthana & Boone, 2012). Asthana and Boone (2012) found that 
audit quality decreases when actual audit fees depart from the usual fee level.  
A representative from MOF described this situation by highlighting the shortcutting audit 
procedures of auditors. According to her, these auditors take shortcuts in audit procedures set by 
auditing standards and issued qualified audit reports to save costs. In some cases, auditors 
produced inaccurate audit opinions. 
 “Some audit procedures auditors must execute, for example attending stock take and conducting 
receivable confirmations at the end of the financial year. Auditors argued that they signed in the 
audit contracts after the end day of the year. So, they could not conduct these procedures and 
they issued qualified audit opinions. They issued a range of qualified audit opinions by cutting 
audit procedures”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
A partner from a medium audit firm confirmed that, previously, audit fees depended on the 
quality of audit reports. As audit clients want to pay low fees, auditors could curtail audit 
procedures and produce qualified reports at a discount. 
“Previously, audit fees depended on the audit reports. In the past, it was easy to produce 
modified audit reports. Audit firms could reduce audit fees by issuing modified audit reports. 
They reduced audit procedures, for example they did not conduct receivable confirmations or 
attend stock take to cut cost. They would produce a modified audit opinion, which except the 
inventory account, for instance”. 
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(Partner, medium audit firm P) 
Hiring audit certificates to operate 
By 03/2010, there were around 1,600 CPAs and the average number of CPAs in an accounting 
firm was nine. The number of accounting firms had increased significantly, but the number of 
auditors increased insignificantly (MOF, 2010). Ha (2008) also stated that the number of auditors 
in Vietnam was so small in comparison to the demand of the economy. The number of practising 
auditors did not meet the needs of the economy.  
Similarly, one manager of a mid-tier accounting firm referred to the establishment of new 
accounting firms and the shortage of auditors in Vietnam:  
“Around four years ago, the regulators could not manage the accounting firms in Vietnam due to 
the notable increase in the number of accounting firms. The number of accounting firms 
increased quickly; however, there was a lack of practicing auditors. So, the audit quality was still 
low”. 
 (Manager, other large audit firm E). 
A manager from a Big Four firm also concurred with this perspective: 
 “In the past, it was so easy to establish a new accounting firm. About 3-4 years ago, the number 
of auditor increased, but the number of auditors in the audit market was still not sufficient, 
according to the statistics”.  
(Manager 1, Big Four firm I). 
The shortage of practising auditors forced audit firms to borrow CPA certificates from others in 
order to establish their audit firms. In appearance, auditors were registered to work in audit firms, 
but in actuality they worked in other fields.  A small number of practising auditors working in an 
audit firm caused difficulties in terms of quality control. Some auditing was done by assistant 
auditors rather than practising auditors, resulting in poor audit quality. This situation existed 
mainly in small audit firms (Ha, 2010b). 
 “Auditors lent audit firms their audit certificates…In the past, an audit firm could have only two 
practicing auditors and this firm rent other audit certificates. Therefore, the audit quality was 
decreased. This situation caused the unfair competition in the audit market. The firm renting the 
audit certificates has lower costs, so this firm could reduce audit fee to compete.” 
(Partner, small audit firm N) 
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5.4.1.3 The Law was introduced to fix the deficiencies of the previous audit regulations, for 
the purpose of correcting inefficiencies in the audit market 
Fixing deficiencies of the previous audit regulations  
The highest legal document and more stringent audit regulation framework 
The enactment of the Law created the highest legal framework for external audit. This Law 
overcame the previous limitations of Decree 105, enabling audit services to grow both in size 
and quality (MOF 2010). The Law is more comprehensive than previous audit regulations 
(Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation, 2007). 
According to regulators, other professions had laws to regulate them. Therefore, it was necessary 
to have the highest legal document, a law to regulate the auditing profession. 
“In the past, we just had the Decree to regulate the auditing profession. Other professions have 
laws to regulate. It is crucial to enact the Law. The auditing profession in Vietnam has history of 
more than 20 years. It was a need to have the Law”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
 “As the highest level of regulation was introduced, the auditing framework now is more 
comprehensive and effective than previous audit regulations”. 
Representative 1, VACPA 
 “This one has a lot of opinions but I think it fits the trend. Professional activities must have the 
highest legal document to govern. The Law provides a fully legal framework, more 
comprehensive and more highly effective than the Decree”. 
 (Partner, small audit firm C) 
The Law also strictly regulates external audit activities in Vietnam. This law stipulates stricter 
conditions for the establishment and operation of auditing firms, the conditions for certified 
auditors, audit practice conditions, provisions on audit principles, rights and responsibilities of 
audit firms, practicing auditors. For instance, the Law prescribes stricter conditions to establish 
accounting firms than did the Decree. The minimum number of practising auditors is five and 
these practising auditors must have at least 3 years’ experience. The Decrees just required three 
practising auditors for the establishment of an audit firm (MOF, 2009). These contents are 
essential, in order to regulate the behaviour of auditing firms and auditors. They provide the 
criteria and conditions for state management agencies to monitor the quality of this profession 
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(MOF, 2010). A representative from the MOF confirmed that the contents of the Law are more 
stringent than previous audit regulations, for example regarding the services that audit firms are 
allowed to offer, and the conditions under which individuals can become practising auditors. 
“This Law also eliminated the joint stock audit firms and state-owned audit firms and its outlines 
do not allow audit firms to make arbitrary. Formerly, audit companies also could register to sell 
plane tickets, for example. Now, the Law expels these services. Now, practising auditors have to 
work full-time in audit firms, not part-time as before…Now audit firms are only licensed to 
provide services related to audit and other insurance services.  Numerous audit firms have to 
adjust the business registration certificates, to make the audit profession clean. This Law in the 
short term, it is still good”. 
(Representative 1, MOF) 
A representative from the VACPA agreed with this point of view by referring to the stricter 
conditions associated with inspections and violations. 
 “The criteria, conditions are also higher, more stringent. In addition, inspections of audit firms 
are also more rigorous. Dealing with violations, the responsibility of auditors and liability of 
auditing firms, are generally at a higher level and stronger than before”. 
(Representative 1, VACPA) 
A manager of Big Four firm referred to the schedule of the MOF to strictly govern external audit 
activities step by step: 
“In the past, it was easy to establish audit firms. So, the government will strictly control the audit 
market step by step. The government will give steps, 3 auditors, 5 auditors, 10 auditors. That is 
the route that the MOF wants. The MOF gives audit firms which have 3 auditors time to have 5 
auditors…Actually, the government wants do interfere more. They want to increase the number 
of mandatory audit clients and increase the number of auditors involving in an audit engagement. 
For instance, an audit engagement must have at least 3-5 practicing auditors”.  
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm I) 
More complete contents  
The Law requires that limited-liability audit firms have a minimum capital in order to deal with 
compensation for damages to audit clients. According to the Law, legal capital for the Limited 
liability company is 3 (three) billion Vietnamese dong and from January, 2015, the legal capital 
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has been 5 (five) billion Vietnamese Dong. These provisions were not previously stipulated in 
the Decrees. 
In addition, the detailed provisions regarding the obligations and responsibilities of audit firms, 
auditors and audit clients clearly guide all parties involved in audit in what they must and must 
not do (Ha, 2010b). 
A manager of a medium audit firm stated that the complete contents of the Law are references 
that audit firms and audit clients must consider when adjusting their activities. 
“Because I also see through the Law, I know that it specifies more about the rights and 
responsibilities of audit firms and audit clients. The Law is the legal document for the two sides 
that may reference to work together. During the two parties working together, the Law is the 
reference to adjust two sides’ operations”. 
(Manager, medium audit firm F) 
In addition, the Law stipulates the audit of public interest entities, which are more stringent than 
other audits. The Law includes one chapter stipulating the audit of public interest entities, which 
prescribes the conditions for eligibility to conduct audits of these entities, audit firms’ 
responsibilities for publicly disclosing information of audit firms and auditors, audit firms’ 
responsibilities for issuing annual transparency reports, as well as the independence requirement 
(The Government, 2010). 
Under the Law, Decree No. 105/2013/ND-CP details the sanctions of violation of audit firms and 
auditors that the auditing profession did not have previously. 
The Law created a framework that controls the activities of auditors and audit firms. Auditors 
and audit firms know that if they violate regulations, they will be punished.  
“Perhaps, they detail all the aspects to regulate the auditing profession. There are clear 
punishments for each kind of violations that in the past we did not have… It is a very clear frame 
for audit firms, audit clients and the state agencies”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
Auditors also indicated that the detailed sanction provisions will affect auditors and audit firms 
positively as they must follow audit regulations and standards more strictly. 
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“At the decree level, all provisions in the Decree were general, not clear. So, audit firms could 
apply ways to avoid following these provisions…When that law was born with clearer 
provisions and sanctions, it makes the audit firms do their jobs more deliberately”. 
(Senior auditor, other large audit firm B) 
“Law was passed with more apparent sanctions and provisions, audit firms develop in that 
direction”. 
(Senior auditor, small audit firm G) 
It is now a straightforward matter for state agencies to deal with violations after inspections of 
audit firms, whereas in the past, there was no means of handling violations due to the general, 
non-specific sanctions in Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP. Under the Law, the government issued 
Decree No. 105/2013/ND-CP to detail all the sanction provisions to address violation, making it 
a straightforward matter to address violations.  
“Law is born with innovation creating a basis for audit operations. There are sanctions, the 
Decree 105/2013/ND-CP under the Law with clear sanctions, more specific than the Decree 
105/2004/ND-CP…In Decree 105/2013 ND-CP, it is very specific and the punishments are 
detailed. It is easier to handle with inspections and violations”. 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
Fixing the conflicts with other laws and enhancing the role of state agencies 
 
The Law was introduced to eliminate the conflicts between previous audit regulations and laws 
in other fields. The promulgation of the Law on Enterprises 2005 has made obsolete several 
provisions in Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP and Circulars’ guiding standards and conditions for 
the establishment and operation of auditing firms. One of the motivations for the introduction of 
the Law was to rectify these issues. 
“As audit activities are governed by the Law, the other fields can reference the Law and confirm 
the role of external audit. Other fields and auditing profession are controlled by laws, which do 
not cause contradiction… If auditing profession was still regulated by the Decree and other 
disciplines, such as the Law on Enterprise promulgated differently, the auditing profession would 
have to abide by the Law on Enterprise”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
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The Law gave greater importance to the role of state agencies in monitoring the auditing 
profession. The Law gave more power to regulatory bodies in awarding CPA certificates, 
registration of practicing auditors, management of practising auditors, conducting inspections of 
audit firms and dealing with violations of audit firms and auditors (MOF, 2010 and The MOF, 
2011).  
With the introduction of the Law, the MOF became responsible for monitoring the auditing 
profession. The MOF took on all the responsibilities that it transferred to VACPA in Decision 
No. 47/2005/QD-BTC, dated 17/07/2005. Thus, VACPA became responsible only for training 
auditors, practising auditors and performing a number of tasks related to external audit 
prescribed by the Government, according to the Law. Currently, the main obligations of MOF in 
the Law include: a) Stipulating the conditions for undertaking the examination, the organization 
of examination to grant certificates to auditors; granting, revoking, and managing certificates of 
auditors; b) Stipulating the standard form of the certificate for trading audit service, granting, 
modifying and revoking the certificates f for trading audit service; c) Suspending the trading of 
audit service; d) Inspecting, examining and settling complaints and denunciations and handling 
violations of legislation on external audit; e) Providing for updating knowledge to auditors, 
practicing auditors; and j) Providing for registration and management of audit practice; 
publicizing the list of auditing firms, branches of foreign auditing firms in Vietnam and 
practicing auditors. 
A representative from MOF asserted that the enhancement of the role of MOF and SSC in 
supervising the auditing profession generates much work for MOF’s staff. 
 “We are much affected. There is much work for us to do…In the past, the MOF transferred the 
supervision of the auditing profession to the VACPA. Now, we have to do all work related to 
supervising the auditing profession, including the registration of audit firms and auditors, 
inspections of audit firms and so on”. 
Representative 3, MOF 
Another representative from MOF mentioned the trade-off between independence and expertise 
when the inspection was transferred from the VACPA to the MOF and SSC. The inspection 
regime in Vietnam is still different from that in other countries. In the US and other countries, 
there is an independent oversight board like the PCAOB. The PCAOB conducts inspections of 
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audit firms associated with the audit of public interest entities. Hence, it is suggested that the 
authorities should establish an independent oversight board like those in other countries. 
Currently, SSC is responsible for the inspection of audits of listed firms and other firms in the 
field of securities. MOF is responsible for the inspection of audits of other public interest entities 
and audit of other mandatory audit clients. 
“Staff members of the MOF know the theory, but they do not have practical knowledge and 
skills.  Hence, they face difficulties when they come to inspect audit firms and auditors…It is 
actually demanding work”. 
Representative 1, MOF 
Correcting inefficiencies in the audit market 
The Law was introduced in order to have greater legal force than the Decrees in the past and 
correct the deficiencies of the previous audit regulations. The Law provides a comprehensive 
auditing legal framework for the ultimate aim of correcting the shortcomings in the audit market 
by improving audit quality and enhancing public trust in the auditing profession. MOF (2010) 
stated that the final purpose of introducing the Law is to enhance audit quality. This view was 
also shared by all interviewees.  
Representatives from the regulator bodies confirmed that the major motivation for the 
introduction of the Law was to promote audit quality. 
“The introduction of the Law has two main purposes: extending the mandatory audit clients and 
increasing audit quality”. 
Representative 1, MOF 
“We increase the conditions with the purpose to increase audit quality”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
A manager of a Big Four firm also concurred that the Law’s final purpose is to improve the audit 
quality, especially audit quality of local audit firms:  
“So the Law introduced to auditors to act in accordance with international standards and stricter 
processes. They introduced the Law to improve the quality of audit. As I said above, all the 
provisions of the Law mainly target to improve the audit quality of small audit firms... The 
government wants that it is not easy to carry on audit service to ensure audit quality. The audit 
report is increasingly important; the government wants to gradually raise the conditions”.  
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(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm I) 
A partner of a small audit firm compared the audit quality before and after the Law. He 
emphasized that the greater legal force of the Law and its stringent provisions result in an 
enhancement of audit quality. 
 “In fact, we must understand that the Law is the highest legal framework, it has highly legal 
force. However, when the Law is implemented and applied to improve audit quality...And of 
course, when the government prescribed these stricter provisions, the audit quality will be raised. 
An audit engagement which has more practicing auditors will be more efficient than that with 
less practicing auditors”. 
 (Partner, small audit firm C) 
A manager of a large audit firm asserted that investors trust audit results more due to the more 
comprehensive legal framework. Accordingly, this framework results in stricter compliance of 
audit firms and auditors with auditing standards and regulations. Hence, audit results are of a 
better quality than previously. 
“Thus, the Law protects the investors. Because there is a highly legal framework, the investors 
look at and see that audit firms must follow the Law. So, the investors trust more the audit 
results. The investors may not know the Decrees, but they know the Law. They believe that 
when the auditors violate regulations or cause damages, the investors can base on the Law to suit 
auditors”.  
(Manager 1, other large audit firm J)  
In addition to rectifying the flaws in the audit market, the results also show that the motivation 
for the enactment of the Law was to protect the interests of investors and state-owned capital in 
Vietnam. The objectives of SOX were to protect investors by setting up a new public oversight 
board, enhancing corporate governance and internal control, improving financial information 
quality and auditor independence (Anandarajan, Kleinman, & Palmon, 2008). The enactment of 
the Law on Independent Audit purposes to improve legal effectiveness and efficiency of State 
management of external auditing activities so as to ensure the interests of investors, the State and 
relevant organizations (The MOF, 2011). 
By improving audit quality, raising the role of state agencies in monitoring the auditing 
profession, the aim of the Law was also to protect investors as well as state-owned capital. The 
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respondents concurred with this view. According to them, the protection applies mainly to 
investors of public interest entities and foreign investors. 
 “I think that the Law is to protect the benefits of investors participating in public interest 
entities. It is the first protection”. 
 (Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
 “So I think the first reason is to improve the rights of the individuals involved in the public 
interest entities. It was the first guard. The second is the protection, which inclines to protect 
foreign investors to attract investment in Vietnam in the coming time”. 
(Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
A representative from the VACPA also confirmed that by enhancing the audit results, the state 
can well manage and control the state-owned companies. 
“In the economy transformation, there is privatized process of state-owned enterprises. These 
enterprises were directly managed and controlled by the state in the past. Now, these enterprises 
have been transformed to other economic sectors which are not directly controlled and managed 
by the state. So, it is so necessary to develop external audit to ensure these enterprises’ 
compliance with rules, ensure the state budget revenues. Hence, it is crucial to develop an 
auditing legal framework, which is the most important demand”. 
(Representative 1, VACPA) 
5.4.1.4 Summary and discussion 
Before the enactment of the Law, the auditing profession was regulated by the Decree No. 
105/2004/ND-CP. This Decree had a number of shortcomings as follows.  
Firstly, the Decree had little legal force in the hierarchy of legal documents. In each industry, the 
highest legal document is a law. The Decree had lower legal force than a law. Most areas in 
Vietnam are regulated by laws. The Decree was not in sync with the current legal systems in 
other fields. It seems that the Decree did not provide strong regulatory enforcement for the 
Vietnamese audit market. 
Secondly, the contents of the Decree were non-specific, and did not detail the sanction provisions 
needed to deal with violations. The Decree lacked comprehensiveness and stringency.  
Thirdly, some contents of the Decree conflicted with the Law on Enterprises 2005. The 
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promulgation of the Law on Enterprises 2005 had made some provisions in Decree No. 
105/2004/ND-CP related to conditions for the establishment and operation of audit firm, obsolete 
as a legal force.  
Finally, according to data from archival records, there was inefficiency in monitoring the 
auditing profession under Decree No. 104/2005/ND-CP. Under this Decree, the MOF delegated 
to the VACPA the rights and duties associated with supervising audit firms and auditors. The 
inspection regime conducted by the VACPA was mainly self-regulated. The VACPA had 
difficulty fulfilling its obligations in supervising the auditing profession due to insufficient 
resources, and it did not act independently. The supervision of the auditing profession under the 
VACPA regime was non-punitive. Hence, the VACPA could not monitor audit firms and 
auditors rigorously, which affected audit quality.  This is in line with the results of Fogarty 
(1996), Turner (2006), Bather and Burnaby (2006), DeFond (2010) and Anantharaman (2012). 
These previous studies criticized the peer review regime for its non-independence and non-
punitive nature. 
While the auditing profession was regulated by the Decree, there was a range of shortcomings in 
the audit market mainly due to the inadequate auditing legal framework as presented above. The 
Decree had a number of deficiencies, including the low risk of litigation and regulation for 
auditors and audit firms. The flaws in the audit market were as follows. 
First of all, the audit market was small. Enterprises in Vietnam did not habitually have their 
financial statements audited; this even applied to some statutory audit clients. The shortage of 
practising auditors resulted in a situation where, in order to establish audit firms, audit 
certificates were borrowed from people who did not work in audit fields.  
Secondly, the audit quality was poor, especially in local audit firms, with many practising 
auditors not complying fully with regulations, professional ethics, and auditing standards. The 
reason for poor audit quality and non-compliance was that the previous audit regulation had low 
regulatory enforcement, no details regarding the responsibilities of auditors and audit firms, and 
the sanctions for violations were ambiguous and non-specific. In addition, the civil liability 
regime was also problematic as it was extremely general. The general public lost confidence in 
the audit market since there were audit failures in the stock markets. For instance, there were 
audit failures related to the insolvencies of Bach Tuyet Cotton joint stock Company, Vien Dong 
Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company, and the Vinashin Industry Group. Decree No. 
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105/2004/ND-CP did not provide incentives for auditors and audit firms to improve audit quality 
since they did not face both litigation risk and regulatory risk. This supports the findings of 
Favere-Marchesi (2000) who pointed out that the lack of professional sanctions could lead to 
violations of professional standards and regulations, thereby creating audit markets of uneven 
quality. Favere-Marchesi (2000) also suggested that the MOF should impose sanctions on 
auditors and audit firms so as to provide them with incentives to enhance audit quality. 
Finally, there was unfair competition in the audit market. Audit firms competed by means of 
audit fees rather than audit quality. Some audit firms reduced audit fees significantly by cutting 
audit procedures and issuing qualified audit opinions, leading to a decrease in audit quality. This 
is similar to the US when PCAOB and SEC raised concerns over audit fees that were too low 
which would indicate that auditors conducted insufficient audit work (Knechel et al., 2013). This 
is also consistent with the result of Ettredge, Fuerherm, and Li (2014) who suggested that 
auditors made fee reduction to some audit clients in 2008, and that fee pressure was related to 
reduced audit quality in that year in the US. The situation on Vietnam is similar to those in other 
developing countries, such as Pakistan. Ashraf and Ghani (2005) stated that low audit fees result 
in low cost of conducting audit, which severely harms audit quality in Pakistan.  
However, this situation in Vietnam seems to be different from that in other countries. Managers 
in other countries often dislike qualified audit reports. A qualified audit report can indicate to 
investors that managers have poor control over the company’s affairs (Jackson, Moldrich, & 
Roebuck, 2008). In Vietnam, since some managers and investors do not have knowledge about 
audit, some just consider audit as a compulsory activity and choose audit firms which offer low 
audit fees. Previous studies show that audit independence in developing countries such as in the 
Philippines or Vietnam is often compromised (Favere-Marchesi, 2000). In Vietnam, some 
managers agree with or negotiate with auditors to produce qualified audit reports for the purpose 
of reducing audit fees. Auditors cut audit procedures and issue qualified audit reports so as to 
decrease audit fees. Auditors and audit firms compromised audit independence since the 
regulatory enforcement was weak and they did not face risks of sanctions or litigation.  
The weakness of the audit regulations in Ireland resulted in a more rigorous system of regulation 
and oversight to regulate the auditing profession (O’Regan, 2010). The motivations for the SEC 
were the perceived deficiencies in the securities markets causing the Great Crash of 1929 
(Seligman (1983) in Harold Mulherin (2007)). The Law in Vietnam was introduced, which 
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addressed the shortcomings of the previous audit regulations. Firstly, the Law was passed to 
create the highest legal framework for external audit. Secondly, the Law fixed the other flaws of 
the Decree by introducing a more stringent audit regulation framework and requiring more 
complete contents; detailing sanction provisions; fixing the conflicts with other laws; and raising 
the role of state agencies in monitoring the auditing profession.  
The enhancement of the role of the MOF in monitoring the auditing profession in Vietnam seems 
to mimic the global trend of audit regulation after the collapses related to audit. Corporate 
collapses influence the public confidence in financial data and audit results, and the effectiveness 
of self-regulation by the auditing profession is doubted (Hecimovic & Martinov-Bennie 2009). 
There was criticism of the peer review process. According to DeFond (2010) and Fogarty (1996), 
peer review is not effective since it is neither independent nor punitive. Current actions by 
authorities indicate that self-regulation peer reviews have not been effective. The  change in 
regulation in the US was a reaction to the observation that most audit failures were associated 
with audit firms with clean inspection reports under the peer review system  (Casterella et al., 
2009). Most rights and obligations related to monitoring the auditing profession have been 
transferred from the VACPA back to the MOF and SSC since the Law was adopted. This reform 
in Vietnam is similar to that in Australia and the US. In Australia, the CLERP 9 adjustments led 
to a greater audit regulation by a statutory authority (ASIC), which is similar to the US with the 
transfer from the AICPA to the PCAOB.  
In the participants’ opinion, the Law was introduced because it would have greater legal force 
than the Decrees in the past and would address the shortcomings of the previous audit 
regulations. The Law established a comprehensive auditing legal framework the ultimate goal of 
which was to rectify the flaws in the audit market by improving audit quality and enhancing 
public trust in the auditing profession. This is in line with the findings of Engebretson (2006). 
Engebretson (2006) concluded that the top three aims of the SOX were to enhance the reliability 
of corporate reports, rebuild investor confidence in the fiscal market and halt fraud in the future. 
The audit failures and corporate collapses in Vietnam are not as large as those in the US. 
However, the audit quality in a number of audit firms in Vietnam is still poor, resulting in a 
decrease in the confidence in the financial information. In the US, the public expects the 
government to react to the problems that decrease public confidence in the operation of the 
market by the enactment of the SOX (Bather & Burnaby, 2006). The motivation for the 
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introduction of the Law in Vietnam was to improve audit quality and enhance the public’s trust 
in the financial results. This is consistent with the aim of SOX asserted by researchers. One of 
the major objectives of SOX 2002 was to enhance audit quality (Blankley et al., 2014, Riotto, 
2008). This result of the current study is also consistent with that of Hecimovic and Martinov-
Bennie (2009), which concluded that the government’s motivations for legally backing auditing 
standards in Australia were mainly driven by corporate collapses and the need to increase public 
confidence in financial data. 
In addition to improving audit quality and public trust in the auditing profession, interviewees 
also mentioned that another aim was to protect the interests of investors and the state-owned 
capital in Vietnam. This is in line with the aims of the enactment of SOX in the US. The aim of 
the SOX was to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of fiscal statement 
disclosures (Bather & Burnaby, 2006). 
The Public Interest theory of regulation states that government intervention is in reaction to the 
public need for the correction of inefficiency in market practice and prevention of market 
collapses (Posner, 1974). The inefficiencies in the audit market in Vietnam included the small 
size of the audit market, and the non-compliance of auditors and audit firms with auditing 
standards and auditing regulations leading to poor audit quality, especially in local audit firms. In 
addition, audit firms also competed by reducing audit fees, resulting in cutting audit procedures 
and producing poor audit quality. There were audit failures in the Vietnamese market, which 
decrease public confidence in the audit results. Vietnamese government introduced the Law to 
correct the inefficiencies of audit market, and restore public trust in audit results. Hence, Public 
Interest Theory is a reasonable explanation for the Vietnamese government’s intervention in the 
audit market. There seems to be a consensus among interview data, primary and secondary data 
that the Law on External Audit was introduced to improve audit quality and better protect the 
general and investing public, which is consistent with Public Interest theory, where the central 
authority, namely, the regulator (MOF), is considered to have the best interest of society at heart 
and that it tries to best maximize social welfare. 
The result of this study is also consistent with the purpose of the introduction of SOX in the US. 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) stated that one of the major objectives of 
passing the SOX was to restore and enhance public confidence in the accounting profession in 
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the US. Gaffikin (2005) asserts that SOX is an instance of the public interest approach of 
regulation. 
This finding is also consistent with that of Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009) who 
concluded that the Australian government introduced the force of law auditing standards also in 
the public interest. However, this result is not supported by the findings of Ball (2009) and 
Moore et al. (2006). Ball (2009) accepted the capture theory of regulation when stating that SOX 
has not promoted social welfare. Moore et al. (2006) raised concerns that lobbying by interest 
groups could influence the reforms introduced in the SOX. 
5.4.2 To fulfil Vietnam’s international commitments 
5.4.2.1 The contents of the Decree did not fulfil Vietnam’s international commitments in 
the integration process 
A number of provisions in the Decree did not meet the commitments to international 
organizations in the integration process. Firstly, the number of mandatory audit clients was small 
and the mandatory audit requirement is different from that of other countries. According to 
Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP, mandatory audit clients are defined according to their type of 
business. The private, limited liability, partnerships, joint stock companies which are unlisted 
companies are not mandatory audit clients. This requirement is not consistent with the general 
practice in other countries.  As many of these enterprises on a large and medium scale publicize 
financial statements or raise capital, their financial statements are not audited. This situation does 
not ensure safety for the economy and limits publicly transparent financial reporting of 
enterprises and organizations.  Hence, audit regulations should require mandatory audits of large 
and medium scale businesses of all types in accordance with common practice in other countries. 
It is necessary to fulfil the commitments in the integration process (Department of Accounting 
and Auditing Regulation, 2007). This suggestion seems to follow the model of the EU in terms 
of the structure of its statutory audit market. In the EU, there are an estimated total of more than 
400,000 large and medium-sized limited liability companies in 27 Member states whose annual 
accounts must be audited. In the EU, in principle, the financial statements of all limited liability 
companies must be audited. The private client segment is also crucial in the EU (Eberlea & 
Lauter, 2011). 
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Secondly, some provisions in the Decree 105/2004/ND-CP are inapplicable or lack several 
crucial provisions in comparison with international practices. The Decree did not fully define the 
conditions for the establishment and operation of branches of foreign auditing firms in Vietnam, 
the joint venture, the cooperation between the local auditing firms or between foreign audit firms 
with Vietnamese audit firms. Nor did the Decree stipulate provisions for audit services and 
related services across borders (without legal presence) as commitments signed when Vietnam 
joined the WTO (Ha, 2010b). The Decree also restricted the kinds of services and audit clients of  
audit firms with foreign investment capital. It also did not specify subsidiaries,  whereas Vietnam 
had approved these in the opening commitments signed with ASEAN, the US  (Vietnam – US  
trade agreement ) and with other donors (Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation, 
2007). 
5.4.2.2 The Law was introduced to fulfil the Vietnam’s international commitments in the 
integration process 
Currently, in the international commitments to WTO, ASEAN and others, audit services are open 
and unlimited. Accordingly, Vietnamese enterprises can use the services of international audit 
firms overseas. In addition, Vietnamese audit firms and Vietnamese auditors have the 
opportunity to provide  audit services to other countries. The enactment of the Law on External 
Audit established the Vietnamese legal position which is similar to the international one, so as to 
promote integration in this field. The Law addressed the shortcomings of the Decree in order to 
meet these international commitments in the integration processes. The introduction of the Law 
was intended to meet the commitments with international organisations and WTO, extending the 
audit services under the supervision of state agencies (MOF, 2010). 
“The Law was born to meet the requirements of integration and implementation of WTO 
commitments”. 
(Manager, medium audit firm Q) 
Firstly, the Law extended the mandatory audit clients, and made the financial data of companies 
more transparent, especially of public interest entities (MOF, 2010). Under the current Law, the 
categories of mandatory audit clients are greatly broadened in comparison with Decree No. 
105/2004.ND-CP. These broadened categories of mandatory audit clients include unlisted public 
companies, enterprises and organizations with 20% or more of the voting rights held by state 
       144   
corporations at the end of the fiscal year; enterprises with 20% or more of the voting rights held 
by securities listing, issuing and trading organizations at the end of the fiscal year, the audit 
firms, and branches of foreign audit firms in Vietnam. The audit firms, and branches of foreign 
audit firms in Vietnam must also be audited for annual financial statements. 
Representatives of the MOF also stated that the Law needed to be passed to extend mandatory 
audit clients:  
“The Law needed to be issued to extend mandatory audit clients. The Decrees 105 had articles of 
mandatory audit clients. However, the Law extends the mandatory audit clients…Introducing the 
Law, the general public knows more about external audit and companies have opportunities to 
contact with audit firms”. 
(Representative 2, MOF) 
A manager of a mid-tier firm expressed the same view: 
“The auditing profession was not really popular, not as popular as other professions which have 
laws to regulate them. This means that the Law forces companies to use the external audit 
service more”. 
(Manager, medium audit firm D) 
Secondly, the Law corrected Decree No. 105/2005/ND-CP by adding all the necessary 
provisions related to branches of foreign auditing firms, the joint venture, and the cooperation 
between the local auditing firms or between foreign audit firms with Vietnamese auditing firms. 
The Law also prescribed audit services and related services across borders.  
In addition to meeting the commitments to international organizations in the integration process, 
another point of view emerged from archival and interview data. According to the bank and 
finance program of the ADB policy that all the parties agreed to, from 10/2007 to 03/2009, the 
MOF compiled and submitted the draft of the Law to the government. From 03/2009 to 09/2010, 
the Law was submitted to the parliament for ratification. Hence, the Law was established so as to 
follow the above policy (Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation, 2009). The 
interviewees also stated that there was external pressure from the foreign investors, and lenders 
who required more transparency of fiscal data and a more comprehensive auditing legal 
framework in Vietnam. Hence, the government had to introduce the Law to meet the pressures of 
these stakeholders.  
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 “Then, it may be due to the need of transparency and publicity of the parties in the integration 
process”. 
(Manager, medium audit firm H) 
Another manager of a Big Four firm also asserted that the Law was produced due to the 
international pressure of overseas investors and lenders during the integration process. These 
investors and lenders required more transparency of financial data in Vietnam. 
“Actually, everywhere there was a desire for transparency. I also understand that there was 
pressure from foreign Investors, then from overseas lenders. So, the government needed to 
introduce the Law. It is the first reason. The internal demand for the Law is the second or third 
reason…Other donors, when they lend the banks and the corporations; they need to know how 
transparent Vietnam is”. 
 (Manager 2, Big Four audit firm A) 
A partner of a mid-tier firm also agreed with this point of view. 
“I think that the Law was introduced due to international force. External audit affects companies. 
Firms and companies in Vietnam are integrating and cooperating with other foreign companies. 
In addition, the foreign investors require more transparency of financial data as they invest in 
Vietnam. These investors feel safer as the legal framework of audit is high and comprehensive. 
The foreign investors request the Law and the transparency of Vietnamese environment. Hence, 
the parliament introduced the Law”.  
(Partner, medium audit firm P) 
5.4.2.3 Summary and discussion 
A number of provisions in the Decree did not meet the commitments to international 
organizations in the integration process. Firstly, the number of mandatory audit clients was small 
and Vietnam’s mandatory audit requirements were different from those of other countries. 
Secondly, some provisions in Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP are inapplicable or lack some crucial 
provisions in comparison with international practices. For example, the Decree did not fully 
define the conditions for the establishment and operation of branches of foreign auditing firms in 
Vietnam, the joint venture, the cooperation between the local auditing firms or between foreign 
audit firms with Vietnamese auditing firms. 
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The Law was introduced to correct the above deficiencies of the Decree to meet the international 
commitments (e.g. WTO, ASEAN) in the integration processes. In addition, another point of 
view emerged from archival and interview data. The findings indicate that external pressures 
from foreign investors, lenders who require more transparency of fiscal data force the 
Vietnamese government to enact the Law. The findings of the current study are in line with those 
of (Samsonova, 2009). Samsonova (2009) stated that due to the WTO agreement, Russia had to 
agree to a number of obligations in order to generate a market economy with its infrastructure 
sectors, such as auditing.  
The introduction of the Law was motivated by both internal and external factors. The external 
factors included Vietnam’s international commitments, and the demands of foreign investors and 
lenders (section 5.4.2). The internal motivation was the need to address the shortcomings and 
inefficiencies in the audit market by improving audit quality, enhancing public trust, and 
protecting the general and investing public (see section 5.4.1). While Public Interest theory helps 
explain the Vietnamese government’s internal motivations, the Vietnamese regulators have also 
responded to external force from foreign groups. 
The findings of this study are in line with those of Baker et al. (2014). Baker et al. (2014) 
concluded that the French government was also subjected to international pressures to change 
their auditing regulations, and subsequently passed a law in 2003. The international pressures in 
the case of France came from the SOX’s extraterritorial jurisdictions. 
From the perspective of new institutional theory, the introduction of the Law on External Audit 
in Vietnam can be seen as a result of coercive isomorphism. The evidence presented in this 
section shows that the audit reforms were imposed by international forces. These forces come 
from international commitments, for example, Vietnam’s obligations to WTO. This is consistent 
with the findings of Nguyen and Nguyen (2012) who confirmed the influence of globalization on 
accounting regulations in Vietnam. The recent developments of accounting in Vietnam were 
intended to implement Vietnam’s undertaking to harmonize its accounting system with that of 
other countries. In addition, according to the interviewees, the coercive pressure also came from 
the foreign lenders or investors, such as the ADB and WB. These pressures are the results of the 
need for offering credibility to foreign investors and the need for greater accountability to the 
lending institutions (Mir & Rahaman, 2005). This is in line with Deegan (2009) who stated that 
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the WB is a funding body which usually lends funds for projects in developing countries. Hence, 
lenders such as the WB often exert coercive pressure on borrowers in developing countries to 
implement accounting rules that comply with its requirements.  
Previous studies on accounting concluded that international institutions have the global 
institutional force through their loans and assistance of economic development to influence the 
accounting and auditing regulations in developing countries. The findings of the current study 
support those of Phan (2014), whose study was conducted in Vietnam. Phan (2014) showed that 
international organizations such as WB, the WTO, ADB, and the IMF play pivotal coercive roles 
in the widespread implementation of IFRS in Vietnam. The results of this study are also in line 
with those of other studies which conclude the coercive pressures of international organizations, 
such as the WB, IMF, ADB, WTO shaping accounting and auditing practices in developing 
countries (Ashraf and Ghani (2005); Irvine (2008); Hassan (2008); Mir and Rahaman (2005); Al-
Omari (2010); Judge et al. (2010);  Albu, Albu, Bunea, Calu, and Girbina (2011)). 
5.5 The motivation for the introduction of major reforms in the Law 
5.5.1 The reform of the establishment of accounting firms 
Decree  No. 105/2004/ND-CP dated 30/03/2004, Section 23, No1 promulgated the condition 
related to the number of auditors for the establishment and operation of audit firm: “An audit 
firm is established only when it has at least three auditors holding audit certificates and at least 
one of its managers must be an auditor having audit certificate”. As Decree No. 105/2004/ND-
CP was supplanted by the Law, the condition for establishment and operation of audit firms 
changed. According to Section 21 of the Law, an audit firm can be established if it has at least 
five practicing auditors and at least two of its partners are practising auditors. If an audit firm is a 
private firm, the owner of this private firm must be practicing auditor. The minimum number of 
auditors required for the establishment of an audit firm changed from three auditors to five 
practicing auditors.  
The motivation for this change was to enlarge audit firms, so as to improve audit quality in the 
small firms. Previously, small audit firms with merely three auditors faced difficulties with audit 
partner rotation, investment in technology, quality control, and training. 
According to Ha (2010a), under the provisions of audit partner rotation in Decree No. 
105/2004/ND-CP, lead auditors signing in the audit reports have to rotate after three consecutive 
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fiscal years. The small-scale auditing firms with only three practicing auditors containing a range 
of audit clients could not meet the requirements of audit rotation. According to The Law Making 
Committee (2009), more than 160 audit firms were established. However the number of small 
audit firms with only three practicing auditors accounted for 34% of the existing auditing firms.  
The hardships that small audit firms had to endure were the small number of practicing auditors, 
frequent changes in human resources, not having sufficient resources to invest in training, and 
attracting personnel with high skills and expertise. In addition, their audit contracts were small. 
New audit firms with from three to four practicing auditors often focused on attracting more 
audit clients rather than improving audit quality. Hence, the audit quality in some of these firms 
was low and they did not comply with audit regulations and auditing standards (VACPA, 2012). 
This reform was intended to increase the audit quality of local audit firms in Vietnam (Economic 
Commission, 2010). 
According to The Law Making Committee (2009), the scale of an audit firm should be large 
enough to ensure and enhance the audit quality as these are the ultimate objectives and 
requirements of the construction of the Law. Audit firms with at least 5 practicing auditors, not 
only ensure the quality of independent review process, but also to develop the scale of these 
audit firms. Thus, these audit firms are obliged to invest in technology and improve their 
auditors’ technical skills to enhance professional capacity and audit quality.  
The interviewees expressed the same view that the government’s reason for this change was to 
increase the size of audit firms, so as to enhance the audit quality in the small audit firms.  
A representative from the MOF highlights that the change is significant. In her opinion, the 
number of practising auditors in an audit firm partly influences audit quality. Larger audit firms 
often have better quality control and are more standardized than smaller firms. Hence, the 
authorities required more practising auditors in order for an audit firm to operate. 
“Before we required that an audit firm to have at least three auditors to be established; now it is 
five practicing auditors. This change has much impact since the change in the number of 
practicing auditors from three to five is a significant change…We implemented this change as 
the auditing profession needs to have high audit quality. We want to increase the requirement, so 
the audit firms have to focus more on audit quality. The number of practicing auditors in a firm 
is partly affect audit quality. Bigger audit firms are often more standardized than smaller ones. 
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When the size of audit firms is larger, these firms must have better quality control systems. So, 
the audit quality will be improved. The major purpose of this change is to enhance audit quality”. 
Representative 3, MOF 
“The purpose of increasing conditions is to enhance audit quality. With more practicing auditors 
in an audit firm, the training and audit quality control are better…In addition, through 
inspections we know that audit quality of small audit firms is low. So, they increase the 
conditions for establishing audit firms”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
5.5.2 The reform of the conditions for audit of public interest entities. 
Before the Law was adopted, Decision 89/2007/QD-BTC required certain conditions to be met in 
order for audit firms to be approved to conduct audits of issuing organizations, listed firms and 
securities business organization. This Decision required an auditing firm to have at least seven 
(7) practicing auditors and must have a minimum of thirty (30) clients who were annually 
audited during the two most recent years or must have at least thirty (30) audit clients as at the 
time of lodging its application to be registered as an accredited auditing enterprise. 
Under the Law, the MOF issued the Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC to replace the Decision 
89/2007/QD-BTC. This Circular promulgates the audit of public interest entities. From the effect 
date of the Circular, audit firms must have at least seven (7) practicing auditors and must have at 
least one hundred (100) audit clients so as to be approved to conduct audit of public interest 
entities. From 2016, audit firms must have at least ten (10) practicing auditors and must have at 
least two hundred and fifty (250) audit clients to be approved to conduct audit of public interest 
entities. Where the audit organization is accredited in the year of application, it must have 
additional conditions that it has issued the audit reports (or report of examination result) and 
financial report for at least 05 customers that are public interest entities from January 01 of the 
year of application to the date of submission of the application for registration of audit 
performance. From the approved period for 2016, the minimum number of customers shall be 10 
customers. In term of the conditions for audit of public interest entities in the field of securities, 
from the effect date of the Circular, audit firms must have at least ten (10) practicing auditors and 
must have at least one hundred and fifty (150) audit clients in order to be approved to conduct 
audit of listed firms. From 2016, audit firms must have at least fifteen (15) practicing auditors 
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and must have at least three hundred (300) audit clients in order to be permitted to conduct audits 
of listed firms. Where the audit organization is accredited in the year of application, it has 
additional conditions: it has to issue audit reports (or reports of examination results) and financial 
reports for at least ten customers that are public interest units from January 01 of the year of 
application to the date of submission of the application for registration of audit performance. 
From the approved period for 2016, the minimum number of customers is 20 customers. The 
reform in the Circular 183 is significant in terms of the conditions for approval to conduct audits 
of public interest entities. 
Vietnam seems to have followed other countries in prescribing the new requirement for the audit 
of public interest entities.  According to Ha (2011), the large economic groups in the world have 
been insolvent, which caused seriously economic losses for the financial markets and the 
economy in general. These events led to the decrease in public confidence in the financial data. 
These economic groups were insolvent, whereas auditors certified the accuracy and fairness of 
their financial statements. This was a pressing issue and required a range of countries to further 
strengthen the additional provisions relating to statutory audit of public interest entities. In 
developed countries, the audit of financial statements of public interests entities is closely 
monitored. The Law also stipulated the new requirement for audit of the public interest entities. 
Interviewees also expressed the same view that the objectives of the reform are to control 
stringently the audit of public interest entities and improve the audit quality of public interest 
entities. Most of the participants, apart from those in medium firms, held this view. According to 
most of these participants, the audit quality of public interest entities, especially the listed firms 
provided by small and medium audit firms was not high. There was a decrease in public 
confidence in the audit quality of these firms. Thus, the government had to regulate more tightly 
the audit of public interest entities so as to improve the audit quality. 
A representative from the VACPA stated that the regulators limit the number of audit firms 
participating in the public audit market since they suspect the audit quality of smaller audit firms. 
“The reason for the introduction of this reform, I only know that the SSC declares that in recent 
years the quality of financial reporting decreased so that they do not want to extend the 
organizations allowed to audit public interest entities and listed firms since quality of smaller 
audit firm is not guaranteed. Thus, they just want twenty audit firms instead of forty-three audit 
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firms permitted to conduct audits in this market at present. They restricted the firms permitted in 
this market, adopted criteria and issued this reform”. 
Representative 2, VACPA 
A regulator from the SSC explained that the tightening of the audit of public interest entities was 
in response to demands from the investors. In his view, only superior audit firms should enter the 
public audit market. 
 “Hence, the birth of Circular 183 requires improving the quality of the registered audit firm as 
well as registered auditors since higher audit quality was required. Audit firms must meet the 
conditions of the audit firm approved. These firms are superior to the others. This is tightening 
auditing activities of the public interest entities. It is required by investors in the market, the 
demands of the stock market. Only audit firms having good audit processes, good quality 
control, and a sufficient number of practicing auditors are accepted to join this market”. 
Representative 2, SSC 
However, interviewees of medium firms doubt the public interest rationale for the introduction of 
this reform. 
“We do not know whether there is a lobby to introduce this reform or not. This reform favors big 
audit firms, while small and medium ones face a range of difficulties”. 
(Manager, medium audit firm H) 
5.5.3 The new requirement of audit firm’s transparency 
Regulators have required certain audit firms to issue transparency reports containing information 
on audit firm governance. The regulators’ underlying motivation for requiring audit firms to 
issue public transparency reports is that more transparency on audit firm governance is expected 
to reveal audit quality and allows differentiation between audit firms. Specifically, as monitoring 
audit firms is perceived to have a significant influence on audit quality, transparency of audit 
firm governance may enable market participants to differentiate among audit firms, which in turn 
is expected to provide incentives for audit firms to improve audit quality (Deumes et al., 2012). 
Following other countries’ mandate to issue transparency reports, the Law also requires public 
audit firms to publish their transparency report on their websites. Section 56 of the Law requires 
auditing firms, and branches of foreign auditing firms in Vietnam that are qualified to conduct 
audit of financial statements of the public interest entities, to disclose annual transparency reports 
       152   
on their websites within ninety days from the end of the fiscal year. A transparency report 
contains general information about audit firm, information on audit firm governance, internal 
quality control system; quality assurance review; education and independence practices as well 
as financial information of audit firm.  
Most interviewees agreed that the purpose of these reforms was to increase the transparency of 
audit firms and help the public to oversee audit firms’ activities. 
A representative from the MOF asserted that through the information in the annual transparency 
reports, the general public has a better understanding of audit firms and they can supervise audit 
firms. 
 “This requirement increases the transparency level of audit firms, so the public can supervise the 
audit firms’ activities through the information. Audit firms conduct audit to make other firms 
more transparent, so audit firms also have to be transparent. The purpose is to disclose audit 
firms’ necessary information, so everyone can know at every time, essential information”. 
Representative 1, MOF 
Another representative from MOF referred to the enhancement of the choice of audit firms 
through the information in such reports. In addition, the information in such reports is more 
accurate than that in other sources since audit firms are responsible for the reports. 
“Annual transparency reports provide information about audit firms. The general public can log 
on the websites to obtain the information. Audit clients can use the information to select audit 
firms. The purpose of the requirement is to force audit firms to be responsible for the information 
that they publish. Hence, the information is more accurate”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
In terms of the transparency report that audit firms have to publish on the websites; this 
provision follows the experiences of many countries, including those of the EU.  The EU has the 
General Directive No. 43 of 2006 and each EU country has its own rules on audit requirements 
for public interest entities (MOF, 2010b).  
Representatives from the MOF agreed with this perspective. 
“You see the European Decree No 43 adopted for member states, accounting firms must publish 
transparent reporting. After 90 days of the ending of the financial year, financial statements of 
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accounting firms completed, accounting firms have to publish transparency reports and other 
information for the public to monitor at every time”.  
(Representative 1, MOF) 
5.5.4 The new requirement of audit partner rotation 
Previously, Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP prescribed the audit partner rotation with mandatory 
audit clients, which required that the leading auditor signing in the audit report and a member of 
broad of directors of audit firm signing in the audit report have to rotate after three consecutive 
financial years. Currently, the Law demands audit partner rotation with two kinds of audit 
clients: public interest entities and other mandatory audit clients. Regarding public interest 
entities, the lead auditors and members of the board signing in an audit report have to rotate after 
three consecutive financial years. In addition, other practicing auditors involved in the audit 
engagement also have to rotate after four consecutive financial years. In terms of other 
mandatory audit clients, the Law requests audit partner rotation the same as did the Decree 
105/2004/ND-CP. According to the MOF (2010b), the change of the person signing the audit 
report (lead auditor) with each audit client after three consecutive fiscal years is intended to 
ensure independence between the auditor and the audit client, to avoid the threat of familiarity or 
over-confidence which affect audit quality. 
All of the interviewees also concurred that the purpose of the requirement is to promote auditor 
independence, so as to enhance audit quality. Audit independence plays a pivotal role in ensuring 
audit quality. Another purpose is to have fresh eyes to assess financial statements and prevent old 
auditors from being over-confident. 
A representative from the MOF emphasized that the purpose of this requirement is to avoid the 
familiarity threat.  
“The purpose is to avoid familiarity threat, between audit clients and auditors, to ensure audit 
independence”. 
Representative 2, MOF 
Independence is the most important principle in audit, which assures the audit quality. It is the 
reason for promulgating the reform, according to the regulator. 
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“The purpose is to assure audit independence. Audit quality is assured if audit independence is 
enhanced. We want to change lead auditors because if we work with an audit client for five 
consecutive years, we got used to the audit client, causing a familiarity threat”. 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
“The second is that it is worthwhile as a new auditor comes with another perspective. The most 
important one is that. The new auditor’s consideration, assessment, asking questions and 
identifying audit risks are different from those of the old auditor”. 
(Representative 1, VACPA) 
According to MOF (2010b), this regulation follows other countries. Some countries impose a 
three-year audit partner rotation, whereas others stipulate a five-year rotation, depending on the 
circumstances in each country. Under the pressure from foreign investors, Vietnam has to follow 
the global trend of audit partner rotation. 
“We also follow the international trend so we require audit partners to change. We promulgate 
that lead auditors have to change after three consecutive years, and those who do not sign in the 
audit report have to change after five years”. 
(Representative 1, VACPA) 
5.5.5 The sanctions provisions to deal with violations, the change in inspection regime 
Sanctions for violations in the previous audit regulations were general, not detailed, and not 
strong enough to prevent and deter. Under the Law, the government produced Decree No. 
105/2013/ND-CP to promulgate the sanction provisions to deal with violations. Penalties for 
violations can be harsh, including fines and even revocation of auditing practice licenses. 
According to interviewees, the main purpose of the sanction provision is to provide a stringent 
and comprehensive auditing legal framework that people involving in audit are in.  
“We did not have the sanctions on external audit before. The sanctions were not specified 
separately in a legal document. When the Law came into effect, the sanctions were defined in 
detail in the Decree/2013/ND-CP. Of course, there are a range of penalties for detailed violations 
that were not prescribed previously in the Decree105/2004/ND-CP…It is now very clear rules 
for sanctions and detailed application for the behavior. Thus, it is also convenient to address 
violations… It has a clear framework for government agencies, audit firms and audit clients to 
perform”. 
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(Representative 2, MOF) 
Representative from the MOF declared that the main purpose of the change in the sanction 
regime was to force auditors and audit firms to follow auditing standards and regulations 
stringently. 
“Another purpose is to provide deterrents to participants involved in audit, so as to make them 
follow the audit regulations, auditing standards strictly, and resulting in an improvement in audit 
quality”. 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
Another representative from MOF concurs:  
“The purpose of the sanctioning is not to punish to get the money, but to create a deterrent for 
people to avoid violations. All behaviors were not prescribed before…Recently, with the new 
sanction provisions, we withdrew the audit certificate of an auditor because of a perjury 
case…So we must have clear sanctions for people to look at and then they will avoid violations”. 
(Representative 1, MOF) 
In the past, inspections of audit firms were conducted mainly by the VACPA. Under the Law, 
the government issued Circular No. 157/2014/TT-BTC promulgating the change in the 
inspection regime. Inspections of audit firms are currently executed by the MOF and SSC under 
this regime. The inspection of audit firms has moved from self-inspections conducted by 
VACPC to independent inspections conducted by the SSC and MOF. The annual inspection 
result reports are announced on the website of the MOF, SSC. Any violations of audit 
regulations, unlike the VACPA, could be the basis for disciplinary action by the SSC and MOF. 
The VACPA now merely conducts its own inspections of its members.  This is similar to the US 
as the PCAOB has both increased oversight and sanctions for violations ((Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 
2009). 
“The sanctions are also relevant since currently they inspect audit firms strictly…Here I know 
that after each inspection, they impose very severe penalties”. 
(Partner, small audit firm C) 
The MOF is responsible for the management and inspection of audit firms in general. SSC is 
responsible for inspections of audit firms, and of auditors approved to conduct audits of the 
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public interest entities in the field of securities. The SSC are given more rights in inspections of 
audit quality related to public interest entities in the field of securities. The SSC can make a 
decision about inspection of audit firms approved for performing auditing of securities-related, 
public-interest entities. This agency also takes actions against violations detected through 
inspection under authorities defined by the law on securities and the securities market (The 
VACPA, 2014c). Since the adoption of these reforms, the MOF and SSC have conducted 
inspections of audit firms more often. It is also easier for these agencies to deal with punishment 
due to the reform of sanction provisions.   
Inspections of audit firms are not only conducted more often, but also more stringently.  
“There are a lot of differences. Now, we monitor audit firms tightly, especially audit of listed 
firms. SSC or the other state agencies have function to monitor audit firms and auditors.  They 
also tighten the inspections and checks of audit firms”. 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
The Law requires the MOF to produce auditing standards based on international auditing 
standards. The MOF also generated the checklists on the basis of the new auditing standards for 
the inspection of audit firms. Previously, there were no transparent and detailed checklists for 
inspections.  
“In the checklists of the MOF and VACPA for inspections, they focus more on the planning in 
accordance with the new auditing standards”. 
(Representative 2, VACPA) 
5.5.6 The new requirement for the audit opinion 
The reform of audit opinion is stipulated in the Section 48 of the Law. Under the Law, the 
Ministry of Finance shall prescribe the matters that auditors are not permitted to except in the 
audit statement in accordance with auditing standards. In addition, the competent State 
administration agencies, representatives of the owner of the audit client have the right to request 
the auditing firm, branches of foreign auditing firm in Vietnam, and the audit client to explain 
the matter that has been excluded in the audit report.  
However, the Vietnamese Standard on Auditing No 700 (VSA 700) regarding audit opinion is 
consistent with the International Standard on Auditing No 700 (ISA 700). 
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When the members of parliament voted to pass the Law, the members suggested listing the 
matters that should not be excluded in the audit reports. The Economic Commission recognized 
that this suggestion was reasonable. According to the parliamentarians, the purpose of this 
requirement was to improve audit quality (Economic Commission, 2010). 
Regarding to the first reform, the matters are not allowed to except in the audit statement in 
accordance with auditing standards. When the members of the parliament voted to pass the Law, 
there was an agreement of almost parliament members that the MOF will prescribe the detail of 
matters that are not allowed to except in a separate legal document (Parliament (2011a); 
Parliament (2011b)). Parliament (2011a) states: “At this time, we raise the issue that we should 
determine the matters which cannot be excluded”. We think that this is necessary and the 
government must rule on this issue later. In the Law, we schedule to delegate this work to the 
government, who will prescribe the matters that cannot be excluded. Thus, this also prevents the 
abuse of issuing qualified audit opinions”. 
Initially, the government required the MOF to issue a legal document to prescribe these matters. 
However, there are arguments against this requirement. 
 According to the MOF (2010b), providing a list of specific matters that cannot be excluded in 
the audit report was not possible for the following reasons. Firstly, there are problems with 
disagreements between the auditors and the audit client. When the auditors and the audit client 
are unable to agree some significant matters, the auditors will express a qualified audit opinion. 
Secondly, auditors may issue a qualified audit opinion as they are limited by the scope of audit. 
Thirdly, the issuing of a qualified audit opinion is acceptable according to international practice.  
All interviewees also opposed the requirement since, if the MOF issue a specific legal document 
to stipulate the matters that are not permitted to except, this legal document will be inapplicable 
and will conflict with international auditing standards. 
“It seems to be inapplicable to prescribe the matters that are not permitted to except in the audit 
reports. The parliament members prescribed that the MOF must prescribe matters that are not 
permitted to except in the audit reports. However, in fact we cannot prescribe these matters. We 
do not know which matters are not permitted to except in each engagement, in each 
circumstance, in fact”. 
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Representative 2, MOF 
The final decision of the government and the MOF related to this issue is that auditors and audit 
firms decide which matters are not entitled to except by basing on the new auditing standards. 
The MOF will not issue a specific legal document related to this issue. MOF prescribed matters 
are not excluded in general through the application of new auditing standards and auditors 
applying these standards are complying with article 48 of the Law. However, auditors have to 
apply knowledge and experience to conduct all audit procedures before issuing an audit opinion. 
For example, the audit opinion of the inventory account in case the audit firm was appointed 
after the end of the financial year, the auditors could not participate in observing the stocktaking 
of the audit client, but not be allowed to default to except the matter related to inventory account. 
The auditors must use their professional judgment to decide whether they should perform 
alternative audit procedures (Pham, 2011). 
“Now, MOF prescribed contents that are not permitted to except in general through the 
application of new auditing standards”. 
(Representative 1, VACPA 
Actual audit quality in past years has given investors a bad impression of numerous qualified 
audit reports. In addition, the excepted matters account for a great proportion of the financial 
statement, which makes the audit report not valid. Before the introduction of the Law, auditors 
produced large numbers of qualified audit opinions. The explanation is that auditors cut costs by 
curtailing audit procedures, which led to poor audit quality. The inadequate audit legal 
framework with no details concerning sanctions led auditors and audit firms to disregard rules 
and auditing standards. They cut audit procedures, and issued qualified audit opinion with 
accounts like inventory, receivable or payable accounts which accounted for a large percentage 
of total assets. For instance, they did not attend stock takes or send receivable confirmation 
letters to cut costs and produced qualified audit opinion, which excluded inventory or receivable 
accounts. In some cases, inaccurate qualified audit opinions were published since the excepted 
matter accounted for an extensive portion of a financial report. For example, the excepted 
inventory account contributed to around 70% to 80% of the total assets in the financial statement 
(Bao, 2011). 
“When the authorities created the Law, there was a tendency to issue a range of qualified audit 
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opinions. At the time that they created the Law, qualified audit reports accounted for around 60% 
of the total audit reports. The qualified audit reports with excepted matters like inventory or other 
assets, which account for around 70% to 80% of the total assets. Thus, the members of the 
parliament agreed that auditors are not permitted to issue qualified audit opinion”. 
(Representative 1, VACPA) 
 According to Ha (2011), in order to prevent the issuing of a large number of qualified audit 
reports from auditors, the Law promulgated this reform. Interviewees also shared the same view 
that the purpose of the reform is to prevent the issuing of qualified audit opinion by cutting audit 
procedures, so as to improve audit quality. 
“In the past, auditors issued a range of qualified audit reports. So, we issue this requirement to 
limit this circumstance”. 
Representative 1, MOF 
 “Previously, a range of audit firms competed by reducing audit fees. They reduce audit fees by 
cutting audit procedures and producing qualified audit reports, which affected negatively on 
audit quality. Now, we have to stringently restrict this situation”. 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
Summary and discussion 
The Law changes the conditions for establishing audit firms. The minimum number of auditors 
to establish an audit firm has changed from three auditors to five practicing auditors. Before the 
Law adopted, there was a range of deficiencies in the audit market. One of these was the poor 
audit quality, especially in small audit firms. Small audit firms with only three auditors face 
difficulties with audit partner rotation, investment in technology, quality control as well as 
training. Big audit firms often have the advantages of economies of scale and other technological 
advantages that will reduce their audit costs (Ebrahim, 2010). The main motivation for the 
reform of the minimum number of auditors to establish an audit firm was to increase the size of 
audit firms, and enhance the audit quality of small audit firms so as to correct the deficiency in 
the audit market. The result of the current study supports the results of Willekens et al. (2008). In 
Russia, the Law on Auditing 2001 required that the personnel of an audit firm should include a 
minimum of five certified auditors. The reason for this reform in Russia was a concern with the 
ethical issues of small audit firms, especially their ability and willingness to resist management 
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pressure, and more importantly, a desire to constrain the numbers of “uncontrollable” small 
firms.  
In terms of the reform related to the audit of public interest entities, audit firms must meet the 
new requirement of the number of practicing auditors and the number of audit clients to be 
approved to conduct audits of these entities. These new requirements are much more stringent 
than those in the past. According to regulators, the audit quality of public interest entities, 
especially the listed firms provided by small and medium-sized audit firms, was not high. This is 
consistent with the findings of Hermanson et al. (2007), Hermanson and Houston (2008) and 
Bishop et al. (2013). Hermanson et al. (2007) stated that triennial audit firms considered as 
deficient after PCAOB inspections are likely to be smaller. Hermanson and Houston (2008) 
conclude that audit firms failing to rectify the quality control deficiencies from the PCAOB 
inspection reports have both fewer partners and fewer total professionals per public client in 
comparison with audit firms which have successfully addressed the quality control problems. 
Bishop et al. (2013) found that less competent audit firms are smaller and Big Four firms are less 
likely to have defects than other audit firms.  
Regulators believed that there was a decrease in public confidence in the audit quality of these 
smaller audit firms in Vietnam. Thus, the government had to regulate more stringently the audit 
of public interest entities so as to improve the audit quality of public companies. These views are 
also shared by most participants, except those in medium-sized audit firms. These interviewees 
indicate that the Public Interest theory adequately explains the government intervention. 
However, interviewees from medium firms and professional bodies doubt the public interest 
purpose of the introduction of this reform, and whether there are any lobbies to introduce this 
reform. The economic interest group theory of regulation presumes that groups will form in 
order to protect their own economic interests. Separate groups are considered as having conflicts 
with each other and they will lobby the government to introduce regulations that benefit them 
(Stigler, 1971, Peltzman, 1976). The respondents from some of the medium-sized audit firms 
doubt that the introduction of this reform is in line with the economic interest group theory of 
regulation rather than public interest theory of regulation. 
There is reform related to audit firms’ disclosure of information. The Law requires that auditing 
firms qualified to conduct audit of financial statements of the public interest entities must 
disclose annual transparency reports on their websites within ninety days from the date of ending 
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the fiscal year. Most interviewees concur that the reform’s purpose was to increase the 
transparency of audit firms and help the public to supervise audit firms’ activities, which in turn 
is expected to provide incentives for audit firms to improve audit quality. These provisions 
follow the experiences of many countries, including the countries of the EU. According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), organizations have tendencies to mimic other similar 
organizations in their area which they consider to be more legitimate or successful. The findings 
of this current study support the argument of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that Vietnam mimics 
other countries, particularly countries of the EU, which are considered to be more legitimized 
and successful in terms of the reforms regarding annually transparency reports. Previous 
literature shows that authorities in several countries, typically in the EU, have required audit 
firms to publish transparency reports consisting of information on audit firm governance. 
There is other reform related to the requirement of audit partner rotation. Regarding public 
interest entities, the lead auditors and members of the board signing in an audit report have to 
rotate after three consecutive financial years. In addition, other practising auditors involved in 
the audit engagement also have to rotate after four consecutive fiscal years. With other 
mandatory audit clients, the Law requires a leading auditor signing in the audit report, and a 
member of the board of directors of an audit firm signing in the audit report have to rotate after 
three consecutive financial years. The purpose of this requirement is to promote auditor 
independence, so as to enhance audit quality. Another purpose is to have fresh eyes to assess 
financial statements and prevent old auditors from being over confident. Under the pressure of 
investors, Vietnam had to follow the global trend of audit partner rotation. 
Under the Law, the government produced the Decree 105/2013/ND-CAP to promulgate the 
sanction provisions to deal with violations. This was the first detailed punishment for violations 
committed by auditors and audit firms in Vietnam. In China, the MOF set up legal penalties for 
violation auditing standards in 1992 and in 1993. They issued the Interim Regulations against 
Securities Frauds and the Company Law that stipulated more strict regulation of listed auditors 
(DeFond, Wong, & Li, 2000). The purpose of these reforms in Vietnam was to deal with the 
shortcomings in the audit market. These reforms provided deterrence to participants involved in 
audit, so as to encourage them to strictly follow the audit regulations and auditing standards, 
resulting in an improvement in audit quality. 
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The reform of audit opinion is stipulated in Section 48 of the Law. Firstly, under the Law, the 
Ministry of Finance shall prescribe the contents which are not entitled to except in the audit 
statement in accordance with auditing standards. Secondly, the competent State administration 
agencies, representatives of the owner of the audited unit have rights to request the auditing 
firms, branches of foreign auditing firms in Vietnam and the audited unit to explain the matters 
excluded in the audit statement. This reform in Vietnam is similar to that of China, since firms 
with modified audit opinions  must explain to the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission the 
nature and fundamental reasons concerning a modified audit opinion (Chen, Su, & Zhao, 2000). 
In terms of the first reform, due to the strong opposition of the auditing profession, MOF only 
prescribed that matters are not excluded in general through the application of new auditing 
standards. Auditors who apply these standards conscientiously can be considered as complying 
with this reform. Actual audit quality over the last few years has given investors a bad 
impression from too many qualified audit reports. In addition, the excepted matters accounted for 
a great proportion of the financial statement, which makes the audit report invalid. Some audit 
firms saved costs by cutting audit procedures and issuing qualified audit opinions. The purpose 
of the reform is to prevent the issuing of qualified audit opinion by cutting audit procedures, so 
as to raise audit quality.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The findings related to research question one indicate that internal and external factors are the 
two major factors that have motivated the Vietnamese government to introduce the Law on 
External Audit. The internal factor comes from the flaws of the previous audit regulations, which 
resulted in a range of deficiencies in the audit market, including a small audit market, low audit 
quality, audit failures, and unfair competition in the audit market. According to the data from 
interviews, secondary data and archival records, the government introduced the Law so as to 
improve audit quality, enhance public trust in the audit results and protect the interests of general 
and investing public as well as state capital. The Public Interest theory of regulation is a 
plausible explanation for the government intervention; for the purpose of correcting the 
inefficiencies in the audit market (see section 5.4.1.4). The external factors are the international 
pressures from the international commitments and foreign investors, lenders and donors, such as 
the ADB and WB. Vietnam has international commitments, such as with WTO and ASEAN as 
       163   
Vietnam integrates with the global economy. Previous studies have shown that international 
organizations like ADB and WB often put coercive pressures on developing countries in order to 
shape their accounting and auditing practices. The external factor that motivates the government 
to introduce the Law supports the results of these previous studies and is in line with the coercive 
isomorphism aspect of institutional theory (see section 5.4.2.3).  
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CHAPTER 6 
HOW HAVE ACCOUNTING FIRMS REACTED TO THE REFORMS? WHAT 
CHANGES HAVE THEY MADE IN RESPONSE TO THE AUDIT REFORMS? 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the findings regarding the motivations for the introduction of the 
Law. In this chapter, the researcher presents the results pertaining to research question 2: the 
accounting firms’ reactions to the reforms and the changes they have made as a result of the 
reforms. The analysis of the findings in this chapter is based on the institutional theory, two 
aspects of institutional theory, isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and strategic behaviors 
that organizations adopt in response to institutional rules. The researcher examines the reactions 
of accounting firms and individual auditors to the institutional pressures and the changes they 
have made in response to these pressures (Oliver, 1991). The findings and discussions in this 
chapter include the changes and reactions of accounting firms to the reform of the establishment 
of accounting firms, the reform of the conditions for the audit of public interest entities, the new 
requirement for audit firm transparency, and the requirement for audit partner rotation. The main 
themes, issues emerged from the research question 2 are presented in Table 7, Table 8, and 
Appendix 6. These themes are also presented and discussed in section 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 of 
this chapter. 
6.2 Small audit firms’ responses to the new condition for operating audit firms 
Studies from all over the world show that audit reforms have impacted on audit firms 
significantly in terms of their structure, procedures and strategies. Shaub (2005) asserted that the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act would notably affect audit firms’ structures and procedures. 
The Law on External Audit (2011) changes the conditions for establishing audit firms. The 
minimum number of auditors to establish an audit firm has changed from three auditors to five 
practicing auditors.  
This reform affects only small audit firms with only three auditors before the Law was adopted. 
According to the Law Making Committee (2009), the number of new audit firms being 
established is less than previously due to this more rigorous requirement. The audit firms with 
fewer than five practicing auditors have to restructure (34%). This reform will impact 
significantly on the operation of audit firms and the development of the auditing profession in 
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general. There is also a significant change in the audit market structure in Vietnam. The 
significant changes in these small firms consist of mergers and an increase of their resources. 
Some audit firms that could not meet the new requirement of the Law on External Audit (2011) 
have dissolved. According to the State Audit Office of Vietnam (2014), the reform resulted in 
the dissolution of twenty-two small audit firms in 2014. Of these audit firms, ten did not have 
five practicing auditors to meet the requirement and twelve did not have any auditors who met 
the criteria to become practicing auditors.  
“These changes in the auditing legal environment are huge, and have affected the auditing 
profession significantly. There are a range of new legal documents accompanying the Law”.  
 (Partner, small audit firm ZA) 
6.2.1 Mergers between small audit firms  
The findings show that the reform has influenced small audit firms significantly. Under the 
enforcement of the requirement, small audit firms have to restructure. These reorganizations 
represent huge changes in the audit market.  
“I think this change’s effect is relatively clear…In addition, there is a merger trend to meet the 
conditions of the number of practicing auditors in the Law, to strengthen and improve the 
competitive capacity of these small firms. These are the most affected aspects”.  
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm P) 
 
 “The impacts are huge with small auditors and audit firms”. 
(Manager, small audit firm O) 
The findings of analysis also illustrate that the consolidation between small audit firms became a 
dominant trend in the audit market. Small accounting firms used mergers and strategic alliances 
to meet the reforms’ requirements. Although established audit firms have some time to prepare 
to employ more auditors, mergers between audit firms became more common (Nguyen, 2011).  
 “Consolidations will be conducted more often next time”. 
(Representative 1, VACPA) 
“An increase in the number of practicing auditors from three to five, and especially now the 
change in the condition to conduct audit of public interest entities result in a merging tendency. It 
is an inevitable and prevailing strategy employed by Vietnamese audit firms”. 
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(Partner 1, small audit firm C) 
Small audit firms not only merge to meet the requirement of the Law, but also to strengthen their 
capacity to compete in the audit market. The difficulty facing the small and medium-sized audit 
firms are small audit contracts and these firms do not have their own audit programs (State Audit 
Office of Vietnam, 2012). Hence, the audit firms have to assess their operational capacity so as 
to merge together into the bigger audit firms. VACPA also suggests and encourages too small 
audit firms to consolidate with others. Small audit firms can merge to become a bigger one 
(VACPA, 2013). Thereby, the weak point of the small audit firms can be overcome and 
eliminated (Phan, 2011).  
 
 “Audit firms merge to meet the requirement and to enhance their resources, for the purpose of 
increasing their competitive capacities”. 
Partner, medium-sized audit firm P 
With the support of VACPA, reorganizations of small audit firms are conducted more often. In 
2012, approximately forty very small audit firms which did not meet the minimum requirements 
of the Law had to restructure. The VACPA supported audit firms in their restructuring processes 
(State Audit Office of Vietnam, 2012). 
Some participants stated that small audit firms decide to merge instead of hiring more practicing 
auditors to meet the requirement of the Law. Some small audit firms cannot afford to hire 
additional practicing auditors in order to comply with the Law. Before the introduction of the 
Law, small audit firms were often established by family members or a group of friends. Now, the 
minimum number of practicing auditors must be at least five. However, the cost of hiring more 
practicing auditors is high. Hence, these audit firms cannot afford to hire more practicing 
auditors. These firms choose to consolidate with others in response to the reform. 
 “Small auditing firms having three auditors were often easy to operate. One couple holding audit 
certificates could hire another auditor to run their audit firm. It was simple for them to establish 
an audit firm…If the audit firm hires more practicing to meet this requirement, this firm may not 
afford the cost. Practicing auditors’ salaries are often high. So, this firm has to merge or 
cooperate with other small firms”. 
(Partner, small audit firm N) 
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Hung Chan and Wu (2011) stated that audit firms’ mergers improve audit quality. Several 
interviewees in the current study share this opinion. Small firms merge to become bigger firms 
and their audit quality is better. 
“… The audit firms have tended to merge together to meet the requirements. At that time, the 
audit quality in these firms will be enhanced. Simultaneously, the audit firms shall also pay more 
attention to their audit work, from audit procedures to audit documentation, which comply with 
the Law and the auditing standards.  Then audit quality will be enhanced”. 
(Senior auditor, other large audit firm B) 
However, small audit firm face challenges when they consolidate. They have to implement new 
policies, audit programs and strategies. A partner of medium-sized firm stated that it is not easy 
to merge since it is difficult to find a suitable partner. Two firms must have the same attitudes 
towards the management of the new merged firm as well as the audit quality.  
“Trends of merger will happen. But actually for the Vietnamese people, consolidation is not 
simple. Because horizontal mergers are what people fear the most, in terms of human relations 
between auditors. Auditors have to know how to cooperate with each other, have the same 
perspective to drive the new firm and to improve the audit quality, attitudes and processes”. 
(Partner, small audit firm R) 
6.2.2 Increase in the resources of small audit firms 
Small audit firms have been forced to reorganize their capital and have plans to attract more 
practicing auditors to satisfy the new requirement of the Law (VACPA, 2012), (State Audit 
Office of Vietnam, 2012). This theme is also shared by interviewees. These firms have increased 
their resources to meet the requirement and to compete. Small audit firms have had to increase 
the number of practicing auditors to meet this requirement.  
“Local audit firms have to increase resources to compete with international audit firms. Small 
audit firms face difficulties”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm H) 
 “If small audit firms want to continue to operate, they have to increase the number of practicing 
auditors in their firms”. 
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(Manager, small audit firm G) 
Other small audit firms decided to send their staff to study, so as to obtain the required audit 
qualifications as required by the Law. Small audit firms invest more in their staff to meet the 
requirement. 
 “These firms have sent their staff to study to get audit certificates or they have hired more 
auditors”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm I) 
These audit firms had to increase their resources, not only to satisfy the requirement of the Law, 
but also to increase their capacity to compete since the competition in the audit market is fierce. 
Even large audit firms decrease their audit fees to compete with smaller ones. This situation has 
placed small audit firms at a disadvantage. Hence, these small firms also have to improve their 
capability to survive in the audit market. 
 “Because small audit firms have mainly competed by reducing audit fees, small firms’ audit 
quality is certainly not as high as large firms due to the lower audit fees. So, when the 
government tightened the requirement, small and medium-sized firms had to increase resources 
to compete”. 
(Senior auditor, small audit firm G) 
6.2.3 Changes in appearance of small audit firms 
Although some small audit firms have actually changed due to the reform, a large number of 
them have just changed in appearance only. Small audit firms have merged in appearance to 
fulfill the requirement of the Law. However, their activities and management are still separate. 
Therefore, the merger has not changed audit quality in these audit firms. For example, two audit 
firms located in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh merged, which merely increases their size, enabling 
them to conduct audits. In fact, these two audit firms still work independently, attract audit 
clients and pay salaries separately. They operate independently with different audit quality 
control systems. This type of merger is not an actual consolidation. However, these firms can 
separate more easily if one of the parties is stronger or there are conflicts of interest between 
them (Nguyen, 2011). 
Over a period of three years, twenty auditing firms merged into ten firms, with many different 
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forms. Mergers occurred in the same area (Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh), or in different areas (between 
Hanoi with Ho Chi Minh City or vice versa) (VACPA, 2012). The results of interviews also 
illustrate that a significant number of consolidation is apparent rather than real. 
 “There are a range of mergers between audit firms in the South. In the South, the small firms 
consolidate, but in appearance of ownership. Their audit activities are still independent. They 
have merely changed their outlooks to comply with the Law… For instance, one firm in Ho Chi 
Minh was merged with a firm in Binh Duong. They combined their employees, utilized the same 
logo and newsletters to attract audit clients. However, these two firms still perform their 
activities, control their costs and revenues separately. Each of the two firms is independently 
responsible for its audit quality. There are a lot of mergers like that”. 
(Senior auditor, small audit firm G) 
Interviewees also concurred that audit quality in these firms which merge in appearance are still 
the same as before the Law was enacted. The purpose of regulators to enact the reform was to 
enhance the audit quality of small audit firms. According to the regulators, if audit firms are 
large, they can invest more in technology, training and quality control. However, with the 
apparent consolidation of small audit firms, these firms still operate separately and do not invest 
more in such things. Hence, their audit quality does not improve as the regulators desire. 
 “Three small audit firms combined horizontally like tree branches, but they were not actually 
merged. Each of these firms still records their costs and revenues independently. Thus, the audit 
quality is still the same, not enhanced. They merged in appearance to become a larger firm, so as 
to fulfill the requirement of establishing and operating an audit firm. The audit quality is the 
same before the merger… The purpose of this merger is not to raise audit quality, just to meet 
the requirement in appearance”. 
Partner, medium audit firm K 
Instead of creating a new audit firm, there is also a trend to establish a new branch of an existing 
audit firm because it is less complicated to establish a new branch than it is to create a new audit 
firm. Hence, a number of branches of audit firms have been established. Interestingly, the new 
branch of an audit firm is often located at the same place as the audit firm. This situation never 
occurred prior to the introduction of the Law.  
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“But now, since the rule has come into effect, it is more usual to open new branches of an old 
audit firm instead of setting up a new audit firm. The conditions for establishment of branches 
are easier and simultaneously increase the old audit firm’s capacity. In the past, these branches 
could be established as audit firms. Now, they do not establish new audit firms, but they 
establish the new branches of the old audit firm. There is an extraordinary situation in Vietnam. 
Normally, in the past, a branch of an audit firm was not located in the same city as the head 
office. Now, there are audit firms that have branches in the same area, such as Hanoi. In addition, 
these branches are independent from the head office”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm P) 
Moreover, interviewees concurred that some small audit firms have hired audit certificates to 
comply with the requirement regarding the number of practicing auditors. These auditors just 
register as practicing auditors in these firms; however, they do not actually work for these firms. 
The reason is that the cost of hiring audit certificates is not as expensive as the cost of hiring real 
practicing auditors. Small audit firms seem to cut costs by hiring audit certificates. These firms 
just pretend to comply with the Law through their appearance. Although the MOF strictly 
monitors the registration of practicing auditors, the hiring of audit certificates in order to operate 
still occurs. By 31/12/2014, the total number of people holding audit certificates in Vietnam was 
3,014. Among them, only 1,647 auditors work in audit firms and the remainder work in other 
fields such as finance and insurance (VACPA, 2015). Therefore, some audit firms have rented 
audit certificates from people working in other fields in order to comply with the audit reform. 
 “Although they have five practicing auditors in appearance to operate, the number of practicing 
auditors who actually work in the audit firm is less than five, maybe just two. These audit firms 
hire audit certificates of auditors who do not work in the auditing profession. These people 
register as practicing auditors in these audit firms in appearance…” 
(Senior auditor, small audit firm G) 
“As the Law requires more practicing auditors in an audit firm, audit firms are ready to pay more 
for renting audit certificates. People having audit certificates do not work in the audit field but 
are also ready to lend their audit certificates since they are well paid for that. Renting audit 
certificates in audit firms is relatively common”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
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 6.2.4 Summary and discussion 
The Law has changed the conditions for establishing audit firms. The minimum number of 
auditors needed to establish an audit firm has changed from three auditors to five practicing 
auditors. This reform affected those small audit firms that had only three auditors before the Law 
was adopted. The number of audit firms which did not meet the new requirement dropped from 
170 in 2010 to 134 in 2013 since the conditions for establishing audit firms took effect on 
01/01/2014 (Bui, 2014). This situation in Vietnam is similar to that in Taiwan. In 2001, due to a 
tightening up of the CPA qualification standards, the number of audit firms decreased from 823 
in 2000 to 723 in 2003 (Lee, 2010).  
There are significant changes in these firms in response to the reform including mergers as well 
as increase in their resources. Small accounting firms used mergers and strategic alliances to 
comply with the reform and strengthen their capacity to compete. This is in line with the findings 
of Willekens et al. (2008). Willekens et al. (2008) stated that the Law on Auditing in Russia 
required a minimum of five certified auditors in an audit firm. This reform in Russia also led to 
mergers between small companies and the larger ones.  
In addition, some small audit firms chose other methods to comply with the reform. They 
increased their resources by reorganizing their capital and attracting more practicing auditors to 
satisfy the new requirement of the Law. From the perspective of institutional theory, the 
organizational structures of small audit firms change significantly to reflect the new regulations 
legitimated by the Parliament, the new requirement for operating audit firms in the Law on 
External Audit. The Law represents a regulative pillar in the institutional mechanism generating 
a formally coercive pressure which influences organizations’ structure. Oliver (1991) points out 
five kinds of strategic responses: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and 
manipulation. Acquiescence may take the forms of habit, imitation and compliance. As 
organizations expect increased legitimacy from compliance, acquiescence is the most possible 
response. The notable changes in audit firms due to the reform reflect the acquiescence tactic in 
the form of compliance. These audit firms consciously and strategically select to conform to 
institutional pressures for the purpose of enhancing their legitimacy, protecting it from public 
criticism and sanctions for non-compliance.  
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Although there are real changes in some small audit firms, others just comply with the reform in 
appearance only. These firms apparently merge or establish new branches of existing audit firms 
to satisfy the reform requirement. In addition, due to the shortage of practicing auditors, some of 
these audit firms have to hire audit certificates of those who do not work in the auditing 
profession in order to comply with the new requirement. Oliver (1991) considered the avoidance 
method as organizations’ attempt to preclude the necessity of compliance by concealing their 
nonconformity, buffering themselves from institutional pressures or escaping from institutional 
rules. Concealing is defined as “disguising nonconformity behind a façade of acquiescence”. 
Concealing is different from the acquiescent tactic of compliance by the degree to which 
conformity is apparent or actual. These small audit firms adopt the concealment tactic in 
response to the audit reform in the Law. These audit firms maintain their appearance of 
legitimacy in the eyes of regulators and the general public by apparently, but not actually, 
conforming to the reform in the Law. These audit firms disguise their non-compliance behind a 
façade of compliance with institutional rules. 
6.3 Small and medium audit firms’ responses to the Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC  
In terms of the reform related to audit of public interest entities, audit firms must meet the new 
requirement of the number of practicing auditors and the number of audit clients to be approved 
to conduct audit of these entities (the motivation for the introduction of this reform is presented 
in section 5.5.2, chapter 5). These new requirements are much more stringent than those in the 
past. The overall results illustrate that small and medium-sized audit firms have reacted 
negatively to the reform. In addition, these audit firms also have to restructure their firms and 
merge to meet the requirement. These changes in the audit market are significant, particularly 
since small and medium-sized audit firms are directly affected by the reform. 
The requirement stated in Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC impacted hugely on small and medium-
sized audit firms. To meet this requirement, small and medium-sized audit firms had to increase 
their size within a short period of time (The VACPA, 2015b). 
6.3.1 Resistance to change by small and medium-sized audit firms 
There are arguments against the reform of small and medium audit firms, since the reform expels 
medium-sized audit firms from the public audit market. This is because a large number of small 
and medium-sized audit firms cannot meet the requirement. The reform creates difficulties for 
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small and medium-sized audit firms. In other words, the reform prevents smaller audit firms 
from entering the public audit market. Tran (2014) argued that authorities have not yet passed 
judgment on whether or not the actual results will be as expected. It is impractical for a large 
number of small and medium audit firms to obtain enough audit clients to meet the requirement. 
These firms are forced to quit the public audit market. According to Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC, 
from the effect date of the Circular, audit firms must have at least seven (7) practicing auditors 
and must have at least one hundred (100) audit clients to be approved to conduct audit of public 
interest entities. From 2016, audit firms must have at least ten (10) practicing auditors and must 
have at least two hundred and fifty (250) audit clients to be approved to conduct audit. In term of 
the conditions for audit of  public interest entities in the field of securities, from the effect date of 
the Circular, audit firms must have at least ten (10) practicing auditors and must have at least one 
hundred and fifty (150) audit clients to be approved to conduct audit of listed firms. From 2016, 
audit firms must have at least fifteen (15) practicing auditors and must have at least three 
hundred (300) audit clients to be approved to conduct audits of listed firms. The reform requires 
that firms have a minimum number of audit clients in order to enter the public audit market. 
Hence, auditing firms must increase their clientele by 200 new audit clients for two fiscal years. 
The average increase per year is about 68%. While the whole audit industry growth is only 11%. 
Therefore, most audit firms cannot increase their number of audit clients as quickly as the new 
condition requires. The authorities give audit firms a short route to request the spike in the 
number of auditors and audit clients. In addition, if auditing firms do not have a sufficient 
minimum number of audit clients which are public interest entities, 5-20 in the first approval 
according to the new requirement, these audit firms will never be able to participate in this audit 
market. Hence, it is absolutely certain that these small and medium-sized audit firms cannot 
achieve this.  Moreover, if this year, auditing firms are ineligible to conduct audits of public 
interest entities, these public interest entities will withdraw as clients of the audit firms. 
Therefore, in the following year these audit firms will no longer be able meet the new 
requirement. In other words, these auditing firms will be excluded from the big audit market 
(Tran, 2014). 
Tran (2014) also pointed out that this new requirement seems to prevent the growth of medium 
and small audit firms, especially medium audit firms. Prior to the Circular 183, on average per 
year, nearly 40 auditing firms were eligible to conduct audit of public interest entities and the 
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majority of these audit firms were medium-sized. After Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC was issued, 
only around 20 auditing firms were eligible to operate; the other small and medium-sized audit 
firms lost their share of the market as a result of this reform.  
In Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the MOF in collaboration with the VACPA held its annual 
meeting of directors of audit firms. The conference spent time listening to the opinions of 
directors of audit firms. In particular, some comments focused on the difficulties facing small 
and medium audit firms since the Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC which regulates the audit of the 
public interest entities took effect (The VACPA, 2015a). The overall results of interviews show 
the resistance to the reforms by a significant number of small and medium audit firms. 
“The Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC gives small and medium audit firms little time to meet the 
requirement. Audit firms which do not have 250 audit clients cannot participate in the public 
market. They will lose this market forever. With the increase by 150%, no audit firm can achieve 
this requirement”. 
(Manager, small audit firm G) 
If audit firms achieved the target of the number of audit clients at any price, this issue will 
impact negatively on the quality of audit services. This requirement is a pressure forcing the 
audit firms to accept audit clients, including audit clients which are not accepted at normal (L. 
Tran, 2014). With the new requirement, the authorities care about the number of audit clients 
rather than audit quality. In order to be approved to conduct audits of public interest entities, 
some audit firms try to retain audit clients by any means, which also affects audit independence 
(Hang, 2015). 
A representative from VACPA stated:  
“Small and medium audit firms are finding that this Circular is very problematic and they are 
proposing postponement of this Circular. The problem in this Circular is that it requires the 
minimum number of audit clients, which violates the independence principle. If an audit firm 
wants to keep 200 audit clients, this firm has to spoil its clients. They have to issue unqualified 
audit opinions despite the fact that there are misstatements... Foreign experts see this Circular 
first time, these experts comment on this issue. They find the problem of this Circular...They are 
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requesting for change of this Circular, but there is a doubt whether the MOF will change it or 
not”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
Small and medium-sized audit firms have questioned whether the new policy favors certain 
interest groups who benefit from the new requirement. This suggests that this reform supports 
larger audit firms. Interviewees from medium-sized firms concurred that Decree No. 183/2013/ 
TT-BTC impacts on all audit firms except the large ones. In the view of these interviewees, the 
condition for conducting audit of public interest entities is too strict. The reforms seem to prevent 
medium-sized and small audit firms to participate in the audit market of public interest entities. 
There is enormous influence on medium-sized audit firms due to the reform, whereas large audit 
firms are not affected by this. Medium-sized audit firms’ strategies have significantly changed as 
a result of this condition. The data indicates an overall negative response from small and 
medium-sized firms and some representatives of VACPA.  
“When Circular 183 was introduced, in our opinion, the big audit market belongs to large 
accounting firms. The barrier is raised for medium and small firms to enter the big audit market. 
So, it affects considerably medium audit firms…Medium and small firms are strongly resistant to 
this. This reform impacts our strategies”. 
(Manager, small audit firm C) 
 
Interviewees from small and medium-sized audit firms believed that representatives of the 
VACPA and the regulators should not consider that all smaller audit firms have low audit 
quality, and therefore exclude them. Despite the fact that some smaller firms have poor audit 
quality, others of these firms still have good audit quality. Even though some audit firms have 
small numbers of audit clients, they pay a lot of attention to their audit quality. When the 
regulators enacted the reform, they based their decision on a list of twenty large audit firms in 
Vietnam. Hence, regulators excluded all smaller audit firms from the public audit market. 
According to these interviewees’, audit quality depends more on audit-partner quality rather than 
the size of audit firms. Some large audit firms still have bad audit quality. These participants 
argued that all the corporate collapses were related to unqualified reports issued by large audit 
firms. Smaller audit firms have fewer audit clients, but they still care about their quality.   
“Now all the medium firms are opposed to this change since it is too strict. Actually, you should 
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not remove the small firms…If we have large numbers of auditors to take care of a small number 
of clients, the quality is much better than a large number of clients”. 
(Partner, small audit firm R) 
 “Some small and medium audit firms still have good audit quality…we cannot state that small 
and medium audit firms do not have good audit quality. Only some of these firms have low audit 
quality. All audit failures associated with corporate collapses apply to large audit firms, like 
Vinashine corporate collapses”. 
(Manager 1, medium audit firm V) 
The representatives from small and medium-sized audit firms and the VACPA argue that the 
regulators should strictly conduct inspections of public audits and monitor audits of public audit 
clients more stringently rather than monitoring the number of audit clients that audit firms are 
required to have before entering the public audit market. The inspections of audit firms were 
conducted after the audit processes had been completed. The inspectors just checked the audit 
files based on their checklist. Moreover, the expertise of inspectors is still doubted.  
“The improvement of audit quality should not be implemented in the form of "coercion" by 
administrative order under the provisions of the Circular 183. State agencies should enhance 
inspections of audit firms and auditors rather than enact this reform” (Tran, 2014). 
 
Read et al. (2004) asserted that the primary reason for audit firms voluntarily registering with the 
PCAOB was to signal audit quality to non-public audit clients and stakeholders. A partner of a 
medium-sized audit firms mentioned his firm’s opposition to the reform since his firm was 
forced to quit the public audit market due to the reform. This situation resulted in losing revenue 
and more importantly downgrading this firm’s reputation associated with the audit of non-public 
clients since this audit firm was no longer on the list of public accounting firms. 
 
“Small and medium audit firms lose the revenues from the audit of public interest entities. 
Furthermore, their reputation is decreased since they are not in the short list of firms permitted to 
participate in this market…Actually; Circular 183 is the biggest barrier now”. 
(Manager, small audit firm C) 
 
Small and medium-sized audit firms have submitted a request to change the condition of 
conducting audit of public interest entities as stipulated in Decree No. 183/2013/TT-BTC as well 
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as postpone the effect date of this Decree. According to medium-sized and small audit firms, the 
state agencies have interfered too much in economic activities. State agencies have applied the 
administrative method in the public audit market by requiring that audit firms have a minimum 
number of audit clients before entering the public audit market. 
“The state interferes too much with the business activities of audit firms”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm ZB) 
 “The Circular 183 is also a major problem that companies are discussing and they are asking the 
VACPA to request the MOF and SSC to change the effective time. Currently, we have drafted 
this request… When the authority produced this Circular, they based it on the characteristics of 
the top 20 audit firms in Vietnam. So, small and medium firms are not on the short list. If in 
2014, audit firms did not meet the requirement of this Circular, they were eliminated from this 
market forever”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
 
“The story of Circular 183, I also lost a few nights’ sleep due to the Circular 183. The Circular 
183 impacts on all audit firms, except for the big audit firms which are not affected because they 
have already exceeded the threshold of the condition of Circular 183. The remaining audit firms 
are affected. We are campaigning to correct the circulars 183, for example only 10 practicing 
auditors. Actually Circular 183 changes the strategies of many audit firms…The introduction of 
the policy, I feel that it is not necessary, 15 practicing auditors and 300 audit clients. It is not 
necessary to regulate like that”. 
(Partner, small audit firm C) 
In contrast to the perspectives of VACPA and the small and medium audit firms, regulators and 
large audit firms insist that the reform is justifiable. They believe that the audit quality of smaller 
audit firms is poor and loses the confidence of the public. Therefore, only the larger audit firms 
can participate in this market. When regulators produced the reforms, they based these on the list 
of the twenty largest audit firms in Vietnam. These participants defend the target of improving 
public audit will be achieved through the adoption of the reform. 
“Audit firms have to conduct at least a certain number of contracts before the year of approval. 
So, they have experience in conducting audit of public clients. This is the requirement of the 
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general public to increase the audit quality of public clients… We strictly control the public 
audit”. 
(Representative 2, SSC) 
6.3.2 Merger between audit firms 
In response to the change in conditions for conducting audit of public interest entities and to 
improve their competitive advantage, medium CPA firms have been pursuing mergers and 
strategic alliances (Nguyen, 2011). The VACPA stated that the audit firms selecting mergers as a 
solution is reasonable. The VACPA has encouraged, consulted and supported the 
implementation of mergers (Huu & Bui, 2014). The reform significantly changed the structure of 
audit market. It seems that only larger audit firms can survive in the public audit market. 
 “It is a big change. Only large audit firms can survive”. 
(Manager 1, medium-sized audit firm V) 
There is also a concurrence among all interviewees from all the groups about the predominant 
trend of mergers between audit firms since the reform was adopted. This trend is likely to 
increase and persist into the future. 
 “Circular 183 regulates the audit of the public interest entities, so the medium accounting firms 
cannot meet the requirements of this Circular. Thus, they have to combine together in order to be 
qualified”. 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
 “It is clear that there is an increasing trend in which audit firms join together to comply fully 
with the conditions.” 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm M) 
The consolidation of audit firms has been happening for a few years, especially after the 
introduction of the Law. The most recent mergers include the merger of Grant Thornton 
(Vietnam) and Nexia ACPA in July 2014, becoming Grant Thornton Ltd, which is an official 
member of the Grant Thornton global network. In August, 2014, the Viet People Auditing 
Company Ltd was officially established with 80 staff. This firm was established after the merger 
between the Viet People Auditing Company Ltd and Viet Centre Audit Company Ltd (State 
Audit Office of Vietnam, 2014). The Vietnamese National Auditing Company Ltd was merged 
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with the Vietnamese International Auditing Company Ltd to become a new one, namely the 
National Auditing Company Ltd (VACPA, 2013).  
However, in terms of small and medium-scale audit firms that are operating in Vietnam, not 
every firm has the opportunity and the conditions to merge (The VACPA, 2012). These firms 
face challenges in finding other appropriate firms with which to merge. 
Pickering (2012) stated that researchers have identified difficulties for managers, forecasting 
potential combination benefits of the acquisition of a single firm. These cases indicated that this 
duty is more problematic if aggressively combining dozens of firms. Similarly, interview data 
and secondary data also confirm the difficulties of consolidation. The difficulties of mergers 
between small and medium audit firms are often associated with the selection of the main office, 
new audit firm name, logo, appointment of a new director, reissuing financial policy, quality 
control policy and audit client policy.   
“Some audit firms worry about finding partners and building plans, stability and development 
after the mergers. These audit firms are seeking the support of the VACPA in their consolidation 
processes”. 
 (State Audit Office of Vietnam, 2012) 
 “If medium audit firms do not meet the requirement, they have to merge. However, it is not easy 
to find the partner to merge”. 
(Partner, small audit firm C) 
Although big audit firms have already fulfilled the requirement of Decree No. 183/210/TT-BTC, 
there is also a consolidation trend among big audit firms. Some large accounting firms also used 
mergers and strategic alliances to strengthen their position in the audit market. In 2014, Grant 
Thornton completed a merger with Nexia ACPA to form a larger audit firm. The new firm stands 
in the sixth position, after big 4 and AASC in the audit market. In addition, UHI have merged 
with AFC. The Viet Anh audit firm merged with the An Phu audit firm. The merger between 
these firms increases their size and improves their competitive capacities, strengthening their 
influence in the audit market. This is similar to the global trend of mergers between big audit 
firms around the world. Mergers between big N audit firms and non-big N audit firms are often 
done to increase their portfolio of clients (Healy & Lys, 1986). 
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“The demand for consolidation is increasing… There are mergers, including large accounting 
firms. Last time, the two big accounting firms in the top 10 completed their merger and many 
accounting firms also seek to merge”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
“If you have searched, then you can see that UHI combined with AFC to create a bigger firm. Or 
Grant Thornton and Nexia, they also merged. The two audit firms met the requirement of 
Circular 183, but they also want to become bigger”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm A) 
6.3.3 Audit market concentration 
The SOX implemented numerous changes that affect the structure of the audit market (DeFond 
and Lennox, 2011). Most interviewees in the current study, except for the regulators, concurred 
that the reform related to conditions for audit of public interest entities increases the audit market 
concentration in the public audit market. 
From 2016, in Vietnam, due to an increase in such conditions, the number of audit firms eligible 
to conduct audit of public interest entities will decrease. This decrease helps regulatory agencies 
to better monitor the audit quality but it results in a reduction in competition in the big audit 
market. These conditions do not encourage small and medium-sized accounting firms to 
participate in the public interest entities audit market  (Huu & Bui, 2014). 
Recently, the audit market has witnessed a trend, in which a range of listed firms have changed 
their audit firms from local audit firms to Big Four firms. According to statistics from the 
VACPA, in 2012 the total audit revenue of Big Four firms was 2,142 billion VND, whereas the 
total revenue of the audit market was 3,800 billion VND. Big Four firms accounted for around 
56% of the total market in 2012 (Tran, 2014). In 2013, large audit firms had more audit clients 
and yielded more revenue, especially Big Four audit firms. In 2013, Big Four firms accounted 
for 58% of the total revenue of the audit market (Bui, 2014).   
Interviewees from audit firms and VACPA concur that with the introduction of Decree No. 
183/2013/TT-BTC, the barrier to entry to the big audit market is raised. Big accounting firms 
dominate the market in terms of audit of public interest entities. There is an increase in the audit 
market share of big audit firms in the public interest entity audit market. The reforms seem to 
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prevent medium-sized audit firms from participating in the audit market of public interest 
entities. According to these participants, this reform increased the audit market concentration. 
 “However, the small and medium firms maintain that the audit quality in these firms is not poor. 
The authority should not attribute poor audit quality to all small and medium audit firms. There 
are a range of small and medium firms that have good audit quality. The enactment of this 
Circular prevents small and medium firms from participating in this market”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
By 20/10/2015, if audit firms did not meet the requirements for the number of practicing auditors 
and the number of audit clients prescribed in Circular 183, they could no longer take part in this 
audit market. This presented a huge challenge for medium audit firms to be qualified to conduct 
audits of public interest units (State Audit Office of Vietnam, 2014). 
 “Actually, in the meeting of audit managers and VACPA, small and medium-sized audit firms 
are complaining that the government does so, which will narrow the market of these firms and 
the market falls into big audit firms”. 
(Manager 3, Big Four audit firm A) 
The reform of audit of public interest entities increased the threshold conditions for eligibility to 
conduct audit of these entities. The number of audit firms operating in this audit market 
decreased significantly due to the reform. In 2015, the SSC announced that only 27 audit firms, 
with a total of 512 auditors, had approval to conduct audit of the public interest entities in the 
field of securities (including large public companies, issuers, listed companies, securities 
companies, securities investment companies, funds and fund management companies). This 
figure was much lower than that for 2014 when 43 audit firms were on the short list of firms 
allowed to conduct audit of these companies. The reason for the significant decrease in the 
number of audit firms permitted to audit public interest entities is the higher standards and 
conditions, that had to be met since 2015, especially the requirement regarding the number of 
audit clients. In particular, the regulation requires the number of minimum audit clients to be 300 
clients from the period of the approval for the financial year 2016; hence, the number of audit 
firms being approved may further decrease. The larger auditing firms will have more audit 
clients and reap the benefits from the adoption of the new requirement. This circumstance results 
in a reduction of competition in the audit market. In the audit market of public interest entities, 
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large audit firms compete with each other (Hang, 2015). 
Cullinan et al. (2012) stated that the audit concentration can result in higher audit prices. One 
senior auditor presented her point of view on the monopoly in the audit market. In her view, 
Circular 183 results in the monopoly in the big audit market and reduces competition which can 
lead to an increase in audit fees in the public interest entities market.  
“The change in the conditions for conducting audit of public companies leads to the monopoly in 
the audit market of big accounting firms. Hence, it is tougher for smaller audit firms to compete. 
This reform also limits the choices of audit clients. The number of suppliers in the public audit 
market reduces while the demanding increases, resulting in an increase in audit fees” 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm F) 
Competitive advantage in the market is clearly in favor of the big audit firms in the industry. The 
listed companies which are large scale enterprises or have foreign investment tend to select the 
Big Four audit firms or other large local audit firms that have built a reputation and have 
established brands, although the cost of these audit firms is higher than that of others. Other audit 
firms aggressively compete to gain the rest of the listed audit market shares (Hang, 2013). 
 A partner of a medium-sized firm also mentioned the difficulties of small and medium firms in 
obtaining audit clients in the public audit market. The Law also has reforms related to public 
interest entities, which requires these entities to strengthen their internal quality control and set 
up internal audit units.  In addition, the state agencies including the SSC and MOF have 
monitored the audit of public interest entities more strictly. Hence, audit clients have a tendency 
to appoint auditors from highly reputable audit firms. Hence, big audit firms are able to obtain a 
major share of the public audit market.  
 “Small and medium-sized firms cannot compete with big ones…The main reason is the demand 
of audit clients… Now some medium audit firms are eligible to conduct audit of listed firms, but 
they cannot gain audit clients due to the demand for higher quality of audit clients…Now, audit 
of public companies is strictly regulated. Hence, audit clients tend to appoint audit firms with 
high reputation”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm P) 
The conditions for conducting audits of public clients are tougher. The MOF and SSC supervise 
the audit of public clients more stringently than that of other clients. In addition, the audit fees 
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for some public clients are not much higher than those of other clients. Some of the public audit 
clients do not have high revenues. Hence, the audit fees for these public clients are not high. 
Hence, some medium audit firms leave the public audit market and focus on other segments of 
the audit market. 
 
 “Circular 183 is so strict. So, some audit firms move their directions to another market. The SSC 
and other state agencies supervise strictly audit of public interest entities”. 
(Manager 1, medium-sized audit firm V) 
 
Despite the fact that a large number of interviewees of the current study concurred that large 
audit firms obtain more market share in the public market, some interviewees insisted that the 
increase of market share of larger audit firms is not significant. The explanation is that medium-
sized and small audit firms try to keep their audit clients. These firms try to consolidate and 
attract more audit clients to meet the requirement of Circular 183/TT-BTC. 
 
 “In fact, the public market share of large audit firms does not increase significantly. The small 
and medium-sized audit firms try to merge or attract more audit clients to meet the requirement 
of Circular 183. Therefore, there are more audit firms that meet the requirement of this Circular 
next time. It is the way that medium-sized and small audit firms keep their public market share”. 
(Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
6.3.4 Summary and discussion 
In terms of the reform related to audit of public interest entities, audit firms must meet the new 
requirement for the minimum number of practicing auditors and the number of audit clients in 
Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC to be approved to conduct audit of these entities. These new 
requirements are much more stringent than those in the past. 
The responses from the interviews and secondary data illustrate the overall negative response 
from small and medium-sized audit firms and the VACPA. According to these participants, this 
new requirement seems to prevent the growth of medium-sized and small audit firms, especially 
medium audit firms. This reform raises the barrier for small and medium-sized audit firms to 
enter the public audit market. There are difficulties facing audit firms since the reform took 
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effect. To fulfill the requirement to be approved to conduct audit of public interest entities, some 
audit firms have to retain audit clients by any means, which affects audit independence. Small 
and medium-sized audit firms have questioned about whether the new policy facilitates certain 
interest groups who benefit from the new requirement. 
Small and medium-sized audit firms asked the VACPA to request MOF and SSC to change this 
requirement. They have submitted the request to change the condition of executing audit of 
public interest entities in Decree No.183/2013/TT-BTC as well as postpone the effect date of this 
Decree. From the perspective of institutional theory, Oliver (1991) presents five kinds of 
strategic responses: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. 
Compromising can take the forms of balancing, pacifying or bargaining with external 
constituents. Bargaining is associated with the effort of the organization to demand some 
concessions from an external constituent. The empirical findings suggest a resistance of small 
and medium-sized audit firms to the audit reform related to conditions for conducting audit of 
public interest entities and requested that the MOF and SSC make concessions. These audit firms 
are in a negotiation process. As Oliver (1991) stated, this represents a compromise with their 
institutional body, particularly with the regulators to relax the conditions for conducting audit of 
public interest entities. These audit firms implemented the compromise approach by bargaining 
in response to the institutional pressure, the audit reform enforcement. 
In response to the change and to improve their competitive advantage, medium-sized CPA firms 
have been pursuing mergers and strategic alliances. The reaction of audit firms to the audit 
reforms by consolidation confirms the impact of coercive isomorphism from the perspective of 
institutional theory. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) stated that highly structured organizational 
fields present a situation in which individual efforts to address uncertainty and constraint usually 
lead to homogeneity in structure, culture and output. In addition, Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
argued that organizational structures increasingly come to reflect rules and regulations 
legitimated by the state. Medium-sized audit firms are directly impacted by the coercive pressure 
from the regulatory reform of the state agency, MOF. These audit firms adopt a similar strategy, 
consolidation, to alter their organizational structures. These organizations adopt isomorphic 
behavior as they all face a similar pressure from the state. 
However, not every firm has the opportunity and the conditions to merger. The difficulties of 
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mergers between small and medium-sized audit firms are often associated with the selection of 
the main office, new audit firm name, logo, appointment of new director, reissuing financial 
policy, quality control policy and audit client policy. Although other large audit firms have 
already fulfilled the requirement of Decree No. 183/2013/TT-BTC, there is also a trend toward 
consolidation of large audit firms. Some large accounting firms also used mergers and strategic 
alliances to strengthen their position in the audit market. 
Studies on the impacts of audit reforms on audit market concentration show mixed results. Most 
studies on the impact of audit reforms on the audit market structure point out that the reforms 
result in an increase in the audit market concentration in developed countries. For instance, 
Beckstead (2006) concluded that the PCAOB’s rules covering auditing standards for all auditors 
of public companies actually raised the barrier to entry into the public accounting market for 
small audit firms. Houghton et al. (2013) found that the legal backing auditing standards and 
ASIC inspection increased audit costs, leading to increasing barriers to entry into the audit 
market. Benjamin and Ulrike (2012) concluded that the joint audits and the compulsory audit 
firm rotation considerably increase audit market concentration. However, Zhu and Sun (2012) 
found that the reform of accounting standards has not impacted on audit market concentration in 
China. Other previous studies found that the audit reforms decreased the level of audit market 
concentration. For example, DeFond, Wong and Li (1999) showed a decrease in audit market 
concentration due to the implementation of new auditing standards in China.  
Due to an increase in such conditions, certainly since 2016, the number of audit firms eligible to 
conduct audit of public interest entities will decrease significantly. According to interviewees 
and secondary data, the reform caused a reduction of competition in the public audit market. In 
this audit market, large audit firms compete with each other. This result supports the Kend 
(2004) who found that audit reforms, particularly mandatory audit partner rotation, will cause a 
decrease in the number of small audit firms, leading to reduced competition. 
 There is an increase in the audit market share of large audit firms in the public audit market in 
Vietnam. The larger auditing firm will have more audit clients and reap the benefits of the new 
requirement. The reforms seem to prevent medium-sized and small audit firms from participating 
in the audit market of public interest entities. There has been a considerable reduction of audit 
firms eligible to conduct audit of public companies. In 2014, 43 audit firms were on the short list 
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of firms allowed to conduct audit of these companies. However, in 2015, the SSC announced that 
there were only 27 audit firms. From 2016, the number of audit firms in the public audit market 
will decrease more significantly due to the requirement of Decree No. 183/2013/TT-BTC. In the 
US, the enactment of the SOX led to a large reduction in the number of small audit firms in the 
market. Of the 1,233 small audit firms that operated between 2001 and 2008, 607 exited the 
market (DeFond & Lennox, 2011). The situation in Vietnam is similar to that in the US. The 
audit reform in Vietnam resulted in a decrease in the number of audit firms operating in the 
public audit market. However, in the US market, the reduction of small auditors is attributed to 
the SOX and the PCAOB enforcement that imposes costs on small auditors to encourage them to 
exit the market. The SOX imposes higher costs on small public auditors by increasing regulatory 
scrutiny, requiring more stringent compliance with auditing standards, and by increasing the 
punishments for non-compliance. In Vietnam, the reform of audit of public interest entities 
increases the threshold conditions to be eligible to conduct audit of these entities. The number of 
audit firms operating in this audit market has decreased significantly due to the reform. This is a 
change in the supply side of the public audit market structure. The reform raises barriers to entry 
into the public audit market. This result is in line with the result Beckstead (2006). Beckstead 
(2006) states that the PCAOB’s rules covering auditing standards for all auditors of public 
companies really raise the barrier to entry into the public accounting market for small audit 
firms. Due to the SOX, the Big Four firms now audit 80% of all public companies in the US. The 
result is also in line with Houghton et al. (2013)  who stated that audit reforms in Australia, 
particularly the force of law auditing standards and ASIC oversight, have led to an increase in 
barriers to entry into the audit market. 
According to Beattie et al. (2003), changes in market concentration occur for three major 
reasons: voluntary realignments, changes in the set of audit clients, and changes in the set of 
suppliers. The increase in audit market concentration in Vietnam is due to voluntary 
realignments of audit clients and changes in the sets of suppliers, which is consistent with the 
finding of Beattie and Fearnley (1994), Pong (1999). Beattie and Fearnley (1994) found that one 
of the reasons for the general increase in the audit market concentration in the UK during the 
period from 1987 to 1991 was the voluntary realignment. Pong (1999) concluded that the change 
in the concentration from 1991 to 1995 in the UK was due to the switch from small audit firms to 
the Big Six and newly listed firms selecting Big Six auditors. 
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Audit clients in the public audit market in Vietnam have a tendency to appoint auditors from 
highly reputable audit firms since the Law was adopted. The pressures to require a top tier 
auditor are known to be intense (Beattie et al., 2003). This situation in Vietnam is similar to other 
developed countries. For example, in the US, 82% of large public companies consider that their 
auditor selection is mostly from the Big Four since they perceive that these audit firms have the 
capacity and reputation to conduct audit of their statements (US Government Accountability 
Office, 2008). In Vietnam, the Law also requires public interest entities to set up and run 
effectively their internal control system and internal audit unit. The state agencies including the 
SSC and MOF have monitored the audit of public interest entities more strictly. These changes 
seem to provide these entities’ with incentives and competence to demand high audit quality. 
This is similar to the SOX, which impacts clients’ incentives and competence to demand audit 
quality. Section 404 of the SOX intends to enhance financial reporting quality by offering 
incentives for clients to improve the quality of their internal controls. In addition, SOX 
requirements for strengthened corporate governance, particularly audit committees, improve 
clients’ competence to demand better audit quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
In addition, the reform of audit of public interest entities increases the conditions for entering the 
pubic audit market. Hence, the set of suppliers in the public audit market in Vietnam has 
changed, and some audit firms have disappeared from this market. The Law has intervened to 
change both the voluntary realignments and the set of suppliers in the public audit market.  
The extent of audit market concentration in Vietnam is similar to that of others in developed 
countries. The supply of audit services is concentrated in the hands of a few dominant accounting 
firms in most developed countries (Evans Jr & Schwartz, 2014). This has increased the attention 
of authorities in the US and the Europe who are now considering the removal of barriers to entry 
for small auditors. However, the level of concentration in Vietnam is lower than in developed 
countries, but higher than in other developing like China. In the US, Big Four firms collected 
94% of all audit fess from public companies in 2006 (US Government Accountability Office, 
2008). In China, the market share of the Big Four firms was 36.98% in 2002, increasing to 
54.72% in 2007 and decreasing to 44.3% in 2009 in the audit market (Zhu & Sun, 2012). 
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6.4 Reluctance of audit firms to publish annual transparent report 
There is reform related to audit firms’ disclosure of information. The Law requires that auditing 
firms that are qualified to conduct audit of the public interest entities must provide annual 
transparency reports on their websites within ninety days from the end of the fiscal year.  
The overall findings illustrate a reluctance of audit firms to publish their annual transparency 
report, especially small and medium-sized audit firms. Some audit firms have complied with this 
reform by issuing their transparency report, whereas others have not yet complied. In addition, 
the data shows that transparency reports have significantly lower amount of disclosures. In 
addition, the reliability of disclosures contained in transparency reports of audit firms is currently 
not monitored, which may result in misleading or low level of disclosures.  
A number of audit firms have permission to conduct audits of public interest entities but these 
audit firms have not published annual transparency reports. From 01/12/2014 to 15/01/2015, the 
MOF inspected seven audit firms. The results of the inspections were published and showed that 
of the seven audit firms, five audit firms did not publish their annual transparency reports despite 
the fact that they are required to do so by law. These five audit firms are still allowed to conduct 
audit of public interest entities (Department of Accounting and Auditing Regulation, 2015). 
“In fact, I do not see good compliance with this requirement. Every 31.3, we go to the audit 
firms’ websites to see whether they have published their transparency reports …I cannot find 
their transparency reports. I question whether they published but removed them at the time I 
looked, or not.” 
(Representative 2, VACPA) 
Audit firms are still reluctant to disclose information in their annual transparency reports. Hence, 
the quality of such reports is still poor. A manager of a big audit firm stated that audit firms in 
Vietnam hesitate to disclose their information due to the Vietnamese culture. Vietnamese people 
do not want to expose their activities to the general public. In his opinion, the quality will have to 
improve in the future. Audit firms will have to accept the rules as the Vietnamese economy is 
integrating with the global economy. 
 “Audit firms still hesitate to disclose their information; they do not show much 
information…Our transparency reports still contain poor information and are not as good as 
those in other countries. Due to the culture, the majority of Vietnamese people do not want their 
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activities to be exposed”. 
(Manager, other large audit firm E) 
A manager of a Big Four firm also concurred that the quality of annual transparency reports in 
Vietnam is still poor, just meeting the minimum requirement. The annual transparency reports 
only contain general information from audit firms.  
“But it depends on the quality of this report. I do not comment on this point”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm A) 
“Audit firms do not want to show detailed information. Audit firms only want to show general 
information. Every audit firm is reluctant to publish this kind of report”. 
(Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
It seems that some audit firms and auditors did not pay attention to this requirement. Some 
auditors were even unaware of the annual transparency reports. 
“It is sad that even many auditors do not know what a transparency report is. This requirement is 
a positive point which makes the audit firms more transparent and audit clients can base on the 
report to select audit firms. However, some audit firms still have not published this kind of 
report”. 
(Representative 2, VACPA) 
According to some interviewees, larger audit firms are more likely to show more information in 
the annual transparency reports than medium-sized and small audit firms. Smaller audit firms are 
more reluctant to publish their annual transparency reports. Large audit firms have a long list of 
audit clients, strict quality control, better training, and human resources. Therefore, large audit 
firms want to show the information as a means of advertising. 
“It is normal to publish this kind of report. It is a kind of advertisement for large audit firms”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm K) 
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 “Small and medium-sized audit firms often get audit clients through the relationship… 
Therefore, they do not want to publish this kind of report. It takes time to publish this kind of 
report. However, large audit firms want to publish”. 
(Partner 2, medium-sized audit firm K) 
According to interviewees, authorities and inspectors seem not to pay a lot of attention to 
supervise the compliance with this reform. As a result, while some audit firms have not complied 
yet, others have merely fulfilled the minimum of the requirement. The state agencies have not 
strictly monitored the compliance with this rule. Hence, its implementation is limited, in fact. 
The state agencies only have supervised whether or not audit firms publish this kind of report. 
However, they have not checked the contents of the reports.   
“The SSC only can check whether audit firms publish or not. They do not check the contents of 
the reports”. 
(Partner 1, medium-sized audit firm K) 
“No one supervised the content of transparency reports. They do not check whether the 
information in the report is appropriate or not”. 
Manager 1, medium-sized audit firm V 
Representatives from the VACPA stated that the sanctions for the violation of the requirement 
for publishing annual transparency reports are still low. Hence, audit firms have not complied 
strictly with this requirement. 
 “Although the Law and the Decree 105/2013/ND-CP mention that if an audit firm does not 
publish the transparency report on time or not disclose full information as required, this firm will 
be sanctioned. However, I have never seen any audit firms sanctioned due to their violations 
related to this rule”. 
Representative 2, VACPA 
“The state agencies supervise through inspections. However, the sanctions are low, which do not 
create deterrence for audit firms”. 
Representative 3, VACPA 
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Summary and discussion 
There is a reluctance of audit firms to publish annual transparency report, especially small and 
medium-sized audit firms. This is in line with the results of Pott et al. (2008), which points out 
that audit firms in the US are opposed to the idea of mandatory requirements to publish a 
transparency report. Despite the fact that a transparency report could supply valuable for 
investors and audit clients, the auditing profession in the US is pessimistic in terms of the 
beneficial impact of more transparent information. 
Some audit firms have complied with this reform by issuing their transparency report, whereas 
others have not complied yet. In addition, the data shows that transparency reports have a 
significantly low amount of information disclosure. In addition, the reliability of disclosures 
contained in transparency reports of audit firms is currently not monitored, which may result in 
misleading or low level of disclosures. The state agencies only monitor whether or not audit 
firms publish these reports. However, they do not monitor the contents of the reports.  According 
to interviewees from audit firms and the VACPA, the enforcement of regulators for compliance 
with this reform is still low. As a result, while some audit firms have not complied yet, others 
have merely fulfilled the minimum requirement. The overall results show that larger audit firms 
are more likely to show more information in their annual transparency reports than medium-
sized and small audit firms. Smaller audit firms are more reluctant to publish their annual 
transparency reports. 
 From the stance of institutional theory, defiance is a kind of resistance to institutional pressures. 
The three forms of defiance are: dismissal, challenge and attack. Dismissing or ignoring 
institutional rules is a strategic choice that organizations are more likely to adopt when the 
external enforcement of institutional rule is considered to be poor or when internal targets 
conflict notably with institutional requirements (Oliver, 1991). Some audit firms selected the 
dismissal tactic as their organizational strategy in response to the requirement for publishing 
annually transparency reports. It is possible that these audit firms perceive the external force of 
this requirement as weak. The sanctions for violation of this requirement are still low, which 
reflects weak external enforcement of this institutional rule.  
The findings presented in this section are consistent with those of Deumes et al. (2012), 
Financial Reporting Council in  UK (2015). Deumes et al. (2012)’s study shows that there is a 
difference in the transparency report disclosure scores among audit firms. In addition, the initial 
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transparency reports have a considerable lower transparency disclosure score. The Financial 
Reporting Council in  UK (2015) indicated that some audit firms in the UK had not complied yet 
with the mandatory recruitment of annual transparency report. In the first year of adoption, 40 
audit firms were required to issue this report and in 2014, 32 firms were required to do so. Of 
those, 30 had been issued. In addition, the quality of the transparency reports has increased with 
time. The quality of reports in 2013/2014 was considerably better than that of reports issued in 
2010. 
This result is also in line with International Organisation of Securities Commissions (2009), 
which states that audit firms’ incentives to publish a transparency report continue to be limited. 
The reason is that corporate governance disclosures are considered inconsequential. Corporate 
governance disclosures are generally narrative and subjective. Hence, assessing audit quality on 
a consistent basis could be difficult. The regulators should clearly define what should be revealed 
and consider whether oversight is needed. 
6.5 Audit firms’ responses to the audit partner rotation requirements 
Independence is one of the central points upon which the auditing profession’s legitimacy is 
based (Anandarajan et al., 2008). In order to ensure audit independence, many countries in the 
world adopt and revise their audit partner rotation requirement (Ryken et al. (2007). There is 
reform related to the requirement of audit partner rotation in Vietnam. Regarding public interest 
entities, the lead auditors and members of the board of audit firms signing an audit report have to 
rotate after three consecutive financial years. In addition, other practicing auditors involving in 
the audit engagement also have to rotate in five consecutive fiscal years. With other mandatory 
audit clients, the Law requires a leading auditor to sign the audit report and a member of the 
board of directors of an audit firm signing the audit report have to rotate after three consecutive 
financial years. 
There are two divergent opinions on the current requirement of audit partner rotation, acceptance 
and opposition, among all groups of participants in the study. 
6.5.1 Acceptance of the current requirement of audit partner rotation 
Some of the interviewees are in favor of the current requirement of audit partner rotation. 
According to interviewees, a leading auditor has to rotate after three consecutive financial years, 
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which is appropriate to ensure audit independence and the introduction of fresh ideas. In 
addition, the former auditor, who may remain in the same audit firm as the new one, is available 
for advice if necessary. Furthermore, due to the Vietnamese culture, audit independence is easily 
eroded since auditors often have close relationships with audit clients. In addition, the new 
auditor can read audit files as well as exchange information with the old auditor, which prevents 
inefficiency due to audit partner rotation.  
A partner in a medium-sized audit firm argued in favor of the current requirement. He stated that 
the relationship between auditors and audit clients often becomes close after three years. This is 
due to the Vietnamese culture and the audit environment in Vietnam. Auditors in Vietnam often 
have close relationships with audit clients and audit independence is often compromised. Hence, 
three-year audit partner rotation is appropriate for the Vietnamese context. 
 “I think this requirement is suitable because actually in Vietnam, the professional ethics is not 
good, particularly audit independence. Vietnamese auditors in non-Big Four firms often have 
close relationships with audit clients. After almost three years, the audit independence is 
eroded… So, I think three-year of audit partner rotation is suitable”. 
 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm P) 
These participants maintained that the three-year is appropriate since the change of leading 
auditors is not a problem. Every audit firm has audit files of each audit engagement. The new 
auditor can read audit documentation to obtain knowledge about audit clients quickly. All of the 
necessary information about audit clients is stored in audit files.  
“It does not cause difficulties. In audit firms, we have audit files…the new auditor can get 
information about audit clients quickly. We have audit files about audit clients” 
(Manager, small audit firm C) 
In addition to reading through audit files, the previous partner can transfer knowledge to the new 
one. According to these interviewees, it is quite simple for the exchange of information between 
these auditors. They work in the same audit firm. Hence, it is not problematic. If the authorities 
required audit firm rotation, it would be a problem. 
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“In my opinion, it is okay. Because we just change audit partners in the same audit firm, people 
in the firm can transfer and exchange information with each other, exchange 100%”. 
(Partner, small audit firm R) 
Another point of view is that the rule merely requires that partners have to rotate. With public 
interest entities, other participating auditors also have to rotate. However, there are still other old 
team members involved in the audit engagement. Hence, the requirement does not create 
difficulties for the audit team. 
“We just change the leading auditor and other auditors still involve in the engagement. It is not a 
problem. If no old team member involves, it is a problem”. 
(Manager 1, other large audit firm J) 
Although there are opponents of the audit partner rotation requirement, there are still arguments 
against the current requirement of audit partner rotation. 
6.5.2 Opposition to the current requirement of audit partner rotation 
Some members of parliament who voted on the reforms also argued against the short tenure of 
audit partner rotation.  Leading auditors have to sign off after three consecutive financial years, 
which is too short. Hence, according to these members, the parliament should extend the tenure 
(Trong, 2011). The interviewees also refer to the too-short period of audit partner rotation which 
causes costs and inefficiencies for audit firms. They prefer a five-year audit partner rotation 
rather than three-year one.  
“Audit firms have very strong reaction to this point; they said that the tenure of mandatory audit 
partner rotation is too short. It is a little short with large and complicated audit clients like 
Vincom. In the first year, the auditor just approaches and the second year he or she can approach 
more, but prepares to rotate off. The auditor has to rotate off after three years”. 
(Representative 1, MOF) 
Interviewees commented on the ineffectiveness of the short mandatory audit partner rotation 
since it takes too much time to get to know a complex audit client. The former auditor rotates off, 
which results in the loss of knowledge. It takes much time for the new partner to acquire an 
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understanding of the audit client. Hence, the audit quality of the first audit done by the new 
auditor will not be as good as that of the former auditor. 
 “I think three-year is too short. For instance, in the past, I was appointed as an auditor of a group 
of companies; I saw that for some groups I only understood them well in the third year. If I have 
to transfer to another auditor in the third year, the result of the audit of the new auditor is not as 
good as when I continue to conduct audit of this client in the fourth year. I think with big and 
complicated audit clients, it takes at least three years to understand these clients 
comprehensively”. 
(Audit client 1) 
Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield, and Higgs (2012) found that audit partners have a two- to three-
year new client familiarization period before they are fully effective on a new audit engagement. 
Many of interviewees in the current study also acknowledged that the three-year period is just 
barely enough for the audit partner to effectively understand the audit client. It is necessary to 
extend the audit partner rotation period to obtain a plausible return for the investment in that 
knowledge. According to these participants, a five-year audit partner rotation is more reasonable 
than a three-year one. 
“Three years are too short. It is just enough to understand the audit client well. I think five years 
are more appropriate”. 
 (Manager 1, Big Four audit firm L) 
With complex audit clients, a three-year audit partner rotation is costly since it takes the new 
auditor a lot of time to acquire an understanding of the audit client’s business and to build 
relationships with audit clients. In addition, there is an additional cost related to the transferring 
of knowledge from the old audit partner to the new one.  
“I have never wanted to be rotated since I become used to audit clients. If the risk is low, the old 
auditor can execute more quickly than the new one. Hence, we can save time and cost. The new 
auditor often has to acquire an understanding of the audit client all over again”. 
(Partner, small audit firm N) 
 
These interviewees felt that the authorities should divide audit partner rotation according to two 
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kinds of audit clients: large, complex audit clients and others. It takes a partner a longer time to 
understand the large and complicated audit clients. Therefore, audit partner rotation period for 
such clients should be extended.  
“With normal audit clients, three years is ok, but with big and complicated clients, a  three-year 
rotation is short…If we have to rotate after three years, it produces more costs for audit firms…I 
think regulators should have the audit partner rotation requirements according to different kinds 
of audit clients”. 
(Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
According to these participants, the current requirement regarding audit partner rotation results 
in frustration for audit clients who have to establish a new relationship and ‘retrain’ the new 
partner. Audit clients often do not want their audit partner to have to rotate off after three years. 
It takes audit clients time to assist the new partner to obtain knowledge about their business or 
organization.  
“My global firm policy for audit partner rotation is five years…Actually; three-year audit partner 
rotation causes troubles. Indeed, audit clients do not want to spend time with a new auditor, they 
are not comfortable and not sure that the new auditor is as good as the old one”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm A) 
Interviewees also mentioned the difference between the Vietnamese audit partner rotation rule 
and the international one. They also suggested that the Vietnamese audit partner rotation should 
be similar to the international requirement. 
“Vietnam goes in the direction of three years, which is too short…Rotation like this makes audit 
firms incur many costs. Audit firms in Vietnam do not like this. In fact, three years cannot 
produce the familiarity threat, at least after five or six years this might arise…This rule is 
somewhat inappropriate for Vietnam”. 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
“With public interest entities, other practicing auditors have to rotate off after four years. 
International requirement of audit partner rotation is seven years. But we do not refer to the time 
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of cooling off.  The international requirement is a two-year cooling off period. Other countries 
have professional ethics standards which require seven-year audit partner rotation and a two-year 
cooling off period”. 
(Representative 1, MOF) 
Other practicing auditors involved in the audit of a public interest entity, except for the leading 
auditor, have to rotate after four consecutive financial years. There is also a view that the audit 
partner rotation of these auditors should be adjusted to seven years or five years rather than four 
years. 
 “Actually, if three-year audit partner rotation can be changed to a five-year one, the four-year 
rotation of other practicing auditors should then be changed to seven years”. 
(Senior auditor, other large audit firm B) 
“This requirement is too short. I think it should be at least five years”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
Small accounting firms face difficulties in adhering to audit partner rotation due to the shortage 
of human resource in these firms. Although some partners and managers of small firms have 
reacted positively to the rotation requirement, they affirmed the difficulties of coping with it. The 
lack of practicing auditors in these firms produces challenges for these firms in terms of 
complying with the requirement. 
“Some small audit firms have few practicing auditors. Rotating off after three consecutive years 
creates difficulties for small audit firms to assign leading auditors. Especially with the audit of 
large and sophisticated clients, it is difficult to find people capable and qualified to be lead 
auditor. Small audit firms do not have many practicing auditors. Hence, they actually face 
difficulties”. 
(Manager1, Big Four audit firm A) 
 “In the past, audit firms with only three auditors were signing audit contracts for eight 
consecutive years, for example; it was difficult for them to rotate. They did not have enough 
people to rotate.” 
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(Partner, small audit firm N) 
6.5.3 Compliance with the requirement of audit partner rotation in appearance 
The findings indicate that a large number of audit firms comply with the audit partner rotation 
requirement in appearance only, mainly in order to cut costs. It takes new auditors more time to 
complete audits than it does the old auditors. Therefore, these firms just change auditors on paper 
only. 
 “In the context of Vietnam, they do not change the leading auditor. The reviewer will sign the 
audit report. The old leading auditor is still in charged… It is to cut cost”. 
Manager, medium-sized audit firm K 
The results of data analysis show that compliance with the audit partner rotation in appearance 
only is common practice in Vietnam. Audit independence is often compromised in the context of 
Vietnam. This is in line with the findings of previous studies. 
“They just change the leading auditor in appearance. The old auditor is the person who knows 
the audit client. Audit clients do not want to change auditors. The old auditor can transfer 
knowledge to the new one, but not all the related issues. In the context of Vietnam, it is easier to 
conduct audit if clients know us”. 
(Partner, small audit firm ZA) 
 “They do not have enough people to rotate. The reviewer signs in the audit reports and 
documents, but in reality, the previous leading auditor is still involved. This is common”. 
(Manager 1, other large audit firm J) 
Compliance with the audit partner rotation requirement in appearance is common in the 
Vietnamese context. Auditors do not strictly follow the principles and rules of independence. 
This view was shared by most interviewees in this study. Even Big Four firms and large audit 
firms do not stringently follow the audit partner rotation requirement.  
According to interviewees from Big Four firms, the former leading auditor is not involved 
directly in the audit task and does not sign audit reports after three consecutive financial years. 
However, this former leading auditor may become the reviewer of the audit engagement. Hence, 
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even Big Four firms do not completely comply with the audit partner rotation requirement. 
Interviewees reasoned that the three-year rotation is too short, which produces increased costs for 
audit firms. These costs are associated with transferring knowledge from the old leader to the 
new leader and acquiring knowledge about audit clients. It is not effective if the leading auditor 
has to rotate off after three consecutive years. 
 “In Big Four firms, the leading auditor rotates off after three years, but this auditor becomes the 
reviewer. It means this auditor is still involved in reviewing”. 
Manager 5, Big Four firm A 
“In cases where the new leading auditor does not have as good knowledge as the old leading 
auditor, the former will invite the latter to participate in reviewing the audit. The old auditor is 
responsible for reviewing”. 
(Manager 4, Big Four firm A) 
However, most participants affirmed that Big Four audit firms comply with the audit partner 
rotation more stringently than non-Big Four audit firms. The major reason is that Big Four audit 
firms also have to follow their global firm policies. Big Four firms are not only monitored by the 
Vietnamese regulators, they are also supervised by their head office or regional office. 
Periodically, representatives of their head offices come to inspect their work closely. Their 
global firm policies are also more stringent than the Vietnamese audit regulations. 
 “However, Big Four firms more strictly follow the rule of audit partner rotation than local audit 
firms” 
(Representative 2, VACPA) 
Larger audit firms have a substantial number of practicing auditors and groups of auditors 
specializing in particular industries. Hence, they do not have to struggle with audit partner 
rotation. 
“Large accounting firms do not have any difficulties in the audit partner rotation. But in small 
accounting firms, auditors have to shake hands to sign for each other. That's their way of coping 
with audit partner rotation in appearance”. 
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(Manager, small audit firm O) 
6.5.4 Summary and discussion 
There is reform related to audit partner rotation. Regarding public interest entities, the lead 
auditors and members of the board signing an audit report have to rotate after three consecutive 
financial years. In addition, other practicing auditors involved in the audit task also have to rotate 
after four consecutive fiscal years. With other mandatory audit clients, the Law requires that a 
leading auditor signing the audit report and a member of the board of directors of the audit firm 
signing the audit report have to rotate after three consecutive financial years. 
There are two divergent opinions on the current requirement regarding audit partner rotation. 
Some of the interviewees argue for the current requirement for audit partner rotation. According 
to these interviewees, a leading auditor has to rotate after three consecutive financial years, 
which is appropriate to ensure the audit independence. Due to the Vietnamese culture, audit 
independence is easily eroded since auditors often have close relationships with audit clients. In 
addition, the new auditor can read audit files as well as exchange information with the previous 
auditor, which addresses the inefficiency caused by audit partner rotation.  
The opponents of the audit partner rotation requirement argue against the current requirement for 
audit partner rotation. The interviewees referred the too-short period of audit partner rotation 
which produces additional costs and inefficiencies for audit firms. They prefer a five-year audit 
partner rotation rather than a three-year one, especially with large and complex audit clients. 
These participants also mentioned the discrepancy between the Vietnamese audit partner rotation 
rule and the international one. Other practicing auditors involved in audits of a public interest 
entity, except for the leading auditor, have to rotate after four consecutive financial years. There 
is a view that the audit partner rotation of these auditors should be adjusted to seven years rather 
than four years. This supports the findings of Houghton et al. (2010), Ryken et al. (2007) and 
Beattie et al. (2013). Houghton et al. (2010) stated that it was generally agreed that a five-year 
period of audit partner rotation is too short, particularly with large and complex audit clients. 
Interviewees for the study by Houghton et al. (2010) mentioned a longer period of seven years 
rather than five years. They also mentioned a significant trade-off between the notion of 
independence and the knowledge of the client. Stakeholders who responded to the Treasury’s 
paper generally agreed that a seven- year period was appropriate for an audit partner to rotate off. 
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A range of stakeholders stated that with audits of large, complex or highly regulated firms, it 
could take from two to three years for auditors to achieve optimal effectiveness. Hence, rotating 
off after five years causes a notable loss of expertise and knowledge (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2010). The introduction of changes in audit partner rotation in Australia was strongly 
debated. Of the sixteen submissions to the Parliament of Australia Joint Committee related to the 
proposed change in audit partner rotation, nine submissions were against the audit rotation 
proposal. These submissions were concerned about the different costs to small audit firms and to 
offices in remote areas (Ryken et al., 2007). Respondents of Masters (2009) also criticized that 
five-year mandatory audit partner rotation in the UK was too short. The interviewees in the 
current study also asserted that the current audit partner rotation requirement in Vietnam is too 
short, creating costs and inefficiencies for audit firms. If a partner has to rotate off after three 
consecutive financial years, his/her knowledge of clients is lost.  
Small accounting firms face difficulties in adhering to audit partner rotation due to the shortage 
of human resources in these firms. This result is consistent with Kend (2004)’s conclusion who 
pointed out that most respondents to the surveys concurred that compulsory audit partner rotation 
will offer a competitive advantage to the Big Four firms over the small accounting firms that will 
have a limited number of partners with industry expertise. 
A large number of audit firms have complied with the audit partner rotation requirement in 
appearance only in order to cut costs. It takes new auditors more time to complete an audit than it 
does old auditors, resulting in inefficiencies. Therefore, these firms just change auditors on 
paper. This supports the findings of The World Bank (2013) - although the Law on External 
Audit in Vietnam requires audit partner rotation, there has been little rotation in practice.  
 A large number of audit firms comply with the requirement of audit partner rotation in 
appearance, thereby adopting an avoidance strategy as a response to the institutional rule. These 
audit firms disguise their non-compliance behind a façade of acquiescence (Oliver, 1991). 
Large accounting firms have a substantial number of practicing auditors and groups of auditors 
specializing in particular industries. Hence, they do not face struggles to deal with audit partner 
rotation. Thus, large accounting firms follow the requirement of audit partner rotation more 
strictly than smaller audit firms. This result is in line with that of Rollins and Bremser (1997). 
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Rollins and Bremser (1997) conclude that larger audit firms, especially the big N have resources 
and expertise to implement structures and show compliance with institutional rules. This is in 
line with Roybark (2012), Hermanson et al. (2007), and Hermanson and Houston (2008). 
Roybark (2012) concluded that those audit firms who have attracted public quality control 
criticisms are smaller, have fewer office branches, and significantly fewer audit partners and 
staff than other firms. Smaller audit firms do not have sufficient resources to address quality 
control criticisms made by the PCAOB prior to public disclosure. Hermanson et al. (2007) found 
that audit firms which have audit deficiencies are smaller. Hermanson and Houston (2008) stated 
that the smallest, understaffed audit firms are more likely to struggle to address quality control 
deficiencies identified in the inspection reports. Smaller audit firms in Vietnam face difficulties, 
whereas large audit firms have little difficulty in complying with institutional rules. 
 
Table 7: Responses from main interviews 
Themes or issues 
Small audit 
firms 
Medium 
audit firms 
Other 
large 
audit 
firms 
Big Four 
firms 
Regulators VACPA Auditees 
n % 
N=7 
n % 
N=
8 
n % 
N=
11 
n % 
N=
8 
n % 
N=5 
n % 
N=3 
n % 
N=3 
Mergers between 
small audit firms 
7 100 5 63 7 64 4 50 1 20 1 33 0 0 
Raising resources of 
small audit firms 
1 14 1 13 0 0 1 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Changes in 
appearance of small 
audit firms 
3 43 4 50 3 27 1 13 0 0 1 33 0 0 
Opposition of small 
and medium audit 
firms to the Circular 
183/2013/TT-BTC 
4 57 2 25 0 0 1 13 1 20 3 100 0 0 
Mergers between 
medium audit firms 
4 57 5 63 2 18 4 50 2 40 2 67 0 0 
An increase in audit 
market concentration 
5 71 5 63 0 0 3 38 0 0 1 33 0 0 
Sympathy with the 
current requirement 
of audit partner 
rotation 
3 43 5 63 5 45 1 13 2 40 1 33 0 0 
Opposition to the 
current requirement 
1 14 1 13 6 55 6 75 3 60 3 100 1 33 
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of audit partner 
rotation 
Compliance with 
audit partner rotation 
requirements in 
appearance 
2 29 2 25 5 45 1 13 0 0 1 33 0 0 
Reluctance of audit 
firms to publish 
annual transparent 
reports 
0 0 2 25 3 27 1 13 1 20 2 67 0 0 
 
 
Table 8: Responses from follow-up interviews 
Themes or issues 
Small audit 
firms 
Medium 
audit firms 
Other large 
audit firms 
Big Four firms Regulators VACPA 
 
n % 
N=5 
N % 
N=12 
N % 
N=11 
N % 
N=2 
n % 
N=1 
N % 
N=1 
Mergers between 
small audit firms 
4 80 11 92 11 100 2 100 1 100 1 100 
Raising resources 
of small audit firms 
5 100 11 92 11 100 2 100 0 0 1 100 
Changes in 
appearance of small 
audit firms 
5 100 10 83 11 100 2 100 0 0 1 100 
Opposition of small 
and medium audit 
firms to the 
Circular 
183/2013/TT-BTC 
5 100 6 50 7 64 2 100 0 0 1 100 
Mergers between 
medium audit firms 
5 100 12 100 11 100 2 100 1 100 1 100 
An increase in audit 
market 
concentration 
5 100 8 67 10 91 2 100 0 0 1 100 
Sympathy with the 
current requirement 
of audit partner 
rotation 
1 20 10 83 7 64 1 50 1 100 0 0 
Opposition to the 
current requirement 
of audit partner 
rotation 
4 80 1 8 4 36 1 50 0 0 1 100 
Compliance with 
audit partner 
rotation 
requirements in 
4 80 7 58 11 100 2 100 0 0 1 100 
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appearance 
Reluctance of 
audit firms to 
publish annual 
transparent 
reports 
3 60 6 50 10 91 1 50 0 0 1 100 
Only small and 
medium audit firms 
are reluctant 
0 0 2 17 2 18 1 50 0 0 0 0 
6.6 Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter indicate that there have been significant changes in accounting firms 
due to the coercive pressure from the government mandated regulation, the Law on External 
Audit.  
In terms of the reform related to the conditions for the establishment of accounting firms, there 
are significant changes in these firms in response to the reform including mergers as well as an 
increase in their resources. Although there are real changes in some small audit firms, others 
comply with the regulations in appearance only. 
Regarding the reform related to the audit of public interest entities, the interview data and 
secondary data indicate an overall negative response from medium-sized audit firms and the 
VACPA. In response to the reforms and to improve their competitive advantage, medium-sized 
CPA firms have been pursuing mergers and strategic alliances. The study data shows that this 
audit reform increases the concentration in the audit market. 
With regard to the new requirement for audit firm transparency, there is a reluctance of audit 
firms to publish annual transparent reports. According to interviewees, authorities and inspectors 
seem not to pay a lot of attention to the extent of compliance with this reform. As a result, while 
some audit firms have not complied yet, others have merely met the minimum requirement. 
In terms of the reform of audit partner rotation, there are arguments both for and against the 
current requirement for audit partner rotation. The interviewees refer to the too-short period of 
audit partner rotation which produces additional costs and inefficiencies for audit firms. Big 
accounting firms can more easily deal with audit partner rotation. In contrast, small accounting 
firms face difficulties in adhering to audit partner rotation stipulations due to the shortage of 
human resources in these firms. The results also show that a large number of audit firms comply 
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with the audit partner rotation requirement in appearance only. These firms just change the name 
of auditors signing the audit reports and audit files while the former partners are in fact still in 
charge. 
The framework of Oliver (1991) shows the strategic behaviors that organizations can adopt in 
response to institutional rules. They analyzed the reactions of accounting firms and individual 
auditors to the institutional pressures and the changes they make in response to these pressures. 
This framework is adopted in this chapter to explain the above changes in audit firms as a result 
of the audit reforms. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE IMPACTS OF THE LAW ON AUDIT PRACTICE 
7. 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings and discussions related to research question 
3 which concerns the way in which audit reforms in the Law have impacted on audit practice. 
The first section focuses on the reforms associated with sanctions for non-compliance, and the 
inspection regime. This section shows how these reforms impact on individual auditor practices. 
The second section focuses on the reform associated with the issuance of audit opinion, and 
illustrates how this reform influences the usual work of the auditor. Themes and issues emerged 
from research question 3 are presented in Table 9, Table 10, and Appendix 6. These themes 
and issues are also presented and discussed in section 7.2 and 7.3 of this chapter. In this chapter, 
the researcher develops arguments from the perspective of two aspects of institutional theory: 
isomorphism and decoupling. 
7.2 The changes in auditors’ practice in response to the sanction provision and the new 
inspection regime 
Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP was upgraded to become the Law, which has the greatest legal 
force in any particular sector. Under the Law, the government produced Decree No. 
105/2013/ND-CP to promulgate the sanction provisions to deal with violations. Penalties for 
violations can be harsh, and can include fines and even revocation of auditing practice licenses. 
Since the introduction of these reforms, the MOF and SSC have conducted inspections of audit 
firms more often. It is easier for these agencies to deal with punishment due to the reform of the 
sanction provisions.  In addition, the role of state agencies in the inspection of audit firms has 
become more significant due to the introduction of the Law. In the past, inspections of audit 
firms were conducted mainly by the VACPA. The inspection of audit firms has moved from 
these self-inspections conducted by the VACPC to independent inspections conducted by state 
agencies, the SSC and MOF. Any violations of audit regulations, unlike under the regime of the 
VACPA, could be the basis for disciplinary action by the SSC and MOF. It is similar to the US 
as PCAOB has both increased oversight and sanctions for violations (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 
2009). 
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The Law required the MOF to produce new standards based on international auditing standards. 
The MOF also generated checklists, based on the new auditing standards, to be used when 
inspecting audit firms. Previously, there were no transparent and detailed checklists used for 
inspections.  
The higher legal force of audit regulations, the reform of sanction provisions and the change in 
inspections of audit firms, have affected audit practice recently. 
7.2.1 Audit effort 
Auditors are more responsible for their audit work and more deliberate as producing audit 
opinions. 
As auditors face an increase in legal liability, they have more incentive to avoid audit failures by 
exerting more audit effort (Suil & Seung-Weon, 2001). Oversight regime utilized to supervise 
the auditing profession is likely to affect auditors’ incentives. PCAOB inspectors can impose 
harsh sanctions for non-compliance and report errant auditors to the SEC and the Justice 
Department. Hence, there are reasons to believe that auditors have incentives to be more diligent 
and watchful (DeFond, 2010).  
Similarly, interviewees from non- Big Four firms in the current study agreed that they work more 
diligently due the reform of sanction provisions, and the change in inspections of audit firms. 
Although the Decree 105/2004/ND-CP required auditors to follow regulations and auditing 
standards and professional ethics, some auditors did not perform their jobs diligently. The reason 
is that the sanction provisions in the past were not detailed and strict. Now, with the specific and 
stringent punishment provisions, auditors are more responsible for their audit work. Most of the 
interviewees from the non-Big Four firms asserted that they pay more attention to their work. 
The main reasons for this are the detailed sanction provisions and the change in the inspection 
regime. 
“The upgrading from the Decree 105/2004/ND-CP to the Law affects the audit firm, but affects 
auditors more than audit firms. It gives the clear penalties, so auditors have to be more diligent as 
conducting their jobs.  Auditors are more aware of their work and have higher responsibility for 
their work than before…Now, we have clear sanctions provisions, some sanctions are severe, 
especially the sanctions of violations of audit in the stock market. Auditors and audit firms pay 
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more attention to their reputation in the listed audit market. Thus, auditors and audit firms now 
focus more on their operational activities and increase their professional ethics”. 
(Manager 3, other large audit firm J) 
Auditors from non-Big Four audit firms mentioned the highly professional risk that they incur 
due to the details of the sanction provisions. Hence, auditors must strictly meet all their 
responsibilities to prevent risks to their professional reputation and practice. The regulation risk 
now is much higher than previously. Auditors have to be more responsible for their work since 
they face greater regulation risk. 
 
“Actually in 2013, the Decree 105/2013/ND-CP hugely affects the auditing profession. The first 
one is that auditors have to look back at their audit work, to work more carefully. They have felt 
that their risks are increasing, the risks of audit job…Auditors have to enhance their 
responsibilities for their jobs and they have to complete fully the audit procedures to avoid 
risks”. 
(Manager, small audit firm C) 
Under the Law, inspections are conducted by the MOF and SSC, and these inspections are 
stricter than those conducted by the VACPA. In the past, the inspection regime was considered 
to be non-punitive, and therefore did not encourage auditors to conduct audits responsibly. 
According to the interviewees, inspections by state agencies are conducted more often and more 
stringently, significantly affecting auditors’ practice. 
 “With regard to the sanction provision, now the inspection of audit firms is tougher. In the past, 
inspections were conducted by the VACPA. Now they are conducted by the MOF. This is a big 
change. Audit firms now change their ideologies and attitudes and the market directions”. 
(Partner, small audit firm C) 
A partner in a medium-sized audit firm asserted that auditors are more responsible for their job 
due to the reform, which raises public confidence in the audit results. 
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 “It raises the issue of responsibility in our audit practice. It makes the audit environment better, 
healthier... So, auditors and audit firms are more diligent. Then audit clients have a better trust in 
audit results”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm K) 
Auditors of non-Big Four firms also mentioned their more deliberate consideration when 
conducting audit procedures, especially when producing audit opinions. They have to consider 
whether or not they are producing comprehensive and accurate audit opinions. In addition, they 
also pay more attention to the consequences of issuing audit opinions. In the past, a range of 
auditors have produced inaccurate audit opinions, usually as a result of trying to cut costs.  
“Auditors have been more diligent in conducting their audit work since the sanction provision in 
Decree 105/2013/ND-CP was issued. Now whatever we do, we must consider how the 
consequences are. If an audit client has bad documents, books, accounting systems, then we must 
also consider carefully. If we issue a wrong audit opinion, for example, we issue a qualified audit 
opinion, but actually it is a disclaimer audit opinion. Thus, when the regulators inspect, they 
recognize that it is a wrong audit opinion. We have immediate economic benefits, but we have to 
offset the mistakes in the future”. 
(Partner, small audit firm N) 
As a result of the reform, participants from non-Big Four firms also acknowledged that auditors 
have to assess carefully whether they have followed full audit procedures and collected sufficient 
audit evidence before issuing audit opinions. 
“So now, auditors have to think very carefully before expressing an audit opinion. They have to 
consider whether they apply all auditing procedures or not and the evidence collected is 
sufficient or not. Previously they issued a lot of qualified audit reports”. 
(Manager, other large audit firm E) 
However, a large number of interviewees from non-Big Four audit firms concurred that they are 
more diligent and more responsible for their work, but only with public clients. With other audit 
clients, their audit practice has not changed. The reason is that with audits of public clients, 
auditors are more strictly monitored than with those of other mandatory clients. In addition, the 
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general public is more concerned about the audit results of public clients. As a result, these 
auditors face both higher regulation and reputation risk when conducting audit of public interest 
entities. Hence, they are putting more effort into the audits of public clients. 
“Auditors are more deliberate and more responsible for their work, but only with public clients, 
especially listed firms”. 
(Partners, medium-sized audit firm K) 
In contrast to non-Big Four auditors, auditors of Big Four firms state that they are not affected by 
the reforms in terms of their responsibilities and their production of audit opinions. They believe 
that their global firm policies are much more stringent than the Vietnamese audit regulations. 
Hence, they have already been conducting their audit work conscientiously before the enactment 
of the audit reforms.   
“In my firm, the reform do not influence my firm much since audit method, policies, audit 
procedures, auditing standard in my firm, we have to follow our global firm system… So, the 
reforms do not affect my firm; they just make the whole market better, but they do not affect Big 
Four firms”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm L) 
Following auditing standards more strictly 
Before the Law was enacted, Decree No.105/2004/ND-CP also required that auditors comply 
with auditing standards. However, due to the weak legal force of the Decree, and the lack of 
detailed sanctions to deal with violations, auditors in some non-Big Four firms did not strictly 
follow auditing standards because the Law on External Audit had not been introduced. The State 
did not fully implement supervision measures in the auditing field. Auditing standards were 
issued, but there was no clear mechanism for dealing with non-compliance with auditing 
standards. Auditors who did not fully comply with the auditing standards were not punished. 
Hence, the auditing standards had no effect (Giang, 2009). 
Inspections by the VACPA, a professional body, also found widespread non-compliance with the 
auditing standards. However, the inspection regime under the VACPA was lenient and non-
punitive. After the inspections, the VACPA merely noted the non-compliance and suggested 
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solutions. According to the VACPA (2012), most inspected audit firms did not follow auditing 
standards rigorously and the audit reports had a range of misstatements. It was suggested that 
audit firms needed to adhere to the auditing programs, and avoid cutting audit procedures due to 
limited time and low fees. When signing audit contracts, audit firms needed to reconsider their 
audit fee schedule, and ensure that fees adequately covered the cost of conducting comprhensive 
audit procedures in accordance with auditing standards. 
With the introduction of the Law, auditing standards in Vietnam have the force of law; hence, 
auditors have to follow auditing standards in accordance with the Law. The Law also requires the 
MOF to stipulate auditing standards and professional ethical standards for accounting and 
auditing on the basis of international standards. In 2014 and 2015, the MOF issued new auditing 
standards based on the current international auditing standards to displace the previous ones. 
Auditors from non-Big Four firms stated that they now comply with auditing standards more 
strictly than previously. In the past, a range of auditors did not strictly comply with auditing 
standards. However, some auditors had stringently followed auditing standards before the 
adoption of the Law. The reforms merely affect those auditors who did not strictly follow rules 
and standards before the Law was adopted. Auditors who strictly followed auditing standards are 
not affected by the reforms.  
 “Those auditors who strictly followed the auditing standards and audit regulations in the past, 
are not impacted. The reform just impacts on the auditors who did not follow in the past and cut 
audit fees by reducing audit procedures”. 
(Manager, small audit firm G) 
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 “So, we have to do our jobs more carefully and we have to follow auditing standards. It is clear 
that there are more audit procedures in the new auditing standards”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm M) 
In the past, a range of auditors did not follow the auditing standards due to the weak legal force 
of Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP and the non-punitive inspection regime. Now, they must strictly 
comply with auditing standards when conducting audits. 
 “In the past we did not have the Law, just the Decree, so the auditors did not comply with 
standards much. Now, under the requirement of the Law, each audit firm has its own audit 
program to guide its auditors to follow. Auditors tend to follow the audit programs and auditing 
standards more strictly”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm P) 
However, a large number of auditors from non-Big Four firms concurred that they comply more 
stringently with auditing standards, but only with public audit clients. With other audit clients, 
the level of adherence to auditing standards has not changed since the Law was adopted. 
      
“Non-Big Four auditors follow auditing standards more strictly, but merely with public clients”. 
Partner 2, medium-sized audit firm K 
 
With other audit clients, some non-Big Four auditors stated that they just comply with the 
auditing standards in appearance only, even other large audit firms. In addition, the auditors of 
some small and medium audit firms just indicate in the audit files that they strictly follow the 
auditing standards, but in fact they do not.  The reason is that small and medium auditors do not 
have the resources to meet the mandatory auditing standards. The number of audit clients in 
these audit firms is small and the audit fees are often low. 
“The story of adopting auditing standards fully and sequentially is a theory story, even in the 
internal control assessment. Internal control assessment is merely conducted by the lead auditor. 
Internal control assessment at the moment seems to be symbolic”. 
(Partner, small audit firm C) 
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Due to the increased work load imposed on auditors in order to comply with the auditing 
standards, some auditors focus on filling in the checklists to meet the MOF inspection 
requirements rather than paying attention to their audit judgments. 
“Because the amount of work is too much, auditors just follow the checklists to meet the 
requirement of inspections of VACPA and MOF. If we conduct enough audit procedures 
according to the checklists, we are not punished”. 
(Senior auditor, small audit firm G) 
Another reason that some auditors just comply with the auditing standards in appearance only is 
the inefficiency of inspections. The inspections of state agencies focus on audit files and audit 
reports after the audit reports have been released. The inspections are conducted after the 
engagements have concluded. Therefore, even though some auditors omit some audit procedures 
in their audit process, they have time to indicate in the audit files that they have completed all 
audit procedures. These auditors make up their audit files in order to comply with all audit 
procedures as the auditing standards require. In other words, they just comply with audit 
procedures according to the auditing standards in appearance rather than actuality. 
"The state agencies inspect auditors and audit firms at the end of the audit season, when the audit 
reports are released. They come to inspect at the end of the year. Auditors have a long time to 
make up their audit files…audit fees in non-Big Four firms are not enough to conduct all audit 
procedures completely”. 
(Manager 4, Big Four firm A) 
It seems that the reforms do not affect auditor practice in the Big Four firms, as confirmed by 
most interviewees from Big Four firms. However, one participant from a Big Four firm also 
mentioned the more stringent compliance with auditing standards, particularly the Auditing 
Standard 510 Initial Audit Engagements-Opening Balances due to the reform.  
In the past, according to the results of inspections by the VACPA, auditors often did not conduct 
procedures to collect audit evidences to confirm whether the opening balances contained 
misstatements that materially affected the current period’s financial report. They did not contact 
previous auditors to review their working papers for evidence regarding the opening balances, 
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for example. Some auditors often issued qualified audit opinions which omitted the opening 
balances without conducting any audit procedures or requiring any other information apart from 
the opening balances (VACPA, 2012). 
“The reforms do not impact Big Four firms as much as small firms, but we are still affected. For 
instance, to comply with the requirement of review of the opening balance, the new auditor has 
to send a letter to the previous auditor, review audit files of previous auditors to check the 
opening balance…In the past, we did not have the Law, so auditors in my firm could state that in 
this situation, we could not comply with this requirement since it was out of our auditors’ 
control. So, we could accept this internally. But, now, there is a Law, so we cannot do this. We 
have to contact prior auditors despite the fact that we have to pay prior auditors much money”. 
(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm A) 
In terms of the effect of the force of law on auditing standards and the checklist of inspection 
regime on the auditors’ professional judgment, interviewees expressed mixed views. A large 
number of interviewees stated that these factors do not affect auditor judgment. According to 
these participants, auditors always have to maintain their auditor judgment while they also have 
to comply with the checklist of audit procedures based upon the auditing standards. The reforms 
only generate more audit work for auditors, but it does not influence auditors’ judgments. 
Following auditing standards and the checklist of inspections are not related to making auditor 
judgments. 
These auditors argued that the auditing standards enforced by the Law, and the checklist of 
inspections, merely generate more work for auditors. Auditors still have to exercise their 
professional judgment when conducting audits. 
“In fact, these two things are unrelated to each other. They force auditors to follow auditing 
standards, but auditors still must maintain their judgments. Auditors have to plan from the 
beginning to the finishing of an audit engagement, allocate reasonable time for each period. Each 
period has audit procedures as defined in the auditing standards. Auditors still maintain 
professional judgment in each period. We cannot say that because we have to do more work, so 
our judgments are not appropriate. I disagree with this ... I think it does not affect auditors’ 
judgments”. 
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(Manager, medium-sized audit firm H) 
Representatives of the MOF also agree with this point of view. 
“We must adhere to auditing standards but we still always have to use our professional judgment. 
The audit job requires professional judgment…Regarding compliance with the auditing 
standards, we have to do more but it does not reduce professional judgment”. 
 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
A manager of a Big Four firm asserted that professional judgment mainly concerns the manager 
level, not the staff level. The force of law auditing standards does not related to auditors’ 
professional judgment at the manager level. 
“Compliance with auditing standards takes time. Auditors not only think in their minds, they also 
have to write down on the audit files for other people to check again their work. However, it is 
the nature of this job. Generally, compliance with auditing standards and professional judgments 
are not related to each other…Professional judgment falls mainly into manager level, not into 
staff level”. 
(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm A) 
According to some participants, the requirement of following auditing standards and the 
checklist is the minimum benchmark for the execution of audit. There is an inter-relationship 
between compliance requirements and professional judgment. 
 “Due to the nature of the auditing standards, it gives minimum steps to conduct audit of clients. 
We have to follow these minimum steps to complete an audit engagement”. 
(Manager 1, other large audit firm B) 
 “Now I do not see the contradiction between the professional judgment and the checklists that 
auditors have to follow ... It has never told auditors to do something specific; it only provides the 
general framework for what auditors must do… I think that the requirements of the auditing 
standards and professional judgment intermingle in the audit processes”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
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A manager of a big accounting firm pointed out that auditors have to conduct all audit 
procedures as prescribed in the auditing standards and after that, they make their professional 
judgement. 
 “We still have to make professional judgment. We have to fully follow the checklists, after that 
we make professional judgment”. 
(Manager 3, other large audit firm J) 
A partner in a medium-sized audit firm stated that auditors’ personalities are really strong. 
Hence, the increasingly regulated approach to audit and the checklists of inspection do not 
influence their professional judgment. 
 “Auditors who are actually experienced have very strong personality so the process of 
collaboration and cooperation are low. It also depends on the company and the individual 
auditor, but the overall trend is that auditors are very independent and their judgments are not 
influenced by the checklists”. 
(Partner, small audit firm C) 
Another point of view is that the auditing standards enforced by the Law assist auditors to make 
audit judgment. Hence, if these auditing standards are strictly adhered to, then the quality of 
auditor judgment will be improved. Auditor judgment based on executing all audit procedures in 
accordance with auditing standards is more precise than personal judgment. This view was 
confirmed by some interviewees. 
 “When there are more audit procedures that auditors have to follow to conduct audit, auditors 
feel safer when issuing audit opinion. They have a standard framework to follow, which reduces 
subjective, emotional opinions. It is more favorable for auditors”. 
(Partner, other large audit firm J) 
“It does not affect my firm, but I think it positively affects other firms. It requires auditors to be 
more deliberate when making professional judgment. In addition, the judgment is required to be 
documented properly and reasonably. In the past, the auditor said that his judgment is a, b, c but 
he did not give a specific reason why is it a, why is it not b. Now, a is a; and why is a. The 
judgment is clearer”. 
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(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm L) 
A manager of a Big Four firm also stated that by following auditing standards, auditors are able 
to make appropriate professional judgments. 
 “I think the requirements of the Law are totally justified…After auditors conduct audit in 
accordance with auditing standards, they can make professional judgment…It usually has its 
doctrine; following auditing standards helps auditors to make the professional judgment”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm A) 
Salterio (2008) criticized the mandatory checklist that inspectors adopt which affects auditors’ 
work and suggests that the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) should dispense with 
compulsory checklists and allow auditors some flexibility in their audit work. The more rigorous 
documentation requirement indicates that auditors are less likely to conduct new procedures to 
evidence collection since such procedures will not fit on the forms. Therefore, this would lead to 
troubles for the auditors during PCAOB/CPAB inspections. Some of participants in the current 
research also stated that the force of law auditing standards and the inspection checklist impact 
negatively on auditor judgment. Since auditors have to focus more on the checklist of audit work 
and audit documentation, time they spend on judgment is reduced and the work of auditors is 
less effective. This view was shared by most interviewees from small and medium-sized firms. 
A manager of a small audit firm compared audit work to catching fish in the sea. He emphasized 
the importance of the experience and professional judgment of audit work. It is the nature of the 
auditing profession. In his view, spending too much time on the checklists will decrease the time 
spent on making professional judgments, which affects the audit results. 
“The professional judgment is more important. The elderly people go to the sea, they say with 
this weather there are continental fishes. They are definitely continental fishes. Another person 
can use a lot of machines to detect, but ultimately he cannot catch any fish. We have to perform 
too many audit procedures, but finally we have to decide where the risks are… It is a 
professional judgment. In this job, the judgment is important. We do a lot of procedures, but 
ultimately whether we can catch misstatements or not. Because we have to do too many 
procedures according to the checklists, the time spent on professional judgment is reduced... If 
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we have to do many work to follow the checklist, our judgment is reduced, which does not 
produce good results”. 
(Manager, small audit firm O) 
A partner in a medium-sized audit firm stated that important issues may be overlooked if an 
auditor focuses too much on completing checklists and documentation.  
“Focusing too much on filling in the checklists to conduct enough audit procedures, we neglect 
important issues. We focus too much on audit documentation”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm M) 
A manager of other large audit firm stated that the checklists negatively affect audit judgment at 
staff level, but not at the manager level. 
 “It affects the judgment very much, and actually these regulations, prescribed checklist affects 
judgment of low-level auditors. But it does not influence senior auditors’ judgment since these 
auditors make judgments at the overall level”. 
(Manager, other large audit firm E) 
Additional audit work 
The requirements of the SOX in the US have added audit hours and auditor effort to the auditing 
process (Ebrahim, 2010). The additional work is mainly due to the stipulations in Section 404 of 
the Act which requires that firms have an internal control report in their annual report. This 
section also requires auditors to assess and report on the management’s assessment of internal 
control (Cosgrove & Niederjohn, 2008). 
In terms of the force of law auditing standards and the change in the inspection regime in 
Vietnam, there are mixed views on the impact of the reforms on audit work. 
Regarding audit work, almost auditors from non-Big Four firms mentioned the additional audit 
workload due to the reforms. 
 “Now the audit job is harder than in the past. There is more work to do, many administrative 
jobs like audit documentations. Now, we have to complete more audit documentations…we have 
to apply information technology to work more efficiently. The Law makes the audit environment 
really clear”. 
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(Partner, small audit firm N) 
 
 “The purpose of the Law is to increase audit quality. The state agencies want to enhance audit 
quality control. Hence, auditors have to conduct more audit procedures”. 
(Manager, small audit firm O) 
 
The reason for the more audit procedures that auditors have to conduct is that in the past they 
overlooked some audit procedures since the auditing legal framework was loose. Now, they have 
to follow audit procedures as prescribed by the auditing standards in order to avoid a penalty for 
non-compliance. 
“In the past, we could miss some audit procedures. Now, we have to complete all audit 
procedures because we are inspected by state agencies”. 
(Manager, other large audit firm Y) 
 
The increased audit work that auditors have to conduct is also attributed to the new auditing 
standards. This view was shared by some respondents. The adoption of the new auditing 
standards resulted in a change in the audit method from a sample-based method to a risk-
assessment-based method. Auditors have to conduct more audit work since they have to take 
more responsibilities with the adoption of the new auditing standards.  
“The new 37 auditing standards are based on the international auditing standards…The audit 
work auditors have to do so as to follow these new standards is two or three times more than in 
the past”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm K) 
“Small audit firms apply the model of audit program released by the VACPA, which is based on 
the new auditing standards”.   
(Partner, small audit firm N) 
 However, the greater number of audit procedures that non-Big Four auditors conduct mainly 
applies to public audit clients. These auditors face higher regulation risk and reputation risk 
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when conducting audits of public clients. The state agencies monitor the audit of public interest 
clients more stringently than other clients. In addition, the general public pay a lot of attention to 
the audit of public interest entities. Now, with public clients, non-Big Four auditors conduct full 
audit procedures as prescribed by the auditing standards. In contrast, the audit practice of other 
clients is not much impacted by the audit reforms. A large number of non-Big Four auditors 
merely accomplish all audit procedures in appearance only for non-public audit clients. 
 “With listed audit clients, auditors conduct more audit procedures. They complete audit 
procedures. With other clients, the reforms do not impact much on auditors’ practice”. 
(Senior auditor, other large audit firm ZC) 
 “Perhaps with public clients, we have to conduct more audit procedures. With other clients, the 
audit procedures do not increase due to the lack of sources and time pressure in the audit 
season”.  
(Manager 1, Medium-sized audit firm V) 
Most auditors from Big Four firms do not mention an increased workload. However, two 
auditors from the same Big Four firm asserted that they have to do additional work due to the 
reform. These interviewees emphasized that the reforms have affected them, but not as much as 
those in smaller audit firms. 
 “Actually it creates more work. The more regulations were implemented, the more work we 
have to do. Big Four firms are not impacted as much as small audit firms, but we are still 
affected”. 
(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm A) 
 “If I say that it does not impact, it is not true. Actually, since the Law was implemented, earning 
money of auditors is harder. The audit job is tougher; there is too much work to do. All the 
requirements in the Law impact on the amount of work we have to do, a lot of work to do”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm A) 
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7.2.2 Audit documentation 
In the past, some auditors did not pay attention to audit documentation. In some cases, although 
they followed audit procedures, audit files did not contain complete or comprehensive 
documentation. Some audit files lacked audit evidence which is crucial to the production of audit 
opinions. If there are disputes over the external audit activities or lawsuits, audit firms will face 
risks due to their incomplete audit files. These matters not only affect audit firms’ reputations but 
also affect the whole audit industry (VACPA, 2012). The main reason for this situation persisting 
in the past was the low risk of litigation and inadequate regulation.  
Due to the reforms, auditors of non-Big Four firms focus more on audit documentation, resulting 
in an improvement and increase in audit documentation in these firms. The inspection regime 
under the state agencies is conducted more often and more strictly. After the inspections, 
punishments for violation can be harsh. In contrast, the inspections in the past were considered to 
be lenient and non-punitive. Auditors now face higher regulation risk due to the introduction of 
the Law. Hence, they have to increase and improve their audit documentation. 
A senior auditor stated that there has been an improvement in the audit documentation of small 
audit firms. In the past, some small audit firms did not even have audit files. Now, they have to 
store audit files, in order to meet the minimum requirement of auditing standards. 
 “I think with small audit firms, the Law impacts hugely on these firms. In the past, some small 
audit firms did not even have audit files…They did not collect audit evidence, just signed and 
released audit reports. Now, with the introduction of the Law, these firms have to document and 
collect audit evidence. They have to collect audit evidence at least to meet the requirement. I 
cannot assess them, but I think at least they have to follow the standards to issue audit opinion”. 
(Senior auditor, other large audit firm B) 
Interviewees from non-Big Four firms stated that auditors now pay more attention to audit 
documentation. In the past, they had audit files, but these were not adequate. In addition, these 
files were not presented cohesively and logically. Now, auditors present audit files that are more 
acceptable. 
“About audit files, I think that they have been affected. It is better for our work; our work is 
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documented more logically and reasonably. Auditors have to present, note issues more clearly on 
audit files. They have to document enough audit evidence. Not as in the past, we did not pay 
attention to audit documentation. Sometimes, we did the audit procedures, but we did not 
document, so we did not have evidence that we did them”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm F) 
 “Yes. I see a lot of changes. Previously, we conducted our audit procedures, but we did not fully 
document. Now, we have to do it”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm D) 
The change in requirements for audit documentation is also attributed to the new auditing 
standards. Under the Law, the MOF issued 37 new auditing standards to replace the old ones. 
The VACPA and MOF created transparent checklists for inspections which are based on the new 
auditing standards. Previously, the VACPA did not have specific instructions for their 
examinations of audit firms and auditors. Recently, auditors in these firms have to improve and 
increase their audit documentations to satisfy the checklists for inspection by MOF, SSC and 
VACPA, which are based on the new auditing standards. 
“I think that the number of audit files has increased. In the past, many cases we did but we did 
not document. Auditors executed audit procedures, but they did not carefully document... In the 
past, the VACPA did not have clear criteria for their inspections, to check audit files. Now, they 
have the checklists based on the model of audit files to check audit firms. So, audit firms have to 
follow the checklists strictly”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm P) 
However, some auditors have not improved their audit documentation. There are still many 
deficiencies in their audit files. In addition, a number of auditors just fill in the checklists of 
procedures for the sake of appearance only, but they have not actually improved their audit files. 
This applies mainly to audits of non-public clients. With non-public clients, some non-Big Four 
auditors just make up their audit files to indicate that they follow all audit procedures according 
to the auditing standards. In particular, some small and medium-sized audit firms lack the 
resources to accomplish all audit procedures according to the auditing standards since the audit 
fees charged by these audit firms are not high. 
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“Although there is an improvement in audit documentation of some small and medium-sized 
firms, in some of these firms, auditors still accomplish checklists of audit work in appearance or 
they do not improve their audit documentation”. 
(Manager 1, other large audit firm J) 
“Audit files have increased and improved, but only with public audit clients”. 
(Partner 2, medium-sized audit firm K) 
The inspections of audit firms in 2013 showed that quality control of audit firms was classified 
as weak and audit documentation was classified as weak or unsatisfactory (The VACPA, 2014b). 
According to the inspection results of VACPA in 2012, there were audit files without any 
signatures of auditors who conducted the audit procedures, assessed audit evidence, and drew 
conclusions. These audit files mainly consists of clients’ accounting documents and books. Other 
audit files did not have sufficient audit evidence to justify the audit opinion. There was a lack of 
crucial evidence of revenues and costs. Some auditors observed stock takes, but did not 
document this properly in the audit files. They did not store stock take reports, stock take 
documents or other relevant working papers. In other cases, auditors did not store the 
confirmation letters related to cash in banks, accounts receivable or accounts payable (VACPA, 
2013b). 
 “Exactly, it is so much work to do. It was just filling in the forms in appearance to follow the 
model of audit files…Auditors in my firm focus on our work, but when coming to our office, we 
have to complete a lot of audit files”. 
(Partner, small audit firm R) 
There are mixed views on the change in audit documentation in other large audit firms as a result 
of the audit reforms. Although many auditors from other large audit firms mentioned the 
improvement and increase in audit documentation, others stated that there was no change in audit 
documentation except for updating the reforms of the Vietnamese revised auditing standards in 
their working papers. These firms are members of international audit firms. 
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The manager of another large audit firm commented on the change in audit documentation: 
“Of course, the audit documentations increase and there are more audit procedures than in the 
past. Now, audit files are thicker”. 
 
(Manager 1, other large audit firm J) 
However, another senior auditor insisted that there is no change in audit documentation in his 
firm. His firm is a member of an international audit firm. Hence, auditors have to meticulously 
follow the global firm policy, including audit documentation. Their global firm policies are much 
stricter than the Vietnamese audit regulations. Auditors in his firm documented well prior to the 
introduction of the Law. 
 “Large audit firms are often members of global audit firms. So, their audit files are based on the 
international auditing standards. In addition, their global firm policies are strict. We have 
adopted all these things before the Law, so these new requirements do not impact our firm”. 
(Senior auditor, other large audit firm B) 
According to participants from Big Four firms, audit documentation does not change due to the 
reform. Big Four firms have to comply both Vietnamese audit regulations and their global firm’s 
policies. Hence, the only change in Big Four firms is that they have to update some differences 
between the Vietnamese audit regulations and their international policies in their working papers. 
 “Our audit files follow the global firm policies since we have all the templates. If Vietnam 
requires some different things, we will design to add to our audit files…In the past, Vietnamese 
Auditing Standards did not require these things; now they require the same as the international 
ones. So, it does not affect us”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm I) 
 “We have done too many things, audit files do not increase or change in my firm due to the 
reforms since our internal review in my firm is much tougher than the local one…The Big Four 
firms’ internal policies are very strict and higher level than these local requirements…We just 
check the differences and adjust a little a bit, but do not change much”. 
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(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm A) 
7.2.3 Audit quality 
The findings related to the impacts of audit reforms on audit quality are mixed. Respondents 
from the non- Big Four firms confirmed that there had been an improvement in audit quality in 
their firms due to the audit reforms. Due to facing higher regulation risk, these auditors have to 
be more responsible for their work and conduct more audit procedures, resulting in an 
improvement in audit quality. A large number of auditors of non-Big Four firms confirmed that 
audit quality had improved.  
“The enactment of the Law and the provisions of sanctions will raise audit quality. When the 
audit quality increases, the financial information is more transparent and accurate”. 
(Senior auditor, other large audit firm B) 
“Not as in the past, external audit activities were loosely controlled. Now, they are standardized. 
So, audit firms must have internal control system to make their work standardized. If auditors or 
audit firms do wrong things, they are punished, which raise audit quality”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm H) 
According to a large number of interviewees, the improvement in audit quality mainly applies to 
the audit of public clients. This is due to the stricter supervision of state agencies, particularly the 
SSC and the MOF. In addition, the general public pays a great deal of attention to the audit 
reports of these audit clients. 
“With non-public audit clients, we still increase audit procedures. Audit quality of both public 
clients and non-public clients increases. However, the quality of public clients increases 
significantly. We pay more attention to audit engagement of public clients”. 
(Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
 “Audit quality of non-Big Four firms increases, but only with the engagement of public clients. 
We increase audit procedures and strictly review the audit engagement of public clients”. 
(Partner 2, medium-sized audit firm K) 
Due to the reforms, audit quality is improved and the shopping for audit opinions, as happened in 
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the past, is limited. 
“Audit quality increases, so we can charge audit clients more. So, the local audit environment is 
better. This requirement prevents the shopping audit opinions in Vietnam”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm K) 
However, an increase in audit quality tends to apply to auditors who did not strictly follow 
regulations and auditing standards previously. With auditors who fully complied with auditing 
standards before the adoption of the reforms, their audit quality is not affected by the reforms. 
Several auditors from non-Big Four firms, believe that the audit reforms merely improve their 
audit documentation due to the inspections of state agencies like SSC and MOF; however, their 
audit quality does not change.  
“These reforms do not increase audit quality since we still conduct all audit procedures as we 
have in the past. Now, we just present our audit files better and more clearly. In the past, we 
conducted audit procedures, but we did not present the audit files. These reforms merely make 
audit files better, but audit quality does not increase”. 
(Partner 1, medium-sized audit firm K) 
A number of auditors asserted that audit quality does not change for two main reasons. The first 
reason is that these auditors just comply with the audit reforms in appearance only. With non-
public audit clients, which are small and not risky, auditors might not conduct all audit 
procedures in accordance with the auditing standards. These auditors just present their audit files 
to indicate that they comply with all audit procedures. Hence, the audit quality does not change. 
Secondly, auditors from some small and medium-sized firms appear to comply with the 
regulations and auditing standards, but in reality do not due to the lack of resources. Audit fees 
charged by small audit firms are often low, preventing auditors from conducting thorough audits. 
These auditors just indicate in their audit files that they have followed all audit procedures, but 
actually have not done so. 
 “Large audit firms can comply with regulations, but small audit firms may not, in the 
Vietnamese situation”. 
(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm A) 
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“Small auditors do not have enough time, costs. So, they just increase audit procedures in 
appearance. With large audit firms, in the engagements of small, less risky non-public audit 
clients, auditors just increase audit procedures in appearance. Hence, the audit quality does not 
change”. 
(Representative 3, VACPA) 
According to these interviewees, the most important factor that can increase audit quality is the 
audit fees. Due to the aggressive competition in the audit market and the depression of the 
economy, the audit fees are low, especially in the case of non-Big Four audit firms. Auditors 
have to consider the avenues and the costs. In some cases, the low audit fees preclude auditors 
from being able to conduct comprehensive audit procedures. Hence, the audit quality does not 
change in these cases. However, it is difficult to increase the audit fees charged by local audit 
firms since their clients are mainly small or medium-sized companies. 
 “The important factor to increase audit quality is to increase audit fees. Audit fees are low, 
which do not permit auditors to conduct complete audit procedures”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm ZB) 
Interviewees from Big Four firms did not mention an improvement in audit quality in their firms 
due to the audit reforms. A manager of a Big Four firm suggested that the audit reforms just 
impacted on those auditors and audit firms that did not provide high audit quality before the 
introduction of the Law. 
 “It is a pressure for audit firms which were not good in the past to be better now, to prevent risk. 
They do better so they have to do more work. The audit market moves on a positive way, audit 
firms compete by audit quality, not merely by reducing audit fees as in the past”. 
(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm L) 
7.2.4 Summary and discussion  
The Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP was upgraded to become the Law, which has the greatest legal 
force in any sector. Under the Law, the government promulgates the sanction provisions to deal 
with violations. Since the adoption of these reforms, the MOF and SSC have conducted 
inspections of audit firms more often and more strictly. The role of state agencies in the 
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inspection audit firms is raised due to the introduction of the Law. MOF and SSC are state 
agencies that are responsible for inspections. The inspection process has been transferred from 
self-regulation conducted by the VACPA to the independent regime conducted by the MOF and 
SSC. In particular, the SSC has been empowered with more rights and responsibilities associated 
with inspections and sanctions of auditors and those firms that audit public interest entities in the 
field of securities. This situation is similar to that in the US, SOX empowers the SEC to enforce 
equitable punishments for violations of federal securities laws, which suggests the possible 
increase in fines imposed on auditors (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009).  In addition, when inspecting 
audit firms, these state agencies now have clear checklists based on the new auditing standards.  
Recently, the greater legal force of audit regulations, the reform of sanction provisions and the 
change in inspections of audit firms, have affected audit practice. 
Auditors of non- Big Four firms are more responsible for their audit work and more diligently 
when producing audit opinions. However, according to a large number of non-Big Four auditors, 
the change in audit practice mainly concerns the audit of public clients. In contrast, auditors of 
Big Four firms stated that they are not affected by the reforms. This finding is consistent with 
that of Nelson (2006) in the US, who found that PCAOB’s ability to execute more thorough 
quality control assessment and its ability to punish notable sanctions on audit firms should 
encourage auditors to conduct audits more efficiently. However, this finding contradicts that of 
Daugherty and Tervo (2010), who showed that smaller audit firms do not consider that PCAOB 
inspections positively affect their audit practices. 
Auditors from non-Big Four firms also state that they comply with auditing standards more 
strictly than previously. However, the reforms seem to affect mainly those auditors who did not 
strictly follow rules and standards before the Law was adopted. In addition, the auditing 
standards are strictly adhered to mainly in the case of public entity clients. In Australia, there is a 
new system associated with ASIC’s supervision of compliance with auditing standards and 
penalties for non-compliance. Audit firms seem to take this seriously by adopting controls to 
assure the compliance (Hecimovic & Martinov-Bennie 2009). It seems that the reform does not 
affect auditor practice in Big Four firms. Most of the participants from the Big Four firms 
concurred with this view. However, one participant from a Big Four firm also mentioned the 
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more stringent compliance with auditing standards, particularly the Auditing Standard 510 Initial 
Audit Engagements-Opening Balances, due to the reform.  
Regarding audit work, auditors from non-Big Four firms referred to the additional audit work 
they now have to do due to the reforms. Additional audit work is mainly conducted for public 
clients, according to a large number of non-Big Four auditors. This result is in line with that of 
Blankley et al. (2014). Audit firms in the US responded to the deficiencies investigated by the 
PCAOB by increasing the extent of work done by auditors (Blankley et al., 2014).  According to 
some interviewees, the new auditing standards have meant that auditors need to do more work. 
The new auditing standards introduced major reforms associated with audit methodology, 
internal quality control of audit firms, communicating the deficiencies in internal control to those 
in charge with corporate governance and management, audit documentation, and audit opinion. 
This finding is consistent with the statement made by Menon and Williams (2001). The 
“expectation gap” standards included ten standards issued by the AICPA’s Auditing-Standards 
Board in 1988. These standards extended the auditors’ responsibility in some areas as the client’s 
internal controls, indicating when the client was facing fiscal distress, and detecting fraud. The 
standards increased audit work and audit fees considerably. In addition, in the US, PCAOB 
enforces the rules covering auditing standards for all auditors of public companies. According to 
Beckstead (2006), these reforms have resulted in more auditing tests and countless hours of 
documentation under the guise of increasing vigilance of corporate internal controls.   
Most auditors from the Big Four firms did not mention an increased workload due to the 
reforms. However, two auditors from the same Big Four firm stated that they have to do 
additional work due to the reform. These interviewees said that they had been slightly affected, 
but not as much as smaller audit firms. This result is in line with the statement of Boone et al. 
(2015) that PCAOB oversight may be unrelated to Big Four firms’ brand name service quality.  
In terms of the force of law auditing standards and the checklist for inspection, interviewees had 
mixed views about the impact of the reforms on audit judgment. A large number of interviewees 
contended that the force of law auditing standard and the checklist for inspection do not affect 
auditor judgment. Another view is that the force of law auditing standards and the inspection 
checklist assist auditors to make audit judgments. Hence, strictly following auditing standards 
has a positive effect on auditor judgment.  
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Conversely, some research participants stated that the force of law auditing standards and the 
checklist of inspection impacts negatively on auditor judgment and effectiveness. Since auditors 
have to focus more on the checklist of audit work and audit documentation due to the force of 
Law, they spend less time on judgment. This view is shared by most interviewees from small and 
medium-sized firms. This is consistent with respondents in Beattie et al. (2013), Hecimovic and 
Martinov-Bennie (2009), Houghton et al. (2013), Stuart and Prawitt (2004), Dirsmith and 
Haskins (1991). Beattie et al. (2013) asserted that the regulatory change in the UK is rife with 
rules and box ticking. In addition, the recent change in audit regulations in the UK took auditors 
away from their focus on professional judgment. Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009) and 
Houghton et al. (2013) pointed out that the legally-backed auditing standards and the revised 
auditing standards in Australia have led to the loss of auditor flexibility and judgment. Stuart and 
Prawitt (2004) and Dirsmith and Haskins (1991) indicated that more structured audit 
methodologies often reduce effectiveness and affect the auditors’ judgments. 
Due to the reforms, auditors of non-Big Four firms state that they focus more on audit 
documentation, resulting in an improvement and increase in audit documentation in these firms. 
The increase in audit documentation is also attributed to the adoption of new auditing standards. 
This result also supports the finding of Houghton et al. (2013), which showed that legal force 
auditing standards and the ASIC auditor inspection have produced a change in audit 
documentation in Australia. This finding is also in line with the expectation of Carcello et al. 
(2011). These authors expect that when the deficiencies are identified after the PCAOB 
inspections, audit firms will change their audit documentation to correct these deficiencies.  
However, in some of these non-Big Four firms, auditors still accomplish checklists of audit work 
in appearance or they do not improve their audit documentation. This result supports Salterio 
(2008)’s belief that more stringent audit documentation for the purpose of improving audit 
quality would have a tendency to reduce it since accounting firms will instruct their staff to 
diligently fill in the forms.  
While some auditors from other large audit firms mentioned the improvement and increase in 
audit documentation, others declared that there has been no change in audit documentation 
except for updating the reforms of Vietnamese revised auditing standards in their working 
papers. Other large audit firms which are members of top international audit firms do not seem to 
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have changed their audit documentation due to the reform. This supports the finding of DeFond, 
Wong and Li (1999). Their study indicated that larger audit firms that are joint-ventured with 
international audit firms were not greatly affected by the adoption of audit reforms in China. 
Such firms adhered to strict global policies prior to the adoption of the reforms. According to 
participants from Big Four firms, their audit documentation has not changed due to the reforms.  
Interviewees expressed opinions on audit quality, which are similar to those of Yanyan et al. 
(2015): audit-partner quality considerably impacts on audit engagement quality and  these 
impacts are intensified by the audit partners’ own economic incentives. Interviewees from non- 
Big Four firms mentioned an improvement in audit quality due to the audit reforms. However, 
the increase in audit quality applies mainly to the audit of public entity clients. This is in line 
with Blankley et al. (2012)’s results which indicate that a majority of audit firms confirm that 
they support the PCAOB’s objective of improving audit quality and believe that the inspection 
process results in better audit quality. This result supports the statement of DeFond (2010), 
which indicates that oversight mechanisms utilized to monitor the profession are likely to affect 
auditors’ incentives related to audit quality. However, the audit quality of some non-Big Four 
auditors has not changed since these auditors just comply with the audit reforms in appearance 
only. In contrast, interviewees from Big Four audit firms do not believe that there have been any 
changes in their audit quality as a result of audit reforms. 
Overall, the results show that the audit reforms including the higher legal force of the Law, and 
the inspection reforms and sanctions of violations, generally have not affected the audit practice 
of Big Four auditors. This finding is in contrast to that of Carcello et al. (2011), who showed that 
the PCAOB inspections resulted in an improvement in audit quality of Big Four firms. Carcello 
et al. (2011) used the change in abnormal accruals of auditees as a measure of the change in audit 
quality. However, this current study just shows the perceived impacts of the reforms on audit 
practice of these Big Four firms.  
Factors that drive the supply of audit quality include the incentives for auditors’ independence 
and competence. Audit independence incentives consist of reputation risk, litigation risk and 
regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is the threat that auditors may face sanctions including fines and 
criminal penalties. Regulation risk not only impacts on the auditors’ incentives, but also impacts 
on the auditors’ competence to supply high audit quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
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 Under the Decree No. 105/2004/ND-CP, the professional sanctions were negligible; hence, 
regulation risk was low. The litigation risk was fundamentally problematic, did not give clear 
audit firms’ liability, and was ambiguous regarding sanction procedures. Thus, before the 
introduction of the Law on External Audit, both regulation risk and litigation were extremely 
low. Thus, auditors in the pre-Law period in Vietnam did not have incentives to conduct high 
quality audit. Big Four auditors and non- Big Four auditors faced extremely low litigation risk 
and regulation risk during this period.  
When the Law was enacted, sanctions significantly improved, resulting in a higher regulation 
risk faced by auditors and audit firms. However, litigation risk has not significantly improved, 
and is still ambiguous, general and low.  
Auditors of Big Four firms are not affected by the Law since their incentives of reputation risk is 
still higher than the incentives of regulation risk. Big Four firms often have more incentives to 
provide high audit quality because of reputation risk according to Cullinan et al. (2012) and 
DeAngelo (1981). In the context of Vietnam, since the enactment of the Law, regulation risk is 
higher, but the penalties are mostly at the administrative level. The number of criminal sanctions 
of auditors and audit firms is negligible.  Previous studies by Weber et al. (2008) and Skinner 
and Srinivasan (2012) indicated that Big Four auditor reputation incentivizes high audit quality 
in low litigation jurisdictions. Thus, the reputation risk of Big Four auditors is still higher than 
regulation risk in Vietnam. Big Four auditors in Vietnam are generally not influenced by the 
increased regulation risk, particularly the reform in the Law. 
In contrast, the results show that the audit reforms including the higher legal force of the law, the 
inspection reforms and sanctions of violations have significantly influenced the audit practice of 
non-Big Four auditors. The improvement in the audit effort and audit quality of non-Big Four 
firms in the post-Law period can be attributed to the higher regulation risk, particularly stronger 
regulatory enforcement of the Law and the improvement of professional sanctions. This result is 
in line with the finding of Shimin et al. (2010) who found that the institutional change in China 
has prevented the compromising of  audit quality of economically important clients  since 
auditors have to be concerned about litigation risk and regulatory sanctions. This result is in 
contrast to that of Beattie, Fearnley, and Hines (2013), who stated that the inspection regime was 
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considered to be less effective since their research participants declared that the changed regime 
produced higher costs with limited benefits. 
The overall result also suggests that some auditors just have changed their audit practice but in 
appearance only to indicate that they are complying with the requirements of the reforms. One 
explanation for this is that some small audit firms lack sufficient resources to be able to comply 
with the reforms in the Law. This confirms the findings of Roybark (2012), Hermanson et al. 
(2007), Hermanson and Houston (2008), Pickering (2010). Roybark (2012) concluded that audit 
firms with public quality control criticisms are smaller, have fewer office branches, and 
significantly fewer audit partners and staff. Smaller audit firms do not have sufficient resources 
to address criticisms of quality control discovered by the PCAOB prior to the public disclosure. 
Hermanson et al. (2007) found that audit firms which have audit deficiencies are the smaller 
ones. Hermanson and Houston (2008) stated that the smallest, understaffed audit firms are more 
likely to struggle to address quality control deficiencies identified in the inspection reports. 
Pickering (2010) considered that small audit firms face challenges to cope with changing and 
increasingly complex legislation and regulation in comparison with large audit firms. The second 
explanation is that with non-public audit clients, that are smaller and less risky, the auditors do 
not conduct all audit procedures in accordance with auditing standards. In these cases, these 
auditors just fill in the checklist in order to demonstrate in appearance only that they have 
followed all audit procedures in order to avoid post-inspection punitive action. Hence, in these 
cases, the audit quality of these auditors does not improve. 
The general result of this study indicates that the Law introduced to correct the shortcomings in 
the audit market and audit regulatory reform in the Law has impacted on audit practice. This is in 
line with the results of Khlif and Samaha (2014), which indicated that the audit reform, the 
adoption of Egyptian Standards on Auditing seems to have notably improved audit practice. This 
also supports the findings of Ohman and Wallerstedt (2012), who concluded that that accepted 
practice has preceded audit regulation and that the laws and additional rules codified audit 
practice in Sweden.  
Institutional theorists suggest that organizations react to the pressures of their institutionalized 
environments by developing or altering their practices which enhance such organizations’ 
legitimacy in their environment (Zucker, 1987). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contended that 
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bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change appear as a result of processes that 
cause organizations to become more similar. Due to the stronger legal framework for the 
auditing sector, the reforms related to inspections and sanctions for violations are considered as 
new coercive pressures from state agencies that strive for change in audit practice. These state 
agencies are the parliament, the MOF and the SSC, who have the power of enforcement. This 
coercive pressure causes non-Big Four firms to make similar changes in their audit practice. 
These changes include greater audit effort, more stringent compliance with auditing standards of 
auditors, changes in audit documentation, and changes in audit quality. Auditors are aware of the 
more stringent inspection regime and sanction provisions. This awareness informs their actions, 
indicating the power of coercive pressures to improve their audit practice (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). The findings of this study support those of Arena et al. (2006), who concluded that the 
impacts of regulations on internal audit is stronger when regulations impose sanctions. It is clear 
that the coercive pressures from state agencies, together with the sanctions provisions, exert 
stronger pressure on audit firms to change – more so than those from the professional body 
which is a non-punitive organization. 
 However, some non-Big Four auditors under the coercive isomorphism theory just change their 
apparent audit practice rather than their actual practice. These auditors have complied with the 
Law merely in appearance. Meyer and Rowan (1977) state that decoupling occurs when actual 
organizational practice is different from the external appearance of organizations. This permits 
organizations to apparently comply with social expectations for the purpose of maintaining 
legitimacy. The result of the current study shows the difference between actual audit practice in 
some non-Big Four firms and their apparent adherence to the Law. In other words, the actual 
practices are not attached to technical aspects at all, but have a symbolic significance (Irvine, 
2008). The decoupling occurs when the actuality is different from the appearance of these audit 
firms. Their apparent practice reflects external norms expected by external constituents in the 
institutionalized environment. The image of these apparent practices are called ‘rationalized 
myths’ (Pettersen, 1995).  
Respondents from Big Four audit firms state that the audit reforms do not impact on audit 
practice. This is in line with the results obtained by Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) which 
suggest that elite organizations like Big five accounting firms become immune to coercive and 
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normative pressure since their market activities extend beyond the jurisdiction of field-level 
regulations. 
7.3 The new audit opinion requirement and audit practice 
The reform of audit opinion is stipulated in Section 48 of the Law. Firstly, under the Law, the 
Ministry of Finance shall prescribe the matters which must not be excluded in audit reports in 
accordance with auditing standards. Secondly, the state agencies, representative for the owners 
of the audited unit have rights to request the audit firms, branches of foreign audit firms in 
Vietnam and the audited unit to explain the matters excluded in the qualified audit reports. In 
terms of the first reform, due to the strong opposition of the auditing profession, MOF, only 
prescribed matters cannot be excluded in general through the application of the new auditing 
standards. Auditors applying these standards are complying with this reform. 
7.3.1 The reduction in the number of qualified audit reports  
Interviewees concurred that, due to the reforms, there is a decrease in the number of qualified 
audit opinion reports produced by auditors (According to ISA 705, the auditor will express a 
qualified opinion when:  
a) The auditor, having obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence, concludes that 
misstatements, individually or in the aggregate, are material, but not pervasive, to the financial 
statements; or 
b) The auditor is unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence on which to base the 
opinion, but the auditor concludes that the possible effects on the financial statements of 
undetected misstatements, if any, could be material but not pervasive). 
However, there is a more significant reduction in qualified audit opinion in non-Big Four firms 
than in Big Four firms. The reason is that before the introduction of the Law, some non-Big Four 
firms did not strictly execute all audit procedures before issuing qualified opinions. Non-Big 
Four auditors produced a range of qualified audit reports before the adoption of the Law. In order 
to save costs, these auditors cut their audit procedures, for instance, observing stock takes and 
sending receivable or payable confirmation letters. In some circumstances, auditors could not 
conduct these audit procedures. For example, the auditors were appointed after the last day of the 
financial year or they sent confirmation letters, but these were not returned to them. However, 
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the auditors did not conduct alternative audit procedures before issuing qualified audit opinions. 
They issued a range of qualified audit opinions which excluded inventory accounts, receivable or 
payable accounts. Recently, with the introduction of the audit reforms, the number of qualified 
audit reports has decreased significantly. The decrease mainly concerns non-Big Four auditors 
rather than Big Four auditors. According to interviewees from Big Four firms, the number of 
qualified audit reports before the enactment of the Law was small. In addition, Big Four auditors 
conducted all audit procedures before issuing qualified audit opinions. 
“This may affect local firms more…Auditors in my firm can issue qualified audit opinions, but 
we quantify the matter of concern, not as local audit firms... Auditors in these local audit firms 
produce qualified audit opinion without conducting alternative audit procedures. In Big Four 
firms, we conduct alternative audit procedures if we do not receive the confirmation letters back. 
We get all enough audit evidence to express audit opinions, and we do not issue qualified audit 
opinions if we do not get the confirmation letters back like local firms. It means that some local 
audit firms often produce qualified audit opinions since they do not conduct alternative audit 
procedures”. 
(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm I) 
The reform forces the auditors to be more responsible when issuing qualified audit opinions. In 
the past, auditors curtailed audit procedures and issue qualified audit opinions to reduce audit 
fees. This situation is limited by the reform of the Law. 
 “This provision minimizes the number of qualified audit opinions which are not appropriate. It 
constrains the circumstance that auditors produce qualified audit opinions to reduce their 
responsibilities”. 
(Manager, small audit firm G) 
 “With this new request, the number of qualified audit opinions reduces significantly…In the 
past, they produced a range of qualified audit opinions… Due to the responsibility to explain the 
matter of concern with state agencies or owners of audit clients, we have to do more”. 
(Manager 1, other large audit firm J) 
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According to some interviewees, in the past, audit clients were easy to accept the modified audit 
opinions. Recently, since the enactment of the Law, audit clients have acquired more knowledge 
about audits and qualified audit opinions. In addition, audit clients do not want to receive 
qualified audit reports as they have to explain any excepted matters to state agencies.  Hence, 
audit clients cooperate with auditors to conduct alternative audit procedures to limit the number 
of qualified audit opinions being issued. 
 “The number of qualified audit opinion has reduced…Audit clients also understand this issue. 
For instance, in the past, they easily accepted qualified audit reports. Now, audit clients also 
support auditors to conduct more audit procedures to reduce qualified audit opinions”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm F) 
 
“The MOF issued the new auditing standards which strictly prescribe the audit procedures before 
issuing qualified audit reports. This requirement is stricter, which limits the number of qualified 
audit reports significantly. When we issue qualified audit reports, we have to quantify the 
material misstatements in this kind of report”. 
(Partner, small audit firm ZA) 
According to some interviewees, the reduction in the number of qualified audit opinions among 
non-Big Four firms mainly concern public audit clients.  
 “Now we strictly monitor audit of listed firms. Hence, it impacts audit practice significantly”. 
(Representative 3, MOF) 
“With the enactment of this reform, auditors still produce qualified audit reports. The reduction 
of qualified audit reports falls mainly into engagement of public clients”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm K) 
According to the interviewees from Big Four firms, there was a reduction in the issuance of 
qualified audit opinions in their firms, but the reduction is not significant. Auditors in these firms 
strictly followed all audit procedures in accordance with auditing standards before issuing audit 
opinions. In addition, the number of qualified opinions in these firms was small before the Law 
was adopted. Due to the reforms, the only change has been that it is easier for auditors in these 
Big Four firms to convince audit clients to correct misstatements to have unqualified opinions. 
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“We convince audit clients to correct material misstatements by this requirement of the Law 
better than by my firm policy. In the past, we faced difficulties to convince audit clients to 
correct…The positive effects are that audit clients correct misstatements more quickly and 
seriously…There is a tendency that it is more favorable for us to convince audit clients to correct 
material misstatements to limit qualified audit opinions”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm A) 
A manager of a Big Four firm stated that auditors in his firm do not conduct more audit 
procedures. However, it takes more time to discuss with audit clients to convince them to correct 
misstatements. In addition, his firm does not have to incur much more cost due to the reform. 
“In my opinion, my firm does not have to incur much more cost due to the reform. The only 
thing that has changed is that we try to convince audit clients to correct material misstatements to 
have unqualified audit opinion. So the more time spent relates to meetings, discussion with audit 
clients, but is not much. We do not execute more audit procedures”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm I) 
7.3.2 More audit procedures  
Previously, a range of auditors issued qualified audit opinions since they did not complete all 
audit procedures. Auditor did not observe stock take and issued qualified audit opinion which 
excluded the inventory account, cash on hand and fixed assets, without conducting alternative 
audit procedures. They also produced qualified audit opinions with accounts receivable or 
payable without any alternative audit procedures such as not receiving back the confirmation 
letters. As for issuing qualified opinion, auditors did not explain matters of concern on the 
financial statements. Some auditors issued this kind of opinion, but in fact they were disclaimer 
opinions or adverse opinions (VACPA, 2012). 
With the enactment of the reform, auditors have to conduct more audit procedures to limit the 
number of qualified audit opinions. Auditors from non-Big Four audit firms asserted that they 
have to conduct more audit procedures due to the reforms, so as to reduce the number of 
qualified audit opinions. Auditors in these firms have to conduct all audit procedures as 
prescribed by the auditing standards before issuing audit opinions.  
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“I am sure that audit firms have to incur higher costs since we have to conduct more audit 
procedures and auditors are more responsible for their signs in the audit reports. In the past, 
auditors issued a range of qualified audit opinions which excluded the matters of concerns 
related to inventory account or payable or receivable accounts. The excluded matters account for 
a large proportion of the total asset. Now, auditors are not permitted to do like that. They have to 
conduct more audit procedures, like alternative audit procedures before issuing audit opinions, so 
the costs increase”. 
(Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
 “In the past, there were two accounts that were often excluded in qualified audit reports, 
including inventory accounts, accounts receivable or payable. Now, with the introduction of the 
Law, the qualified audit opinions with these two accounts have decreased significantly and 
auditors are forced to conduct more comprehensive audit procedures to minimize qualified audit 
opinions”. 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm P) 
However, the reforms seem to affect mainly those auditors who did not strictly follow rules and 
standards before the Law was adopted. These reforms significantly influenced the auditors’ 
practice, especially of those who tended to cut audit procedures or previously did not follow 
auditing standards. Those auditors who strictly adhered to auditing standards previously have not 
been influenced by these reforms. 
 “Exactly, it causes more costs, but just with auditors who did not follow rules and auditing 
standards in the past. With auditors who followed rules and regulations in the past, the reform 
does not affect them since they still have to do the same work as in the past”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm K) 
“This matter merely relates to the audit firms which have to balance the revenues and the costs, 
so sometimes the cut audit procedures to save costs. This reform only affects these audit firms. If 
an auditor has highly professional ethics, he or she will strictly follow all and is not impacted by 
this new requirement”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm L) 
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According to some participants, auditors now have to conduct all audit procedures before they 
consider issuing qualified audit opinions. Auditors are more diligent when they produce audit 
opinions, especially when issuing qualified audit opinions. Auditors have to consider carefully 
whether they have followed all audit procedures before issuing an audit opinion.  
“Previously, we consider that if we issue qualified audit opinion, it is safe for us since it reduces 
auditors’ responsibilities. However, it is not right… Now, we have to conduct all audit 
procedures before we decide to exclude matters of concern. So, the audit work is more…Now, 
we have to explain the matters of concern that we except. So, we have to execute all audit 
procedures and all alternative audit procedures in the auditing standards before issuing qualified 
audit opinions. It is clear that the requirement is stricter and auditors have to do more work. But 
it is right”. 
(Partner, small firm N) 
Some interviewees stated that more audit procedures need to be conducted by auditors so as to 
obtain sufficient audit evidence. They complete the work and obtain adequate audit evidence to 
enable them to explain any excepted matters. The more thorough audit procedures and the 
gathering of acceptable explanatory evidence lead to higher costs.  
“We spend more time to collect audit evidence for the explanations. If authorities require us to 
explain the matters in the audit reports, we must have enough audit evidences. It also leads 
auditors to work more, understand well the matters. So, it costs more time and money to do those 
things”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm D) 
Some of interviewees stated that the increase in audit procedures is also due to the new auditing 
standard No 705 which requires auditors to quantify the effect of the material misstatements on 
the financial statements in the modified audit opinions. Section 48 of the Law requires auditors 
to strictly follow auditing standards before issuing qualified audit opinions. Vietnamese auditing 
standard No 705 clearly stipulates that auditors have to quantify the effects of material 
misstatements. Hence, auditors have to conduct more audit procedures so as to quantify. 
 “In the past, we did not do. Now, we have to do. We have to quantify the matters that are 
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excluded. It takes more time and costs more because we have to conduct more audit procedures 
to quantify. Generally, it causes more costs”. 
(Partner, small audit firm O) 
The chief accountant of a client firm acknowledged that auditors have to conduct more audit 
procedures and complete more audit documentations due to the reform. Hence, audit clients 
cooperate well with auditors to assist them to complete their tasks. 
 “In fact, it will be better to regulate like that. So, auditors will worry more about producing 
qualified opinion and they have to follow all audit procedures according to auditing standards. It 
is a better thing…Auditees cooperate with auditors better to support them. Auditors often 
complaint about too much work they have to do, so we cooperate with them well to help them”. 
(Audit client 1) 
However, some auditors argued that auditors conduct more audit procedures mainly with public 
audit clients. With non-public audit clients, which are small and less risky, auditors just indicate 
in their audit files that they have conducted comprehensive audit procedures. Public audit clients 
are more risky since the state agencies and the general public pay more attention to their audit 
reports. The state agencies also supervise public audits more strictly. In addition, in the opinion 
of interviewees, non-public audit clients are less risky and the audit fees are often lower than 
those for public audit clients. Hence, some audit procedures are omitted. However, auditors still 
indicate in the audit files that they (apparently) have thoroughly adhered to all audit 
requirements. 
“Auditors have to conduct more audit procedures, but mainly with public audit clients. With non-
audit clients, auditors just present in audit files that they have accomplished all audit procedures 
in appearance”. 
(Partner 2, medium-sized audit firm K) 
Another reason why auditors conduct more audit procedures with public interest entities is that 
public clients are also supervised by the SSC. These audit clients also have to explain to SSC and 
MOF when they receive qualified audit reports. Hence, these clients cooperate well with auditors 
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in order to have audit procedures followed fully, so as to obtain unqualified audit reports. Other 
audit clients are not supervised by the SSC or other state agencies. Hence, these audit clients do 
not cooperate as well as do public clients. 
 “Audit of non-public clients is not monitored strictly by state agencies. Hence, these audit 
clients sometimes do not cooperate with auditors to allow these auditors to conduct more 
thorough audit procedures”.  
(Partner, small audit firm X) 
Another reason why some auditors in some non-Big Four firms, only appear to follow more audit 
procedures in order to comply with the reforms, or have not complied with the reforms, is to save 
costs. Auditors in these firms still take shortcuts of audit procedures in order to save cost.  
“I do not know whether other audit firms conduct full audit procedures or not. It may be more 
risky if some firms just complete audit procedures in appearance by filling in the forms. For 
example, they can produce a fake stock take report to prove that they observe the stocktake, but 
actually they do not”. 
(Manager 1, other large audit firm B) 
“This Law is born, which increases costs for audit firms. The cost increases but not clearly 
because sometimes they just complete audit procedures in appearance or they do not comply 
with the reforms”. 
(Senior auditor, small audit firm G) 
According to the result of the inspections of its members conducted by the VACPA in 2012, 
there were still non-compliances with the Law. Some auditors delivered qualified audit opinions, 
but did not quantify the impacts of the matters of concerns on the fiscal statements. In some 
cases, the matters of concerns pervasively affected the financial statements; however, auditors 
still issued this kind of audit opinion rather than disclaimers or adverse opinions. In addition, 
they still produce qualified audit opinions without following any alternative audit procedures if 
they did not observe stock take. This circumstance also occurred with the accounts receivable or 
payable. There are some audit opinions which are not consistent with the audit evidences. For 
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instance, auditors did not send confirmation letters of accounts receivable, but in the audit reports 
they asserted that they did not receive back sufficient confirmation letters (VACPA, 2013b). 
Auditors from Big Four audit firms stated that they do not have to conduct a greater number of 
audit procedures. However, they have to spend more time on explaining the excepted matters in 
qualified audit reports as well as meeting with audit clients and convincing them to correct 
misstatements in order to obtain unqualified audit opinions. The reason for this is that auditors in 
these firms had strictly followed the global firm policies before the reforms were introduced. The 
auditors conducted all audit procedures in accordance with auditing standards before issuing 
qualified audit opinions. 
“We always have to comply with our global firm policies, so there is no change in audit 
procedures due to the reform. This reform just makes auditors more worried as issuing qualified 
audit opinions... I do not see any influences in my firm. Actually, now the SSC requires us to 
explain a lot, it is more costly for my firm but we still accept. It is not a problem in my firm. It 
means that we have to spend more time to explain to SSC, but it does not affect our audit 
processes”. 
(Manager 1, Big Four audit firm I) 
“In my opinion, my firm does not have to incur much more cost due to the reform. The only 
thing that has changed is that we try to convince audit clients to correct material misstatements to 
have an unqualified audit opinion. So the more time spent relates to meetings, discussion with 
audit clients, but is not much. We do not execute more audit procedures”. 
(Manager 2, Big Four audit firm I) 
7.3.3 Audit quality 
A large number of participants from non-Big Four firms stated that there had been an 
improvement in audit quality due to the reforms. However, it seems that only the audit work of 
those auditors who did not comply with audit regulations and auditing standards before the Law 
was enacted improves in quality due to the reforms.  
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Conversely, all the interviewees from Big Four firms did not mention any improvement in audit 
quality in their firms as a result of the reforms. 
Non-Big Four auditors have to conduct more audit procedures and collect sufficient audit 
evidence to prevent the issuance of inaccurate qualified audit opinions, which results in an 
improvement in audit quality. In contrast, in the past, many auditors issued qualified opinions 
which excluded inventory accounts, accounts receivable or payable since they did not follow all 
audit procedures. 
 “Now, they have to sign audit contracts early to observe the stock take at the end of the fiscal 
year. Now we are not permitted to except receivable or payable accounts if we do not conduct 
receivable or payable confirmations. Actually, this reform is good, but it affects audit firms. 
Auditors have to spend more time on collecting audit evidences. They also have to execute more 
audit procedures to avoid issuing qualified audit opinions”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm H) 
 “It restricts the qualified audit opinions and increases audit quality…Auditors now cannot 
convince that because they sign the audit contract after the end day of financial year, they cannot 
observe stocktake and they will issue qualified audit reports with the inventory account. Now the 
government strictly regulates this issue, so audit firms have to stringently follow”. 
(Manager 3, Big Four audit firm A) 
 
 A manager of another large audit firm asserted that regulation is good. The authorities control 
the output of audit and audit opinions, which affects the whole audit process. Auditors have to 
conduct each audit process thoroughly so as to obtain an accurate result, which leads to an 
improvement in audit quality. The first reason is that auditors have to explain excepted matters to 
the SSC and MOF. This reform increases regulation risks faced by auditors, which encourages 
auditors to improve their independence and competence in order to improve audit quality. 
“As a practicing auditor, I recognize that it is a good way to regulate. They control the output of 
an audit engagement, the audit opinion. If you want to get good results, you have to conduct the 
whole audit processes well. The authorities control the results of audit rather than the details of 
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the audit processes… With every qualified audit opinion of public interest entity in the field of 
security, the SSC requires us to explain the excepted matters” 
(Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
The second explanation for an improvement in audit quality is that auditors face higher 
reputation risks. Due to the reforms, the company owners and representatives of shareholders 
have the right to request from auditors an explanation for any excepted matters in the audit 
reports in the annual shareholder meetings. If auditors do not conduct thorough audits, and 
cannot explain their procedures satisfactorily, their public reputation will suffer. 
 “In addition, with a public interest entity, if the auditor issue qualified opinion, the president, 
representatives of shareholders, members’ council of audit clients can question auditors to 
explain the matters at the annual shareholder meeting. It is a new point. Now, the shareholders’ 
audit knowledge is better than before. If the auditor is not deliberate when conducting audit and 
issuing opinion, he or she is questioned a lot at the meeting, which will reduce the firm’s 
reputation…Hence, audit firms have to strictly control their audit quality”. 
(Manager 2, other large audit firm B) 
“Audit quality increases…now we have to conduct more audit procedures. Now, audit clients 
cooperate with auditors better to limit issuance of qualified audit reports” 
(Partner, medium-sized audit firm K) 
However, the audit quality of some auditors has not changed; it is still as poor as it was prior to 
the introduction of the Law. This is because some auditors are complying with the Law in 
appearance only. Some small and medium audit firms cannot afford high costs and they operate 
on the principle of profit. If costs exceed revenue, small audit firms cannot comply with the 
reforms of the Law and the new auditing standards. These firms cannot increase their audit fees 
due to the nature of their clients, although the audit reforms are constraining auditors to conduct 
more audit procedures to improve audit quality. Therefore, for financial reasons, auditors are 
forced to comply in appearance only.  
In addition, with non-public audit clients, that are small and less risky, even some of the non-Big 
Four auditors do not completely follow audit procedures. These auditors just present audit 
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documents which indicate, in appearance only, that they have followed all auditing procedures.  
“I think that if we answer based on theory, it is like that.  But in fact, there are a number of audit 
firms who do not follow the Law, they just comply in appearance. I think that. At the moment, 
small audit firms do not have enough resources to cope with the reforms. They do not have 
enough human resources to establish a suitable system”. 
(Manager, medium-sized audit firm D) 
“Audit quality of non-Big Four firms increases, but only with the engagement of public clients. 
We increase audit procedures and strictly review the audit engagement of public clients”. 
(Partner 2, medium-sized audit firm K) 
7.3.4 Summary and discussion 
The reform of audit opinion is stipulated in Section 48 of the Law. Firstly, under the Law, the 
Ministry of Finance shall prescribe the information which cannot be excluded in the audit 
statement in accordance with auditing standards. Secondly, the state agencies and representatives 
of the owner of the audited unit have rights to request the auditing firms, branches of foreign 
auditing firms in Vietnam and the audited unit to explain what has been excluded in the qualified 
audit reports. In terms of the first reform, due to strong opposition from the auditing profession, 
MOF prescribed only those matters that cannot be excluded in general through the application of 
new auditing standards, and auditors applying these standards can be considered as complying 
with this reform. Audit practice is affected by these reforms as follows. 
Interviewees concurred that auditors were producing fewer qualified audit opinions due to the 
reforms. There was a more significant reduction in qualified audit opinions in non-Big Four 
firms rather than in Big Four firms. The reason is that before the Law was adopted, some non- 
Big Four firms did not strictly follow all audit procedures before issuing qualified opinions. The 
reduction in the number of qualified audit opinions in non-Big Four firms applies mainly to the 
audit of public clients. This decrease in the number of qualified audit reports being issued 
suggests that more effort is being put into the audit process. Due to the reforms, there has been a 
change in auditors’ behavior in the non-Big Four firms, particularly in terms of the audit process 
and reporting decisions.  
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This finding supports that of Myers et al. (2014) who concluded that non-Big N auditors have 
changed their audit reporting behavior significantly due to the audit reforms of SOX. This is in 
line with other studies which conclude that audit reforms affect auditor reporting behavior, 
including Gramling et al. (2011), Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama (2005), Geiger, 
Raghunandan, and Rama (2006), Fargher and Liwei (2008), DeFond, Wong, and Li (2000), Blay 
(2005).  
 According to the interviewees from the Big Four firms, there has been a reduction in qualified 
audit opinions issued by their firms, although the reduction is not significant. Auditors in these 
firms followed all audit procedures strictly in accordance with auditing standards before issuing 
audit opinions. In addition, the number of qualified opinions in these firms was small before the 
Law was introduced. Due to the reforms, the only change is that it is easier for auditors in these 
firms to convince audit clients to correct misstatements in order to receive unmodified opinions. 
The finding suggests a small change in auditors’ behaviour related to reporting decisions by Big 
Four firms. However, Myers et al. (2014) concluded that the reporting behavior of Big N audit 
firms has generally improved in response to the adoption of SOX. Big N auditors in Vietnam 
also have changed their behavior regarding reporting decisions due to the audit reform, but not 
significantly. 
Auditors of non-Big Four audit firms asserted that they have to conduct more audit procedures 
due to the reforms, so as to reduce the number of qualified audit opinions. However, the reforms 
seem to have affected only those auditors who did not strictly follow rules and standards before 
the Law was adopted. Auditors are making greater efforts to conduct more comprehensive 
auditing procedures for public audit clients. However, some auditors only appear to execute 
more thorough audit procedures with non-public audit clients in order to comply with auditing 
standards. The first reason for that is to cut costs in some small audit firms. Auditors in these 
firms still cut audit procedures to save cost, despite the reforms. The second reason is that, with 
non-public audit clients that are small and less risky, some auditors just present their audit files 
which appear to comply with audit standards, but in reality do not.  
Auditors from the Big Four audit firms state that their workload in terms of the audits themselves 
has not increased. However, they have to spend more time on explaining the excepted matters in 
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the qualified audit reports, as well as meeting with audit clients and convincing them to correct 
misstatements in order to obtain qualified audit opinions. 
A large number of participants from non-Big Four firms stated that there has been an 
improvement in audit quality due to the reform. It seems that there has been an improvement in 
the quality of the audit work of those auditors who did not comply with audit regulations and 
auditing standards before the Law was enacted. The improvement of audit quality mainly falls 
into audit of public interest entities. 
With other audit clients, in some cases, the audit quality of auditors has not changed, remains as 
poor as it was before the enactment of the Law. The major reason is that these auditors just 
appear to change in order to comply with the Law, but have not improved in reality.  
This can be explained by the fact that some small auditors do not have sufficient resources to 
comply with the Law. Some small audit firms cannot afford high costs and they operate on the 
principle of profit. If the costs exceed the revenues, small audit firms cannot comply with the 
reforms of the Law and the new auditing standards. This is in line with Pickering (2010), who 
suggested that small audit firms face challenges when complying with changing and increasingly 
complex legislation and regulation in comparison with large audit firms. 
Secondly, with non-public audit clients which are small and less risky, auditors do not follow all 
audit procedures. Auditors just present audit documents which indicate that, apparently, they 
have followed all audit procedures. 
Interviewees from Big Four firms did not report an improvement in audit quality in their firms as 
a result of the reforms. This result supports Boone et al. (2015)’s statement that  ‘Big Four’ 
implies brand name quality which exceeds the minimum imposed by professional standards. The 
finding of Boone et al. (2015) suggested that there was no evidence to show that Deloitte’s audit 
quality is different from that of other Big Four firms during a three-year window before or after 
the PCAOB censure. Big Four firms in Vietnam seem to have had greater brand name quality 
prior to the audit reform. Thus, their audit quality has not been affected by the regulatory reforms 
introduced by the Vietnamese government. 
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The audit reform associated with audit opinion in Vietnam is different from that in other 
countries. To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, other countries have not introduced audit 
reforms similar to those of Vietnam. Thus, the findings regarding the influences of these reforms 
to audit practice in Vietnam seem to be unique and interesting.  
Table 9: Responses from main interviews 
Themes or issues 
Small 
audit 
firms 
Medium 
audit 
firms 
Other 
large 
audit 
firms 
Big Four 
firms 
Regulator
s 
VACPA Auditees 
N % 
N=
7 
n % 
N=
8 
n % 
N=
11 
n % 
N=8 
n % 
N=5 
N % 
N=3 
n % 
N=3 
Reforms related to audit opinion 
Reduction in the 
number of qualified 
audit reports 
3 43 3 38 6 55 2 25 1 20 2 67 0 0 
More audit 
procedures  
7 100 8 100 9 82 1 13 1 20 2 67 1 33 
Changes in appearance 
of small auditors 
0 0 0 0 2 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Audit quality 
3 43 6 75 6 55 1 13 3 60 1 33 0 0 
Audit quality does not 
change, due to change 
in appearance of 
auditors 
1 14 1 13 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The change in sanction provisions and inspection regime 
Audit quality 
5 71 6 75 5 45 0 0 2 40 2 67 0 0 
Audit quality does not 
change, due to change 
in appearance of small 
firms 
1 14 1 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
More audit effort 
7 100 7 88 9 82 3 38 1 20 2 67 1 33 
Changes in appearance 
of small audit firms 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Audit documentation 
4 57 7 88 5 45 0 0 1 20 2 67 0 0 
Changes in appearance 
of small audit firms 
4 57 0 0 0 0 1 13 1 20 0 0 0 0 
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Table 10: Responses from follow-up interviews 
Themes or issues 
Small audit 
firms 
Medium 
audit firms 
Other large 
audit firms 
Big Four 
firms 
Regulators VACPA 
n % 
N=5 
N % 
N=12 
n % 
N=1
1 
n % 
N=2 
N % 
N=1 
n % 
N=1 
Reforms related to audit opinion 
Reduction in the 
number of 
qualified audit 
reports 
5 100 7 58 10 91 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Reduction in the 
number of qualified 
audit reports only 
with public clients 
0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
More audit 
procedures 
5 100 9 75 11 100 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Medium and large 
auditors conduct 
more audit 
procedures  only 
with public clients, 
other clients just 
change in 
appearance 
0 0 3 25 3 27 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Small auditors 
conduct more audit 
procedures in 
appearance 
2 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Audit quality 
5 100 8 67 11 100 0 0 1 100 1 100 
Medium and large 
auditors increase 
audit quality only 
with public clients 
0 0 3 25 3 27 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Audit quality of 
small auditors does 
not change, due to 
change in 
appearance of small 
firms 
2 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 
The change in sanction provisions and inspection regime           1 100 
Audit quality 
5 100 10 83 11 100 0 0 1 100 1 100 
Medium and large 
auditors increase 
audit quality only 
0 0 3 25 3 27 0 0 0 0 1 100 
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with public clients 
Audit quality of 
small auditors does 
not change, due to 
change in 
appearance of small 
firms 
2 40  0  0  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 100 
More audit effort 
5 100 12 100 11 100 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Changes in 
appearance of small 
auditors 
2 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Medium and large 
auditors put more 
audit effort  only 
with public clients, 
other clients just 
change in 
appearance 
0 0 3 25 3 27 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Audit 
documentation 
5 100 10 83 11 100 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Medium and large 
auditors enhance 
audit documentation 
only with public 
clients, other clients 
just change in 
appearance 
0 0 3 25 3 27 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Changes in 
appearance of small 
auditors 
2 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The results presented in this chapter show that the reform related to the stronger enforcement of 
the Law, which includes the sanctions and inspection regime, have significantly influenced audit 
practice in terms of audit effort, compliance with auditing standards, audit documentations, and 
audit quality. The reform associated with the issuance of audit opinions has led to a reduction in 
the number of qualified audit opinions, more thorough audit work, and a positive change in audit 
quality. However, although some firms have actually implemented changes in order to comply 
with the Law, there are still instances where compliance is in appearance only, rather than in 
reality, particularly in smaller auditing firms.  Two aspects of institutional theory, isomorphism 
and decoupling, were applied to explain these changes in audit practice. The reforms are 
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considered as new coercive pressures from state agencies that strive for change in audit practice. 
This coercive pressure causes non-Big Four firms to make similar changes in their audit practice. 
However, some non-Big Four auditors under the coercive isomorphism theory just change their 
apparent audit practice rather than their actual practice. These auditors have complied with the 
Law merely in appearance. The decoupling occurs when the actuality is different from the 
appearance of these audit firms. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This study investigated the Vietnamese government’s motivations for the introduction of the 
Law on Independent Audit and its impacts on the auditing profession after approximately four 
years of adoption. A data triangulation method is adopted, consisting of interviews, archival 
records and secondary data. Public Interest theory of regulation and Institutional theory are 
introduced in the theoretical framework and applied in the study. Public interest theory will be 
used to explain the internal motivations that led the Vietnamese government to introduce the 
Law. The concept of coercive pressure in the institutional theory will be utilized to explain how 
the factors outside the Vietnamese jurisdiction, international pressures, such as from WTO, 
ASEAN or WB shape change in the audit regulations in Vietnam by motivating the Vietnamese 
government to introduce the Law. In addition, the researcher also adopts an institutional 
framework, particularly the aspects of isomorphism, decoupling and strategic behaviors that 
organizations can adopt to react to institutional rules in order to analyze the reactions of 
accounting firms and individual auditors to the audit reforms and their changes to respond to 
these reforms. The research contributes to the auditing regulation literature, Public Interest 
theory and Institutional theory related literature in developing countries. 
This chapter commences with the summary of key findings. The research contributions and 
limitations are also presented. Suggestions for future research are recommended. 
8.2 Key findings 
This research aims to report on the perceptions of regulatory bodies, professional bodies, audit 
firms and audit clients in relation to the audit reforms in the Law on External audit after around 
four years of adoption in Vietnam. Specifically, its objectives are: 
To explore the major reasons why the Vietnamese government promulgated the Law on External 
Audit. 
To identify the audit firms’ reactions and changes in response to the audit reforms in the Law, at 
the audit firm level. 
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To investigate the impacts of the audit reforms on the audit practice, at the individual auditor 
level. 
The main findings of the study are as following. The internal motivation for the introduction of 
the Law by the Vietnamese government was to serve the public interest. The findings indicate 
that the government introduced the Law for the purpose of correcting the deficiencies of the 
previous audit regulations and rectifying the inefficiencies in the audit market. On top of the 
other main motivations, the data analysis also showed that protecting investors, state-owned 
capital and other institutions is another motivation for the enactment of the Law. The 
contribution of this study is that the findings indicate the protection of state-owned capital is also 
one of the motivations for the introduction of the Law. The Public Interest theory of regulation 
assumes that regulation is put in place for public interest. The research provides this key 
contribution of the study to the Public Interest theory related literature in emerging economies. 
In addition, the government’s external motivation was a result of the coercive pressures imposed 
by international commitments and foreign investors, lenders such as the WTO, ASEAN, WB and 
ADB. This result supports findings of previous studies in developing countries which conclude 
that  the coercive pressures of international organizations, such as the WB, IMF, ADB, WTO 
shaping accounting and auditing practices in developing countries (Ashraf and Ghani, 2005, 
Irvine, 2008, Hassan, 2008, Mir and Rahaman, 2005, Al-Omari, 2010, Judge et al., 2010, Albu et 
al., 2011) 
Furthermore, interviews with partners, managers, and senior auditors of audit firms indicate that 
small and medium-size audit firms have negatively responded to the new requirements for the 
audit of financial statements of public utility entities. In addition, almost all research participants 
believe that the new conditions for conducting audit of public interest entities have resulted in an 
increase in audit market concentration in the public audit market. 
In terms of the requirement for audit partner rotation, a number of audit firms regardless of size 
also oppose the requirement of audit partner rotation. Interestingly, most participants in the 
research concur that compliance with the audit partner rotation requirement in appearance is 
common in the Vietnamese context. The results indicate a severe compromise of audit 
independence in this country. 
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 Regarding the now-mandatory annual transparency report, interviewees believe that apart from 
large audit firms, a notable number of audit firms are reluctant to publish this kind of report. 
Therefore, a number of audit firms have tended to publish poor quality annual transparency 
reports in order to meet the minimum requirements. 
Audit firms, especially the non-Big Four firms, have made significant changes in response to the 
audit reforms. Small audit firms use mergers and increase their resources in response to the new 
regulations regarding the conditions for establishment of audit firms. Medium-sized audit firms 
also use consolidations as strategies in order to comply with the new conditions for conducting 
audits of public interest entities.  However, some of these firms change in appearance only in 
order to appear to satisfy these requirements. There are consolidations in appearance and renting 
audit certificates to meet the requirements of the reform. This is the first study that adopts the 
Oliver (1991)’s framework at the audit firm level of all firm sizes to understand and explain the 
audit firms’ responses and changes towards the audit reforms. The adoption of this framework is 
the contribution of the current study to the Institutional theory related literature. 
According to the participants, auditors’ practices have also been significantly influenced by the 
audit reforms in terms of the amount of effort being put into audit, audit reporting behaviour, 
audit documentation and audit quality. However, these audit reforms notably affected the 
practice of non-Big Four auditors rather than that of Big-Four auditors. Non-Big Four auditors 
have changed their practices in response to the audit reforms. There is a concurrence among non-
Big Four auditors regarding the increased audit workload, the enhancement in audit 
documentation, and audit quality. In addition, auditors produce fewer qualified audit reports than 
prior to the audit reforms. These changes are attributed to the change in the sanction provisions, 
the change in inspection regime, the force of law auditing standards, and the change in audit 
opinion regulation. However, a notable number of non-Big Four auditors concur that their 
changes in audit practice are mainly with the audits of pubic clients. The audit of public client is 
monitored strictly by the state agencies, the MOF and the SSC. The findings indicate that the 
influence of regulation on audit firms and auditors’ practice is heavier when regulations impose 
tougher sanctions. With audit of public interest entities, the audit practice changes more 
significantly than audit of other clients. 
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A number of auditors confirm that the audit practice of other clients does not change in reality. 
Auditors merely change their practice in appearance with other audit clients to fulfil the 
regulations. The explanation is that audit of other clients is not as strictly monitored as is that of 
public clients.  
8.3 Contributions 
This study contributes to the auditing regulation literature. It offers detailed insights into the 
audit reforms, the motivations for the introduction of audit reforms, the influence of audit 
reforms on audit firms and auditors’ practice in a developing country. A range of studies on audit 
reforms has been conducted in developed countries and China rather than in other developing 
countries (Hecimovic & Martinov-Bennie, 2009, Houghton, Kend, & Jubb, 2013, Engebretson, 
2006, Brooks, Chalmers, Oliver, and Veljanovski, 2011, Kend, 2004, Zhu and Sun, 2012, 
DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999). This thesis offers useful insights about the current audit reforms 
in Vietnam that have not been published in the international auditing literature. In addition, the 
audit market in Vietnam is still developing, with a history of around twenty-five years. Hence, 
this thesis contributes to the literature on audit regulations in emerging economies and would be 
a helpful reference for future auditing research in Vietnam (Pham et al., 2014). 
In addition, most studies on audit reforms have been conducted by using quantitative methods 
rather than qualitative methods (Benjamin and Ulrike, 2012, DeFond and Lennox, 2011, Zhu and 
Sun, 2012, DeFond et al., 1999, Hossain, 2013, Wong, 2006). Previous studies, such as 
Engebretson (2006), Brooks et al. (2011), and Wong (2006) use a survey method but do not 
provide an in-depth understanding about the subject matter. Studies using a qualitative method, 
interview, for example Hecimovic and Martinov-Bennie (2009) and Houghton et al. (2013) have 
smaller numbers of participants. The current study is unique. It is a qualitative study using a 
triangulation method for data collection, including interviews, archival records and secondary 
data to investigate the audit reforms in Vietnam. Seventy semi-structured face-to-face interviews 
were conducted. 
This thesis adopts the Oliver (1991)’s framework to identify the reactions and changes in 
response to the audit reforms in the external audit firms context in Vietnam. Previous studies 
such as Albu, Albu, and Alexander (2014) use the Oliver (1991) framework in the accounting 
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context to illustrate how practices vary with regard to the adoption of IFRS. Shapiro and Matson 
(2008) adopt the institutional concept of power, resistance to study the internal control 
regulation. Auditing studies such as that of Lander et al. (2013) examine how audit firms address 
changes in their institutional environment, but focus only on mid-tier audit firms. Mark Dirsmith, 
Heian, and Covaleski (1997)’s study focuses on Big 6 firms. The current study is the first study 
that adopts the Oliver (1991)’s framework at the audit firm level of all sizes to understand and 
explain the audit firms’ responses and changes towards the audit reforms. The adoption of this 
framework is the contribution of the current study to the Institutional theory related literature. 
The findings indicate that a number of auditors merely change their practice to comply with the 
new audit regulations in appearance rather than in reality. This finding confirms the decoupling 
aspect of Institutional theory in the context of a developing country. This is one of the few 
studies that utilize the decoupling aspect of Institutional theory in the auditing field.  
In terms of the contribution to Public Interest theory of regulation, the government provided the 
story that they introduced the Law to fix the deficiencies of previous audit regulations, to fix the 
flaws in the audit market by enhancing audit quality and protect investors. However, the study 
finds that additionally, there is another motivation, such as to protect the state-owned capital. 
In terms of practical contribution, the results also have implications for audit firms in terms of 
their future strategies in the audit market. Non-Big Four firms are significantly affected by the 
audit reforms rather than Big Four firms. According to participants, large audit firms have better 
advantages and more market share than medium and small audit firms in the public audit market. 
In addition, since the introduction of the audit reforms, public audit clients are likely appoint 
auditors from large firms. The results also show that there is a common trend of mergers between 
audit firms after the enactment of audit reforms. However, the interviewees assert that there are 
difficulties facing audit firms as they consolidate. The results of the current study are interest of 
audit firms which consider consolidations in the future. 
Furthermore, the results show that a number of audit firms and auditors merely comply with the 
audit reforms in appearance. The results have implication for the professional body, the VACPA 
in supporting their audit firm members to comply with the audit reforms 
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8.4 Limitations 
This study has several limitations. Firstly, the sample size of the respondents is not large and the 
number of audit firms involved in this study is not substantial. The interviewees may not be fully 
representative of the regulatory bodies, professional bodies, audit firms, audit clients.  Hence, the 
results may not be generalizable to other audit firms and auditors. 
Secondly, it is difficult to isolate the impacts of audit reforms in the Law and the introductions of 
the new auditing standards with the new audit methodology on the auditors’ practice. The 
reforms in the Law and the new auditing standards go hand in hand. In addition, the introduction 
of the audit reforms in the Law was at the same time as the introduction of the new auditing 
standards. 
Thirdly, this study investigates the short-term impacts of the audit reforms on audit firms and 
auditors’ practice. The Law on Independent Audit has taken effect since 1st, January, 2012. The 
interview data was collected in 2014, 2015 and 2016. The findings merely present the influence 
of the audit reforms on audit firms and auditors’ practice after around four years of its adoption. 
8.5 Future research recommendations. 
This research aims to fill the gap in the audit regulation literature and Institutional theory related 
literature. This study is an exploratory research, investigating the issues that were little known 
before. Future research should use the survey approach to test the themes that emerged from this 
study. Other methods such as observations in audit firms are also encouraged. 
The findings of this research should be understood in the context of the short term of the 
adoption of the audit reforms. Future research should investigate the longer term impact of the 
audit reforms. 
This study merely examines impacts of several audit reforms in the Law. Future research should 
consider the impacts of other aspects of audit reforms, such as the change in the conditions to 
becoming practicing auditors, the adoption of the new auditing standards. 
The interview participants come from merely two cities including Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City. 
Future research should extend the participants in various locations in Vietnam for the purpose of 
generalization of the findings. 
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There are consequences of audit market concentration, like limited choice, higher audit fees, the 
change in audit quality and audit reputation. These issues are not in the scope of this research. 
Future research should investigate the influence of audit market concentration on audit fee and 
audit quality. 
The current study does not identify the impacts of the audit reforms on audit fees and retention of 
audit professionals. Future research should examine the change in audit fees and the retention of 
audit professionals as a result of audit reforms. 
The findings of the study indicate that the reforms related to inspection regime, sanction 
provisions and the new requirement for audit opinion affect audit quality of non-Big Four 
auditors significantly. However, the definition of audit quality in the current study is consistent 
with Yanyan et al. (2015)’s definition. According to Yanyan et al. (2015), audit-partner quality 
considerably impacts on audit engagement quality. Future research should investigate the impact 
of the audit reforms on audit quality by using different proxies of audit quality. 
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Appendix 1: Interview questions for pilot interviews 
1. What are the Vietnamese government’s motivations in enacting the Law? 
2. What are the main impacts of the Law on audit practice? 
3. What are the major costs and benefits of adoption the Law? 
4. Before 2012, auditors were required by the Decree 105 to comply with auditing standards 
when conducting audits. Now, auditors are required by the Law to comply with auditing 
standards. What are the main impacts of the force of law auditing standards on audit 
practice? 
5. To what extent, are external auditors becoming prescriptive as they have to comply with 
the auditing standards under the Law? Does the checklist of work which has to be done 
according to auditing standards remove auditors’ exercise of professional judgement? 
6. Is three years appropriated for the duration of audit partner rotation of lead auditors for 
every audit client? 
7. Is five years appropriate for the duration of audit partner rotation of participating auditors 
in public interest entities or is it too costly in terms of creating inefficiencies in some 
instances? How do firms manage the partner rotation requirements while maintaining 
partner satisfaction and audit quality? 
8. How does the reform on audit opinion (the Ministry of Finance prescribes the contents 
which are not entitled to except in the audit report according to the Law) impact audit 
practice? 
9. What are the major costs and benefits of the reform on audit opinion? 
 
Appendix 2: Interview questions of main interviews 
RQ1: What are the Vietnamese government’s motivations for the introduction of 
the Law? 
- What were the government’s purposes for introducing the Law?  
- Did the government introduce the Law for the public interest or/and due to pressures 
from outside? 
RQ2: How do accounting firms react to major reforms in the Law? What are the 
changes in accounting firms in response to the major audit reforms? 
- What are the audit reforms that influence audit firms significantly? What are changes 
in audit firms and audit markets due to these reforms?  
- How does the change in the conditions for granting certificates to carry on business of 
audit service (the number of practicing auditors and legal capital) affect audit firms in 
Vietnam? 
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- How does the change in the condition for conducting audit of public interest entities 
affect audit firms and audit market in Vietnam? 
- Is three- year appropriate for the duration of lead audit partner rotation? Is five-year 
appropriate for the duration of participating auditor rotation in the public interest 
entities? Does audit partner rotation result in any inefficiency in audit? 
- Are annual transparency reports useful? How do accounting firms respond to the 
annual transparency report requirement? What are audit firms’ strategies towards the 
audit reforms? 
RQ3: How do major audit reforms impact on audit practice? 
- How do the higher legal force of the Law and the sanction provisions in the Decree 
105/2013/ND-CP affect audit practice? How does the change in the inspection regime 
impact on audit practice? 
- Do the auditing standards established by the force of law and the checklist of 
inspections influence professional judgments?  
- How do the changes in the requirement for audit opinion (Point 2 and 3, article 48 in 
the Law) impact on audit practice?  
 
Appendix 3: Interview Protocol 
 
Introductory Stage (3 minutes) 
 
Interviewer:   
 
1. Introductions     
 - Participants would already have received a letter outlining the purpose of the project  
 
2. Ethical issues  
- Collect consent form, survey 
- Confidentiality, recording 
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3. Structure  
- Participants would have received a copy of the interview questions.  
 
Step 1 – In-depth Questions 1 to 12 (60mins) 
 
1 Group 1: Government’s motivations of enacting the Law 
 Main questions: 
What were the government’s purposes for introducing the Law?  
Did the government introduce the Law for the public interest or/and due to outside 
pressures? 
Examples of follow-up questions: 
The Vietnamese audit market had a range of shortcomings. Did the Vietnamese 
government pass the Law to rectify shortcomings in the audit market and to maximize 
public welfare? 
The Law was introduced to have stronger legal force? 
The Law was introduced for the purpose of having a more stringent auditing legal 
framework? 
Foreign investors put pressures on the government to introduce the Law? They want 
more transparent financial information? 
Are there any other motivations? 
The Law was introduced to protect investors? 
You have said that the Law was introduced to improve audit quality and protect state-
own capital, haven’t you? 
What are the main purposes of the requirement for publishing annual transparency 
reports? 
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The reason is the deficiencies of the previous audit regulations? 
Do you mean that the Decree is not clear and detailed enough? 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Group 2: The impacts of the Law on audit firms 
 Main questions: 
What are the audit reforms that significantly influence audit firms? What are changes 
in audit firms and audit markets due to these reforms? 
Examples of follow-up questions: 
What are audit firms’ strategies in response to the audit reforms? 
Are there any changes in Big Four firms? 
Are there any big changes in your firm? 
Has the strategy for selecting audit clients changed? 
 
 Main questions: 
How does the change in the conditions for granting certificates to carry on business of 
audit service (the number of practicing auditors and legal capital) affect audit firms in 
Vietnam? 
Examples of follow-up questions: 
Does this audit reform affect the competition in the audit market? 
You have said that some small audit firms merged in appearance only haven’t you? 
 
 Main questions: 
How does the change in the condition for conducting audit of public interest entities 
affect audit firms and the audit market in Vietnam? 
Examples of follow-up questions: 
Does the reform impact on big audit firms like your firm? 
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Do big audit firms get more benefits due to the reform? 
Does this audit reform affect the competition in the audit market? 
 
 
 Main question: 
Is three-year duration appropriate for lead audit partner rotation? Is a five-year 
duration more appropriate for participating auditor rotation in the public interest 
entities? Does audit partner rotation result in any auditing inefficiencies? 
Examples of follow-up questions: 
With big and complicated audit clients, you stated that a three-year term is too short. 
Can you explain this further? 
 
 
 
 
 Main question: 
Are annual transparency reports useful? How do accounting firms respond to the 
annual transparency report requirement? 
Examples of follow-up questions: 
Do annual transparency reports provide audit clients with more information about 
audit firms? 
Do annual transparency reports enhance the choices of audit clients? 
You have said that small and medium audit firms are reluctant to publish this kind of 
report, haven’t you? 
 
 
3 Group 3: The impacts of the Law on audit practice 
 Main question: 
How do the higher legal force of the Law and the sanction provisions in the Decree 
105/2013/ND-CP impact audit practice? How do the change in the inspection regime 
impact audit practice? 
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Examples of follow-up questions: 
Are auditors more responsible for their audit work? 
You have said that auditors in large audit firms are not significantly affected by the 
audit reforms, haven’t you? 
You have said that you have just completed audit documentation in appearance to meet 
the checklist? 
Do auditors from your Big Four firm have to conduct more audit work and enhance 
audit documentation due to the reforms? 
Has audit quality been enhanced or not? 
Do the reforms impact on Big Four auditors’ practice? 
You said that these reforms impact on local audit firms rather than Big Four audit 
firms, didn’t you? 
 Main question: 
To what extent, if at all, are external audits becoming too prescriptive as a result of 
the force of law auditing standards and the checklist of inspections?  
Examples of follow-up questions: 
Do the force of law auditing standards and the checklist of inspections influence 
professional judgment? 
You said that these reforms impact positively on the professional judgment didn’t you? 
 
 Main question: 
How do the changes in the requirement for audit opinion (Point 2 and 3, article 48 in 
the Law) impact on audit practice?  
Examples of follow-up questions: 
Has the audit quality of small audit firms been enhanced? 
You have said that there has been a reduction in the number of qualified audit reports, 
haven’t you? 
Do you have to undertake more audit work due to the reform? 
Does the reform impact on local audit firms rather than Big Four firms? 
To what extent does the reform impact on your practice? 
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Would you agree that Big Four auditors like you are not affected much since you 
thoroughly followed audit procedures before the introduction of the Law? 
Does this reform merely affect the auditors who did not comply with auditing 
standards and rules before the introduction of the Law? 
  
Interviewer:        The interviewer leaves a business card and gift 
                  Thank participant (2 minutes)   
 
Appendix 4: Interview questions (follow-up interviews) 
Do you believe that the purpose of introducing the Law was to correct the flaws in the audit 
market and enhance public trust in audit results? 
The Law was introduced to meet the commitment of Vietnam to international organizations such 
as WTO and ASEAN in the integration process. The Law was also introduced due to the 
pressure from foreign investors and lenders. Do you agree with these statements? 
Do you think that small audit firms have merged or acquired resources to meet the new 
requirement of establishing and running audit service businesses? To what extent do you believe 
that small audit firms have outwardly changed to meet this requirement (renting audit 
certificates, apparent mergers)? 
Are small and medium audit firms opposed to the new requirement of conducting audits of 
public interest entities? Do they merge to fulfill this requirement? 
To what extent, if at all, is there sufficient competition in the public audit market? 
Is a three-year duration of lead audit partner rotation appropriate? Is a five-year duration 
appropriate for participating auditor rotation in the public interest entities? Does audit partner 
rotation result in any auditing inefficiencies? 
Are transparent, annual reports useful? Are audit firms reluctant to publish transparent, annual 
reports? 
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Do the stronger legal force of the Law, the sanction provisions in the Decree 105/2013/ND-CP, 
and the change in the inspection regime impact on auditors’ efforts? Do these changes influence 
audit documentation? Do auditors follow auditing standards more stringently due to these 
changes? Do you believe that these changes enhance audit quality? 
Do the force of law auditing standards and the checklist of inspections affect professional 
judgments? 
Do the changes in the requirement for audit opinion (Point 2 and 3, Section 48 in the Law) 
influence auditors’ reporting behaviors? Do auditors have to conduct more audit procedures due 
to the changes? Do the changes improve audit quality? 
 
Appendix 5: The list of codes 
Code 
number 
Code name Example of material coded 
1 Low level  “At the Decree level, we cannot address these 
issues, so we have to upgrade the Decree to the 
Law”.  
2 General articles  “The Decree 105/2004/ND-CP was so general, so 
we finished inspections of audit firms but there 
were no grounds for sanctioning”. 
4 Loose audit regulations “Provisions associated with the prohibited actions, 
rights and duties of auditors, audit firms and audit 
clients were loose and not clear”. 
5 Incomplete contents  “Even the no minimum capital requirements for 
limited liability audit firms in the Decree also 
caused problems in the compensation for damages 
for audit clients”. 
6 Out-of-date audit regulations  “The promulgation of the Law on Enterprises 2005 
has made some provisions in the Decree 
105/2004/ND-CP and Circulars guiding standards 
       290   
and conditions for the establishment and operation 
of audit firms obsolete legal force”. 
7 Conflicting with regulations in 
other fields 
“The Circular 60/2006/TT-BTC date 28/06/2006 
under the Decree 105/2004/ND-CP prescribed the 
conditions for establishing and operating audit 
firms… However, according to the Law on 
Enterprises 2005, this Circular became ineffective 
since the Law on Enterprises 2005 was enacted”. 
8 Ineffective inspections of audit 
firms  
“The VACPA faced difficulties to complete its 
obligation due to the insufficient resources, did not 
act so professionally, independently. The 
inspection of VACPA was considered as non-
punitive, which did not deter audit firms and 
auditors from violating auditing standards and 
rules”. 
9 More stringent audit regulation 
framework 
 
“Formerly, audit companies also could register to 
sell plane tickets, for example. Now, the Law 
expels these services. Now, practicing auditors 
have to work full-time in audit firms, not part-time 
as before”. 
10 Detailed sanction provisions “There are sanctions, the Decree 105/2013/ND-CP 
under the Law with clear sanctions, more specific 
than the Decree 105/2004/ND-CP”. 
11 The highest legal document “In the past, we just had the Decrees. Now, we 
build the Law to have higher legal force” 
12 More complete contents “The Law contains the comprehensive principles of 
external audit”. 
 
13 Enhancing the role of stage 
agencies  
“The Law will heighten the role of regulatory 
bodies in awarding CPA certificates, registration of 
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practicing auditors, management of practicing 
auditors, conducting inspections of audit firms”. 
14 Fixing the conflicts with other 
laws 
“Other fields and auditing profession are controlled 
by laws, which do not cause contradiction”. 
15 Small audit market “Even though some companies were mandatory 
auditees, they did not appoint auditors to conduct 
audit of their fiscal statements”. 
16 Low audit quality “The audit quality did not meet the requirement in 
the integration process”. 
17 Renting audit certificates  “There were auditors who registered to become 
practicing auditors, but actually not work in audit 
firms and sign in audit reports. These auditors lent 
their audit certificates”. 
18 Unfair in the audit market by 
cutting audit procedures 
“Auditors issued qualified audit reports by cutting 
audit procedures to save costs”. 
19 Extending the compulsory audit 
clients 
“The Law needed to be issued to extend mandatory 
audit clients”. 
20 Increasing audit quality “The final purpose of introducing the Law is to 
enhance audit quality”. 
21 Protecting investors, users, 
state-owned capital 
“The enactment of the Law on Independent Audit 
purposes to improve legal effectiveness and 
efficiency of State management of external 
auditing activities so as to ensure the interests of 
investors, the State and relevant organizations”. 
22 The lack of provisions related 
to international practices 
“The Decree did not fully define the conditions for 
establishment and operation of branches of foreign 
auditing firms in Vietnam, the joint venture, the 
cooperation between the local auditing firms or 
between foreign audit firms with Vietnamese 
auditing firms”. 
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23 Complying with international 
commitments  
“The Law corrects the deficiencies of the Decree to 
meet these international commitments in the 
integration processes”. 
24 Pressure of foreign investors, 
lenders 
“Actually, everywhere there was a desire for 
transparency. I also understand that there was 
pressure from foreign Investors, then from 
overseas lenders”. 
25 Actual mergers between small 
audit firms 
“There is a merger trend to meet the conditions of 
number of practicing auditors in the Law and to 
strengthen, improve competitive capacity of these 
small firms”. 
26 Mergers in appearance  “Small firms consolidate, but in appearance of 
ownership. Their audit activities are till 
independent. They have merely changed their 
outlooks to comply with the Law”. 
27 Hiring more practicing auditors  “If small audit firms want to continue operating, 
they have to increase the number of practicing 
auditors in their firms”. 
28 Sending staff to study to get 
audit certificates 
“These firms have sent their staff to study to get 
audit certificates”. 
29 Renting audit certificates “Although they have five practicing auditors in 
appearance to operate, the number of practicing 
auditors who actually work in the audit firm is less 
than five, may be just two”. 
30 Establishing branches of audit 
firms 
“Now, they do not establish new audit firms, but 
they establish the new branches of the old audit 
firm. There is an extraordinary story in Vietnam. 
Normally, in the past, a branch of audit firm is not 
located in the same city as the head office. Now, 
there are audit firms that have branches in the same 
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area”. 
31 Actual mergers between 
medium audit firms 
“The Circular 183 regulating audit of the public 
interest entities, so the medium accounting firms 
cannot meet the requirements of this Circular. 
Thus, they have to combine together in order to be 
qualified”. 
32 Difficulties facing audit firms 
when merging 
“But actually for the Vietnamese people, 
consolidation is not simple. Because horizontal 
mergers are what people fear the most, in human 
relations between auditors. Auditors have to know 
how to cooperate with each other, have the same 
perspective, attitudes and processes to drive the 
new firm and to improve the audit quality”. 
33 Advantages of large audit firms  “I think larger audit firms have more advantages in 
the audit market. You image that the audit market 
is a cake. If small audit firms do not get the cake, 
the large audit firms will get it. The audit clients 
move from smaller audit firms to large audit 
firms”. 
35 Difficulties facing smaller audit 
firms 
“So, it affects considerably medium audit firms. 
These firms lose the revenues from audit of public 
interest entities” 
“Some small audit firms have few practicing 
auditors. Rotating off after three consecutive years 
creates difficulties for small audit firms to assign 
leading auditors. Especially with the audit of large 
and sophisticated clients, it is difficult to find 
people capable, qualified to be lead auditor.” 
36 An increase in barrier to enter 
the public audit market 
“The enactment of this Circular constrains small 
and medium firms participating in this market”. 
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37 The request for changing the 
Circular 183/2013/TT-BTC 
“The Circular183 is also a major problem that 
companies are discussed and they are asking 
VACPA to request MOF and SSC to change the 
effective time”. 
38 The weakness of the Circular 
183/2013/TT-BTC 
“The problem in this Circular is that it requires the 
minimum number of audit clients, which violates 
the independence principle. If an audit firm wants 
to keep 200 audit clients, this firm has to spoil its 
clients. They have to issue unqualified audit 
opinions despite the fact that there are 
misstatements”. 
39 Supporting large audit firms “We questioned whether large audit firms lobbied 
to introduce the reform. Smaller audit firms are 
forced to be out of the public market”. 
40 Affecting relationships with 
audit clients 
“Actually; three-year audit partner rotation causes 
troubles. Indeed, audit clients do not want to spend 
time with a new auditor, they are not comfortable 
and not sure that the new auditor is as good as the 
old one. They dislike that and very few audit 
clients say that they are comfortable or changing 
auditors to have new mindset”. 
41 Differences between 
Vietnamese requirements and 
international requirements 
“With public interest entities, other practicing 
auditors have to rotate off after four years. 
International requirement of audit partner rotation 
is seven years. But we do not refer to the time of 
cooling off.  International requirement is two- year 
cooling off”. 
42 Ineffectiveness with large and 
complex audit clients 
“I think with big and complicated audit clients, it 
takes at least three years to understand these clients 
comprehensively. So, with big and complex audit 
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clients, three-year of audit partner rotation is too 
short. I think five-year is appropriate, but six-year 
is too long”. 
43 Close relationship in 
Vietnamese culture 
“I think this requirement is suitable because 
actually in Vietnam, the professional ethics is not 
good, particularly audit independence. Vietnamese 
auditors in non-big 4 firms often have close 
relationships with audit clients. After almost 3 
years, the audit independence is eroded”. 
44 Fresh eyes “The new auditor can find issues that the old one 
did not detect. So, the change of leading auditor 
brings fresh eyes. It is a benefit”. 
45 Reviewing previous audit 
documentation 
“In audit firms, we have audit files. We store all 
information related to audit clients in audit files. 
So, the new auditor can get information of audit 
clients quickly from the audit files”.  
46 Transferring knowledge 
between auditors 
“In my opinion, it is okay. Because we just change 
audit partners in the same audit firm, people in the 
firm can transfer and exchange information with 
each other, exchange 100%. Only if we require to 
change audit firms, that is a problem. If the audit 
firm’s policy is good, auditors can completely 
exchange information, the significant information”. 
47 Involvements of other team 
members  
“We just change the leading auditor and other 
auditors still involve in the engagement. It is not a 
problem. If no old team member involves, it is a 
problem”. 
48 Compliance in appearance “Large accounting firms do not have any 
difficulties in the audit partner rotation. But small 
accounting firms, auditors have to shake hands to 
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sign for each other. That's their way to cope with 
audit partner rotation in appearance”. 
49 Non- compliance  “There are many audit firms on the list of approved 
audit firms of public interest entities audit, but they 
have not issued their transparency reports. There is 
rule on that, but they still do not follow. Audit 
firms do not see the role of these reports with audit 
clients”. 
50 Low quality transparency 
reports 
“Surely, we must follow the world’s trend. To 
make foreign people believe in local audit firms, it 
forces audit firms to reveal transparency report. 
However, audit firms still hesitate to disclose their 
information; they do not show much information… 
Our transparency reports still contain poor 
information and are not as good as those in other 
countries” 
51 Fulfilling minimum 
requirements 
“You still do not know much information. In these 
transparency reports, they disclose the same 
information as on their websites” 
52 Small actual effects “The SSC does not have enough people to monitor 
this rule. They are lack of human resources. This 
rule is good, but its actual implementation is still 
very limited” 
53 Lenient supervisions “However, this provision has no monitoring 
mechanism. I mean that the Law contains this rule 
but the authority still has not given the mechanism 
to monitor, punish the violation. I've never seen 
audit firms sanctioned since they did not publish 
transparency report on their websites or they did 
not disclose full information required”. 
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58 Reduction in the number of 
qualified audit reports 
“With this new request, the number of qualified 
audit opinions reduces significantly…In the past, 
they produced a range of qualified audit opinions”. 
59 More audit procedures  “They have to conduct more audit procedures, like 
alternative audit procedures before issuing audit 
pinions, so the costs increase”. 
60 Higher audit quality “I think the benefits that we can see clearly are that 
audit quality in audit firms is enhanced”. 
61 Unchanged audit quality  “Big audit firms can comply with regulations, but 
small audit firms may not, in the Vietnamese 
circumstance”. 
 
63 Being more responsible for 
audit work 
It gives the clear penalties, so auditors have to be 
more diligent as conducting their jobs.  Auditors 
are more aware of their work and have higher 
responsibility for their work than before.  
 
64 More stringent following 
auditing standards 
“Now, under the requirement of the VACPA and 
the Law, each audit firm has its own audit program 
to guide its auditors to follow. Auditors tend to 
follow the audit programs and auditing standards 
more strictly”. 
 
65 The force of law auditing 
standards and professional 
judgment 
“Because we have to do too many procedures 
according to the checklists, the time spent on 
professional judgment is reduced”. 
66 An increase in audit 
documentation 
“Previously, we conducted our audit procedures, 
but we did not fully document. Now, we have to do 
it”. 
67 An improvement in audit “It is better for our work; our work is documented 
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documentation more logically and reasonably. Auditors have to 
present and note issues more clearly on audit 
files.... Not as in the past, we did not pay attention 
to audit documentation”. 
68 The adoption of new auditing 
standards 
“It is clear that there are more audit procedures in 
the new auditing standards. There are more audit 
procedures in comparison with the old auditing 
standards”.  
 
69 Changes in appearance “It was just filling in the forms in appearance to 
follow the model of audit files.”  
 
 
Appendix 6: List of themes and subthemes 
 
Code 
number 
Sub-themes or issues Themes or issues Research 
question 
1; 2; 4; 5; 
6; 7; 8 
Deficiencies of previous audit 
regulations 
Fixing the inefficiencies in the 
audit market and enhancing 
public trust 
Research 
question 1 
15,16; 17; 
18 
Inefficiencies of the audit market 
9; 10; 11; 
12; 13; 14;  
Correcting the deficiencies of 
previous audit regulations 
19; 20; 21;  Rectifying the inefficiencies of the 
audit market 
15; 19; 22; 
23 
Fulfilling the international 
commitments 
External pressures 
24 Pressure of foreign lenders, 
investors  
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25; 32 Mergers between small audit firms Small audit firms’ responses to 
the new condition for operating 
audit firms 
Research 
question 2 27; 28 Raising resources of small audit 
firms 
26; 29; 30 Changes in appearance of small 
audit firms 
33; 35; 36; 
37; 38 
Opposition of small and medium 
audit firms to the Circular 
183/2013/TT-BTC 
Small and medium audit firms’ 
responses to the Circular 
183/2013/TT-BTC 
31; 32 Mergers between medium audit 
firms 
33; 35; 36; 
39 
An increase in audit market 
concentration 
Audit market concentration 
35; 40; 41; 
42 
Sympathy with the current 
requirement of audit partner 
rotation 
Audit firms’ responses to the 
audit partner rotation 
requirements 
43; 44; 45; 
46; 47 
Opposition to the current 
requirement of audit partner 
rotation 
48; 35 Compliance with audit partner 
rotation requirements in 
appearance 
49; 50; 51; 
52; 53;  
 Reluctance of audit firms to 
publish annual transparent reports 
58 Reduction in the number of 
qualified audit reports 
The changes in auditors’ practice 
as a result of the new requirement 
for audit opinion 
Research 
question 3 
59; 69 More audit procedures  
60; 61; 69 Audit quality 
60; 61; 69 Audit quality The changes in auditors’ practice 
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59; 63; 64; 
65; 68; 69 
More audit effort in response to the stronger legal 
force, the sanction provision and 
the new inspection regime 66; 67; 68; 
69 
Audit documentation 
 
